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No. I. LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHBR. 

By Huoh James Ro-:e, B.D. 

Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge. 

THE LATER DAYS OF THE JEWISH POLITY: 

tvith a copious Introduction and Notes (chiefly derived from the Tal- 

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the Language, the Manners, and general Illstorv 

of the New Testament. 

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HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN IRELAND. 

By C. R. Elrington, D.D. 

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HISTORY OF THE REFORMED RELIGION IN FRANCE. 

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ILLUSTRATIONS OF EASTERN MANT^RS, SCRIP! ITRAL . 
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Autbor of " Arminianisai and Calviois'v d'oipared." 



I ^UIRIES CONCERNING THE INTELLEC- 
TUAL POWERS, AND THE INVESTIGA- 
TION OF TRUTH. By John AbercroiMbie, M.D. 

F.R.S.E., Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, 
and First Physician to His Majesty in Scotland. 



"In the execution of this plan, Dr. Abercrombie brings to his sub- 
ject a mind thoroughly versed in its details, and habituated to this spe- 
cies of abstract inquiry. His descriptions of the mental phenomena are 
clear and precise, and his reasonings perspicuous and sound. He never 
seeks to surprise us by the ingenuity, or to startle us by the novelty of 
his doctrines ; but he directs all his force against the most prominent 
difficulties of his subject, and never quits his position till the reader is 
intrenched in its strongholds. The style of the work merits equal 
praise. It is simple and unambitious, without being devoid of ornament 
or power; and on those occasions especially when the author touches 
on the great questions of faith and hope, it rises info an eloquence which 
never fails to reach the heart. 'J'he manner, indeed, in which he points 
out the practical application of his subject to the interesting topics of 
education, morality, and religion, gives a charm to this volume, which 
we look for in vain in similar works. The doctrines of the Christian 
faith are never unnecessarily obtruded upon the reader's attention, but 
are always referred to as truths which challenge the most rigid scrutiny, 
and are secure of the best reception when they are examined by minds 
the best regulated and possessed of the highest powers. — On these 
grounds, we consider Dr. Aberchombie's volume equally useful to the 
young men of all professions, and as a work whi^h may be perused with 
advantage even by those who have discovered the last and the most pre- 
■cious application of all our knowledge."— Quarterly Review. 

"The whole is executed with great ability, and in a manner corres- 
ponding to the latest improvements of the science. We entertain no 
doubt of its becoming a popular book. And we can assure our fair 
readers, if any such have honoured us with peru.sal, that, under such a 
master even they may now study ?netaphysics without danger of incur- 
ring what has been esteemed " the odious epithet" of bas-bltu. The 
whole is well digested and easily apprehended, requiring, in general, no 
dangerous knittings of the brow.'* — Presbyterian Review. 

"Among Christian physicians, we are happy to class the author of 
the volume before us ; who, after the publication of various important 
works in medicine, which have been received with much applause by 
the physicians of the Continent as well as of this country, has turned 
his attention to metaphysical subjects, and to inquiries into the intel- 
lectual powers. He does not, like too many metaphysical writers, spend 
much of his work on disputed topics, or in supporting any particular 
theory of morals; but stating what appears to him to be legitimate de- 
ductions from acknowledged facts, he has succeeded in giving a perspi- 
cuous summary of what Dr. Chalmers, in his lectures, calls the ortho- 
dox system of moral philosophy, or that which is admitted by Mr. 
Stewart, and the best writers of his school. This work supplies, in 
metaphysical and moral science, what the progress and accumulation 
of discovery had rendered a desideratum in most of the departments of 
knowledge."— CAri^fian Instructor. 



Abercromhie on the Intellectual Powers. 

*' Now this is precisely the good office which, in our estimation, Dr. 
A. has actually rendered to the disciples of that science of which he ia 
himself so distinguished an ornament. In the very moderate compass 
of one volume, he has placed within the reach of the student as much 
sound metaphysical lore as any human being need eive a rush to pos- 
sess, unless he aspires to very high distinction in that peculiar line of 
investigation. He has divested his researches of all the frivolous trum- 
per\ in which the philosophers of former days were ofren in the habit 
of disguising their ambitious poverty. He has shown that, in this, as 
in other sciences, the grand object is to establish the universality of 
facts, and that science is successful and triumphant in pioportion/as she 
approximates to the accomplishment of this object. And, lastly, what 
is above all praise, he has exhibited philosophy as the handmaid of re- 
ligion ; and has made it manifest that all the rays of knowledge natu- 
rally converge towards that one point in which is situated the throne of 
eternal ajid heavenly truth. All this he has done with a degree of mas- 
tery which shows the amplitude of his resources ; and, at the same 
lime, with that simplicity and modesty which are among the most en- 
gaging attributes of every superior mind. He professes not to offer 
any thing which has a claim to novelty or originality His avowed ob- 
ject is merely to direct the inquiries of the student "on a subject of 
great and general interest,"' and of peculiar importance to the inquirer, 
namely, the philosophy of mind ; aud, without formally assuming the 
character of a moral or religious lecturer, he has made his work auxil- 
iary to the most sacred and majestic of all sciences. He has made it 
clear that sound metaphysical philosophy is not a knowledge which 
puffeth up: that, on the contrary, its legitimate tendency is to chastise 
the arrogance of human wisdom, and to conduct us to that wisdom 
which is from above, and which is pure, and peaceable, and rich in all 
the fruits which can strengthen up the soul into eternal life. But our 
limits admonish us that we must break off our converse with this can- 
did, sagacious, and benevolent inquirer. We cannot, however, take 
leave of, his work without expressing our reverence for the motives 
which prompted him to undertake it, aad our admiration for the powers 
which have so nobly redeemed from loss and waste the fragments of 
time spared him from the distractions of a most extensive practice." 

British Critic. 

"Dr. Aeercrombie is already known to the public as a gentleman 
of the first eminence in his profession. The work before us proves him 
to possess an independent, vigorous, and practical mind, thoroughly 
conversant with the subjects it discusses, that enters ex animo into the 
spirit of inductive philosophy, and withal is deeply nnbued with Chris- 
tian piety. It is a volume calculated to render essential service to intel- 
lectual, medical, and theological science, and we have risen from the 
peru.sal of it with an earnest wish that it may find its way into the hands 
of every thinking man in the empire, be he a believer or an infidel. It 
abounds with interesting statement and powerful reasoning; and we 
confidently recommend it to our readers as a publication of no ordinary 
value— one of the few, compared with the numbers at present issuing 
from the press, which will long outlive the year of its appearance, and 
will be the more prized in proportion as its contents are known." 

Dublin Christian Examiner. 



Harper^s St ereotype Edition. 

INCIUIRIES 



CONCERNING THK 



INTELLECTUAL POWERS, 



INVESTIGATION OF TRUTH. 



BY JOHN ABERCROMBIE, M.D. F.R.S., 

F«llow of the Royal College of Pbysidans in Edinburgh, &c., and Fint Fbysician 
to His Majesty in Soolland. 



FROM THE SECOND EDINBURGH EDITION. 



NEW-YORK : 

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY J. & J. HARPER, 

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iND FOR SALE BY THE PRINCIPAL BOOKSELLERS THROUGHOUT 

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183 2. 



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In Exchang© 
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MAY 7 - 193^ 



PREFACE 

TO THE SECOND EDITION. 



The Author deeply feels the favourable manner 
in which this volume has been received by the 
public, and the notice which has been bestowed 
upon it by those whose approbation is high praise. 
In preparing a new edition, he has made various 
verbal corrections, and has added a considerable 
number of new facts and observations, which, he 
trusts, may increase the interest of the work. 
Some of these additions will be found under the 
following subjects : — The question of the imma- 
teriality of the thinking principle ; — false percep- 
tions ; — the credibility of testimony ; — memory ; — 
conception ; — and the influence of disease upon 
attention and memory. There are also various 
new facts on dreaming and spectral illusions ; 
and under the section " On the qualities and 
acquirements which constitute a well-regulated 
I mind," there have been added remarks on observing 
and inventive genius. 
Edinburgh, 1831. 



CONTENTS. 



Pa«o 
Introduction 15 

Preliminary Observations on the General Objects 
OF Science. 

Uniformity of the Relations of Bodies . . .19 
Origin of our Idea of Causation . . . .20 

Our Idea of the Relation of Cause and Effect in refer- 
ence to any two events, entirely distinct from our 
..intuitive impression of Causation . . 21 

Of Physical, Etiicient, and Final Causes . . 23 

The Object of Science is to trace the Uniform Rela- 
tions of things . . . . • . 24 

The Object of Art is to apply our Knowledge of these 

Relations for producing particular Results . 24 

Distinction of Sciences and Arts, according to the par- 
ticular Substances or Relations which are their im- 
mediate objects . . . . . .25 

Division of Sciences into certain and uncertain . . 27 
Grounds of Uncertainty in a Science . . . 28 

Illustrations of the Uncertain Sciences from Medicine 
and Political Economy . . . . . 30 

Imperfection of all Science, from the limited nature of 
Uie human faculties . . . . .31 



PART I. 



OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR 
KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

Our Knowledge of Mind limited entirely to Facts . 33 
Ideal Theory of the Old Philosophy . . .34 



6 CONTENTS. 

Of Materialism 37 

Grounds for considering Materialism as not only un- 
founded, but as in its nature opposed to the First 
Principles of Philosophical Inquiry . . . 37 . 

Grounds for believing that the Thinking Principle is 
in its Essence independent of the Botly, and will 
survive it 38 

This Belief is entirely independent of our Speculations 
resTpecting the Immateriality of the Thinking Prin- 
ciple, and rests on a species of evidence altogether 
different. . . . . . . . 41 • 



PART II. 

OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
FACTS RELATING BOTH TO MATTER 
AND MIND. 



SECTION I. 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 



Of the Primary and Secondary Properties of Matter 48 
Knowledge of the Properties of Matter by the Senses 49 
Of our Knowledge of Distance and Magnitude . . 51 
Apparent improvement of some Senses after loss of 
others . . . . .... 63 

Of our Knowledge of the Nature of Perception . , 57 
Remarkable Influence of Attention . . .58 
Habits of Attention and Inattention . . .69 
Of False Perceptions 63 



SECTION n. 

CONSCIOUSNESS AND HEFLECTiaN. 

Of the Knowledge which we derive from Conscious- 
ness and Reflection . . .... 66 



CONTENTS. 7 

Pago 

1. The Knowledge of our Mental Processes . . 67 

2. Compound Notions, — as Time, Cause, Motion . 67 

3. First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of Belief . 68 



SECTION III. 



TESTIMONY. 



Rules by which we estimate the Credibility of Testi- 
mony 69 

Confidence in Testimony in regard to statements at va- 
riance with our Personal Observation or Experience 72 

Objections which have been made to the Reception of 
such Statements on the E\-idence of Testimony 73 

Fallacy of these Objections, and Grounds of our Con- 
fidence in Testimony 74 

Distinction between Events which are marvellous and 
those which are miraculous . . . .77 

Moral Probability of Miracles • . . . 79 

Miracles not a violation of the established order of Na- 
ture, but referable to an agency altogether new and 
peculiar 81 

Grounds on which we estimate the Credibility of Tes- 
timony in regard to unusual or miraculous events 83 



PART III. 

OF THE INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 



SECTION I. 

MEMORY. 

Attention . 91 

Association . . . . . . . 93 

1. Natural or Philosophical Association . . 97 

2. Local or Incidental Association . . . 101 



8 CONTENTS. 

'^ 

3. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association . .106 

Artificial Memory ..... 107 

Important Application of the Principle of Arbi- 
trary Association in Commemorative Rites 108 
Conception, or the Memory of Perceptions . .110 

Of the Culture and Improvement of Attention, Reflec- 
tion, and Memory . . . . . .113 

Of the Influence of Disease upon Attention and Memory 119 
Of Extensive Cerebral Disease, without Sensible De- 
rangement of the Mental Functions . . . 132 
Influence of the Facts connected with.this sub- 
ject in showing the Independent Existence 
of the Thinking Principle .... 133 



SECTION II. 



ABSTRACTION. 



Nature and Applications of Abstraction . . . 134 
Disputes of the Nominalists and Realists . . . 135^; 



SECTION III. 



IMAGINATION'. 



Nature and Applications of Imagination . . .138 

Various Kinds of Artificial Combination to which it is 

applicable .... . . 139 

Importance of a Proper Application of it in the Forma- 
tion of Character . . ... 140 

Eflfects of Fictitious Narrative .... 141 

Effects of an Ill-regulated Imagination . . .142 



SECTION IV. 

REASON OR JUDGMENT. 

Analysis of the Mental Process of which Reason con- 



144 



CONTENTS. 9 

fage 

Applications of Reason in the Investigations of Sci- 
ence, the Affairs of Common Life, and the Forma- 
tion of Opinions ...... 148 

Man's Responsibility for his Belief . . . 163 

Farther Division of the Subject. — Brief Outline of the 
System of Dr. Brown ..... 154 



^ I. — OF THE USE OF REASON IN THE INVESTIGATION 
OF TRUTH. 

Of First Truths, or Intuitive Articles of BeUef, as the 

Foundation of all Reasoning .... 156 

1. A Belief in our own Existence, and of Mind as 
something distinct from the Body . . . 157 

2. A Confidence in the Information furnished by 

our Senses ...... 158 

3. A Confidence in our Mental Operations . . 158 

4. A Belief of our Personal Identity . . . 158 

5. A Conviction that every Event must have a 
Cause . . . .... 159 

6. A Confidence in the Uniformity of Nature . 159 

Uniformity of Physical Relations . . 160 

Uniformity of Moral Relations . . 163 

Application to the Question of Liberty 

and Necessity .... 165 
Of the Nature and Importance of First Truths, and 
Sophisms connected with attempts to reason against 

them 173 

Laws of Investigation in any Department of Know- 
ledge 177 

1. Of collecting Facts 180 

2. Of tracing the Relation of Cause and Effect 180 

3. Of deducing General Principles . .181 
Of Fallacies in Investigation . . . . 182 

Fallacies in regard to Facts .... 182 

False Induction 182 

False Reasoning ...... 183 

Of the Nature of Reasoning .... 183 

Of the Syllogism and its Uses . . . .184 



10 CONTENTS. 

Of the Cautions in examining a Process of Reasoning 
or Investigation ...... 187 

Distinction between a Process of Reasoning and a Pro- 
cess of Investigation ..... 190 

Of Fallacies in Reasoning . . . .193 

Of Mathematical Reasoning 202 

Difference between the Sound Exercise of Judgment 

and the Art of Disputation .... 205 

Of the Culture and Regulation of the Judgment . 207 

Influence of Attention ..... 207 

Influence of Prejudice 208 

Influence of Passion, or State of Moral Feelings 208 
Importance of a well-regulated Judgment . . 209 



^ II. OF THE USE OP REASON IN CORRECTING THE 

IMPRESSIONS OF THE MIND IN REGARD TO EXTER- 
NAL THINGS. 

Nature and Efl!ects of this Exercise of Reason . .211 
PecuUar Conditions connected with the Suspension of it 212 

I. Dreaming ...... 214 

PecuUar Condition of the Mind in Dreaming 214 
Origin of the various Classes of Dreams 

1. Recent Events .... 215 

2. Old Associations excited by Bodily 
Sensations ..... 216 

3. Old Associations recalled by a Process 

of the Mind itself . . . 220 

4. Mental Emotions imbodied into 
Dreams ..... 225 

Dreams consist chiefly of Real Objects of 
Conception ..... 231 

Operations of an Intellectual Character in 
Dreams 233 

II. SOMNAMBPLISM .... . . 237 

Various Degrees of this Afl!ection 
Remarkable Condition, commonly called Dou- 
ble Consciousness .... 241 



CONTENTS. 11 

P»ge 

III. Insanitt 245 

Peculiar Condition of the Mind constituting In- 
sanity . 246 

Various Modifications of it, from Eccentricity to 

Mania 248 

Great Activity of the Mental Powers in many 

Cases 249 

Remarkable Loss of Recent Impressions, and sud- 
den Revival of them on Recovery . . . 250 

Hallucination confined to a single Point . . 253 

Probable Origin of the peculiar Hallucinations 

in different cases of Insanity . . . 254 

1. Propensities of Character . . . 254 

2. Old Associations 255 

3. Old Fictions of the Imagination . . 255 

4. Bodily Feelings 256 

5. Undefined Impression of the new and pe- 
culiar Condition of the Mental Powers . 256 

Melancholia — Propensity to Suicide . . 257 

Origin and Causes of Iiisanity . . • . 259 

Cautions in deciding on slight or suspected Cases 263 

LiabiHty of the Insane to Punishment . . 265 

Moral Treatment of Insanity .... 268 

Of Idiocy — DLft'erence between it and Insanity . 272 

Cretinism . . . .... 274 

IV. Spectral Illusions. 

Various Forms and Sources of them . . . 279 



PART lY. 

APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PHILOSO- 
PHICAL INVESTIGATION TO MEDICAL SCI- 
ENCE. 



Uncertainty of Medicine 293 

Sources of this Uncertainty 294 

I, Difficulty of tracing Effects to their true Causes 297 



12 CONTENTS. 

2. Intervention of new Causes, which elude our Ob- 
servation . . . .... 298 

3. Difficulty in extending our Knowledge to new 
Cases ; as we must generally act on Analogy, not 

on Experience ...... 29J) 



SECTION I. 

ACQUISITION AND RECEPTION OF FACTS. 

Rules to be observed, and Sources of Error to 
avoided, in the Reception of Facts 



SECTION 11. 

ARRANGING, COMBINING, AND SEPARATING FACTS. 

Rules to be observed in this Process . . . 809 
Evils arising; from unsound Combinations . . 307 
Of the Effects produced on Medical Science by a Zeal 
for Nosology 308 



SECTI9N III. 

TRACING THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT. 

Importance and Difficulty of this Process . . . 309 
Sources of Fallacy in conducting it . . . .311 
Of the Division of Causes into Predisposing, Exciting, 
and Proximate 317 



SECTION IV. 

DEDUCING GENERAL FACTS OR GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 

Nature of Generalizing . . .* . . .319 
Difference between Generalizing and Classification . 319 
Rules of Generalizing, or of the Induction of General 
Principles 323 



CONTENTS. 13 

1. That the Principle he a Fact . . . .323 

2. That it be true of all the Individuals . . 324 
Legitimate Use of Hypothesis 336 



RCLES TO BE OBSERVED BY THOSE WHO WOULD CON- 
TRIBUTE TO THE Improvement of Medical Science 329 



PART V. 

VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIRE- 
MENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE A WELL- 
REGULATED MIND. 



1. Habit of Attention .... 

2. Regulation of the Succession of Thoughts 

3. Activity of Mind 

4. Habits of Association and Reflection 

5. Proper Selection of Objects of Pursuit . 

6. Government of the Imagination . 

7. Culture and Regulation of the Judgment 

Observing and Inventive Genius 

8. Right Condition of the Moral Feelings . 

B 



. 334 
. 335 
. 337 
. 337 
. 337 
. 338 
. 339 
. 341 
. 345 



INTRODUCTION. 



In entering upon the following Essay, I find it ne- 
cessary to offer some explanation of the views which 
induce me to attempt a subject so foreign to those 
inquiries by which I am in some measure known to 
the public, and in which they have been pleased 
to re-ceive my researches in the most favourable 
manner. 

The study of the phenomena of mind presents a 
subject of intense interest, not to the moral philoso- 
pher only, but to every one who has in view the cul- 
tivation of his own mental powers, or the proper 
application of them to the investigation of truth in 
any department of knowledge. During the preva- 
lence of that system which has been called the Meta- 
physics of the Schools, this important inquiry was 
obscured by speculations of the most frivolous nature. 
It is in modern times only that it has assumed a real 
value andapractical importance, under the researches 
of those eminent men who have cultivated the phi- 
losophy of mind on the principles which are acted 
upon in physical science, namely, a careful observa- 
tion of facts, and conclusions drawn from these by 
the most cautious induction. The chief hinderance 
to the cultivation of the science on these principles 
arises from the difficulty of procuring the facts : for 
the only field in which the mental philosopher can 
pursue his researches with perfect confidence is his 
own mind. In his observations on the minds of other 



16 INTRODUCTIOW. 

men he is obliged to judge of the internal operations 
by external phenomena ; and in this manner a degree 
of uncertainty attends his investigations, which does 
not occur in physical science. From this source 
also has probably arisen much of that difference of 
opinion which we meet with in regard to the mental 
powers : for, each inquirer having drawn his obser- 
vations chiefly from one mind, namely, his own, it 
was scarcely to be expected that there should not be 
some diversity, or that facts derived in this manner 
should possess the character of being universal. 

The means by which this difficulty can be removed 
must consist in an extensive collection of facts, illus- 
trating the phenomena of mind in various individuals, 
and under a variety of circumstances ; and there are 
several points of view in which the subject is pecu- 
liarly adapted to the medical observer. Mental mani- 
festations are greatly modified by the condition of 
those bodily organs by which the mind holds inter- 
course with external things, especially the brain. It 
becomes therefore a matter of the greatest interest 
to ascertain the manner in which the manifestations 
of mind are affected by diseases of these organs, as 
well as to observe their condition in that remarkable 
class of affections commonly called diseases of the 
mind. Besides, in the affections which are referable 
to both these classes, we often meet with manifesta- 
tions of the most interesting kind, and such as are 
calculated to illustrate, in a very striking manner, 
important points in the philosophy of the mental 
powers. It is thus in the power of the observing 
physician to contribute valuable facts to the science 
of mind ; and it is almost unnecessary to add, that ' 
the study may be turned to purposes of immediate 
importance to his own inquiries. He does not need 
to be reminded how much the mind acts upon the 
body — that mental emotions often prove sources of 
disease, or causes by which his remedies are modi- 
fied or counteracted — and that, on the other hand, a 



INTRODUCTION. 17 

remedy may often be introduced by the mind, capa- 
ble of composing tumults of the corporeal functions, 
which cannot be tranquilhzed by physical aid. 

From the deep interest which the philosophy of 
mind thus presents to the medical inquirer, I have 
been induced to attempt a slight outhne of this im- 
portant subject. In doing so, I do not profess to offer 
any thing new or original. My object is to present 
to the younger part of the profession some leading 
facts, which may serve to direct their further inquiries 
on a subject of great and general interest. 

This slight outline of the functions of mind will 
be followed by an attempt to trace the rules which 
ought to guide us in applying these powers to the 
investigation of truth in any department of know- 
ledge. The practical application of the subject will 
lead to a general view of the laws or principles of 
philosophical inquiry and inductive science, and will 
then be directed in a more particular manner to the 
purposes of medical investigation. This is attempted 
in the hope that the principles which it is meant to 
convey may be of use in giving precision to medical 
investigations, by illustrating those rules of sound 
induction which are acted upon in other departments 
of science. 

B2 



i 



PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 



GENERAL NATURE AND OBJECTS 
OF SCIENCE. 



By the will of the Almighty Creator, all things in 
nature have been placed in certain relations to each 
other, which are fixed and uniform. In other words, 
they have been endowed with capacities of acting 
and capabilities of being acted upon, according to 
certain uniform laws ; so that their actions take place 
in the same manner in ever}' instance in which the 
same bodies are brought together under similar cir- 
cumstances. We have a conviction, which appears 
to be original and instinctive, of the general uniform- 
ity of these relations ; and in this consists our con- 
fidence in the regularity of all the operations of na- 
ture. But the powers or principles on which the 
relations depend are entirely hidden from us in our 
present state of being. The province of human 
knowledge is merely to observe the facts, and to 
trace what their relations or sequences are. This is 
to be accomplished only by a careful and extensive 
observation of the facts as they pass before us, and 
by carefully distinguishing their true or uniform rela- 
tions from connexions which are only incidental and 
temporary. 



20 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

In our first observation of any particular series of 
facts or events, we find a certnin number of them 
placed together in a state of contioruity or apparent 
connexion. But we are not entitled from this to 
assume the connexion to be any thing more than 
incidental juxtaposition. When, in the further pro- 
gress of observation, we find the same events occur- 
ring a certain number of times, in the same relations 
or sequences to each other, we suspect that their 
connexion is not merely that of incidental contiguity. 
We begin to believe that there exists among them 
such a relation as leads us, when we meet with some 
of these events, to expect that certain others are to 
follow. Hence is excited our idea of power in refer- 
ence to these events, or of the relation of cause and 
effect. This relation, however, according to the ut- 
most extent of our knowledge of it in any individual 
instance, is founded entirely upon the fact of certain 
events uniformly following one another. But when 
we have found, by sufficient observation, the partic- 
ular events which do thus follow one another, we 
conclude that there is a connexion, whatever may be 
the nature of it, in consequence of which the sequence 
which we have observed will continue to recur in 
the same fixed and uniform manner. In other words, 
we conclude with confidence, that when we observe 
the first of two such events, the second will follow; 
and that when we observe the second, the first has 
preceded it. The first we call cause, the second 
effect. Thus our general confidence in the uniform- 
ity of the true relations or sequences of events is an 
original or instinctive principle, and not the result 
of experience ; but it is by experience that we ascer- 
tain what the individual sequences are which ob- 
serve this uniformity ; or, in other words, learn to 
distinguish connexions which consist of incidental 
contiguity from those which constitute true and uni- 
form relations. 

The natural tendency of the mind appears mdeed 



ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF CAUSATION* 21 

to be, to infer causation from every succession of 
phenomena, and to expect uniformity in every se- 
quence. It is from experience we learn that this 
impression is not to be relied on in regard to indi- 
vidual sequences, but requires to be corrected by 
observation. The result of our further experience 
then is, to ascertain what those sequences or con- 
nexions are which are uniform, and which, conse- 
quently, we may consider as connected in the manner 
of causation. We are thus fi-rst taught by experience 
the caution which is necessary in considering events 
as connected in the manner of cause and effect, and 
learn not to assume this relation till, by further ex- 
perience, we have ascertained that the sequence is 
uniform. This caution, however, has no reference 
to our instinctive impression of causation, or our 
absolute conviction that every event must have an 
adequate cause ; it only relates to our fixing the ar- 
rangement of individual antecedents, or, in other 
words, to our determining what individual events we 
are warranted in considering as the true antecedents 
or causes of certain other events. This, accordingly, 
can in many cases be accomplished only by long and 
extensive observation; while, in others, a single in- 
stance may be sufficient to produce an absolute con- 
viction of what is the true antecedent. A child who 
has been only once burnt may dread the fire as cer- 
tainly as if the accident had happened a hundred 
times ; and there are many other instances in which 
the conviction may be produced in the same rapid 
manner. The natural tendency of the mind, in fact, 
is not only to infer the connexion, but in many cases 
to carry it further than the truth. If, for instance, 
we suppose a man who, for the first time in his life, 
has seen gunpowder explode upon a match being ap- 
plied to it, he would probably have an immediate 
conviction that a similar explosion would take place 
again in similar circumstances. But he would per- 
haps go further than this : he would probably expect 



22 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

a similar explosion when he apphed a match to other 
black powders, with the nature of which he was un- 
acquainted, such as powdered charcoal. It is by- 
experience that this erroneous expectation would be 
corrected, and that he would learn the precise in- 
stances in which the particular result takes place. 
But it is also by experience that he learns the former, 
though the conviction was produced more immedi- 
ately ; for there is nothinof in the characters of gun- 
powder and charcoal from which any man could 
pronounce, by reasoning a priori, that the one would 
explode with violence when a match was applied to 
it, and the other remain entirely unchanged. 

Thus, our general impression of causation is not 
the result of experience, but an original and intuitive 
principle of belief; that is, our absolute conviction 
that every event must have an adequate cause. This 
is, in fact, that great and fundamental truth by which, 
from the properties of a known effect, we infer the 
powers and quahties of an unknown cause. It is in 
this manner, for example, that from the works of 
nature we infer the existence and the attributes of 
the Almighty Creator. But in judging of the con- 
nexion between any two individual events in that 
order of things which he has established, our idea 
of causation is derived from experience alone. For, 
in regard to any two such events, our idea of caus- 
ation or of power amounts to nothing more than 
our knowledge of the fact, that the one is inva- 
riably the antecedent of the other. Of the myste- 
rious agency on which the connexion depends, we 
know nothing, and never can know any thing in our 
present state of being. We know that the application 
of a match always sets fire to gunpowder, and we say 
that it has the power of doing so, or that it is the cause 
of the explosion ; but w^e have not the least concej)- 
tion why the application of fire produces combustion 
in an inflammable substance; — these expressions, 
therefore, amount to nothing more than a statement 
of the fact, that the result is universal. 






PHYSICAL, EFFICIENT, AND FINAL CAUSES. 23 

When we speak, therefore, of physical causes, in 
regard to any of the phenomena of nature, we mean 
nothing more than the fact of a certain uniform con- 
nexion which has been observed between events. 
Of efficient causes, or the manner in which the result 
takes place, we know nothing. In this sense, indeed, 
we may be said not to know the cause of any thing, 
even of events which at first sight appear the most 
simple and obvious. Thus, the communication of 
motion from one body to another by impulse appears 
a very simple phenomenon, — but how little idea have 
we of the cause of it ! We say the bodies touch each 
other, and so the motion is communicated. But, in 
the first place, we cannot say why a body in motion, 
coming in contact with one at rest, should put the 
latter in motion ; and further, we know that they do 
not come in contact. We may consider it, indeed, 
as ascertained that there is no such thing as the ac- 
tual contact of bodies under these circumstances ; 
and therefore the fact which appears so simple comes 
to be as unaccountable as any phenomenon in nature. 
What, again, appears more intelhgible than an unsup- 
ported body falling to the ground ? Yet what is more 
inexphcable than that one mass of matter should thus 
act upon another, at any distance, and even though 
a vacuum be interposed between them 1 The same 
observation will be seen to apply to all the facts 
which are most familiar to us. Why, for example, 
one medicine acts upon the stomach, another on the 
bowels, a third on the kidneys, a fourth on the skin, 
we have not the smallest conception ; we know only 
the uniformity of the facts. 

It is of importance to keep in mind the distinction 
now referred to between physical and efficient causes, 
as the former only are the proper objects of philo- 
sophical inquiry. The term final cause, again, has 
been apphed to a subject entirely different ; namely, 
to the appearances of unity of design in the phenom- 
ena of nature, and the manner in which means are 



24 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

adapted to particular ends. The subject is one of ; 
great and extensive importance, but it appears desi- 
rable that the name were altered, though it is sanc- 
tioned by high authority ; for, when viewed in con- 
nexion with the sense in wliich the word cause is 
employed in modern science, it expresses a meaning 
remarkably different. The investigation to which 
it refers is also of a distinct nature, though one of the 
highest interest. It leads lis chiefly to the inductions 
of natural religion respecting a great and intelligent 
First Cause ; but it may also be directed to the discov- 
ery of truth in regard to the phenomena of nature. 
One of the most remarkable examples of this last 
application of it is to be found in the manner in which 
Hirvey was led to the discovery of the circulation 
of the blood, by observing the valves in the veins, and 
contemplating the uses to which that peculiar struc- 
ture might be adapted. 

The object of all science is to ascertain these estab- 
lished relations of things, or the tendency of certain 
events to be uniformly followed by certain other 
events ; in other words, the aptitude of certain bodies 
to produce or to be followed by certain changes in 
other bodies in particular circumstances. The object 
of art is to avail ourselves of the knowledge thus 
acquired, by bringing bodies into such circumstances 
as are calculated to lead to those actions upon each 
other of which we have ascertained them to be capa- 
ble. Art, therefore, or the production of certain 
results by the action of bodies upon each other, must 
be founded upon science, or a knowledge of their 
fixed and uniform relations and tendencies. This 
principle applies to all sciences, and to the arts or 
practical rules which are founded upon them ; and 
the various sciences differ only in the particular 
substances or events which are their more imme- 
diate objects. 

In the ph)^ical sciences, we investigate the rela- 



UNIFORMITY OF RELATIONS. 25 

tions of material substances, and their actions upon 
each other, either of a mechanical or chymical nature. 
On the relations thus ascertained are founded the 
mechanical and chymical arts, in which we produce 
certain results by bringing bodies into such circum- 
stances as are calculated to give rise to their peculiar 
actions. But mental phenomena have also their re- 
lations, which are hkewise fixed and uniform ; though 
it may be more difficult to ascertain the truth in re- 
gard to them, than in the relations of material things. 
The relations or sequences of mental phenomena 
are to be considered in two points of view ; namely, 
relations to each other, and relations to external 
things. In regard to both, it seems necessary to 
divide the phenomena themselves into three classes. 

1. Simple intellect, or those powers by which we 
perceive, remember, and combine facts or events, 
and compare them with each other : such as percep- 
tion, memory, imagination, and judgment. 

2. Passive emotions, or those by which the mind 
is affected by certain pleasurable or painful feelings, 
which are, or may be, confined entirely to the indi- 
vidual who is the subject of them. 

3. Active emotions, or those which tend directly 
to influence the conduct of men, either as moral and 
responsible beings, or as members of society. 

In all these classes, mental phenomena have cer- 
tain relations to each other and to external things, 
the investigation of which is the object of particu- 
lar branches of science ; and these lead to certain 
arts or practical rules which are founded upon them. 

Intellectual science investigates the laws and re- 
lations of the processes of simple intellect, as per- 
ception, memory, imagination, and judgment ; and 
the proper cultivation and regiijation of these is the 
object of the practical art of intellectual education. 

The passive emotions may be influenced or ex- 
cited in two ways; namely, through our relations 
to other sentient and intelligent beings, and by ma- 
C 



26 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

terial or inanimate things. To the former head are 
referable many of the tenderest and most interest- 
ing feehngs of our nature, as love, hope, joy, and 
sorrow. To the latter belong those emotions which 
come under the subject of taste, or the tendencies 
of certain combinations of material things to ex- 
cite emotions of a pleasurable or painful kind, — as our 
impressions of the sublime, the beautiful, the terrible, 
or the ludicrous. The practical rules or processes, 
connected with the science of the passive emoiions, 
arrange themselves into two classes, corresponding 
to the two divisions now mentioned. To the for- 
mer belong the regulation of the emotions, and all 
those rules of conduct not exactly referable to the 
higher subject of morals, which bear an extensive 
influence on the ties of friendship — and the relations 
of social and domestic intercourse. To the latter 
belong chiefly those processes which come under 
the head of the fine arts; namely, the arts of the 
painter, the sculptor, the architect, the musician, — 
perhaps we may add, the poet and the dramatist. 

The active emotions, or those which influence hu- 
man conduct, are referable to two classes ; namely, 
those which aflect men individually as moral and re- 
sponsible agents, and those which affect them as 
united in large bodies constituting civil society. 
The cultivation of the emotions of the former class, 
and the investigation of the motives and principles 
by which they are influenced, belong to the high 
subjects of morals and religion. The investigation 
and control of emotions of the latter class come un- 
der the science of politics ; and the practical art, 
founded upon it, relates to those measures by which 
the statesman attempts to control and regulate the 
conduct of masses of mankind united as members 
of a great civil community. 

In medical science, the objects of our researches 
are chiefly the relations between external things 
and the living powers of animal bodies,— and the re- 



CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. 27 

lations of these powers to each other; — more par- 
ticularly in regard to the tendencies of external 
things to produce certain changes upon living bodies, 
either as causes of disease or as remedies. The 
practical art founded upon this science leads to the 
consideration of the means by which we may avail 
ourselves of this knowledge, by producing, in the 
one case, actions upon the body which we wish to 
produce, and in the other, by counteracting or avoid- 
ing actions which we wish to prevent. 

In all these sciences, and the practical arts which 
are founded upon them, the general principles are 
the same ; namely, a careful observation of the na- 
tural and uniform relations or tendencies of bodies 
towards each other ; and a bringing of those ten- 
dencies into operation for the production of results. 
All art, therefore, must be founded upon science, or 
a correct knowledge of these relations ; and all 
science must consist of such a careful observation 
of facts in regard to the relations, as shall enable 
us confidently to pronounce upon those which are 
fixed and uniform. He who follows certain arts or 
practical rules, without a knowledge of the science 
on which they are founded, is the mere artisan or 
the empiric ; he cannot advance beyond the precise 
rules which are given him, or provide for new oc- 
currences and unforeseen difficulties. In regard to 
science, again, when the relations are assumed 
hastily, or without a sufficiently extensive observa- 
tion of facts, the process constitutes false science, 
or false induction; and when practical rules are 
founded upon such conclusions, they lead to error 
and disappointment in the result which is expected. 

The views which have now been referred to lead 
us to principles by which the sciences are distin- 
guished into those which are certain and those which 
are, in a greater or less degree, uncertain. The 
certainty of a science depends upon the facility and 



28 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

correctness with which we ascertain the true rela- 
tions of things, or trace effects to their true causes, 
and causes to their true effects, — and calculate upon 
the actions which arise out of these relations taking 
place with perfect uniformity. This certainty we 
easily attain in the purely physical sciences, or those 
in which we have to deal oiiJy with inanimate mat- 
ter. For in our investigation of the relations of ma- 
terial bodies, whether mechimical or chymical, we 
contrive experiments, in which by placing the bodies 
in a variety of circumstances towards each other, 
and excluding all extraneous influence, we come to 
determine their tendencies with perfect certainty. 
Having done so, we rely with confidence on these 
tendencies continuing to be uniform ; and should we 
in any instance be disappointed of the result which 
we wish to produce, we are able, at once, to detect 
the nature of some incidental cause by which the 
result has been prevented, and to obviate the effect 
of its interference. The consequence of this ac- 
curate knowledge of their relations is, that we ac- 
quire a power over material things ; but this power 
is entirely limited to a certain control and direction 
of their natural relations ; and we camiot change 
these relations in the smallest particular. Our power 
is of course also limited to those objects which are 
within the reach of our immediate influence ; but 
with respect to those which are beyond this influ- 
ence, as the heavenly bodies, the result of our 
knowledge appears in a manner not less striking, in 
the minute accuracy with which we are enabled to 
foretel their movements, even at very distant periods. 
I need only mention the correctness with which the 
astronomer calculates echpses and the appearance 
of comets. 

With these characters of certainty in the purely 
physical sciences, two sources of uncertainty are 
contrasted in those branches of science in which we 
have to deal with mental operations, or with the 



CERTAIN AND UNCERTAIN SCIENCES. 29 

powders of living bodies. The first of these depends 
upon the circumstance, that, in investigating the re- 
lations and tendencies in these cases, we are gene- 
rally obliged to trust to observation alone, as the 
phenomena happen to be presented to us, and can- 
not confirm or correct these observations by direct 
experiment. And as the actual connexions in which 
the phenomena occur to us are often very different 
from their true relations, it is in many cases ex- 
tremely difficult to ascertain the true relations ; that 
is, to refer effects to their true causes, and to trace 
causes to their true eff"ects. Hence just conclusions 
are arrived at slowly, and after a long course of 
occasional observations ; and we may be obliged to 
go on for a long time without acquiring any conclu- 
sions which we feel to be worthy of confidence. In 
these sciences, therefore, there is great temptation 
to grasp at premature inductions; and when such 
have been brought forward with confidence, there is 
often difficulty in exposing their fallacy ; for in such 
a case it may happen, that as long a course of ob- 
servation is required for exposing the false conclu- 
sion, as for ascertaining the true. In physical 
science, on the other hand, a single experiment may 
often overturn the most plausible hypothesis, or may 
establish one which was proposed in conjecture. 

The second source of uncertainty in this class of 
sciences consists in the fact, that, even after we 
have ascertained the true relations of things, we 
may be disappointed of the results which we wish 
to produce, when we bring their tendencies into ope- 
ration. This arises from the interposition of other 
causes, by which the true tendencies are modified or 
counteracted, and the operation of which we are not 
able either to calculate upon or to control. The 
new causes, which operate in this manner, are chiefly 
certain powers in living animal bodies, and the wills, 
feelings, and propensities of masses of human be- 
ings, which we have not the means of reducing to 
C2 



30 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

any fixed or uniform laws. As examples of the un- 
certain sciences, therefore, we may mention medi- 
cine and political economy ; and their uncertainty 
is referable to the same sources, namely, the diffi- 
culty of ascertaining the true relations of things, or 
of tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to 
their true effects ; — and the intervention of new 
causes which elude Our observation, while they in- 
terfere with the natural tendencies of things, and 
defeat our attempts to produce certain results by 
bringing these into action. The scientific physician 
well knows the difficulty of ascertaining the true re- 
lations of those things which are the proper objects 
of his attention, and the uncertainty which attends 
all his efforts to produce particular results. A per- 
son, for example, affected with a disease, recovers 
under the use of a particular remedy. A second is 
affected with the same disease, and uses this remedy 
without any benefit ; while a third recovers under a 
very different remedy, or without any treatment at 
all. And even in those cases in which he has dis- 
tinctly ascertained true relations, new causes inter- 
vene and disappoint his endeavours to produce re- 
sults by means of these relations. He knows, for 
example, a disease which would certainly be reheved 
by the full operation of diuretics ; — and he knows 
various substances which have unquestionably diu- 
retic virtues. But in a particular instance he may 
fail entirely in relieving the disease by the most as- 
siduous use of these remedies ; — for the real and 
true tendencies of these bodies are interrupted by 
certain other causes in the constitution iiself^, which 
entirely elude his observation, and are in no degree 
under his control. 

It is unnecessary to point out the similarity of 
these facts to the uncertainty experienced by the 
statesman in his attempts to influence the interests, 
the propensities, and the actions of masses of man- 
kind ; or to show how often measures which have 



LIMITED NATURE OF OUR FACULTIES. 31 

been planned with every effort of human wisdom 
fail of the results which they were intended to pro- 
duce, or are followed by consequences remarkably 
diiferent. Nothing indeed can show in a more strik- 
ing manner the uncertainty which attaches to this 
science, than the different aspects in which the same 
measure is often viewed by different men distin- 
guished for political wisdom and talent. I abstain 
from alluding to particular examples, but those ac- 
customed to attend to public affairs will find little 
difficulty in fixing upon remarkable instances in 
which measures have been recommended by wise 
and able men, as calculated to lead to important 
benefits, while others of no inferior name for talent 
and wisdom have, with equal confidence, predicted 
from them consequences altogether different. Such 
are the difficulties of tracing effects to their true 
causes, and causes to their true effects, when we have 
to deal, not with material substances simply, but with 
the powers of living bodies, or with the wills, the in- 
terests, and propensities of human beings. 

One other reflection arises out of the view which 
has been given of this important subject. The object 
of all science, whether it refer to matter or to mind, 
is simply to ascertain facts, and to trace their rela- 
tions to each other. The powers which regulate 
these relations are entirely hidden from us in our 
present imperfect state of being ; and by grasping at 
principles which are beyond our reach, we leave that 
path of inquiry which alone is adapted to our hmited 
faculties, and involve ourselves in error, perplexity, 
and darkness. It is humbling to the pride of human 
reason, but it is not the less true, that the highest 
acquirement ever made by the most exalted genius 
of man has been only to trace a part, and a very 
small part, of that order which the Deity has estab- 
lished in his works. When we endeavour to pry into 
the causes of this order, we perceive the operation 



32 GENERAL OBJECTS OF SCIENCE. 

of powers which lie far beyond the reach of our] 
limited faculties. They who have made the highest j 
advances in true science will be the first to confess j 
how limited these faculties are, and how small a part j 
we can comprehend of the ways of the Almighty I 
Creator. They will be the first to acknowledge, that • 
the highest acquirement of human wisdom is to ad- 
vance to that line which is its legitimate boundary, 
and there contemplating the wondrous field which 
lies beyond it, to bend in humble adoration before a 
wisdom which it cannot fathom, and a power which 
it cannot comprehend. 



INQUIRIES 

CONCERNING THE 

INTELLECTUAL POWERS, (fee. 



PART I. 

OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR 
KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

The mind is that part of our being which thinks 
and wills, — remembers and reasons: we know no- 
thing of it except from these functions. By means of 
the corporeal senses it holds intercourse with the 
things of the external world, and receives impres- 
sions from them. But of this connexion also we 
know nothing but the facts ; when we attempt to 
speculate upon its nature and cause, we wander at 
once from the path of philosophical inquiry into con- 
jectures which are as far beyond the proper sphere 
as they are beyond the reach of the human faculties. 
The object of true science on such a subject, there- 
fore, is simply to investigate the facts, or the relations 
of phenomena, respecting the operations of mind 
itself, and the intercourse which it carries on with 
the things of the external world. 

This important rule in the philosophy of mind has 
been fully recognised in very modern times only, sa 



34 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND! 

that the science, as a faithful interpretation of nature, 
may be considered as of recent origin. Before the 
period now referred to the investigation was encum- 
bered by the most fruitless speculations respecting 
the essence of mind, and other discussions which led 
to no discovery of truth. It was contended, for ex- 
ample, that the mind cannot act where it is not pres- 
ent, and that consequently it cannot be said to per- 
ceive external objects themselves, but only their 
images, forms, or sensible species, which were said 
to be conveyed through the senses, and represented 
to the mind in the same manner in which images are 
formed in a camera obscura. By the internal func- 
tions of mind these sensible species were then sup- 
posed to be refined into phantasms, the objects of 
memory and imagination ; and these, after undergo- 
ing a further process, became intelligible species, the 
objects of pure intellect. By a very natural applica- 
tion of this doctrine, it was maintained by Bishop 
Berkeley and the philosophers of his school, that as 
the mind can perceive nothing but its own impres- 
sions or images, we can derive no evidence from our 
senses of the existence of the external world ; and 
Mr. Hume carried the argument a little further, by 
maintaining that we have as little proof of the exist- 
ence of mind, and that nothing exists in the universe 
except impressions and ideas. Of another sect of 
philosophers who arose out of the same system, each 
individual professed to believe his own existence, 
but would not admit the existence of any other being; 
hence they received the appropriate name of Egoists. 
The various eminent individuals by whom the fal- 
lacy of these speculations was exposed, combated 
them upon the principle that the doctrine of ideas is 
entirely a fiction of philosophers ; and that a confi- 
dence in the information conveyed to us by our senses 
must be considered as a first truth, or a fundamental 
law of our nature, susceptible of no explanation, and 
admitting of no other evidence than that which is 



SPECULATIONS OP THE SCHOOLS. 35 

derived from the universal conviction of mankind. 
Nor does it, to common minds, appear a slight indi- 
cation of the validity of this mode of reasoning, that 
the philosophers who supported this theory do not 
appear to have acted upon their own system ; but 
in every thing which concerned their personal ac- 
commodation or personal safety, showed the same 
confidence in the evidence of their senses as other 
men. 

The deductions made from the ideal theory by 
Berkeley and Hume seem to have been applications 
of it which its former advocates had not contem- 
plated. But it is a singular fact, as stated by Dr. 
Reid, that nearly all philosophers, from Plato to Mr. 
Hume, agree in maintaining that the mind does not 
perceive external things themselves, but only their 
ideas, images, or species. This doctrine was founded 
vpon the maxim that mind cannot act where it is not 
present ; and we find one waiter only who, admitting^ 
the maxim, called in question the application of it 
so far as to maintain that the mind, in perceiving 
external things, leaves the body, and comes into con- 
tact with the objects of its perception. 

Such speculations ought to be entirely banished 
from the science of mind, as not only useless and 
unprofitable, but as referring to things entirely be- 
yond the reach of the human faculties, and therefore 
contrary to the first principles of philosophical inves- 
tigation. To the same class we are to refer aU 
speculations in regard to the essence of mind, the 
manner in which thought is produced, and the means 
by which the intercourse is carried on between the 
mind and external objects. These remarkable func- 
tions were at one time explained by an imaginary 
essence called the animal spirits, which were sup- 
posed to be in constant motion, performing the office 
of messengers between the brain and the organs of 
sense. By another class of philosophers, of no very 
ancient date, thinking was ascribed to vibrations in 



36 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

the particles of the brain. The communication of 
perceptions from the senses to the mind has been 
accounted for in the same manner by the motions 
of the nervous fluid, by, vibrations of the nerves, or 
by a subtile essence, resembling electricity or gal- 
vanism. The mind, again, has been compared to a 
camera obscura, to a mirror, and to a storehouse. 
In opposition, however, to all such hypotheses, M'hich 
are equally incapable either of proof or of refutation, 
our duty is to keep steadily in view, that the objects 
of true science are facts alone, and the relations of 
these facts to each other. The mind can be com- 
pared to nothing in nature ; it has been endowed by 
its Creator with a power of perceiving external 
things ; but the manner in which it does so is entirely 
beyond our comprehension. All attempts, therefore, 
to explain or illustrate its operations by a reference 
to any thing else can be considered only as vain and 
futile. They are endeavours to establish a resem- 
blance where there is not the vestige of an analogy ; 
and consequently they can lead to no useful result. 
It is only by a rigid adherence to this course of inves- 
tigation that we can expect to make any progress in 
true knowledge, or to impart to our inquiries in any 
department of science the characters either of tnith 
or utility. 

The ideal theory, with all the doctrines founded 
upon it, may now be considered as gone by. But 
certain speculations are still occasionally brought 
out by writers of a particular order, which are refer- 
able to the same class, namely, hypotheses which 
are to be treated, not merely as unsound, but as being, 
by their very nature, directly opposed to the first prin- 
ciples of philosophical inquiry. Among these, the 
most prominent is the doctrine of materialism, of 
which it may be advisable to take a shght view in 
the commencement of this essay. On the principles 
which have been referred to, the following considera- 
tions may be submitted as bearing upon this subject. 



MATERIALISM. 37 

The term Matter is a name -which we apply to a 
certain combination of properties, or to certain sub- 
stances which are sohd, extended, and divisible, and 
which are known to us only by these properties. 
Tlie term Mind, in the same manner, is a name which 
we apply to a certain combination of functions, or 
to a certain power Avhich we feel within, which 
thinks, and na^IIs, and reasons ; and is known to us 
only by these functions. The former we know only 
by our senses, the latter only by our consciousness. 
In regard to their essence or occult quahties, we 
know quite as little about matter as we do about 
mind ; and in as far as our utmost conception of them 
extends, we have no ground for believing that they 
have any thing in common. The true object of phi- 
losophy is simply to investigate the facts in regard 
to both ; and materiaUsm is not to be viewed only 
as imsound reasoning, but as a logical absurdity, and 
a total misconception of the first principles of philo- 
sophical inquiry. Does the materialist tell us that 
the principle which thinks is material, or the result 
of organization, we have only to ask him what light 
he expects to throw upon the subject by such an as- 
sertion ? For the principle which thinks is knoA\ai 
to us only by thinking ; and the substances which 
are solid and extended are known to us only by their 
solidity and extension. When we say of the former 
that it is immaterial, we simply express the fact that 
it is known to us by properties altogether distinct 
from the properties to which we have given the name 
of matter, and, as far as we know, has nothing in com- 
mon with them. Beyond these properties, we know 
as little about matter as we do about mind, so that 
materialism is scarcely less extravagant than would 
be the attempt to explain any phenomenon by refer- 
ring it to some other altogether distinct and dissimi- 
lar ; to say, for example, that colour is a modification 
of sound, or.gravity a species of fermentation. The 
assertion, indeed, would be fully as plausible, and 
D 



38 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

calculated to throw as much light upon the subject, 
were a person anxious to explain the nature of mat- 
ter, to tell us that it is the result of a particular mani- 
festation of mind. Something analogous to this, in 
fact, seems to be the foundation of the theory of Bos- 
covich, who conceives all bodies to consist of unex- 
tended atoms or mathematical points endowed with 
a certain power of repulsion, and consequently makes 
the essence of matter to consist merely in the prop- 
erty of resistance. We have, in truth, the same kind 
of evidence for the existence of mind that we liave 
for the existence of matter, namely, from its prop- 
erties ; and of the t\vo, the former appears to be the 
least liable to deception. " Of all the truths we 
know," says Mr. Stewart, " the existence of mind is 
the most certain. Even the system of Berkeley con- 
cerning the non-existence of matter is far more con- 
ceivable than that nothing but matter exists in the 
universe." 

A similar mode of reasoning may be applied to the 
modification of materialism more prevalent in mod- 
ern times, by which mind is considered as a result 
of organization, or, in other words, a function of the 
brain ; and upon which has been founded the conclu- 
sion, that, like our bodily senses, it will cease to be 
when the bodily frame is dissolved. The brain, it is 
true, is the centre of that influence on which depend 
sensation and motion. There is a remarkable con- 
nexion between this organ and the manifestations 
of mind ; and by various diseases of the brain these 
manifestations are often modified, impaired, or sus- 
pended. We shall afterward see that these results 
are very far from being uniform ; but even if they 
were uniform, the facts would warrant no such con- 
clusion respecting the nature of mind ; for they ac- 
cord equally with the supposition that the brain is 
the organ of communication between the mind and 
the external world. When the materialist advances 
a single step beyond this, he plunges at once into 



MATERIALISM. 39 

conclusions which are. entirely gratuitous and un- 
warranted. We rest nothing more upon this argu- 
ment than that these conclusions are unwarranted ; 
but w^e might go further than this, and contend that 
the presumption is clearly on the other side, when 
we consider the broad and obvious distinction which 
exists between the peculiar phenomena of mind and 
those functions which are exercised through the 
means of bodily organization. They do not admit 
of being brought into comparison, and have nothing 
in common. The most exquisite of our bodily senses 
are entirely dependent for their exercise upon im- 
pressions from external things. We see not without 
the presence both of light and a body reflecting it ; 
and if we could suppose light to be annihilated, 
though the eye were to retain its perfect condition, 
sight would be extinguished. But mind owns no 
such dependence on external things, except in the 
origin of its knowledge in regard to them. When 
this knowledge has once been acquired it is retained 
and recalled at pleasure ; and mind exercises its va- 
rious functions without any .dependence upon im- 
pressions from the external world. That which has 
long ceased to exist is still distinctly before it, or is 
recalled after having been long forgotten, in a man- 
ner even still more wonderful ; and scenes, deeds, or 
beings, which never existed, are called up in long and 
harmonious succession, invested with all the char- 
acters of truth, and all the vividness of present exist- 
ence. The mind remembers, conceives, combines, 
and reasons ; it loves, and fears, and hopes, in the 
total absence of any impression from without that 
can influence in the smallest degree these emotions : 
and we have the fullest conviction that it would con- 
tinue to exercise the same functions in undiminished 
activity, though all material things were at once an- 
nihilated. 

This argument, indeed, may be considered as only 
negative, but this is all that the subject admits of. 



40 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

For when we endeavour to speculate directly on the 
essence of mhid, we are immediately lost in per- 
plexity, in consequence of our total i.^norance of the 
subject, and the use of terms borrowed from anal- 
ogies with material things. Hence the unsatisfac- 
tory nature of every physiological or metaphysical 
argument respecting the essence of mind, arising 
entirely from the attempt to reason the subject in a 
manner of which it is not susceptible. It admits 
not of any ordinary process of logic, for the facts 
on which it rests are the objects of consciousness 
only ; and the argument must consist in an appeal 
to the consciousness of every man, that he feels a 
power within totally distinct from any function of 
the body. What other conception than this can he 
form of that power by which he recalls the past, 
and provides for the future ; by which he ranges un- 
controlled from world to world, and from system to 
system ; surveys the works of all-creating power, 
and rises to the contemplation of the eternal Cause 1 
To what function of matter shall he liken that prin- 
ciple by which he loves and fears, and joys and sor- 
rows ; by which he is elevated with hope, excited 
by enthusiasm, or sunk in tlie horrors of despair ? 
These changes also he feels, in many instances, to 
be equally independent of impressions from without, 
and of the condition of his bodily fran^e. In the 
most peaceful state of every corporeal function, pas- 
sion, remorse, or anguish may rage within; and 
while the body is racked by the most frightful dis- 
eases, the mind may repose in tranquillity and hope. 
He is taught by physiology that every part of his 
body is in a constant state of change, and that within 
a certain period every particle of it is renewed. 
But, amid these changes, he feels that the being 
whom he calls himself remains essentially the same. 
In particular, his remembrance of the occurrences 
of his early days, he feels to be totally inconsistent 



MATERIALISM. 4 1 

with the idea of an impression made upona n)aterial 
organ, unless he has recourse to the absurdity of 
supposing that one series of particles, as they de- 
parted, transferred the picture to those which came 
to occupy their room. 

If the being, then, which we call mind or soul be, 
to the utmost extent of our knowledge, thus dis- 
similar to and distinct from anything that we know 
to be a result of bodily organization, what reason 
have we to beUeve that it should be affected by any 
change in the arrangement of material organs, ex- 
cept in so far as relates to its intercourse with this 
external world 1 The effects of that change which 
we call the death of an animal body are nothing 
more than a change in the arrangement of its con- 
stituent elements ; for it can be demonstrated, on 
the strictest principles of chymistry, that not one 
particle of these elements ceases to exist. We 
have, in fact, no conception of annihilation ; and our 
whole experience is opposed to the belief that one 
atom which ever existed has ceased to exist. There 
is, therefore, as Dr. Brown has well remarked, in 
the very decay of the body, an analogy which would 
seem to indicate the continued existence of the 
thinking principle, since that which we term decay 
is itself only another name for continued existence. 
To conceive, then, that any thing mental ceases to 
exist after death, when we know that every thing 
corporeal continues to exist, is a gratuitous assump- 
tion, contrary to every rule of philosophical inquiry, 
and in direct opposition, not only to all the facts re- 
lating to mind itself, but even to the analogy which 
is furnished by the dissolution of the bodily frame. 

To this mode of reasoning it has been objected, 
that it would go to estabhsh an immaterial principle 
in the lower animals, which in them exhibits many 
of the phenomena of mind. I have only to answer, 
be it so. There are in the lower animals many 
D2 



42 EXTENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

of the phenomena of mind; and, with recrard to ' 
these, we also contend, tliat tliey are entirely dis- 
tinct from any thinor we know as the properties of 
matter, — which is all that we mean, or can meaji, 
by bein^ immaterial. There are other principles 
superadded to material things, of the nature of which 
we are equally ij^iorant ; such, for example, as the 
principle of vegetable life, and that of luiimal life. 
To say that tliese are properties of matter is merely 
arguing about a term ; for what v,e mean by matter 
is something wliich is solid, extended, and divisible. 
That these properties are, in certain individuals, com- 
bined with simple or vegetable life, — in others, with 
animal hfe, that is, life and the powers of sensation 
and motion, — and in others with animal life, and 
certain of those properties which we call mind, — are 
all facts equally beyond our comprehension. For 
any thing we know, tliey may all be immortal prin- 
ciples ; and for any thing we know, matter itself 
may be immortal. The simple truth is, that we 
know nothing on the subject ; and while, on the one 
hand, we have no title to assume an essence to be 
mortal because it possesses only the properties of ; 
matter ; neither, on the other hand, have we any 
right to infer an essence to be immortid, because it 
possesses properties different from tliose of matter. 
We talk, indeed, about matter, ;ind we talk about 
mind; we speculate concerning materiality and imma- 
terialit}^ until we argue ourselves into a kind of 
belief that we really understand something of the 
subject. The truth is that we understand nothing. 
Matter and mind are known to us by certain prop- 
erties ; these properties are quite distinct from 
each other ; but in regard to both, it is entirely out 
of the reach of our l^ticulties to advance a single 
step beyond the facts which are before us. "Whether 
in their substratum or uhimate essence, they are the 
same, or whether they are different, we know not. 



MATERIALISM. 43 

and never can know in our present state of being. 
Let us, then, be satisfied with the facts, when our 
utmost faculties can carry us no farther; let us 
cease to push our feeble speculations, when our duty 
is only to wonder and adore. 

These considerations, while they are directly op- 
posed to the crude conclusions of the materialist, 
also serve to show us how much the subject is re- 
moved beyond our limited faculties ; and it is not on 
such speculations, therefore, that we rest the evi- 
dence for a future state of being. We know no- 
thing of the nature or the essence of mind ; but what- 
ever may be its essence, and whatever may be the 
nature and extent of that mysterious connexion 
which the Deity has established between it and our 
bodily organization, these points have no reference 
whatever to the great question of its future exist- 
ence. This is a principle which seems to have been 
too much lost sight of in the discussion of this sub- 
ject, namely, that our speculations respecting the 
immateriality of the rational human soul have no in- 
fluence on our belief of its immortality. This mo- 
mentous truth rests on a species of evidence alto- 
gether different, which addresses itself to the moral 
constitution of man. It is found in those principles 
of his nature by which he feels upon his spirit the 
awe of a God, and looks forward to the future with 
anxiety or with hope ; — by which he knows to dis- 
tinguish truth from falsehood and evil from good, 
and has forced upon him the conviction that he is 
a moral and responsible being. This is the power 
of conscience, that monitor within which raises its 
voice in the breast of every man, a witness for his 
Creator. He who resigns himself to its guidance, 
and he who repels its warnings, are both compelled 
to acknowledge its power ; and, whether the good 
man rejoices in the prospect of immortality, or the 
victim of remorse withers beneath an influence un- 



44 EXTENT OP OtJR KNOWLEDGE OF MIND. 

seen by human eye, and shrinks from the anticipa- 
tion of a reckoning to come, each has forced upon 
him a conviction, such as arcfument never gave; that 
the being v^^hich is essentially himself is distinct from 
any function of the body, and will survive in undi- 
minished vigour when the body shall have fallen into 
decay. 

When, indeed, we take into the inquiry the high 
principles of moral obligation, and the moral govern- 
ment of the Deity, this miportant truth is entirely 
independent of all our feeble speculations on the 
essence of mind. For though we were to suppose, 
with the materialist, that the rational soul of man 
IS a mere chymical combination, which, by the dis- 
solution of its elements, is dissipated to the four- 
winds of heaven, where is the improbability that 
the Power which framed the wondrous compound 
may cohect these elements again, and combine them 
anew, for the great purposes of his moral adminis- 
tration. In our speculations on such a momentous 
subject we are too apt to be influenced by our con- 
ceptions of the powers and properties of physical 
things ; but there is a point where this principle nnist 
be abandoned, and M^iere the soundest philosophy 
requires that we take along with us a full recogni- 
sance of the power of God. 

There is thus, in the consciousness of every man, 
a deep impression of continued existence. The 
casuist may reason against it till he bewilder him- 
self in his own sophistries ; but a voice within gives 
the lie to his vain speculations, and pleads with au- 
thority for a life which is to come. The sincere and 
humble inquirer cherishes the impression, while he 
seeks for farther light on a subject so momentous ; 
and he thus receives, with absolute conviction, the 
truth which beams upon him from the revelation of 
God, — that the mysterious part of his being, which 
thinks, and wills, and reasons, shall indeed survive 
the wreck of its mortal tenement, and is destined 
for immortality. 



PART n. 

OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF 
FACTS RELATING BOTH TO MIND AND 
MATTER. 

Among writers on the science of mind, there was 
formerly much controversy in regard to the origin 
of our ideas. Some maintained that they are 
derived entirely from perception, that is, through 
the external senses; others considered them as 
arising partly from perception and partly from con- 
sciousness, or reflection ; and some added a third 
class, which they called innate ideas, and which 
were supposed to exist in the mind itself, inde- 
pendently of and prior to the exercise either of per- 
ception or reflection. This phraseology had its 
origin in the ancient theory of ideas, according to 
which something was supposed to exist distinct 
both from the mind and the exterual object of its 
perception. This, as we have formerly seen, was 
what philosophers meant by an idea. It was be- 
lieved to be the immediate object of the mind's per- 
ception, but to be only a kind of image or repre- 
sentative of the object perceived. This hypothesis, 
which kept its place in the science of mind till a 
very recent period, is now generally admitted to 
have been a fiction of philosophers ; and the phrase- 
ology respecting ideas is abandoned by the best 
practical writers ; because, though the ancient doc- 
trine be exploded, and the term maybe used only in 
a figurative sense, it still seems to imply something 
existing in the mind distinct from the mind itself. 
The impressions derived from external things are 
therefore to be considered as the occasions on which 



46 ORIGIN OF OUR KNOWLEDGE. 

the various powers of the mind are brought into 
action. These powers themselves then become the 
objects of consciousness or reflection, and by their 
further exercise we acquire certain notions which 
arise out of the mental operations. This doctrine 
gives no encouragement to the scheme of material- 
ism, for it is clear that we cannot remember till we 
are furnished with some fact to be remembered ; but 
this can never be supposed to affect our belief in the 
existence of the power of memory before the fact 
was so furnished. If we could suppose the case of 
a man who had lived all his life in the dark, he cer- 
tainly could not see, but we should not say that the 
admission of light imparted to him the power of 
vision ; it only furnished the circumstances which 
gave occasion to the exercise of sight. Tt has 
accordingly been shown by Mr. Stewart, that though 
we may not be conscious of our mental powers till 
they are called into action, yet this may arise from 
the most simple sensation, — such as afl^ords no evi- 
dence of the properties, or even of the existence 
of the material world. 

Through the senses, then, we acquire a knowledge 
of the facts relating to external things. The mental 
processes thus brought into action then become the 
subjects of consciousness, and we acquire a know- 
ledge of the facts relating to them. By a further 
exercise of these powers on various facts referring 
to both matter and mind, we acquire certain notions 
arising out of our reflection upon the relations of 
these facts, such as our notions of time, motion, 
number, cause and eflfect, and personal identity ; and 
we acquire, further, the impression of certain funda- 
mental laws of belief, which are not referable to 
any process of reasoning, but are to be considered 
as a part of our constitution, or a spontaneous and 
instinctive exercise of reason in every sound mind. 

The origin of our knowledge then is referable, 
in a pliilosophical point of view, to perception and 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 47 

reflection. But, in point of fact, the knowledge 
which is acquired by an individual through his own 
perception and reflection is but a small part of what 
he possesses ; much of the knowledge possessed by 
every one is acquired through the perceptions of 
other men. In an essay, therefore, which is in- 
tended to be entirely practical, I shall include this 
last department under the head of Testimony. The 
division of this part of the subject will therefore be, 

1. Sensation and Perception. 

2. Consciousness and Reflection. 

3. Testimony. 



SECTION I. 

OF SENSATION AND- PERCEPTION. 

We know nothing of perception except the fact 
that certain impressions made upon the organs of 
sense convey to the mind a knowledge of the 
properties of external things. Some of the older 
speculations on this subject have already been 
referred to. In these the mind was compared to a 
camera obscura, and the transmission of the forms 
or- images of things to it from the organs of sense 
was explained by the motion of the animal spirits, 
or the nervous fluid, or by vibrations in the sub- 
stance of the nerves. All such speculations are now 
dismissed from the investigation, being considered 
as attempts to penetrate into mysteries which are 
beyond the reach of the human faculties, and conse- 
quently not the legitimate objects of philosophical 
inquir}^ 

Our first knowledge of the existence and proper- 
ties of the material world is evidently of a complex 



48 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

nature. It seems to arise from the combined action 
of several senses, conveying to us tlie general 
notion of certain essences which are solid and ex- 
tended, or possessed of those properties which 
characterize material things. Without this general 
knowledge previously acquired, our various senses 
acting individually could convey to us no definite 
notion of the properties of external things. A 
smell, that is, a mere odour, for example, might be 
perceived by us, but would convey nothing more 
than the sensation simply. It could not comnnmi- 
cate the impression of this being a property of an 
external body, until we had previously acquired a 
knowledge of the existence of that body, and had 
come by observation to associate the sensation with 
the body from which it proceeds. The same holds 
true of the other senses, and we are thus led at the 
very first step of our inquiry to a compiii^ated pro- 
cess of mind Avitliout which our mere sensations 
could convey to us no definite knowledge. 

Having thus acquired a knowledge of the exist- 
ence and general properties of material things, we 
next derive from our various senses a knowledge 
of their more minute cliaracters. These are gene- 
rally divided into primary and secondary. The 
primary qualities of material things are such as 
are essential, and must at all times belong to matter ; 
such as solidity and extension. These properties 
necessarily convey to us a conviction of something 
existing out of the mind, and distinct from its own 
sensations. The secondary qualities, again, are 
colour, temperature, smell, taste, &c. These are 
not essential properties of matter, but qualities pro- 
ducing sensations in a sentient being; they may or 
they may not belong to any particular body, or fhey 
may be attached to it at one time and not at anotluM-. 
Hence they convey to us primarily no definite 
notion in regard to the existence or "properties of 
external things, except, as ^Ir. Stewart expresses it, 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 49 

" as the imknown cause of a known sensation." 
One of the quibbles or paradoxes of the scholastic 
philosophy was, denying- the real existence of these 
secondary qualities of matter. Every one is 
familiar with the humorous account given in the 
" Guardian" of the attainments of a youth from col- 
lege, and his display of them when on a visit to 
Lady Lizard, his mother. " When the girls were 
sorting a set of knots he would demonstrate to them 
that all the ribands were of the same colour, or 
rather of no colour at all. My Lady Lizard herself, 
though she was not a little pleased with her son's 
improvement, was one day almost angry with him; 
for, having accidentally burnt her fingers as she was 
lighting the lamp for her teapot, in the midst of her 
anguish Jack laid hold of the opportunity to instruct 
her that there is no such thing as heat in the fire." 
Such speculations, which were at one time common 
in the schools of philosophy, had their origin en- 
tirely in an abuse of terms. The term heat, for ex- 
ample, has two meanings, which are quite distinct 
from each other. It means a sensation produced in 
a sentient being, and in this sense it may be said 
with truth that there is no heat iii the fire ; but it 
means also a quality in material substances capable 
of producing this sensation, and it is in this sense 
that we speak of heat as a property of matter. 

The process by which we acquire a knowledge 
of external things is usually di\dded into two stages, 
namely, sensation and perception; the former im- 
plying the corporeal, the latter the mental part of it. 
Others apply the term perception to both ; and, ac- 
cording to Dr. Brown, sensation is the simple im- 
pression made upon the organs of sense ; perception 
is an association formed between this impression 
and an external substance which we have ascer- 
tained to be concerned in producing it. Our senses, 
by which this knowledge is acquired, are generally 
E 



50 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

reckoned five, — namely, sight, hearing, taste, smell, 
and touch. Dr. Brown proposes to add our mus- 
cular frame, and apparently with good reason ; for 
there seems ground for believing that it is by resist- 
ance to muscular action that we acquire the notion 
of solidity, and that this could not be acquired by 
touch alone. 

Our first impression of the existence and solidity 
of material objects, then, seems to be derived from 
touch combined with muscular resistance ; and at 
the same time we acquire the knowledge of temper- 
ature, roughness or smoothness, &c. There has 
been some difference of opinion in regard to the 
manner in which we acquire the notion of extension, 
including figure and magnitude. It is evident that it 
cannot be acquired from touch alone ; but it may be 
acquired from touch combined with muscular motion, 
as when we move the hand over the surface of a 
body. This, however, includes also the idea of 
time, — for our notion of the extent of a surface 
when the hand moves over it is very much in- 
fluenced by the velocity with which the motion is 
made. Hence time has been supposed by some to 
be one of our very earliest impressions, and antece- 
dent even to the notion of extension or space. It 
is probable, however, that the notion of extension 
may also be acquired in a more simple manner from 
the combined operation of touch and vision. If this 
opinion be correct, it will follow that our first know- 
ledge of the existence and essential properties of 
material things is derived from the combined opera- 
tion of sight, touch, and muscular action. 

With regard to all our senses, however, the truth 
seems to be, that the first notions conveyed by them 
are of a very limited and imperfect kind ; and that 
our real knowledge is acquired only after consider- 
able observation and experience, in the course of 
which the impressions of one sense are corrected 
and assisted by those of others, and by a process of 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 51 

mind acting upon the whole. The primary objects 
of vision, for example, seem to be simply light or 
colour, and expansion. But the judgments which 
we are in the daily habit of forming upon vision are 
of a much more extensive kind, embracing also dis- 
tance, magnitude, and what has been called tangible 
figure, such as the figure of a cube or a sphere. 
This last, it is evident, cannot be considered as a 
primary object of vision, but as entirely the result 
of experience derived from the sense of touch ; for 
we never could have formed any conception of the 
figure of a cube or a sphere by vision alone. Dis- 
tance and magnitude, also, are evidently not the 
primary objects of vision; for persons who have 
been suddenly cured of congenital blindness, by the 
operation for cataract, have no conception of the 
distance or magnitude of objects ; they perceive only 
simple expansion of surface with colour. Our judg- 
ment of distance and magnitude by vision, therefore, 
is an acquired habit, founded upon ihe knowledge 
which we have received by other means of the 
properties of the objects. Accordingly, it is familiar 
to every one, that we have no idea of the distance 
of an object, except we have some notion of its mag- 
nitude ; nor, on the other hand, of its magnitude, ex- 
cept we have some knowledge of its distance. The 
application of this principle is also famiUar in per- 
spective drawing, in which the diminished size of 
known objects is made to convey the notion of dis- 
tance. On the same principle, known objects seen 
through a telescope do not appear to be magnified, 
but to be brought nearer. In the same manner with 
regard to sounds ; we have no idea of their intensity, 
except we have some notion of their distance, and 
vice versd. A given degree of sound, for example, 
if we beheved it to have been produced in the next 
room, we might conclude to proceed from the fall 
of some trifling body ; but if we supposed it to be at 
the distance of several miles, we should immediately 



52 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

conclude that it proceeded from a tremendous ex- 
plosion. 

In regard to certain small distances, however, 
there is a power of judging by sight alone ; and it 
appears to arise out of the degree of inclination 
which is given to the axis of vision in directing the 
two eyes to the object. Thus, in snuffing a candle, 
or carrying the finger to a small object within arm's 
length, it will be found that we are very apt to miss 
it, if we look with one eye only, but can touch it 
with unerring certainty when both eyes are directed 
to it. It appears to be on the same principle that 
we enjoy in a greater degree the deception produced 
by a painting, when we look at it with one eye, 
especially if we also look through a tube. By the 
former we cut off the means of correcting the illu- 
sion by the direction of the axis of vision ; and by 
the latter we remove the influence of all neighbour- 
ing objects. It is impossible to determine the pre- 
cise distance to which we can extend this power of 
judging of distance by the inclination of the axis of 
vision, but it does not appear to be great ; and in re- 
gard to all greater distances the judgment by vision 
is evidently an acquired habit, arising out of such a 
mental exercise as has now been referred to. 

There are some other circumstances, also the re- 
sult of experience, by which we are greatly influ- 
enced in all such cases, particularly the degree of 
illumination of the objects, and the degree of dis- 
tinctness of their outline and minute parts. Thus, 
in a picture, distant objects are represented as faintly 
illuminated, and with indistinctness of outline and 
minute parts ; and vice versd. On this principle, ob- 
jects seen through a fog, or in obscure light, are apt 
to appear much larger than they really are ; because, 
in the mental process which takes place in regard to 
them, we first assume them to be distant, from their 
imperfect outline and faint illumination, and then, 
judging from this assumed distance, we conclude 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 53 

them to be of great size. On the other hand, ob- 
jects seen in an unusually clear state of the atmo- 
sphere appear nearer than they really are, from the 
greater distinctness of their outline. In our judg- 
ment of distance by sight, we are also greatly influ- 
enced by the eye resting on intermediate objects ; 
and hence the difficulty of judging of distances at 
sea. A striking illustration of the same principle is 
furnished by Captain Parry, in regard to objects seen 
across a uniform surface of snow. " We had fre- 
quent occasion, in our walks on shore, to remark 
the deception which takes place in estimating the 
distance and magnitude of objects, when viewed 
over an unvaried surface of snow. It was not un- 
common for us to direct our steps towards what we 
took to be a large mass of stone, at the distance of 
half a mile from us, but which we were able to take 
up in our hands after one minute's walk. This was 
more particularly the case when ascending the 
brow of a hill." Captain Parry adds, that this de- 
ception did not become less on account of the fre- 
quency with which its effects were experienced ; and 
a late writer has used this as an objection to the 
doctrine lately referred to, respecting the influence 
of experience on our judgment of distance by vision. 
But this is evidently founded on a misconception of 
the eff'ect of experience in such cases. Captain 
Parry could mean only, that he did not acquire the 
power of judging of the distance or magnitude of un- 
known, objects. Had he been approaching an object 
by which he had once been deceived, knowing it to 
be the same, he would not have been deceived a 
second time ; but, judging from its known magni- 
tude, would have inferred its distance. Thus the 
result of experience is to enable us to judge of the 
distance of an object of known magnitude, or of the 
magnitude of an object at a known distance ; but, in 
regard to objects of which both the distance and 
E2 



54 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

magnitude are unknown, it teaches us only not to 
trust the indications of vision. 

In our judgement by vision of the magnitude of ob- 
jects, again, we are much influenced by comparison 
with other objects, the magnitude of which is sup- 
posed to be known. I remember once having occa- 
sion to pass along Ludgate Hill, when the great door 
of St. Paul's was open, and several persons were 
standing in it. They appeared to be very little chil- 
dren ; but, on coming up to them, were found to be 
full-grown persons. In the mental process which 
here took place, the door had been assumed as a 
known magnitude, and the other objects judged of 
by it. Had I attended to the door being much larger 
than any door that one is in the habit of seeing, the 
mind would have made allowance for the apparent 
size of the persons; and, on the other hand, had 
these been known to be full-grown persons, a judg- 
ment would have been formed of the size of the 
door. On the same principle, travellers visiting the 
Pyramids of Egypt have repeatedly remarked, how 
greatly the notion of their magnitude is increased 
by a number of large animals, as camels, being as- 
sembled at their base. 

There is something exceedingly remarkable in the 
manner in which loss or diminution of one sense is 
followed by increase of the intensity of others, or 
rather, perhaps, by an increased attention to tlie in- 
dications of other senses. Blind persons acquire a 
wonderful dehcacy of touch; in some cases, it is 
said, to the extent of distinguishing colours. Mr. 
Saunderson, the blind mathematician, could distin- 
guish by his hand, in a series of Roman medals, the 
true from the counterfeit, with a more unerring dis- 
crimination than the eye of a professed virtuoso ; 
and, when he Avas present at the astronomical ob- 
servations in the garden of his college, he was ac- 
customed to perceive eveiy cloud w^hich passed over 
the sun. This remarkable power, which has some- 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 55 

times been referred to an increased intensity of par- 
ticular senses, in many cases evidently resolves 
itself into an increased habit of attention to the indi- 
cations of all those senses which the individual re- 
tains. Two instances have been related to me of 
blind men who were much esteemed as judges of 
horses. One of these, in giving his opinion of a 
horse, declared him to be blind, though this had 
escaped the observation of several persons who had 
the use of their eyes, and who were with some dif- 
ficulty convinced of it. Being asked to give an ac- 
count of the principle on which he had decided, he 
said it was by the sound of the horse's step in walk- 
ing, which implied a peculiar and unusual caution in 
his manner of putting down his feet. The other 
individual, in similar circumstances, pronounced a 
horse to be blind of one eye, though this had also 
escaped the observation of those concerned. When 
he was asked to explain the facts on which he 
■formed his judgment, he said he felt the one eye to 
be colder than the other. It is related of the late 
Or. Moyse, the well-knowm blind philosopher, that 
he could distinguish a black dress on his friends iDy its 
^smell; and there seems to be good evidence that 
Wind persons have acquired the power of distin- 
guishing colours by the touch. In a case of this 
kind, mentioned by Mr. Boyle, the individual stated 
that black imparted to his sense of touch the greatest 
•degree of asperity, and blue the least. Dr. Rush re- 
lates of two blind young men, brothers, of the city 
of Philadelphia, that they knew when they ap- 
proached a post in walking across a street, by a pecu- 
liar sound which the ground under their feet emitted 
in the neighbourhood of the post ; and that they 
-could tell the names of a number of tame pigeons, 
with which they amused themselves in a little gar- 
den, by only hearing them fly over their heads. I 
have known several instances of persons affected 
with that extreme degree of deafness, which occurs 



56 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

in the deaf and dumb, who had a peculiar suscepti- 
bility to particular kinds of sounds, depending appa- 
rently upon an impression communicated to their 
organs of touch or simple sensation. They could 
tell, for instance, the approach of a carriage in the 
street without seeing it, before it was taken notice 
of by persons who had the use of all their senses. 
An analogous fact is observed in the habit acquired 
by the deaf and dumb, of understanding what is said 
to them by watching the motion of the lips of the 
speaker. Examples still more wonderful are on re- 
cord, but certainly require confirmation. A story, 
for instance, has lately been mentioned, in some of 
the medical journals, of a gentleman in France wlio 
lost every sense, except the feeling of one side of his 
face ; yet it is said that his family acquired a method 
of holding communication with him, by tracing char- 
acters upon the part which retained its sensation. 

IMuch ingenuity has been bestowed upon attempts 
to explain how, with two eyes, we see only one ob- 
ject; and why that object is seen erect, when we 
know that the image on the retina is inverted. All 
that need be said upon the subject, and all tliat can 
properly be said, appears to be, that such is the con- 
stitution of our nervous system. It is on the same 
principle, that by the sense of touch, in which may 
be concerned a thousand or ten thousand distinct 
points of contact, we receive the impression of only 
one body; or, what perhaps may appear a more 
strictly analogous case, we receive the impression 
of but one body, though we grasp the substance with 
two hands, or with ten distinct fingers. For the 
healthy perception in both these cases, however, a 
certain arrangement is required, which we may call 
the natural harmony of the nervous system ; and 
when this harmony is disturbed, the result is re- 
markably altered. Thus, squinting produces the 
vision of a double image, because the images fall 
upon what we may call unharmonizing points of the 



SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 57 

retina; and the same principle may be illustrated 
in a very curious manner by a simple experiment 
with the sense of touch. If a small romid body, 
such as a pea, be laid upon the palm of the one hand, 
and roiled about between the first and second fingers 
of the other, in their natural position^ one pea only 
is felt ; but, if the fingers are crossed, so that the 
pea is rolled between the opposite surfaces of the 
two fingers, a most distinct impression of two peas 
is conveyed. 

Of the whole of the remarkable process of senscu- 
tion and perception we know nothing but the facts, 
that certain impressions made upon the organs of 
sense are followed. by certain perceptions in the 
mind ; and that this takes place, in some way through 
the medium of the brain and nervous systeai. We 
are in the habit of saying, that the impressions are 
conveyed to the brain ; but, even in this, we proba- 
bly advance a step beyond what is warranted. We 
know that the nerves derive their influence from 
their connexion with the brain, or as forming along 
with it one great medium of sensation ; but we do 
not know whether impressions made upon the ner- 
vous fabric connected with the organs of sense are 
conveyed to the brain ; or whether the mind per- 
ceives them directly, as they are made upon the or- 
gans of sense. The whole subject is one of those 
mysteries which are placed above our reach, and in 
which we cannot advance a single step beyond the 
knowledge of the facts. Any attempt to speculate 
upon it is therefore to be considered as contrary to 
the first principles of philosophical inquiry. We 
must simply receive the facts as of that class which 
we cannot account for in the smallest degree ; and 
the evidence which we derive from our senses, of the 
existence and properties of the things of the mate- 
rial world, is to be recognised as one of those fun- 
damental laws of belief which admit of no other 
proof than that wliich is found in the universal con- 
viction (5f mankind. 



58 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

Before concluding the subject of perception, it re- 
mains to be noticed that a certain voluntary effort 
is required for the full exercise of it ; or, at least, 
for that degree of perception which leaves an im- 
pression capable of being retained. It is familiar to 
every one, that when the mind is closely occupied, 
numerous objects may pass before our eyes, and cir- 
cumstances be talked of in our hearing, of which 
we do not retain the slightest recollection ; and this 
is often in such a degree as implies, not a want of 
memory only, but an actual want of the perception 
of the objects. We cannot doubt, however, that 
there was the sensation of them ; that is, the usual 
impression made upon the eye in the one case, and 
the ear in the other. What is wanting is a certain 
effort of the mind itself, without which sensation is 
not necessarily followed by perception ; — this is what 
we call Attention. It is a state or act of the mind 
which is exercised by different individuals in very 
different degrees. It "is much influenced by habit ; 
and though it may not often be wanting in such a 
degree as to prevent the perception of objects, it is 
often deficient in a manner which prevents the re- 
collection of them, and consequently has an exten- 
sive influence upon the intellectual character. 

The effect of attention is illustrated by various 
mental phenomena of daily occurrence. If we are 
placed in sucli a situation that the eye commands 
an extensive landscape, presenting a great variety 
of objects, or the wall of an apartment covered with 
pictures, we have the power of fixing the mind upon 
one object in such a manner that all the rest become 
to us nearly as if they did not exist. Yet we know 
that they are actually seen as far as the mere sense 
of vision is concerned ; that is, images of all of 
them are formed upon the retina ; but they are not 
objects of attention, or of that pecuhar voluntary 
effort of mind which is necessary for the full per- 
ception of them. In the same manner, a practised 



INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 59 

musician can in the midst of a musical performance 
direct his attention to one part, such as the bass, — 
can continue this for such a time as he pleases, and 
then again enjoy the general harmony of the whole. 
On the same principle, the mind maybe so intensely 
fixed upon something within itself, as an object of 
conception or memory, or a process of reasoning, 
as to have no full perception of present external im- 
pressions. We shall afterward have occasion to 
refer to a state of mind in which this exists in such 
a degree, that objects of conception or memory are 
believed to have a real and present existence ; and 
in which this erroneous impression is not corrected- 
by impressions from external things : — this occurs 
in insanity. 

Attention is very much influenced by habit, and 
connected with this subject there are some facts of 
great interest. There is a remarkable law of the 
system, by which actions at first requiring much at- 
tention are after frequent repetition performed with 
a much less degree of it, or without the mind being 
conscious of any effort. This is exemplified in vari- 
ous processes of daily occurrence, as reading and 
writing, but most remarkably in music. Musical 
performance at first requires the closest attention, 
but the effort becomes constantly less, until it is 
often not perceived at all ; and a lady may be seen 
running over a piece of music on the piano, and 
at the same time talking on another subject. A 
young lady, mentioned by Dr. Darwin, executed a 
long and very difficult piece of music with the ut- 
most precision, under the eye of her master ; but 
seemed agitated during the execution of it, and when 
she had concluded, burst into tears. It turned out 
that her attention had, during the whole time, been 
intensely occupied with the agonies of a favourite 
canary bird, which at last dropped dead in its cage. 
We see the same principle exemplified in the rapidity 
with which an expert arithmetician can run up a 



60 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

long column of figures, without being conscious of 
the individual combinations. It is illustrated in 
another manner by the feats of jugglers, the decep- 
tion produced by which depends upon their perform- 
ing a certain number of motions with such rapidity 
that the attention of the spectators does not follow 
all the combinations. 

In teaching such arts as music or arithmetic, this 
principle is also illustrated ; for the most expert 
arithmetician or musical performer is not necessarily, 
and perhaps not generally, the best teacher of the 
art ; but he who, with a competent knowledge of it, 
directs his attention to the individual minute com- 
binations through which it is necessary for the 
learner to advance. 

In processes more purely intellectual, we find the 
influence of habit brought under our view in a similar 
manner, particularly in following the steps of a pro- 
cess of reasoning. A person little accustomed to 
such a process advances step by step, with minute 
attention to each as he proceeds ; while another 
perceives at once the result, with little conscious- 
ness of the steps by which he arrived at it. For 
this reason, also, it frequently happens that in cer- 
tain departments of science the profound philosopher 
makes a bad teacher. He proceeds too rapidly for 
his audience, and without sufficient attention to the 
intermediate steps by which it is necessary for them 
to advance ; and they may derive much more in- 
struction from an inferior man, whose mental pro- 
cess on the subject approaches more nearly to that 
which, in the first instance, must be theirs. We re- 
mark the same difference in public speaking and in 
writing ; and we talk of a speaker or a writer who 
is easily followed, and another who is followed with 
diflficulty. The former retards the series of his 
thoughts, so as to bring distinctly before his hearers 
or his readers every step in the mental process. 
The latter advances without suflicient attention to 



INFLUENCE OF ATTENTION. 61 

this, and consequently can be followed by those only 
who are sufficiently acquainted with the subject to 
fill up the intermediate steps, or not to require them. 

There is a class of intellectual habits directly the 
reverse of those now referred to ; namely, habits 
of inattention, by which the mind, long unaccus- 
tomed to have the attention steadily directed to any 
important object, becomes frivolous and absent, or 
lost amid its own waking dreams. A mind in this 
condition becomes incapable of following a train of 
reasoning, and even of observing facts with accuracy 
and tracing their relations. Hence nothing is more 
opposed to the cultivation of intellectual character ; 
and when such a person attempts to reason, or to 
follow out a course of investigation, he falls into 
slight and partial views, unsound deductions, and 
frivolous arguments. This state of mind, therefore, 
ought to be carefully guarded against in the young ; 
as, when it is once established, it can be removed 
only by a long and laborious effort, and after a cer- 
tain period of hfe is probably irremediable. 

In rude and savage life remarkable examples occur 
of the effect of habits of minute attention to those 
circumstances to which the mind is intensely directed 
by their relation to the safety or advantage of the 
observer. The American hunter finds his way in 
the trackless forests by attention to minute appear- 
ances in the trees, which indicate to him the points 
of the compass. He traces the progress of his ene- 
mies or his friends by the marks of their footsteps ; 
and judges of their numbers, their baitings, their 
employments by circumstances which would en- 
tirely escape the observation of persons unaccus- 
tomed to a mode of life requiring such exercises of 
attention. Numerous examples of this kind are 
mentioned by travellers, particularly among the origi- 
nal natives of America. 
F 



62 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 



OF FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 

Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to refer 
to some remarkable facts respecting perceptions 
taking place, without the presence of any external 
body corresponding with them. These are called 
false perceptions, and they are usually referred to 
two classes ; namely, those arising in the organs of 
sense, in which the mind does not participate ; and 
those which are connected with hallucination of 
mind, or a belief of the real existence of the object. 
The former only belong to this part of the subject. 
The latter will be referred to in another part of our 
inquiry, as they do not consist of false impressions 
on the senses, but depend upon the mind mistaking its 
own conceptions for real and present existences. 

Of false perceptions, properly so called, the most 
familiar are the musccE volitanles floating before the 
eyes, and sounds in the ears resembling the ringing 
of bells, or the noise of a waterfall. Changes are 
also met with in the organs of sense giving rise to 
remarkable varieties of perception. Dr. Falconer 
mentions a gentleman who had such a morbid state 
of sensation that cold bodies felt to him as if they 
were intensely hot. A gentleman mentioned by Dr. 
Conolly, when recovering from measles, saw objects 
diminished to the smallest imaginable size; and a 
patient mentioned by Baron Larry, on recovering 
from amaurosis, saw men as giants, and all objects 
magnified in a most remarkable manner; it is not 
mentioned how long these peculiarities continued. 
This last peculiarity of perception occurred also to 
a particular friend of mine in recovering from typhus 
fever. His own body appeared to him to be about 
ten feet high. His bed seemed to be seven or eight 
feet from the floor, so that he felt the greatest dread 



FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 63 

in attempting to get out of it ; and the opening of the 
chimney of his apartment appeared as lar^e as the 
arch of a bridge. A singular peculiarity of this case 
however was, that the persons about him with whom 
he was famihar did not appear above their natural 
size. But the most interesting phenomena connected 
with affections of this kind are furnished by the va- 
rious modifications of spectral illusions. These are 
referable to three classes. 

I. Impressions of visible objects remaining for 
some time after the eye is shut, or has been with- 
drawn frjom them ; generally accompanied by some 
remarkable change in the colour of the objects. 
Various interesting experiments of thi3 kind are re- 
lated by Dr. Darwin ; one of the most striking is the 
following: — "I covered a paper about four inches 
square with yellow, and with a pen filled with a blue 
colour wrote upon the middle of it the word BANKS 
in capitals ; and sitting with my back to the sun, 
fixed my eyes for a minute exactly on the centre of 
the letter N in the word. After shutting my eyes, 
and shading them somewhat with my hand, the word 
was distinctly seen in the spectrum, in yellow colours 
on a blue ground ; and then on opening my eyes on 
a yellowish wall at twenty feet distance, the magni- 
fied name of BANKS appeared on the wall written 
in golden characters." — A friend of mine had been 
one day looking intensely at a small print of the 
Virgin and Child, and had sat bending over it for some 
time. On raising his head he was startled by per- 
ceiving at the farther end of the apartment a female 
figure, the size of life, with a child in her arms. The 
first feeling of surprise having subsided, he instantly 
traced the source of the illusion, and remarked that 
the figure corresponded exactly with that which he 
had contemplated in the print, being what painters 
call a kit-cat figure, in which the lower parts of the 
body are not represented. The illusion continued 
distinct for about two minutes. Similar illusions of 



64 SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 

hearing are met with, though less frequently than 
those of vision. A gentleman recently recovered 
from an affection of the head, in which he had been 
much reduced by bleeding, had occasion to go into 
a large town a few miles from his residence. His 
attention was there attracted by the bugle of a regi- 
ment of horse, sounding a particular measure which 
is used at changing guard in the evening. He as- 
sured me that this sound was from that time never 
out of his ears for about nine months. During all 
this period he continued in a very precarious state 
of health ; and it was only as his health became more 
confirmed that the sound of the bugle gradually left 
him. In regard to ocular spectra, another fact of a 
very singular nature appears to have been first ob- 
served by Sir Isaac Newton, — namely, that when he 
produced a spectrum of the sun by looking at it with 
the right eye, the left being covered, upon uncover- 
ing the left, and looking upon a white ground, a spec- 
trum of the sun was seen with it also. He likewise 
acquired the power of recalling the spectra, after 
they had ceased, when he went into the dark, and 
directed his mind intensely, " as when a man looks* 
earnestly to see a thing which is difficult to be seen.*?! 
By repeating these experiments frequently, such < 
efiect was produced upon his eyes, " that for somel 
months after," he says, " the spectrum of the suol 
began to return as often as I began to meditate upon 
the phenomena, even though I lay in bed at midnight 
with my curtains drawn." 

II. Impressions of objects recently seen returning 1 
after a considerable interval. Various interesting 
^ xamples of this kind are on record. Dr. Ferriar 
mentions of himself that when about the age of four- 
teen, if he had been viewing any interesting object 
in the course of the day, as a romantic ruin, a fine 
seat, or a review of troops, so soon as evening came, 
if he had occasion to go into a dark room, the whole 
totjene was brought before him with a brilliancy equal 



FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 65 

to what it possessed in daylight, and remained visible 
for some minutes. 

III. False perceptions arising in the course of 
some bodily disorder, generally fever. A lady whom 
I attended some years ago, in a slight feverish dis- 
order, saw distinctly a party of ladies and gentlemen 
sitting round her bedchamber, and a servant handing 
something to them on a tray. The scene continued 
in a greater or less degree for several days, and was 
varied by spectacles of castles and churches of a 
very brilliant appearance, as if they had been built 
of finely cut crystal. The whole was in this case 
entirely a visual phantasm, for there was no hallu- 
cination of mind. On the contrary, the patient had 
from the first a full impression that it was a morbid 
affection of vision, connected with the fever, and 
amused herself and her attendants by watching and 
describing the changes in the scenery. A gentleman 
who was also a patient of mine, of an irritable habit, 
and liable to a variety of uneasy sensations in his 
head, was sitting alone in his dining-room in the twi- 
light, the door of the room being a little open. He 
saw distinctly a female figure enter, wrapped in a 
mantle, and the face concealed by a large black bon- 
net. She seemed to advance a few steps towards 
him and then stop. He had a full conviction that 
the figure was an illusion of vision, and amused him- 
self for some time by watching it ; at the same time 
observing that he could see through the figure, so as 
to perceive the lock of the door and other objects 
behind it. At length, when he moved his body a 
little forward, it disappeared. The appearances in 
these two cases were entirely visual illusions, and 
probably consisted of the renewal of real scenes or 
figures, in a manner somewhat analogous to those 
in Dr. Ferriar's case, though the renewal took place 
after a longer interval. When there is any degree 
of hallucination of mind, so that the phantasm is be- 
F2 



•66 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

lieved to have a real existence, the affection is en- 
tirely of a different nature, as will be more particu- 
larly mentioned under another part of our subject. 

False perceptions may be corrected by one of three 
methods ; — by the exercise of other senses — by a 
comparison with the perceptions of other persons — 
and by an exercise of judgment. If I suspect that 
my eye deceives me, I apply the hand, with the per- 
fect conviction of the improbability that the two 
senses should be deceived at once. If this cannot 
be done, I appeal to the impressions of some other 
persons, with an equally strong conviction that the 
same sense will not be deceived in the same man- 
ner in several persons at once. Or I may do it 
in another way, by a reference to some known and 
fixed object. Suppose, for example, I see two ob- 
jects where I imagine there should be but one, and 
suspect a visual deception ; I turn my eyes to some 
object which 1 know to be single — such as the sun. 
If I see the sun double I know that there is a delu- 
sion of vision; if I see the sun single, I conclude the 
original perception to be correct. These processes 
imply a certain exercise of judgment; and there 
are other cases in which the same conviction may 
arise from an exercise of judgment, without any 
process of this kind. In one of the cases now re- 
ferred to, for example, the correction took place 
instantly, from observing that the lock of the door 
was seen as if through the figure. 



SECTION II. 

OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND REFLECTION. 

Consciousness appears to mean, simply, the act 
of attending to what is passing in the mind -at the 
time. That more extensive operation to which we 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 67 

ought to give the name of reflection, as distinguished 
from simple consciousness, seems to be connected 
with a power of remembering past perceptions and 
past mental processes, — of comparing them with 
present feelings, so as to trace between them a rela- 
tion, as belonging to the same sentient being, — and, 
further, of tracing the laws by which the mental pro- 
cesses themselves are regulated. It is employed 
also in tracing the relations and sequences of exter- 
nal things, and thus proves the source of certain 
notions expressive of these relations. It is therefore 
a compound operation of mind, including various 
mental processes, especially consciousness, memory, 
and the act of comparison or judgment. The know- 
ledge which we derive from this source, whether we 
call it consciousness or reflection, is referable to 
three heads, 

I. A knowledge of the mental processes, and the 
laws and relations by which they are regulated ; a 
knowledge, for example, of the laws and facts relat- 
ing to memory, conception, imagination, and judg- 
ment. These will be more particularly referred to 
in a subsequent part of our inquiry. In the same 
manner we acquire our knowledge of those which 
have been called the active and moral powers, as 
love, hope, fear, joy, gratitude, &c. 

II. Certain notions arising out of the exercise of 
the mental processes, in reference to the successions 
and relations of things ; our notion, for example, of 
time, arising out of memory and consciousness, — 
our notion of cause — of motion — number— duration 
— extension or space. From simple perception we 
seem to acquire a knowledge of external things as 
existing only at the moment ; and from simple con- 
sciousness a knowledge of a mental impression as 
existing only at the moment. Our notions of the 
succession of things, as implying time and motion, 



68 CONSCIOUSNESS. 

require the exercise of consciousness and memory; 
and our notions of cause, and the various other rela- 
tions of things to each other, require both memory 
and comparison. To the same head, in reference to 
another department of these faculties, belong our 
notions of truth and falsehood — right and wrong. 
These result from a certain exercise of mind, aided 
by that remarkable principle in our constitution which 
commonly receives the name of conscience. 

III. With this exercise of the mental functions 
there spring up in the mind certain convictions, or 
intuitive and instinctive principles of belief. They 
are the immediate result of a certain exercise of the 
understanding, but are not referable to any process 
of induction or chain of reasoning, and can be con- 
sidered only as an original and fuiKiamental part of 
our constitution. This is a subject of great and ex- 
tensive importance, and the articles of belief which 
are referable to it are chiefly the following : — 

(1.) A conviction of our own existence as sentient 
and thinking beings, and of mind as something dis- 
tinct from the functions of the body. 

(2.) A confidence in the evidence of our senses in 
regard to the existence and properties of external 
things ; or a conviction that they have a real exist- 
ence independent of our sensations. 

(3.) A confidence in our own mental processes — 
that facts, for example, which are suggested to us by 
our memory, really occurred. 

(4.) A belief in our personal identity, derived from 
the combined operation of consciousness and mem- 
ory ; or a remembrance of past mental feelings and 
a comparison of them with present mental feehngs, 
as belonging to the same sentient being. 

(5.) A conviction that every event ^must have a 
cause, and a cause adequate to the effect. 

(6.) A confidence in the uniformity of the opera- 
tions of nature^ or that the same cause, acting in the 



TESTIMONY. 69 

same circumstances, will always be followed by the 
same effect. 

These first or instinctive principles of belief will 
be referred to in a more particular manner when we 
come to speak of the use of reason in the investiga- 
tion of truth. They are usually called First Truths, 
and will be seen to occupy a most important place 
as the foundation of all reasoning-. Many ingenious 
but fallacious arguments were at one time wasted in 
attempts to establish them by processes of reasoning. 
These again were assailed by sophistical and skep- 
tical writers, who easily succeeded in showing the 
fallacy of these arguments, and thus assumed the 
credit of undermining the authority of the truths 
themselves. All this species of sophistical warfare 
is now gone by; and the most important era in the 
modern science of reasoning was, when it was dis- 
tinctly shown that these first truths admit of no 
other evidence than the conviction which forces 
itself upon the understanding of all classes of men. 
Since that period it has been generally allowed that 
they admit of no proof by processes of reasoning ; 
and, on the other hand, that they are entirely unaf- 
fected by the arguments by which all such reasoning 
was shown to be fallacious. 



SECTION III. 

OF TESTIMONY. 



A VERY small portion of our knowledge of external 
things is obtained through our own senses ; by far 
the greater part is procured through other men, and 
this is received by us on the evidence of testimony. 
But, in receiving facts in this manner, we usually 



70 TESTIMONY. 

proceed with more caution than when they come to 
us by our personal observation. We are much in- 
fluenced, in the first place, by our confidence in the 
veracity of the narrator, and our knowledge of the 
opportunities which he has had of ascertaining the 
facts he professes to relate. Thus, if he be a person 
on whose testimony we have formerly received im- 
portant statements, which have turned out to be cor- 
V rect, we are the more ready to receive his testimony 
^gain ; if he be a stranger to us, we receive it with 
greater caution ; if he has formerly misled us, we 
view it with suspicion, or reject it altogether. 

But there is another principle of very extensive 
application in such cases, and which is independent 
in a great measure of the character of the narrator. 
In receiving facts upon testimony, we are much in- 
fluenced by their accordance with facts with which 
we are already acquainted. This is what, in com- 
mon language, we call their probability ; and state- 
ments which are probable, that is, in accordance 
with facts which we already know, are received 
upon a lower degree of evidence than those which 
are not in such accordance, or which, in other 
words, appear to us in the present state of our know- 
ledge to be improbable. Now this is a sound and 
salutary caution, but we should beware of allowing 
it to influence us beyond its proper sphere. It 
should lead us to examine carefully the evidence 
upon which we receive facts, not in accordance with 
those which we have already acquired; but we 
should beware of allowing it to engender skepticism. 
For, while an unbounded credulity is the part of a 
weak mind, which never thinks or reasons at all, an 
unhmited skepticism is the part of a contracted 
mind, which reasons upon imperfect data, or makes 
its own knowledge and extent of observation the 
standard and test of probability. An ignorant pea- 
sant may reject the testimony of a philosopher in 
regard to the size of the moon, because he thinks he 



TESTIMONY. 71 

has the evidence of his senses that it is only a foot 
in diameter; and a person, holding a respectable 
rank in society, is said to have received with con- 
tempt the doctrine of the revolution of the earth on 
its axis, because he was perfectly satisfied that his 
house was never known to turn with its front to the 
north. When the King of Siam was told by a Dutch 
traveller that in Holland, at certain seasons of the 
year, water becomes so solid that an elephant might 
walk over it, he rephed, " I have believed many ex- 
traordinary things which you have told me, because 
I took you for a man of truth and veracity, but now 
I am convinced that you lie." This confidence in 
one's own experience, as the test of probability, 
characterizes a mind which is confined in its views 
and limited in its acquirements ; and the tendency of 
it would be the rejection of all knowledge, for which 
we have not the evidence of our senses. Had the 
King of Siam once seen water in a frozen state, he 
would not only have been put right in regard to this 
fact, but his confidence would have been shaken in 
his own experience as the test of probability in other 
things ; and he would have been more disposed for 
the further reception of truth upon the evidence of 
testimony. 

Thus, progress in knowledge is not confined in its 
results to the mere facts which we acquire, but has 
also an extensive influence in enlarging the mind for 
the further reception of truth, and setting it free 
from many of those prejudices which influence men 
who are limited by a narrow field of observation. 
There may even be cases in which, without any re- 
gard to the veracity of the narrator, a cultivated 
mind perceives the elements of truth in a statement 
which is rejected by inferior minds as altogether in- 
credible. An ingenious writer supposes a traveller 
of rather doubtful veracity bringing into the country 
of Archimedes an account of the steam-engine. His 
statement is rejected by his countrvmen as alto 



[ 



72 TESTIMONY. 

gether incredible. It is entirely at variance Tyith 
their.experience, and they think it much more prob- 
able that the traveller should lie, than that such a 
thing should be. But when he describes to Archi- 
medes the arrangement of the machine, the philoso- 
pher perceives the result, and, without any consider- 
ation of the veracity of the narrator, decides, upon 
the evidence derived from the relation of the facts 
themselves, and their accordance with principles 
which are known to him, that the statement is un- 
questionably true. 

This illustration leads to a principle of the utmost 
practical importance. In judging of the credibiUty 
of a statement, we are not to be influenced simply 
by our actual experience of similar events ; for this 
would limit our reception of new facts to their ac- 
cordance with those which we already know. We 
must extend our views much forther than this, and 
proceed upon the knowledge which we have derived 
from other sources, of the powers and properties of 
the agent to which the event is ascribed. It is on this 
principle that the account of the steam-engine would 
have appeared probable to Archimedes, while it was 
rejected by his countrymen as absolutely incredible ; 
because he would have judged, not according to his 
experience of similar machinery, but according to his 
knowledge of the powers and properties of steam. 
In the same manner, when the King of Siam rejected, 
as an incredible falsehood, the account of the freez- 
ing of water, if there had been at his court a phi- 
losopher who had attended to the properties of heat, 
he would have judged in a different manner, though 
the actual fact of the freezing of water might have 
been as new to him as it was to the king. He would 
have recollected that he had seen various solid 
bodies rendered fluid by the application of heat ; and 
that, on the abstraction of the additional heat, they 
again became solid. He would thus have argued 
the possibility, that, by a further abstraction of heat. 



TESTIMONY. 73 

bodies might become solid which are fluid in the or- 
dinaiy temperature of the atmosphere. In -this 
manner, the fact, which was rejected by the king-, 
judging from his own experience, might have been 
received by the philosopher, judging from his know- 
ledge of the powers and properties of heat — though 
he had acquired this knowledge from events appa- 
rently far removed from that to which he now ap- 
phed it. 

The principle here referred to is independent alto- 
gether of the direct rehance which we have on tes- 
timony, in regard to things which are at variance 
with our experience, when we are satisfied that the 
testimony has the characters of credibihty ; but^ 
even on these grounds, we may perceive the fallacy 
of that application of the doctiine of probability 
which has been employed by some writers, in oppo- 
sition to the truths of revealed religion and to the 
means by which they were promulgated — particu- 
larly the miracles of the sacred writings. Miracles, 
they contend, are deviations from the established 
course of nature, and are, consequently, contrary t(y 
our uniform experience. It accords vv^ith our expe- 
rience that men should lie, and even that several 
men might concur in propagating the same lie ; and, 
therefore, it is more probable that the narrators hed,. 
than that the statement respecting miracles is true. 
Mr. Hume even went so far as to maintain, that a 
miracle is so contrary to what is founded upon firm 
and unalterable experience, that it cannot be estab- 
lished by any human testimony. 

The fallacy of this argument may probably be 
maintained from the principles which have been 
stated. It is, in fact, the same mode of reasoning 
which induced the King of Siam to reject the state- 
ment of water becoming solid. This was entirely 
contradicted by his " firm and unalterable experi- 
ence," and, therefore, could not be received, every 
upon' the evidence of a man v/hom he had already 
G 



74 TESTIMONY. 

recognised as a witness of unquestionable veracity, 
and upon whose single testimony he had received 
as truth " many extraordinary things." He thought 
it much more probable that even this man lied, than 
that such a statement could be true. Strictly speak- 
ing, indeed, the objection of Mr. Hume may be con- 
sidered as httle better than a play upon words. For 
what renders an occurrence miraculous is precisely 
the fact of its being opposed to uniform experience. 
To say therefore that miracles are incredible because 
they are contrary to experience is merely to say 
that they are incredible because they are miracles. 

They who are imposed upon by such a sophism 
as this do not, in the first place, attend to the fact 
that the term experience, if so much is to be founded 
upon it, must be limited to the personal observation 
of every individual ; that is, it can apply, in each 
particular case, only to the last fifty or sixty years 
at most, and to events which have happened during 
that period, at the spot where the individual was 
present. Whatever he knows of events which took 
place beyond this spot, or before that period, he 
knows, not from experience, but entirely from testi- 
mony: and a great part of our knowledge, of what 
we call the established course of nature, has been 
acquired in this manner. In the reception of new 
knowledge, then, an individual must either receive 
facts upon testimony, or believe nothing but that for 
which he has the evidence of his senses. It is un- 
necessary to state how much the latter supposition 
is at variance with the daily practice of every man; 
and how much information we are in the constant 
habit of leceiving upon testimony, even in regard to 
things which are very much at variance with our 
personal observation. How many facts do we re- 
ceive in this manner, with unsuspecting confidence, 
on the testimony of the historian, in regard to the 
occurrences of ancient times ; and on the testimony 
©f the naturalist and the traveller, respecting the 



TESTIMONY. 75 

natural and civil history of foreign countries. How 
few persons have verified, by their personal observa- 
tion, the wonders which we receive on the testimony 
of the astronomer; and, even of the great phe- 
nomena of nature on the surface of our globe, how 
much do we receive upon testimony in regard to 
things which are widely at variance with our own 
experience. I need only mention the boiling springs 
of Iceland, and the phenomena of earthquakes and 
volcanoes. But, on the principles of Mr. Hume, 
these could not be believed. On the contrary, if 
one of our intelligent Highlanders were hearing de- 
scribed to him the devastations of a volcano, he 
would point to his heath-covered mountain, as the 
basis of his " firm and unalterable experience," and 
declare it to be more probable that travellers should 
lie than that such a statement could be true. 

The reception of facts upon the evidence of testi- 
mony must therefore be considered as a fundamental 
principle of our nature, to be acted upon whenever 
we are satisfied that the testimony possesses certain 
characters of credibihty. These are chiefly refer- 
able to three heads : that the individual has had suf- 
ficient opportunity of ascertaining the facts; that 
we have confidence in his power of judging of their 
accuracy; and that we have no suspicion of his 
being inJfluenced by passion or prejudice in his tes- 
timony, — or, in other words, that we believe him to 
be an honest witness. Our confidence is further 
strengthened by several witnesses concurring in the 
same testimony, each of whom has had the same 
opportunities of ascertaining the facts, and presents 
the same characters of truth and honesty. On such 
testimony we are in the constant habit of receiving 
statements which are much beyond the sphere of 
our personal observation, and widely at variance 
with our experience. These are the statements 
which, for the sake of a name, we may call marvel- 
lous. In regard to such, the foundation of incredu- 



76 TESTIMONY. 

lity, as we have seen, is generally ignorance ; and il 
is interesting to trace the principles by which a man 
of cultivated mind is influenced in receiving upon 
testimony statements which are rejected by the 
■vulgar as totally incredible. 

1. He is influenced by the recollection that many 
things at one time appeared to him marvellous which 
he now knows to be true : and he thence concludes 
that there may still be in nature many phenomena 
and many principles with which he is entirely un- 
acquainted. In other words, he has learned from 
experience not to make his own knowledge his test 
of probability. 

2. He is greatly influenced by perceiving in the 
statement some element of probability, or any kind 
of sequence or relation by which the alleged fact 
may be connected with principles which are known 
to hin\. It is in this manner that the freezing of 
water, which was rejected by the King of Siam as 
an incredible falsehood, might have appeared credible 
to a philosopher who had attended to the properties i 
of heat, because he would have perceived in the * 
statement a chain of relations connecting it with 
facts which he knew to be true. 

3. He is much guided by his power of discrimi- 
nating the credibility of testimon}^ or of distin- 
guishing that species and that amount of it which 
he feels to be unworthy of absolute credit from that 
on which he relies with as implicit confidence as on 
the uniformity of the course of nature. The vulgar 
mind is often unable to make the necessary dis- 
crimination in this respect, and therefore is apt to 
fall into one of the extremes of credulity and skepti- 
cism. Mr. Hume, indeed, himself admits that there 
is a certain amount of testimony on which he would 
receive a statement widely at variance with his own 
uniform experience, as in the hypothetical case 
which he proposes, — the account of a total darkness 
over the whole earth continuing for eight days two 



TESTIMONY. 77 

hundred years ago. The evidence which he re- 
quires for it is simply the concurrence of testimonies, 
— namely, that all authors in all languages describe 
the event ; and that travellers bring accounts from 
all quarters of traditions of the occurrence being 
still strong and lively among the people. On such 
evidence he admits that philosophers ought to re- 
ceive it as certain. 

These principles may be considered as the ele- 
ments of our belief in regard to statements which 
are new to us ; and it is interesting to remark how 
they balance and compensate each other. Thus, a 
statement which appears probable, or can be readily 
referred to known relations, is received upon a lower 
degree of testimony, as in the illustration respecting 
Archimedes and the steam-engine. Others, which 
we find greater difficulty in referring to any kno\\ii 
principle, we may receive upon a certain amount of 
testimony which we feel to be worthy of absolute 
confidence. But there may be others of so very 
extraordinaiy a kind, and so far removed from or 
even opposed to ever}^ known principle, that we may- 
hesitate in receiving them upon any kind of testi- 
mony, unless we can discover in relation to them 
something on which the mind can fix as an element 
of moral probability. 

This leads us to a very obvious distinction of ex- 
traordinary events, — into those which are only mar- 
vellous, and those which are to be considered mirac- 
ulous. A marvellous event is one which differs in 
all its elements from any thing that we previously 
knew, without being opposed to any known princi- 
ple. But a miraculous event implies much more 
than this, being directly opposed to what every man 
knows to be the established and uniform course of 
nature. It is further required that such an event 
shall be of so obvious and palpable a kind that every 
man is qualified to judge of its miraculous character, 
G2 



'^S TESTIMONY. 

or is convinced it could not happen from the opera- 
tion of any ordinary natural cause. 

In receiving a statement respecting such an event 
we require the highest species of testimony, or that 
on which we rely with the same confidence as on 
the uniformity of the course of nature itself. But 
even with this amount of testimony a doubt may 
still remain. For we have two amounts of proba- 
bihty which are equally balanced against each other ; 
namely, the probability that such testimony should 
not deceive us, and the probability that there should 
be no deviation from the course of nature. The 
concurring evidence of numerous credible witnesses, 
indeed, gives a decided preponderance to the testi- 
mony ; and upon a certain amount of testimony we 
might receive any statement however improbable — 
as in the case admitted by Mr. Hume of a universal 
darkness. But, though in such a case we might re- 
ceive the statement as a fact which we could not 
dispute, the mind would be left in a state of absolute 
suspense and uncertainty in regard to any judgment 
which we could form respecting it. Something 
more appears to be necessary for fixing the distinct 
belief of a miraculous interposition ; and this is an 
impression of moral probability. This consists of 
two parts. (I.) A distinct reference of the event to 
a power which we feel to be capable of producing 
It ; namely, a direct interposition of the Deity. (2.) 
The perception of an adequate object, or a convic- 
tion of high moral probability that an interposition 
of Divine power might be exerted in such circum- 
stances, or for the accomplishment of such an object. 
Such are the miracles of the sacred writings. As 
events opposed to the common course of nature, 
they are, by the supposition, physically improbable 
in the highest degree. Were they not so, were they 
in the lowest degree probable according to our con- 
ceptions of the course of nature, they could not be 



TESTIMONY. 79 

miracles, and consequently could not answer the 
purpose for which they are intended. But notwith- 
standing this species of improbability, they carry 
with them all the elements of absolute credibility ; 
namely, the highest species of testimony, supported 
by a moral probability which bears directly upon 
every element of the statement. This may be 
briefly referred to the following heads : — 

1. The human mind had wandered far from truth 
respecting God ; and on the great question of his 
character and will, a future state, and the mode of 
acceptance in his sight, the light furnished by reason 
among the wisest of men was faint and feeble. On 
points of such importance there was the highest 
moral probabihty that the Deity would not leave 
mankind in this state of darkness, but would com- 
municate to them some distinct knowledge. 

2. It is further probable, that if such a communi- 
cation were made to man, it would be accompanied 
by prodigies or miraculous events, calculated to 
show beyond a doubt the immediate agency of God, 
and thus to establish the divine authority of the 
record. 

3. There is no improbability that the power of the 
Deity should produce deviations from the usual 
course of nature capable of answering such a pur- 
pose. For what we call the course of nature is 
nothing more than an order of events which he has 
established ; and there is no improbability that for 
an adequate end he might produce a deviation from 
this ordex. 

4. An important branch of the moral probability 
of the whole statement of the sacred writings arises 
from the characters of the truths themselves, chal- 
lenging the assent and approbation of every uncon- 
taminated mind. This part of the subject resolves 
itself into three parts ; namely, the truths relating 
to the character and perfections of the Deity ; the 
high and refined morality of the gosDel*. and the 



80 TESTIMONY. 

adaptation of the whole provisions of Christianity to 
the actual condition of man as a moral being. The 
former carry a conviction of their truth to the mind 
of every candid inquirer ; the two latter fix them- 
selves upon the conscience or moral feelings of all 
classes of men with an impression which is irre- 
sistible. 

This mode of reasoning is not chargeable with 
that kind of fallacy which has sometimes been 
ascribed to it, — that it professes first to prove the 
doctrine by the miracle, and then to try the miracle 
by the doctrine. The tendency of it is only to 
deduce from the various elements which really enter 
into the argument a kind of compound evidence, the 
strongest certainly which on such a subject the 
human mind is capable of receiving. It is composed 
of the character of the truths — the moral probability 
of a revelation of clear knowledge on subjects of 
such infinite importance — and the highest species of 
testimony for the miraculous evidence by which the 
revelation was accompanied. There are principles 
in our nature calculated to perceive the manner in 
which the different parts of such an argument har- 
monize with each other ; and, upon ever}' principle 
of the human mind, it is impossible to conceive any 
thing more highly calculated to challenge the serious 
attention and absolute conviction of every sound 
understanding. 

This imperfect view of a deeply interesting sub- 
ject will be sufficient to show the fallacy of the ob- 
jection which has been urged against the credibility 
of miracles, — that they are contrary to our unalter- 
able experience of the established course of nature. 
There might have been some degree of plausibility 
in the argument if these events had been alleged to 
have taken place in ordinary circumstances ; but the 
case is essentially altered, and this kind of improb- 
ability is altogether removed, when in the alleged 
deviation a new agent is introduced entirely capable 



TESTIMONY. 81 

of producing it. Such, as we have seen, are the 
miracles of the sacred writings ; and the question in 
regard to their probabihty is, not whether they are 
probable according to the usual course of nature, 
but whether they are probable in the circumstances 
in which they are alleged to have taken place ; 
namely, in. the case of a direct interposition of the 
Deity for certain great and adequate purposes. In 
such a case, our estimate of probability must be 
founded, according to the principles already stated, 
not upon our experience of similar events, but on 
the knowledge which we derive from other sources 
of the power of the agent to whom the event is 
ascribed. Now the agent to whom miracles are 
ascribed is the Supreme Being, the creator of all 
things, the stupendous monuments of whose omnipo- 
tent power are before us, and within us, and around 
us. What we call the established course of nature 
is merely an order of events which he has appointed ; 
and the question of probability is, whether it is 
probable that for certain adequate purposes he should 
produce a deviation from this order. For such a 
statement, indeed, we require strong, numerous, 
credible, and concurring testimonies ; but it comes 
to be simply a question of evidence ; and there is no 
real improbability that in these circumstances such 
events should take place. 

In this manner, then', there is entirely removed from 
the statement the improbability which is founded 
upon the uniformity of the ordinary course of na- 
ture ; because it is not in the ordinary course of na- 
ture that the events are alleged to have taken place, 
but in circumstances altogether new and peculiar. 
The subsequent inquiry becomes, therefore, simply 
a question of evidence ; this evidence is derived from 
testimony; and we are thus led to take a slight view 
of the grounds on which we estimate the credibility 
of testimony. 

Testimony, we are told, is fallacious, and is liable 



82 TESTIMONY. 

to deceive us. But so are our senses ; — they also 
may deceive, and perhaps have deceived us, as in 
the case of ocular spectra ; but we do not, on that 
account discredit the evidence of our eyes ; we only 
take means, in certain cases, for correcting- their in- 
dications by other senses, as by touching the object, 
or by a comparison with the visual impressions of 
other men ; and, whatever probabihty there is that 
the eyes of one man maybe deceived in any one in- 
stance, the probability is as nothing that both his 
sight and touch should be deceived at once ; or that 
the senses of ten men should be deceived in the 
same manner at the same time. It is the same with 
regard to testimony. It may have deceived us in 
particular instances ; but this applies to one species 
of testimony only ; there is another species which 
never deceived us. We learn by experience to sepa- 
rate distinctly the one from the other, and fix upon 
a species of testimony on which we rely with the 
same confidence as on the uniformity of the course 
of nature. Thus, if we find a man who in other re- 
spects shows every indication of a sound mind, re- 
lating an event which happened under his own in- 
spection, and in such circumstances that he could 
not possibly be deceived ; if his statement be such 
as contributes in no respect to his credit or advan- 
tage, but, on the contrary, exposes him to ridicule, 
contempt, and persecution ; if, notwithstanding, he 
steadily perseveres in it, under every species of per- 
secution, and even to the suffering of death ; to sup- 
pose such a testimony intended to deceive would be 
to assume a deviation from the established course of 
human character, as remarkable as anj^^ event which 
it could possibly convey to us. This might be main- 
tained in regard to one such testimony ; but if we 
find numerous witnesses agreeing in the same testi- 
mony, all equally informed of the facts, all showing 
the same characters of credibility, and without 
the possibihty of concert or connivance, the evi- 



TESTIMONY. 83 

dence becomes, not convincing only, but incontro- 
vertible. 

The grounds on which we receive with confidence 
the evidence of testimony, may, there fore, be briefly 
stated in the following manner: — 

1. That the statement refers to a matter of fact, 
— that the fact was such as could be easily ascer- 
tained by the person who relates it, — and that he 
had sufficient opportunity of ascertaining it. When 
the statement includes a point of opinion, the case 
comes under another principle ; and we require, in 
the first instance, to separate what is opinion from 
what is fact. 

2. That we have no reason to suspect the witness 
to be influenced by interest or passion in his evi- 
dence ; or that he has any purpose to answer by it 
calculated to promote his own advantage. 

3. That various individuals, without suspicion of 
connivance, have concurred in the same statement. 
This is a point of the utmost importance; and in 
cases in which we are satisfied that there could be 
no connivance, a degree of evidence is derived from 
the concurrence of testimonies which may be often 
independent even of the credibility of the individual 
witnesses. For, though it were probable that each 
of them singly might lie, the chances that they 
should all happen to agree m the same lie may be 
found to amount to an impossibility. On this subject 
there is also a further principle of the greatest in- 
terest, which has been well illustrated by Laplace, 
namely, that the more improbable a statement is in 
which such witnesses agree, the greater is the proba- 
bility of its truth. Thus we may have two men 
whom we know to be so addicted to lying that we 
would not attach the smallest credit to their single 
testimony on any subject. If we find these concur- 
ring in a statement respecting an event which was 
highly probable, or very likely to have occurred at 



M^ 



84 TESTI3I0NY. 

the time which they mention, we may still have a 
suspicion that they are lying, and that they may have 
happened to concur in the same lie, even though there 
should be no supposition of connivance. But if the 
statement was in the highest degree improbable, such 
as that of a man rising from the dead, we may feel 
it to be impossible that they could accidentally have 
agreed in such a statement; and, if we are satisfied 
that there could be no connivance, we may receive 
a conviction from its very improbability that it must 
be true. In cases of concurring testimonies, we ex- 
pect that the witnesses shall agree in all essential 
and important particulars ; and, on the other hand, 
evidence of the authenticity of testimony is some- 
times derived from the various witnesses differing 
in trifling circumstances in such a manner as, with- 
out weakening the main statement, tends to remove 
the suspicion of collusion or connivance. 

4. In all matters of testimony, we are greatly in- 
fluenced by our confidence in a certain uniformity of 
human character. We attach much importance, for 
example, to our previous knowledge of the narrator^s 
character for veracity ; and a man may have ac- 
quired such a character in this respect that we con- 
fide in his veracity in every instance in which his 
testimony is concerned, with a confidence equal to 
that with which we rely on the uniformity of the 
course of nature. In such a case, indeed, we pro- 
ceed upon a uniformity which applies only to a par- 
ticular order, namely, those whom w^e consider as 
men of veracity. But there is also a principle of 
uniformity which applies to the whole species ;. and 
in which we confide as regulating every man of sane 
mind. Thus, if the statement of a narrator contain 
circumstances calculated to promote his own ad- 
vantage, we calculate on the probability of fabrica- 
tion, and reject his evidence, except we had pre- 
viously acquired absolute confidence in his veracity. 
But if, on the contrary, his statement operates 



TESTIMONY. 85 

against himself, conveying an imputation against his 
own character, or exposing him to contempt, ridicule, 
or personal injury ; without any previous know^ledge 
of his veracity, we are satisfied that nothing could 
make him adhere to such a testimony but an honest 
conviction of its truth. 

5. A very important circumstance is the absence 
of any contradictory or conflicting testimony. This 
applies, in a striking manner, to the miraculous state- 
ments of the sacred writings ; for, even on the part 
of those who were most interested in opposing them, 
there is no testimony w^hich professes to shoAv, that 
at the time when the miracles are said to have taken 
place they did not take place. It is, indeed, a re- 
markable circumstance, that the earliest writers 
against Christianity ascribe the miraculous events to 
the power of sorcery or magic, but never attempt 
to call them in question as matters of fact. 

6. Much corroboration of testimony may often be 
obtained from our knowledge of facts of such a na- 
ture as, without directly bearing upon the statements 
to which the testimony refers, cannot be accounted 
for on any other supposition than the conviction of 
these statements being true. This principle applies, 
in a remarkable manner, to the miraculous histories 
of the sacred writings. We know, as an historical 
fact, the rapid manner in which the. Christian faith 
was propagated in the early ages, against the most 
formidable opposition, and by means of the feeblest 
human mstruments. We are told, that this was 
owing to the conviction produced by miraculous dis- 
plays of Divine power; w^e fe^l that the known 
effect corresponds with the alleged cause ; and that 
it cannot be accounted for on any other principle. 

It does not belong to our present inquiry to alhide 
more particularly to the direct evidence by which 
the miracles of the sacred v/ritings are supported ; 
we merely refer, in this general manner, to the prin- 
ciples on which the evidence is to be e^timated^ A 
H 



86 INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS, 

very interesting branch of the subject will come un- 
der our view when we speak of memory and arbi- 
trary association. We shall then see the irresistible 
importance of the commemorative rites of Chris- 
tianity, by which the memory of these events has been 
transmitted from age to age, or rather from year to 
year ; and by which our minds are carried backward, 
in one unbroken series, to the time when the events 
occurred, and to the individuals who witnessed them. 
In this manner, also, is entirely removed any feeling 
of uncertainty which may attach to testimony, as 
we recede from the period at which the events took 
place, and as the individuals are multiplied. Upon 
the whole, therefore, the evidence becomes so clear 
and conclusive, that we may say of those who reject 
it what the great Author of Christianity said on 
another occasion, — '* If they hear not these, neither 
will they be persuaded though one rose from the 
dead." 



PART III. 



OF THE INTELLECTU.AJ. OPERATIONS. 

Through the various sources referred to in the 
preceding observations, we acquire the knowledge 
af a certain number of facts, relating either to the 
mind itself or to things external to it. The next 
part of our inquiry refers to the operations (to use 
a figurative expression) which the mind performs 
upon the facts thus acquired. The term functions, 
or powers of mind, has often been apphed to these 
operations ; but, as we are not entitled to assume 



INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. S7 

that they are not in fact separate functions in the 
usual acceptation of that expression, it is perhaps 
more correct, and accords better with our limited 
knowledge of mind, to speak simply of the opera- 
tions which it is capable of performing upon ^ given 
series of facts. These seem to be chiefly referable 
to the following heads. 

I. We remember the facts; and we can also 
recall them into the mind at pleasure. The former 
is Memory; the latter is that modification of it 
which we call Recollection. But, besides this 
simple recollection of facts, we can recall a percep- 
tion; that is, the impression of an actual scene 
which has been witnessed, or a person who has 
been seen, so as to place them, as it were, before 
the mind, with all the vividness of the original per- 
ception. This proc-ess is called Conception. It is 
often described as a distinct power, or a distinct 
operation of the mind ; but it seems to be so nearly 
allied to memory that it may be considered as a 
modification of it. It is the memory of a perception. 

II. We separate facts from the relation in which 
they were originally presented to us, and contem- 
plate some of them apart from the rest ; — consider- 
ing, for example, certain properties of bodies apart 
from their other properties. Among a variety of 
objects, we thus fix upon qualities which are com- 
mon to a certain number of them, and so arrange 
them into genera and species. This process is 
usually called Abstraction. 

III. We separate scenes or classes of facts into 
their constituent elements, and form these elements 
into new combinations, so as to represent to our- 
selves scenes, or combinations of events, which 
have no real existence. This is Imagination. 



88 INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS. 

IV. We compare facts with each other, — observe 
their relations and connexions, — and trace the re- 
sults which follow particular combinations of them. 
We also obsei've their general characters, so as to 
deduce from the whole general facts or general prin- 
ciples. This is Reason or Judgment. 

In this arrangement, it will be observed, I confine 
myself entirely to facts. I do not say that the mind 
possesses distinct faculties, which we call memory, 
abstraction, imagihation, and judgment, — for this 
at once leads into hypothesis; but simply, that, 
in point of fact, the mind remembers, abstracts, im- 
agines, and judges. These processes appear to con- 
stitute distinct mental acts, which every one is con- 
scious of who attends to the phenomena of his own 
mind. But beyond the simple facts we know nothing, 
and no human ingenuity can lead us one step farther. 
Some of the followers of Dr. Reid appear to have 
erred in this respect, by ascribing to the mind dis- 
tinct faculties or functions, somewhat in the manner 
in which we ascribe to the body distinct senses. 
Dr. Brown, on the other hand, has shown much 
ingenuity in his attempts to simplify the arrange- 
ment of the mental processes, by referring them all 
to his two principles of simple and relative sugges- 
tion. But, without inquiring what has been gained 
to the science by this new phraseology, and avoid- 
ing entirely any system which seems to suppose 
distinct functions of mind, I confine myself to facts 
respecting the actual mental operations ; and it ap- 
pears to answer best the purpose of practical utility 
to speak of these operations in the arrangement, 
and by the names, which are commonly used by the 
generahty of mankind. 



SECTION I. 



By Memory we retain the impression of facts or 
events ; and by Recollection we recall them into 
the mind by a voluntary effort. By Conception we 
recall perceptions, or the impression of actual scenes, 
persons, or transactions : thus a skilful painter 
can delineate from conception a landscape a con- 
siderable time after he has seen it, or the counte- 
nance of a friend who is dead or absent. These 
appear to be the leading phenomena which are re- 
ferable to the head of memory. 

There seem to be original differences in the power 
of memory, some individuals being remarkable for 
Tetentive memory, though not otherwise distin- 
guished by their 'intellectual endowments. Thus, 
persons have been known to repeat a long discourse 
after once hearing it, or even a series of things 
without connexion, as a long column of figures, or a 
number of words without meaning. There is on 
record the account of a man who could repeat the 
whole contents of a newspaper ; and of another who 
could retain words that were dictated to him, with- 
out any connexion, to the amount of six thousand. 
A man mentioned by Seneca, after hearing a poet 
read a new poem, claimed it as his own ; and, in 
proof of his claim, repeated the poem from begin- 
ning to end, which the author could not do. A simi- 
lar anecdote is told of an Englishman, whom the 
King of Prussia placed behind a screen when Vol- 
taire came to read to him a new poem of consider- 
able length. It has been alleged, that this kind of 
memory is generally connected with inferiority of 
H2 



90 MEMORY. 

the other intellectual powers ; but there appears to 
be no foundation for this. For, though the mere 
memory of words may be met with in a high degree in 
persons of defective understanding, it is also true 
that men of high endowments have been remarkable 
for memory. It is said that Themistocles could 
name all the citizens of Athens, amounting to 
twenty thousand ; and that Cyrus knew the name of 
every soldier in his army. 

The late Dr. Leyden was remarkable for his 
memory. I am informed, through a gentleman who 
was intimately acquainted with him, that he could 
repeat correctly a long act of parliament, or any 
similar document, after having once read it. When 
he was, on one occasion, congratulated by a friend 
on his remarkable power in this respect, he replied, 
that instead of an advantage it was often a source 
of great inconvenience. This he explained by say- 
ing, that when he wished to recollect a particular 
point in any thing which he had read, he could do 
it only by repeating to himself the whole from the 
commencement till he reached the point which he 
wished to recall. 

We may find a mere local memory combined 
with very little judgment; that is, the power of 
remembering facts in the order in wliich they oc- 
curred, or words in the order in which they were 
addressed to the individual ; but that kind of memory 
which is founded, not upon local or incidental rela- 
tions, but on real analogies, must be considered as 
an important feature of a cultivated mind, and as 
holding an important place in the formation of in- 
tellectual character. The former kind of memory, 
however, is often the more ready, and is that which 
generally makes the greater show, both on account 
of its readiness, and likewise because the kind of 
facts with which it is chiefly conversant are usually 
those most in request in common couversatioiL 

The facts now referred to are matters of curiosity 



ATTENTION. 91 

only. The points of real interest and practical im- 
portance, in regard to memory, respect the manner 
in which it is influenced by the intellectual habits 
of individuals, and the principles on which it may 
be improved. These are referable chiefly to two 
heads, namely. Attention and Association. 

Memory is very much influenced by Attention, 
or a full and distinct perception of the fact or object 
with a view to its being remembered ; and by the 
perception being kept before the mind, in this dis- 
tinct manner, for a certain time. The distinct re- 
collection of the fact, in such cases, is generally in 
proportion to the intensity with which it has been 
contemplated ; and this is also very much strength- 
ened by its being repeatedly brought before the mind. 
Most people, accordingly, have experienced that a 
statement is more strongly impressed upon the 
memory by being several times repeated to others. 
It is on the same principle, that memory is greatly 
assisted by writing down the object of our know- 
ledge, especially if this be done in a distinct and 
systematic manner. A subject also is more dis- 
tinctly conceived, and more correctly remembered, 
after we have instructed another person in it. Such 
exercises are not strictly to be considered as helps 
to the memory, but as excitements to attention ; 
and as thus leading to that clear and full compre- 
hension of the subject which is required for the dis- 
tinct remembrance of it. 

It is familiar to every one that there are great 
diff'erences in memory, both in respect to the facil- 
ity of acquirement and the power of retention. In 
the former there appear to be original differences, but 
a great deal also depends upon habit. In the power 
of retention much depends, as we shall afterward 
see, upon the habit of correct association ; but, be- 
sides this, there are facts which seem to show a 
singular connexion with the manner in which the 
acquisition was made. The following fact was 



92 MEMORY. 

communicated to me by an able and intelligent 
friend, who heard it from the individual to whom it 
relates. A distinguished theatrical performer, in 
consequence of the sudden illness of another actor, 
had occasion to prepare himself, on very short no- 
tice, for a part which was entirely new to him ; and 
the part was long and rather difficult. He acquired 
it in a very short time, and went through it with 
perfect accuracy, but immediately after the perform- 
ance forgot every word of it. Characters which 
he had acquired in a more deliberate manner he 
never forgets, but can perform them at any time 
without a moment's preparation ; but in regard to 
the character now mentioned, there was the farther 
and very singular fact, that though he has repeatedly 
performed it since that time, he has been obliged 
each time to prepare it anew, and has never acquired 
in regard to it that facility which is familiar to him 
in other instances. When questioned respecting 
the mental process which he employed the first time 
he performed this part, he says, that he lost sight 
entirely of the audience, and seemed to have nothing 
before him but the pages of the book from which 
he had learned it; and that if any thing had occurred 
to interrupt this illusion, he should have stopped 
instantly. 

That degree of attention which is required for the 
full remembrance of a subject is to be considered as 
a voluntary act on the part of the individual ; but 
the actual exercise of it is influenced in a great 
measure by his previous intellectual habits. Of four 
individuals, for example, who are giving an account 
of a journey througli the same district, one may de- 
scribe chiefly its agricultural produce ; another, its 
mineralogical characters; a third, its picturesque 
beauties ; while the fourth may not be able to give 
an account of any thing except the state of the roads 
and the facilities for travelling. The same facts or 
objects must have passed before the senses of all tho 



ASSOCIATION. yd 

four ; but their remembrance of them depends upon 
the points to which their attention was directed. 
Besides the majiner here alluded to, in which the 
attention is influenced by pre\ious habits or pursuits, 
some persons have an active inquiring state of mind, 
which keeps the attention fully engaged upon what- 
ever is passing before them ; while others give w^ay 
to a Ustless inactive condition, which requires to be 
strongly excited before the attention is roused to the 
degree required for remembrance. The former, ac- 
cordingly, remember a great deal of all that passes 
before them, either in reading or observation. The 
latter are apt to say that they are deflcient in memory ; 
their deficiency, however, is not in memory, but in 
attention ; and' this appears from the fact that they 
do not forget any thing which deeply engages their 
feelings or concerns their interest. 

The habit of listless inactivity of mind should be 
carefully guarded against in the young; and the 
utmost care should be taken to cultivate the opposite, 
namely, the habit of directing the mind intensely to 
whatever comes before it, either in reading or obser- 
vation. This may be considered as forming the 
foundation of sound intellectual character. 

Next to the effect of attention is the remarkable 
influence produced upon memOry by Association. 
This principle holds so important a place in relation 
to the mental operations, that some philosophers 
have been disposed to refer to it nearly all the phe- 
nomena of mind; but without ascribing to it this 
universal influence, its effects are certainly very ex- 
tensive, and the facts connected with it present a 
subject of peculiar interest. 

The principle of association is founded upon a re- 
markable tendency, by which two or more facts or 
conceptions, which have been contemplated together, 
or in immediate succession, become so connected in 
the mind that one of them at a future time recalls 



94 MEMORY. 

the others, or introduces a train of thoughts which, 
without any mental effort, follow each other in the 
order in which they were originally associated. 
This is called the association of ideas, and various 
phenomena of a very interesting kind are connected 
with it. 

But besides this tendency, by which thoughts for- 
merly associated are brought into the mind in a par- 
ticular order, there is another species of association 
into which the mind passes spontaneousl}^ by a sug- 
gestion from any subject which happens to be pres- 
ent to it. The thought or fact which is thus present 
suggests another which has some kind of affinity to 
it ; this suggests a third, and so on, to the formation 
of a train or series which may be continued to a 
great length. A remarkable circumstance likewise 
is, that such a train may go on with very little con- 
sciousness of or attention to it; so that the particu- 
lars of the series are scarcely remembered, or are 
traced only by an effort. This singular fact every 
one must have experienced in that state of mind 
which is called a revery. It goes on for some time 
without effort and with little attention; at length 
the attention is roused, and directed to a particular 
thought which is in the mind, without the person 
being able at first to recollect what led him to think 
of that subject. He then, by a voluntary effort, 
traces the chain of thoughts backwards, perhaps 
through a long series, till he arrives at a subject of 
which he has a distinct remembrance as having 
given rise to it. 

It is impossible distinctly to trace the pnncipies 
which lead to the particular chain of thoughts which 
arise in a case of this kind. It is probably much 
influenced by the previous intellectual habits of the 
individual; and perhaps in many instances is guided 
by associations previously formed. There are also 
among the facts or thoughts themselves certain 
principles of analogy, by which one suggests another 



ASSOCIATION. 95 

without that kind of connexion which is estabhshed 
by previous proximity. These have usually been 
called principles of association, or, according to the 
phraseology of Dr. Brown, principles of simple sug- 
gestion. They have been generally referred to four 
heads, — namely, resemblance, contiguity in time and 
place, cause and effect, and contrast: and others 
have reduced them to three, considering contiguity 
and cause and effect as referable to the same head. 
On these principles, then, one thought may suggest 
another which has some relation to it, either in the 
way of resemblance, contiguity, cause, effect, or con- 
trast. But still the question recurs. What gives rise 
to the occurrence of one of these relations in prefer- 
ence to the others 1 This may depend, in some in- 
stances, on previous habits of thought and peculiari- 
ties of mental temperament; and in other cases 
associations may be more apt to occur, according 
as some analogous association may have been more 
recently formed, more lively, or more frequently 
repeated. When the common topic of the weather, 
for example, is introduced in conversation, or pre- 
sented to the mind, the agiiculturist will naturally 
refer to its influence on vegetation ; the physician to 
its effect on the health of the community ; the man 
of pleasure may think only of its reference to the 
sports of the field; the philosopher may endeavour 
to seek for its cause in some preceding atmospheric 
phenomena; and another person of certain habits 
of observation may compare or contrast it wath the 
weather of the same period in a preceding year. 
Thus, in five individuals, the same topic may give 
rise to five trains of thought, perfectly distinct from 
each other, yet each depending upon a very natural 
and obvious principle of suggestion. In other in- 
stances it is impossible to trace the cause which 
leads the mind off into peculiar and unusual associa- 
tions. The following example from Hobbes has 
been frequently referred to: — "In a company in 



96 MEMORY. 

which the conversation turned on the civil war, what 
could be conceived more impertinent than for a per- 
son to ask abruptly what was the value of a Roman 
denarius? On a little reflection, however, I was 
easily able to trace the train of thought whicii sug- 
gested the question ; for the original subject of dis- 
course naturally introduced the history of the king, 
and of the treachery of those who surrendered his 
person to his enemies ; this again introduced the 
treachery of Judas Iscariot, and the sum of money 
which he received for his reward. And all this train 
of ideas passed through the mind of the speaker in a 
twinkling in consequence of the velocity of thought." 
Mr. Stewart adds, in relation to this anecdote, " It is 
by no means improbable, that if the speaker had 
been interrogated about the connexion of ideas which 
led him aside from the original topic of discourse, he 
would have foimd himself, at first, at a loss for an 
answer." 

In the mental process now referred to it is evident 
that the term suggestion is much more correct than 
association, which has often been applied to it. For 
in the cases which belong to this class the facts or 
thoughts suggest each other, not according to any 
connexion or association which the mind had pre- 
viously formed between them, but according to some 
mental impression or emotion, which by a law of our 
constitution proves a principle of analogy or sugges- 
tion. We readily perceive how this takes place in 
regard to circumstances which are allied to each 
other by resemblance, contiguity, cause, or effect; 
and the suggestion of contrast must also occur to 
every one as by no means unnatural. Thus, the 
sight of a remarkably fat man may recall to us the 
thought of another man we had lately seen, who was 
equally remarkable for his leanness : the playfulness 
and mirth of childhood may suggest the cares and 
anxieties of after life ; and an instance of conduct 
which we greatly disapprove may lead us to recollect 



PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 97 

how very differently another individual conducted 
himself in similar circumstances. 

In a practical view the subject of association leads 
us chiefly to a consideration of the manner in which 
facts are so associated in the mind as to be recalled 
by means of the connexion ; in other words, the in- 
fluence of association upon memory. In this view, 
associations are distinctly referable to three classes : 

I. Natural or philosophical association. 

II. Local or incidental association. 

III. Arbitrary or fictitious association. 

A variety of mental phenomena of the most inter- 
esting kind will be found connected with the subjects 
referred to under these classes. The principle on 
which they all depend is simply the circumstance of 
two or more facts, thoughts, or events being contem- 
plated together by the mind, though many of them 
may have no relation to each other except this con- 
junction. The strength of the association is gene- 
rally in proportion to the intensity of the mental 
emotion; and is likewise in a great measure regu- 
lated by the length of time, or the number of times, 
in which the facts have been contemplated in this 
connexion. Astonishing examples may be often met 
with of facts or occurrences which have long ceased 
to be objects of simple memory, being brought up in 
this manner by association, though they had not 
passed through the mind for a very long time. 

I. Natural or Philosophical Association takes 
place when a fact or statement on which the atten- 
tion is fixed is, by a mental process, associated with 
some fact previously known to which it has a rela- 
tion, or with some subject which it is calculated to 
illustrate. The fact so acquired is thus, to use a 
figurative expression, put by in its proper place in 
the mind, and can afterward be recalled by means 
of the ^association* 

I 



The formation of associations, in this manner, is 
of course influenced in a very great degree by pre- 
vious mental habits, pursuits, or subjects of reflec- 
tion ; and, according to the nature and the variety 
of these pursuits or subjects of thought, facts which 
by some are passed by and instantly forgotten may 
be fixed upon by others with eager attention, and 
referred to some principle which they are calculated 
to illustrate. Examples of this kind must be famihar 
to every one ; I may mention the following : — In a 
party of gentlemen, the conversation turned on the 
warlike character of the Mahrattas, as compared 
with the natives of Lower Iixiia, and the explanation 
given of it by an author who refers it to their use of 
animal food, from which the Hindoos are said to be 
prohibited by their religion. A doubt was started 
respecting the extent to which Hindoos are prohib- 
ited from the use of animal food : some were of one 
opinion and some of another, and the point was left 
undecided. Reading soonnfter the Journal of Bishop 
Heber, I found it stated, that on one occasion during 
his journey, when a large supply of meat was brought 
to him, he ordered three lambs to be sent to his Hin- 
doo attendants, and that the gift was received with 
every expression of gratitude. On another occasion 
such a fact might have been passed by without pro- 
ducing any impression; or it might have been slightly 
associated with the good bishop's attention to the 
comfort of all around him, but not remembered be- 
yond the passing moment. In connexion with the 
discussion now mentioned it became a fact of great 
interest, and never to be forgotten ; and led to inquiry 
after more precise information on the subject to which 
it related. 

This trifling example may serve to illustrate the 
principle, that the remembrance of insulated facts 
does not depend merely upon the degree of attention 
directed to them, but also on the existence in the 
mind of subjects of thought with which th« new 



PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. 99 

fact may be associated. Other facts, as they occur, 
will afterward be added from time to time, giving 
rise to a progressive increase of knowledge in a 
mind in which this mental process is regularly car- 
ried on. This habit of attention and association 
ought therefore to be carefully cultivated, as it must 
have a great influence on our progress in knowledge, 
and likewise on the formation of intellectual char- 
acter, provided the associations be made upon somid 
principles, or according to the true and important 
relations of things. It is also closely connected with 
that activity of mmd which is ever on the alert for 
knowledge, from every source that comes within 
its reach; and that habit of reflection which always 
connects with such facts the conclusions to which 
they lead, and the views which they tend to illus- 
trate. On this principle also, every new fact which 
is acquired, or every new sulDJect of thought which 
is brought before the mind, is not only valuable in 
itself, but also becomes the basis or nucleus of 
further improvement. Minds which are thus fur- 
nished with the requisite foundation of knowledge, 
and act uniformly upon these principles of enlarg- 
ing it, will find interesting matter to be associated 
and remembered, where others find only amusement 
for a vacant hour, which passes away and is for- 
gotten. There is also another respect in which the 
habit of correct and philosophical association assists 
the memory, and contributes to progress in know- 
ledge. For by means of it, when applied to a great 
mass of facts relating to the same subject, we arrive 
at certain general facts, which represent a numerous 
body of the individuals, and the remembrance of 
which is equivalent to the remiembrance of the whole. 
The associations referred to under this first head 
arise out of the real relations of facts to each other, 
or to subjects of thought previously existing in the 
mind. The particular train of association, therefore, 
which is formed from the same facts bv diff'erent in- 



100 MEMORY. 

dividuals may vary exceedingly. Thus, the same 
facts may often admit of various applications, or, in 
other words, of being associated in various ways, 
by different persons, according to their intellectual 
habits, or by the same person at different times, ac- 
cording to the subject of thought which happens to 
be more immediately present. 

When a variety of facts have been associated in 
the mind in the manner now referred to, they form 
a series which hang together and recall each other 
in a very remarkable manner. There are two ways 
in which this takes place, which may be called 
voluntary and spontaneous. (1.) We call up facts 
by a voluntary effort, by directing the mind into 
particular trains of thought calculated to lead to 
those which we are in search of. This is what we 
call recollecting ourselves on a particular subject. 
We have an impression, perhaps, that the mind is 
in possession of information which bears upon 
the subject, but do not at the moment remember 
it ; or we remember some circumstances, and wish 
to recall a more full and complete remembrance. 
We therefore commence a mental process which 
consists in putting in motion, to speak figuratively, 
a train of thoughts, or a series of associated facts, 
which we think calculated to lead us to the facts we 
wish to recall. (2.) Associations recur spontane- 
ously, either when particular topics naturally lead- 
ing to them are brought before the mind, in reading 
or conversation, or in that state in which the mind is 
left to follow, without any effort, the current of 
thoughts as they succeed each other. In the 
healthy state of the mind, we can give way to this 
spontaneous succession of thoughts ; or we can check 
it at our pleasure, and direct the mind into some 
new train connected with the same subject, or 
arising out of it ; or we can dismiss it altogether. 
While we allow it to go on, it does so, not only with- 
out effort, but often without consciousness ; so that 



LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 101 

when the attention is, after some time, arrested by 
a subject of thought which is in the mind, we do 
not at first remember what led us to think of it, and 
begfin to recollect ourselves by tracing- the series 
backwards. In this state of mind, it is most inter- 
esting to observe the manner in which old associa- 
tions are revived, and old recollections renewed, 
which seemed to have been lost and forgotten; and 
how facts and occurrences come into the mind which 
had not been thought of for many years. They are 
recalled, we scarcely know how, by some train of 
association which we can hardly trace, and which 
had long ceased to be the subject of any voluntary 
effort of attention. We shall again allude to this 
most interesting subject, in relation to the manner 
in which associations, long forgotten, are sometimes 
brought into the mind in dreaming, and in certain 
states of delirium. 

The voluntaiy power over the succession of 
thoughts and associations which has now been al- 
luded to is a subject of extreme interest. We shall 
have occasion to refer to it asfain when we come to 
speak of a remarkable condition in which it is lost; 
and in which the mind is left entirely under the in- 
fluence of the series of thoughts as they happen to 
succeed each other, according probably to old asso- 
ciations, without the power of arresting or varying 
it. This occurs in two very interesting mental con- 
ditions to be afterward more particularly mentioned ; 
namely, dreaming and insanity. 

II. Local Or iNcmENTAL Association. — In the men- 
tal process referred to under the preceding head, 
facts or thoughts are associated according to certain 
real relations ; though these, we have seen, may be 
various, and the particular relation which is fixed 
upon, in particular cases, depends upon the intellec- 
tual habits of the individual. In the class now to 
be mentioned, the associations are formed according 
12 



102 MEMORY. 

to no other relations than such as are entirely local 
or casual. Thus, a fact, a thought, or a mental im- 
pression is associated with thp person by whom it 
was communicated, or the place where the commu- 
nication was made ; and is recalled to the mind 
when the place or person is seen, mentioned, or 
thought of. Some persons seem to form almost no 
other associations than those of this description. 
When a place which they had visited, for example, 
is spoken of, they immediately relate, in connexion 
with it, the persons whom they met there, incidents 
which occurred in their company, and opinions or 
statements which were mentioned in conversation 
with them ; and from this, perhaps, they may branch 
off to other circumstances relating to these indi- 
viduals, their families, or connexions. 

These mere local associations, however, often 
make a very deep impression upon the mind ; more 
vivid, certainly, than simple memory of the facts or 
transactions connected with them. Thus, we avoid 
a place which is associated with some painful recol- 
lection ; yet the very fact of avoiding it shows that 
we have a full remembrance of the circumstances, 
and, at the same time, a conviction that the siglit 
of the spot would make the impression more vivid 
and more painful. After the death of a beloved 
child or a much valued friend, we may retain a lively 
remembrance of them, and even anxiously cherish 
the impression of their endearing qualities; yet, 
after time has in some measure blunted the acute- 
ness of feeling, the accidental discovery of some 
trifling memorial strongly associated wrtii the la- 
mented object of our affection produces a freshness 
and intensity of emotion, known only to those who 
have experi<3need it. This feeling is peculiarly 
strong if the memorial has been long lost sight of, 
and discovered by ac cident ; because, as has been 
well remarked by Dr. Browji,it in this case presents 
the unmixed image of the friend with whom it is as- 



LOCAL ASSOCIATION". 103 

sociated ; whereas, a memorial which has become 
famihar to us is associated with other feehngs not 
relating exclusively to him. Philosophers have en- 
dt3avoured to explain the mental phenomenon here 
referred to by supposing, that in such cases the 
mingling of mental emotion with actual perception 
gives a feeling of reality to the emotion, and for the 
time a kind of belief of the existence of the object 
of it. This is sufficiently plausible, but, after all, 
amounts to little more than expressing the fact in 
other words, without conveying any real explanation. 
Similar impressions, whether of a pleasurable or 
painful character, according to the. original feeling 
which is thus recalled, are excited by the sight of a 
spot which we have visited while under the influence 
of strong emotion ; by a tune, a piece of poetry, 
an article of dress, or the most trifling object with 
which, from incidental circumstances, the associa- 
tion was made. The eff"ect of a particular tune on 
the Swiss regiments in foreign service is familiar 
to every one ; and a similar effect has been remarked, 
from a similar cause, among the Highland regiments 
of our own country. The feelings thus produced 
may be so vivid as even to overpower present emo- 
tions ; to excite pleasure amid circumstances of 
pain or depression ; and to produ<ie depressing and 
painful emotions, when all present circumstances 
are calculated to give satisfaction. Hence, it is prob- 
able that th€ principle might often be employed 
with much advantage, as a moral remedy, in various 
circumstances of depressing disease, as in the low 
state of fever, and certain conditions of insanity- 
A pleasing anecdote of this kind is mentioned by Dr. 
Rush. " During the time that I passed at a country 
school in Cecil Comity in Maryland, I often went 
on a holyda}^ with my schoolmates, to see an eagle's 
nest upon the summit of a dead tree, in the neigh- 
bourhood of the school, during the time of the in- 
cubation of the bird. The daughter of the farmer 



104 MEMORY. 

in whose field the tree stood, and with whom I be- 
came acquainted, married, ajiid settled in this city 
about forty years ago. In our occasional interviews, 
we now and then spoke of the innocent haunts and 
rural pleasures of our youth, and among others, of 
the eagle's nest in her father's field. A few years 
ago I was called to visit this woman when she was 
in the lowest stage of typhus fever. Upon entering" 
the room, I caught her eye, and with a cheerful tone 
of voice said only. The eagle's nest. She seized my 
hand, without being able to speak, ami discovered 
strong emotions of pleasure in her countenance, 
probably from a sudden association of all her early 
domestic connexions and enjoyments with the words 
■which I uttered. From that time she began to re- 
.cover. She is now living, and seldom fails, when 
we meet, to saltite me with the echo of — ' The eagle's 
nest.' " 

Tliere is even something in these mere local asso- 
ciations which fixes an impression upon the mind, 
almost independent of memory, and upon a principle 
with which we are little acquainted. The follow- 
ing anecdote is, I believe, authentic, though I cannot 
at present refer to the work in which it is related. 
It is certainly one of the most extraordinary of its 
kind, and yet we see enough of the principle, in va- 
rious instances, to give it a high degree of proba- 
bility. — A lady, in the last stage of a chronic disease, 
was carried from London to a lodging in the country : 
there her infant daughter was taken to visit her, 
and, after a short interview, carried back to town. 
The lady died a few days after, and the daughter 
grew up without any recollection of her mother, 
till she was of mature age. At this time, she hap- 
pened to be taken into the room in wliich her mother 
died, without knowing it to have been so ; she 
started on entering it, and Avhen a friend who was 
along with her a^sked the cause of her agitation, 
replied, " I have a distinct impression of having been 



LOCAL ASSOCIATION. 105 

in this room before, and that a lady, who lay in thai 
corner, and seemed very ill, leaned over me and 
wept." 

The singular influence of local association is often 
iihistrated by the most trivial occurrences. Walking 
in the street lately, I met a lady whose face was 
famihar to me, but whom I could not name. I had, 
at the same time, an impression that I ought to have 
spoken to her, and to have inquired for some rela- 
tive who had lately been my patient ; but, notwith- 
standing repeated efforts, I could not recognise her, 
ahd passed on. Some time after, in passing a4ong 
the road a few miles from town, my eye caught a 
cottage, to which I had bf^en taken about six months 
before, to see a gentleman who had been carried 
into it in a state of insensibility, in consequence of 
being thrown from a gig. The sight of the cottage 
instantly recalled the accident, and the gentleman 
who was the subject of it ; and, at the same instant, 
the impression that the lady whom I had passed in 
the manner now mentioned was his wife. In this 
case no recollection was excited by the sight of the 
lady, even after repeated and anxious attempts ; and 
I believe I should not have recognised the patient 
himself, had he been along with her ; whereas the 
whole was recalled in an instant by the sight of the 
cottage. Similar illustrations must have occurred 
to every one. We meet a person in the street, who 
stops and speaks to us ; but we cannot recognise 
him. We ai^ unwilling to tell him so, and walk 
along with him conversing On various topics ; at 
length, he makes an allusion to some person or some 
circumstance, by means of which we instantly re- 
collect who he is, and where we met with him. On 
the same principle, when we are endeavouring to 
remind a person of a transaction which he has for- 
gotten, and which we are anxious to call to his re- 
collection, we mention various circumstances con- 
nected with it, until at length we mention one which, 



106 MEMORY. 

by association, instantly brings the whole distinctly 
before him. There are even facts which seem to 
show that the impression recalled by local associa- 
tion may affect the bodily organs. Van Swieten re- 
lates of himself, that he was passing a spot where 
the dead body of a dog burst and produced such a 
stench as made him vomit ; and that, happening to 
pass the same spot some years after, he was affected 
by sickness and vomiting from the recollection. 

Finally, to the influence of local association we 
are to refer the impressions produced by the monu- 
ments of the illustrious dead ; tlae trophies of other 
times ; the remains of Greece and Rome ; or by the 
visitation of spots distinguished by illustrious deeds, 
as Thermopylae, Bannockburn, or Waterloo. " Far 
from me," says Dr. Johnson, " and from my friends, be 
such frigid philosophy, as may conduct us, indifferent 
and unmoved, over any ground which has been dig- 
nified by wisdom, bravery, or virtue. That man is 
little to be envied whpse patriotism would not gain 
force upon the plains of Marathon, or whose piety 
would not grow warmer among the ruins of lona," 

III. Arbitrary or Fictitious Association. — This 
association is generally produced by a voluntary ef- 
fort of the mind ; and the facts associated are not 
connecied by any relation except what arises out 
of this effort. The process is exemplified in the 
connexion we establish between something which 
we wish to remember and something which we are 
in no danger of forgetting ; as in the common ex- 
pedients of tying a thread about the finger, or mak- 
ing a knot on the pocket-handkerchief. A Roman, 
for the same purpose, turned the stone of his ring 
inwards towards the palm of his hand. There is an 
analogous expedient which most people probably 
have employed for enabling them to remember the 
names of persons. It consists in forming an asso- 
ciation between the name to be remembered and 



ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. 107 

that of some intimate friend or public character of 
the same name, which is famiUar to ns. Tl^ re- 
markable circumstance in these cases is, that what- 
ever difficulty a person may have in simply remem- 
bering a name, he never forgets who the individual 
was \vith whose name he formed the association. 

On this principle have been founded various 
schemes of artificial memory. One of the most an- 
cient consisted in associating the divisions of a dis- 
course to be delivered with the various apartments 
of a building, and the leading sentiments with articles 
of furniture. This is said to have been much prac- 
tised by the ancient orators, and to have given rise 
to the phraseology by which we speak of the divi- 
sions of a discourse, as the first place, the second 
place, &c. I have repeatedly made experiments on 
this method in remembering the discourses of public 
speakers, and the effect is certainly astonishing ; for 
though it is many years since the experiments were 
made, I still find articles of furniture associated in 
the clearest manner with sentiments delivered by 
some of the speakers. Other systems of artificial 
memory are founded upon the same general princi- 
ple, though the particular apphcations of it may vary;, 
and some of them are extremely absurd. One of 
the last which attracted notice in this country was 
that of a German of the name of Feinagle, who de- 
livered lectures on memory to crowded and fashion- 
able audiences, about the year 1809 or 1810. A 
leading part of his system was the memory of dates^ 
and it consisted in changing the figures in the date 
into the letters^of the alphabet corresponding to them 
in number. These letters were then formed into a 
word to be in some way associated with the date to 
be remembered. One example, which I happen to 
recollect, will be sufficient to illustrate the peculiarity 
of the system, and at the same time its efficiency for 
its purpose. Henry IV. King of England was born 
m the year 1366. This date, changed into letters. 



108 MEMORY. 

gives mff, which are very easily formed into the word 
muff. The method is not so obvious of estabhshing 
with this a relation to Henry IV. " Henry TV.," 
says M. Feinagle, " is four hens, and we put them 
into the muff, one in each corner." No, one, certainly, 
after hearing this, is in any danger of forgetting the 
date of the birth of Henry IV. ; but whether the re- 
membrance is worth such a process is a separate 
question. 

It is unnecessaiy to enlarge upon the subject of 
arbitrary association, as the observation of every one 
will furnish numerous examples of it. Tliere is one 
application of the principle, however, which deserves 
to be referred to in a more particular manner. I 
allude to the practice of commemorative rites, or 
periodical observances, for transmitting the remem- 
brance of remarkable events. These are in their 
nature, in general, entirely arbitrary ; or, if they have 
any analogy to the events, the relation is only figu- 
rative. But the influence of such celebrations is of 
the most extensive and most important kind. If the 
events, particularly, are of a very uncommon char- 
acter, these rites remove any feeling of uncertainty 
which attaches to traditional testimony, when it has 
been transmitted through a long period of time, and 
consequently through a great number of individuals. 
They carry us back, in one unbroken series, to the 
period of the events themselves, and to the individ- 
uals who were witnesses of them. 

The most important application of the principle 
in the manner now referred to is in the observances 
of religion which are intended to commemorate those 
events which are connected with the revelation of 
the Christian faith. The importance of this mode 
of transmission has not been sufficiently attended to 
by those who have urged the insufficiency of human 
testimony to establish the truth of events which are 
at variance with the common course of nature. We 
have formerly alluded to one part of this sophism. 



ARBITRARY ASSOCIATION. 109 

and have stated the grounds on which we contend 
that no objection to the credibihty of these events 
can be founded upon our observation of what we call 
the course of nature. We have admitted that a much 
higher species of evidence is required for them than 
would be required for events which correspond with 
our previous observation ; and this high and peculiar 
evidence is confirmed in a striking manner by the 
periodical rites now referred to. By means of these 
we are freed entirely from every impression of the 
fallibility of testimony, and the possibility of the 
statements having been fabricated ; as we are con- 
ducted in one uninterrupted series to the period when 
the events took place, and to the individuals who wit- 
nessed them. This will appear if we state in a few 
"words a hypothetical case. Let us conceive a person 
attempting to impose upon the world by an account 
of some wonderful or miraculous event, which he 
alleges occurred five hundred years ago. He, of 
course, exerts every possible ingenuity in fabricating 
documents, and framing the appearance of a chain 
of testimony in support of his statement. It is quite 
possible that he might thus deceive a considerable 
number of credulous persons ; and that others, who 
did not believe his statement, might yet find difficulty 
in proving its fallacy. But if the report were further 
to bear, that ever since the occurrence of the alleged 
event it had been regularly and specially celebrated 
by a certain periodical observance, it is clear that this 
would bring the statement to the test of a fact open 
to examination, and that the fallacy. of the whole 
would be instantly detected. 

On these principles it must appear that the state- 
ments of the sacred writings, respecting miraculous 
events which are said to have ocj3urred upwards of 
1800 years ago, could not have been fabricated at any 
intermediate era during that period. It is unneces- 
sary to state how much more improbable it is that 
they could have been fabricated at the very time and 
K 



no MEMORY. 

place in which they are said to have occurred, ai^d 
in the midst of thousands who are said to have wit- 
nessed them, many of whom were deeply interested 
in detecting their fallacy. This part of the question 
is not connected with our present inquiry, but it is 
impossible to dismiss the subject without one reflec- 
tion : — that if we are to proceed upon the principle 
of probabilities, we must balance fairly the proba- 
bilities of fabrication. If we do so, we hesitate not 
to assert, that the probability of the world being im- 
posed upon, mider all the circumstances now alluded 
to, is more at variance with our firm and unalterable 
experience than all that we are called upon to believe. 

It does not appear necessary to say much of that 
modification of memory which is called Conception. 
It is the recalhng of a perception. If, for example, we 
have passed a person in the street whose face we 
think we have seen, but without being able to recognise 
him, we can recall the impression of his countenance, 
and endeavour to recollect who he is. By a higher 
exercise of this faculty a painter can draw from con- 
ception a landscape or a building long after he has 
visited them,. and even the portrait of a friend who is 
dead or absent, and whom he has not seen for a con- 
s-iderable time. By another modification of this 
power we can imbody into a conception a scene, a 
figure, or a transaction which has been described to 
us by another. The vividness of our conception, in 
such cases, does not depend upon the accuracy or 
even the truth of the description, but upon the degree 
of liveliness with which it is given, or the intensity 
with which our attention is directed to it. Thus, it 
has been remarked that we have a more clear con- 
ception of Don Quixote or Sancho than of any char- 
acters in real history, unless they have been made 
familiar to us by paintings. The business of the 
novelist being to create his hero, he gives a more 
full and graphic delineation of him than the authentic 



CONCEPTION. Ill 

historian finds it necessary to do ; hence, the former 
begins his narrative by an impression made upon our 
conception ; the latter disregards this, and proceeds 
at once to the facts which he has to address to our 
attention and memory. 

Conception, properly so called, or the recalling- of 
a perception, does not appear to be necessarily con- 
nected with the impression of past time, but rather 
to be at first accompanied by a feehng of the present 
existence of the object. Connecting the impression 
with past time seems to be a distinct act of the mind ; 
and the conception may be so strong as, for the mo- 
ment, almost to exclude all idea of the past. That 
degree of conception by which a painter can take the 
likeness of a friend who has been long dead, or de- 
lineate a scene visited at a remote period, must 
amount to something of this nature. In the active 
and healthy state of the other faculties of the mind 
this impression is but momentary, being almost in- 
stantly corrected by impressions received from the 
external world. We shall afterward have occasion 
to refer to a remarkable state of mind in which it is 
not thus corrected, but in which objects which exist 
only in conception are beheved to have a real and 
present existence. On this condition depend many 
of the peculiarities of dreaming, insanity, and spec- 
tral illusions. 

Different individuals possess the faculty of concep- 
tion in different degrees ; and, connected with the 
degree of it, there is generally a corresponding talent 
for lively description. The faculty itself, or the 
formation of the conception, probably follows nearly 
the same laws with memory, and depends in a great 
measure upon the degree of attention which was 
originally directed to the objects. This, again, is 
•Influenced, as in the case of memory, partly by the 
general activit}^ of mind of the individual, and partly 
by his particular habits and pursuits. ^ Thus, as for- 



112 MEMORY. 

merly remarked, in describing the features of a coun- 
try which they have passed over, one person will 
give a clear and lively description of its general char- 
acters, so as to place it, as it were, before you ; a 
second will describe chiefly its pastures and produce ; 
a third may include both ; while a fourth may not be 
able to give an intelligible account of any one feature 
of the scene. 

There are particular situations in which concep- 
tion is apt to be most intensely brought into exercise, 
especially those of seclusion and the absence of all 
external impressions. A beautiful example of this 
occurs in the Life of Niebuhr, the celebrated Danish 
traveller. When old, blind, and so infirm that he was 
able only to be carried from his bed to his chair, he 
used to describe to his friends the scenes which he 
had visited in his early days with wonderful minute- 
ness and. vivacity. When they expressed their as- 
tonishment, he told them, " that as he lay in bed, all 
visible objects shut out, the pictures of what he had 
seen in the East continually floated before his mind's 
eye, so that it was no wonder he could speak of 
them as if he had seen them yesterday. With like 
vividness the deep intense sky of Asia, with its bril- 
liant and twinkling host of stars, which he had so 
often gazed at by night, or its lofty vault of blue by 
day, was reflected, in the hours of stillness and dark- 
ness, on his inmost soul." This may perhaps be con- 
sidered as an example of what we may call the high- 
est degree of healthy conception. Something a little 
beyond this leads to that state on which depends the 
theory of apparitions or spectral illusions. 

In concluding this brief allusion to the subject of 
conception, I shall only add the following example 
of another application of this mental process. In 
the church of St. Peter at Cologne the altar-piece 
is a large and valuable picture by Rubens, represent** 
ing the martyrdom of the apostle. This picture 
having been carried away by the French in 1805, to 



ITS CULTURE A^TD IMPROVEMENT. 113 

the gi-eai re^et of the inhabitants, a painter of that 
citj' midertook to make a copy of it from recollection ; 
and succeeded in doing so in such a manner, that the 
most delicate tints of the original are preserved with 
the most minute accuracy. The original painting 
has now been restored, but the copy is preserved 
along with it ; and even when they are rigidly com- 
pared, it is scarcely possible to distinguish the one 
from the other. I am not aware that this remarka- 
ble anecdote has been recorded by any traveller ; I 
am indebted for it to my friend Dr. Duncan, of the 
university of Edinburgh, who heard it on the spot in a 
late visit to the Continent, and saw both the pictures. 



OF THE CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT OF ATTENTION AND 
MEMORY. 

The facts which have been briefly referred to, in 
regard to the phenomena of memory, lead to some 
remarks of a practical nature. These relate to the 
improvement of attention and memory in persons of 
adult years, and tne cultivation of these powers in 
the education of the young. 

The rules from which benefit is to be derived for 
the improvement of memory, in persons of adult 
years, may be chiefly referred to the following heads. 

I. The cultivation of habits of attention, or of in- 
tense application of the mind to whatever is at the 
time its more immediate object of pursuit. 

II. Habits of correct association. These consist 
in the constant practice of tracing- the relation be- 
tween new facts and others with which we are pre- 
viously acquainted ; and of referring facts to prin- 
ciples which they are calculated to illustrate, or to 

K2 



114 MEMORY. 

opinions which they tend to confirm, modify, or over- 
turn. This is the operation of what we call a reflect- 
ing mind ; and that information which is thus fully 
contemplated and associated is not likely to be for- 
gotten. 

III. Intimately connected with both the former 
rules is the cultivation of that active, inquiring state 
of mind which is always on the watch for knowledge 
from every source that comes within its reach, either 
in reading, conversation, or observation. Such a 
mind is ever ready to refer newly-acquired knowledge 
to its proper place. It is thus easily retained, and 
made to yield those conclusions which are legiti- 
mately deduced from it. 

IV. Method ; that is, the pursuit of particular sub- 
jects, upon a regular and connected plan. 

A.II these principles are opposed to that listless, 
inactive state of mind which is occupied with trifles, 
or with its own waking dreams; or which seeks 
only amusement in desultory pursuits which pass 
away and are forgotten. They are likewise opposed 
to habits of irregular and desultory application, which 
even intellectual persons are apt to fall into, by means 
of which the mind loses the train of investigation, or 
of argument, in which it had made some progress, 
and may not be able to recover it in a satisfactory 
manner. Nothing, indeed, appears to contribute 
more to progress in any intellectual pursuit than the 
practice of keeping the subject habitually before the 
mind, and of daily contributing something towards 
the prosecution of it. 

V. Attention und memory are greatly promoted 
by writing on a subject, especially if it be done in a 
distinct and systematic manner; also, by conversing 
on the subject, and by instructing others in it. These 



ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 115 

exercises, indeed, may perhaps be considered rather 
as aids to attention, or a clear comprehension of the 
subject, than to memory. For in regard to memory, 
it is remarkable how much its power is increased in 
many instances by that kind of exercise by which it 
is alone trasted to, without any aid from writing. I 
have known medical men, for example, who had to 
recollect numerous appointments, do so with perfect 
accuracy by trusting to memory, to which they had 
habituated themselves, but blunder continually when 
they kept a written memorandum. The mental 
power which is in some cases acquired by constant 
and intense exercise is indeed astonishing. Bloom, 
field the poet relates of himself, that nearly one-half 
of his poem, the Farmer's Boy, was composed, re- 
vised, and corrected, without writing a word of it, 
while he was at work with other shoemakers in a 
garret. 

Similar rules apply to the cultivation of these 
powers in young persons. They may be chiefly 
referred to the following heads : — 

I. Exciting constant attention and constant in 
terest. For this purpose it is of essential import- 
ance that whatever reading is presented to children 
shall be of a kind which they understand, and in 
which they can feel interest and pleasure. This 
will be greatly promoted by directing their attention 
to the meaning of words, and explaining them by 
famihar illustrations. The practice of setting tasks 
as punishments cannot be alluded to in terms ade- 
quate to its extreme absurdity. On this ground also 
it must be considered as a great error in education 
to make children attempt too much ; that is, more 
than they can do with close attention. When a 
sense of weariness or mental languor takes place, 
what follows is not merely loss of time*, but an im- 
portant injury done to the mental constitution ; and 



116 MEMORY. 

it appears to be of the utmost consequence that the 
time of children should be as much as possible 
divided between intense attention and active recre- 
ation. By a shorter time occupied in this manner 
not only is more progress made than by a longer 
with listless and imperfect application, but an im- 
portant part of mental discipline is secured, which 
by the other method is entirely neglected. Similar 
observations, indeed, apply to persons at every 
period of life, and we are fully persuaded that 
progress in any intellectual pursuit does not depend 
so much upon protracted laborious study as on the 
practice of keeping the subject habitually before the 
mind, and on the intensity of mental application. 

II. Cultivating habits of association, by pointing 
out to children the relation of facts to each other, 
the mamier in which they illustrate one another, or 
lead to some general conclusion. By directing them 
in this manner from any particular fact to recollect 
similar or analogous facts which had formerly 
passed before them, they will be trained at once to 
attention, memory, and reflection. 

III. Cultivating that general activity of mind 
which seeks for information on every subject that 
comes in its way. The most common and trivial 
occurrences may thus be made the source of mental 
improvement : the habits of animals ; the natural 
history of the articles that are constantly before us, 
in clothes, food, furniture ; articles of manufacture 
from a watch to a pin ; the action of the mechanic 
powers, as illustrated by various contrivances in 
constant use;' the structure of a leaf, a flower, a 
tree. To those farther advanced a constant source 
of interest may be found in history, geography, and 
memoirs of eminent individuals ; and in the leading 
principles of natural history, natural philosophy, and 
chymistry. Every new subject of thought which is 



ITS CULTURE AND IMPROVEMENT. 117 

thus presented to the miiid is both vakiable in itself 
by the powers which it calls into action, and by 
proving a nucleus to which new facts may be after- 
ward associated. 

IV. Memory and attention are greatly promoted 
in young persons by writing ; provided it be done, 
not merely in the form of extracts from books, but 
in their own words : in history, for example, in the 
form of chronological tables ; and on other subjects 
in clear and distinct abstracts, neatly ajid method- 
ically written. 

V. These exercises of mind are greatly promoted 
in the young by verbal communication. Hence the 
importance of frequent examination. The teacher 
is thereby enabled, not only to ascertain their pro- 
gress, but to explain what they do not understand; 
to impress upon them important points to which 
they may not have sutRciently attended ; to excite 
attention, inquiry, and interest ; ajid so to cultivate 
the habits of association and reflection. These, in 
fact, ought to be the objects to be kept in view in 
all such exercises as of much greater moment than 
the mere putting of questions. On the same prin- 
ciple, a most useful exercise for young persons is 
instructing others still younger on subjects which 
they have themselves recently acquired. 

VI. In the cultivation of the mental powers in the 
young, a point of essential importance is the selec- 
tion of proper and worthy objects of acquirement. 
In the general conduct of education in this respect 
the chief error appears in general to have been, de- 
voting too much time and attention in fem.ales to 
superficial accomplishments, and in males to mere 
acquirement in languages and mathematics : and the 
great object to be kept in view from the very 
earliest period is the paramomit importance of the 



118 MEMORY. 

actual knowledge of things on subjects of real utility ; 
the actual cultivation of habits of observation, in- 
quiry, association, and induction ; and, as the foun- 
dation of the whole, the habit of steady and con- 
tinued attention. The cultivation of these mental 
habits is of greater value by far than any one 
acquirement whatever ; for they are the basis of all 
future improvement, and are calculated to give a 
tone to the whole character. 

In this brief outline I have said nothing on the 
subject of religious instruction ; for the same rules 
apply to it as to branches of inferior importance, in 
as far as it is to be considered as engaging the in- 
tellectual powers. The chief error here appears 
to be, the practice of trusting too much to the mere 
repetition of tasks or catechisms, without that kind 
of diroct personal instruction which is calculated to 
interest the attention, to fix the truths upon the un- 
derstanding, and to cultivate the habits of association 
and reflection. A leading branch of this subject, 
the culture of the moral feelings, does not belong to 
our present inquiry ; but it is impossible to mention 
it without alluding to its intense interest even in a 
philosophical point of view. One of the most 
striking phenomena, certainly, in the science of the 
human mind, is the high degree of culture of which 
the moral powers are susceptible, even in the infant 
mind, long before the powers of intellect are de- 
veloped for the investigation of truth. 

In reference to the whole science of education 
nothing is of greater importance than the principle 
of association, which, we have formerly seen, exerts 
a most extensive influence, not in the remembrance 
of facts alone, but in perpetuating and recalling 
mental emotions. We take a very limited view, 
indeed, of this great subject, if we confine education 
entirely or chiefly to the acquisition of knowledge, 
or even to the culture of the intellectual powers. 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 119 

That system is deficient in its most essential part 
which does not carry on along with these a careful 
and habitual culture and regulation of the passions 
and emotions of the young: their attachments and 
antipathies, their hopes and fears, their joys and 
sorrows ; the cultivation of the social and benevolent 
affections ; the habit of repressing selfishness, and 
bearing inconveniences and disappointments with- 
out murmuring ; a disposition to candour and in- 
genuousness, and a sacred regard to truth. Their 
future character as social and moral beings will be 
greatly influenced by the manner in which they are 
taught from an early period to regulate their emo- 
tions, by directing them to adequate and Avorthy ob- 
jects, and controlling them by the great principles 
of wisdom and virtue. In tliis important process 
the principle of association exerts a most extensive 
influence. The stern lessons of morality, and even 
the sublime truths of religion, may be rigidly im- 
pressed upon the minds of the young, and may, in 
after-life, recur from time to time as a mere matter 
of remembrance ; but many must have experienced 
how different is the impression when they recur in 
close association with a father's affection and a 
mother's tenderness, — with the lively recollection 
of a home, where the kindest sympathies of the 
human heart shed around the domestic circle all that 
is lovely in life, while a mild and consistent piety 
habitually pointed the way to a life which is to come. 



OF THE INFLTJENCE OF DISEASE UPON ATTENTION 
AND MEMORY. 

The preceding imperfect outline of the subject of 
memory naturally leads us briefly to investigate the 
manner in which this function is impaired in con- 



120 MEMORY. 

nexion with bodily disease. This takes place chiefly 
from injuries of the head, affections of the brain, 
fever, ajid diseases of extreme debility. Similar 
effects arise from intemperance and other habits of 
dissipation. Our present purpose, however, is, not 
to investigate the peculiar effects of these various 
causes, but to endeavour to trace the manner in 
which attention and' memory — and w^e may include 
perception — are affected by any or all of them. 

The first mental function which is impaired by 
bodily disease is usually the power of attention; 
this we see illustrated in all febrile affections. The 
patient, in the early or milder stages, is incapable 
of fixing his mind upon any thing that requires much 
attention, of following out an argument, or of trans- 
acting business which calls for much thought or 
consideration. He is acute and intelligent as to all 
common occurrences, and shows no want of recol- 
lection or of the power of reasoning when his atten- 
tion is excited; but he feels it an exertion that is 
painful to him. In a higher degree of this condition, 
he is still intelligent as to what is said or done at 
the time, or in recognising persons ; but in a short 
time forgets every thing in regard to the person or 
the occurrence. He is incapable of that degree of 
attention which is necessary for memory, though 
the powers of perception are entire. In the next 
stage he becomes incapable of receiving the full 
impression from external things; and, in conse- 
quence of this, he mistakes the objects of his own 
thoughts for realities. This is delirium, and there 
are various degrees of it. In some cases the atten- 
tion of the patient can be roused for a time, and 
directed to the true relations of external things, 
though he relapses into his delirious impressions 
when he is left undisturbed : in others, the false im- 
pression is constant, and cannot be corrected by any 
effort which is made to direct the attention ; and in 
a third modification of this remarkable condition, he 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 121 

mixes up his hallucinations with external impres- 
sions in a most singular manner. He is still capable, 
however, of describing his impressions, — that is, of 
talking so as to be miderstood, though what he 
speaks of relates only to his erroneous conceptions, 
or mere bodily feelings. In the next stage he either 
does not attempt to express himself at all, or is en- 
tirely unintelUgible. He is now cut off from com- 
munication with external things, and with other sen- 
tient beings ; and the highest degree of this is what we 
caU coma, or stupor, which resembles profound sleep. 
This description refers chiefly to the gi-adations in 
the state of the mental functions which we observe 
in continued fever. It is particularly interesting to 
trace them in this disease, because we see the va- 
rious grades passing into one another, and thus 
showing in a connected series the leading peculiari- 
ties which, in other affections, we have to contem- 
plate separately. These peculiarities may be chiefly 
referred to the following heads: — 

I. A state in which the attention cannot be steadily 
directed to a long and connected train of thought, or 
to any thing requiring a continued effort of mind. 
This takes place, as already stated, in the earlier 
stages of all febrile diseases. It likewise occurs in 
connexion with the debihty which succeeds acute 
diseases, in persons broken down by intemperance, 
and in the first approaches of old age. It is also 
often observed in a remarkable degree in connexion 
with a disordered state of the stomach. 

II. A state in which the impression made by ex- 
ternal things is not sufficient to produce remem- 
brance, though there appears to be, at the time, a 
perfect perception. A person so affected under- 
stands what is said to him, and answers correctly, 
but very soon forgets what has passed ; he knows a 
friend, and is happy to see him, but in a short time 

L 



122 MEMORY. 

forgets the occurrence. This is met with in a more 
advanced state of febrile diseases, in the higher de- 
grees of the condition which results from habitual 
intemperance, and in the more advanced periods of 
age. It also occurs in diseases of the brain, and in 
cases of injuries of the head. A lady whom I at- 
tended some time ago, on account of an injury pro- 
duced by a fall from a horse, lay, for the first week, 
in a state of perfect stupor; she then gradually re- 
vived, so as to be sensible to external impressions, 
and after some time to recognise her friends. But 
afterward, when she was entirely recovered, she had 
no recollection of this period of her convalescence, 
or of having seen various friends who then visited 
her, though, at the time, she recognised them, con- 
versed with them sensibly, and was very happy to 
see them. 

III. The third condition is that in which external 
impressions are either not perceived at all, or are 
perceived in a manner which cannot convey any dis- 
tinct notion of their relations to the mind. On this 
accoiuit the conceptions or trains of ideas existing 
in the mind itself are beheved to be realities. This 
remarkable condition belongs properly to another 
part of our subject. It occurs in various forms of 
delirium, and constitutes the peculiar characters of 
insanity and dreaming. The ideas or conceptions 
which occupy the mind in this condition are various. 
They may be trains of thought excited by some 
passing event or some bodily sensation ; and fre- 
quently the patient repeats something which is said 
in his hearing, and then branches off into some other 
train to which that has given rise. In other cases 
the impression is one which has been brought up by 
some old associations, even relating to things which 
the person when in health had not recollected. Of 
this kind there are various remarkable examples on 
record, especially in regard to the memory of Ian- 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 123 

guages. A man, mentioned by Mr. Abernethy, had 
been born in France, but had spent the greater part 
of his hfe in England, and for many years had en- 
tirely lost the habit of speaking French. But when 
under the care of Mr. Abernethy, on account of the 
effects of an injury of the head, he always spoke 
French. A similar case occurred in St. Thomas's 
Hospital, of a man who was in a state of stupor in 
consequence of an injury of the head. On his par- 
tial recovery, he spoke a language which nobody in 
the hospital understood, but which was soon ascer- 
tained to be Welsh. It was then discovered that he 
had been thirty years absent from Wales, and, before 
the accident, had entirely forgotten his native lan- 
guage. On his perfect recovery, he completely for- 
got his Welsh again, and recovered the EngHsh lan- 
guage. A lady, mentioned by Dr. Prichard, when in 
a state of delirium spoke a language which nobody 
about her understood ; but which also was discovered 
to be Welsh. None of her friends could form any 
conception of the manner in which she had become 
acquainted with that language ; but after much in- 
quiry it was discovered, that in her childhood she 
had a nurse, a native of a district on the coast of 
Brittany, the dialect of which is closely analogous 
to the Welsh. The lady had at that time learned a 
good deal of this dialect, but had entirely forgotten 
it for many years before this attack of fever. The 
case has also been communicated to me of a lady 
who was a native of Germany, but married to an 
English gentleman, and for a considerable time ac- 
customed to speak the English language.. During 
an illness, of the nature of which I am not informed, 
she always spoke German, and could not make her- 
self understood by her Enghsh attendants, except 
when her husband acted as interpreter. A woman 
who was a native of the Highlands, but accustomed to 
speak English, was under the care of Dr. Macintosh 
of Edinburgh, on account of an attack of apoplexy. 



124 MEMORY. 

She was so far recovered as to look around her with 
an appearance of intelligence, but the doctor could 
not make her comprehend any thing he said to her, 
or answer the most simple question. He then de- 
sired one of her friends to address her in Gaelic, 
when she immediately answered with readiness and 
fluency. An Italian gentleman, mentioned by Dr. 
Rush, who died of the yellow fever in New-York, in 
the beginning of his illness spoke English, in the 
middle of it French, but on the day of his death he 
spoke only Italian. A Lutheran clergyman of Phil- 
adelphia informed Dr. Rush that Germans and 
Swedes, of whom he had a considerable number in 
his congregation, when near death always prayed in 
their native languages, though some of them he was 
confident had not spoken these languages for fifty 
or sixty years. 

A case has been related to me of a boy, who at 
the age of four received a fracture of the scull, for 
which he underwent the operation of trepan. He 
was at the time in a state of perfect stupor, and 
after his recovery retained no recollection either of 
the accident or the operation. At the age of fifteen, 
during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a 
correct description of the operation and the persons 
who were present at it, with their dress and other 
minute particulars. He had never been observed to 
allude to it before, and no means were known by 
which he could have acquired the circumstances 
which he mentioned. An eminent medical friend 
informs me, that during fever, without any delirium, 
he on one occasion repeated long passages from 
Homer, which he could not do when in health ; and 
another friend has mentioned to me, that in a simi- 
lar situation there were represented to his mind, in 
a most vivid mamier, the circumstances of a journey 
in the Highlands, which he had performed long be- 
fore, including many minute particulars which he 
had entirely forgotten. 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 125 

In regard to the memory of languages as influ- 
enced by these affections of the brain, a condition 
occurs the reverse of that now mentioned, and pre- 
senting some singular phenomena : the cause of the 
difference is entirely beyond our researches. The 
late Dr. Gregory was accustomed to mention in his 
lectures the case of a clergyman, who, while labour- 
ing under a disease of the brain, spoke nothing but 
Hebrew, which was ascertained to be the last lan- 
guage that he had acquired. An English lady, men- 
tioned by Dr. Prichard, in recovering from an apo- 
plectic attack, always spoke to her attendants in 
French, and had actually lost the knowledge of the 
English language : this continued about a month. 

IV. The fourth condition is the state of stupor, or 
coma, in which the mind is entirely cut off from in- 
tercourse with the external world. This occurs in 
the worst states of fever, in various diseases of the 
brain and injuries of the head ; and the same condi- 
tion takes place, from a very different cause, in the 
state of fainting. In such cases there is seldom any 
recollection of mental impressions ; yet there are 
facts which tend to show, that the patient is not in 
such a state of total insensibility to external things 
as his appearance would indicate. A gentleman 
whom I attended in a state of perfect apoplexy, 
from which he did not recover, was frequently ob- 
served to adjust his nightcap with the utmost care, 
when it got into an uncomfortable state ; first pull- 
ing it down over his eyes, and then turning up the 
front of it in the most exact manner. Another, 
whom I saw lately in a state of profound apoplexy, 
but from which he recovered, had a perfect recollec- 
tion of what took place during the attack, and men- 
tioned many things which had been said in his hear- 
ing, when he was supposed to be in a state of per- 
fect unconsciousness. A lady, on recovering from 
a similar state, said she had been asleep and dream- 
L2 



126 MEMORY. 

ing, and mentioned what she had dreamed about. 
Facts are wanting on this curious subject ; but there 
can be Uttle doubt, that many of the stories related 
of things seen by persons in a state of trance are 
referable to this head, and that their visions con- 
sisted of the conceptions of the mind itself, believed 
for the time to be real, in a manner analogous to 
dreaming. That such impressions should not be 
more frequently remembered in the ordinary cases 
of stupor, probably arises from the higher degree 
and greater permanency of the affection than that 
which occurs in sleep. For we have reason to be- 
lieve that dreams which are remembered occur only 
in imperfect sleep, and that in very profound sleep 
we do not remember any mental impressions, though 
we have satisfactory proof that they exist. Thus, a 
person will talk ia his sleep so as to be distinctly 
understood by another, but without having the least 
recollection of the mental impression which led to 
what he said. 

In the preceding observations we have referred 
chiefly to the temporary influence of disease, in im- 
pairing or suspending the powers of attention and 
memory. But there is a part of the subject quite 
distinct from this, namely, the effect of certain dis- 
eases in obliterating impressions formerly received 
and long retained. The higher degrees of this con- 
dition amount to that state which we call idiotism, 
and this we find supei-vening both upon affections of 
the brain and protracted febrile diseases. The con- 
dition so produced is sometimes permanent, but fre- 
quently is recovered from ; and recovery takes place 
in some cases gradually, in others very suddenly. 
A man, mentioned by Willis, on recovering from a 
putrid fever, was found to have so entirely lost his 
mental faculties, that he knew nobody, remembered 
nothing, and understood nothing : " vix supra brutum 
saperet.'' He continued in this state for two months. 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 127 

and then gradually recovered. Some years ago I 
attended a young man, who, on recovering from a 
tedious fever, was found to be in a state bordering 
upon idiotism; and this continued even after his 
bodily health was entirely restored. In this state 
he was taken to the countiy, where he gradually re- 
covered after several months. A gentleman, men- 
tioned by Wepfer, on coming out of an apoplectic 
attack, was found to know nobody, and remember 
nothing. After several weeks he began to know his 
friends, to remember words, to repeat the Lord's 
Prayer, and to read a few words of Latin, rather 
than German, which was his own language. When 
urged to read more than a few w^ords at a time, he 
said that he formerly understood these things, but 
now did not. After some time he began to pay 
more attention to what was passing around him; 
but, while thus making slight and gradual progress, 
he was, after a few months, suddenly cut off by an 
attack of apoplexy. 

The sudden recoveries from this condition of the 
mental powers are still more remarkable. Dr. 
Prichard, on the authority of the late Dr. Rush of 
Philadelphia, mentions an American student, a per- 
son of considerable attainments, w^ ho, on recovering 
from a fever, was found to have lost all his acquired 
knowledge. \Vhen his health was restored, he be- 
gan to apply to the Latin grammar, had passed 
through the elementary parts and was beginning to 
construe, w^hen, one day, in making a strong effort 
to recollect a part of his lesson, the whole of his lost 
impressions suddenly returned to his mind, and he 
found himself at once in possession of all his former 
acquirements. 

In slighter injuries of the head, accompanied by 
loss of recollection, we observe the circumstances 
gradually recalled in a very singular maimer. Some 
years ago I saw a boy who had fallen from a wall, 
and struck his head against a stone which lay at the 
foot of it. He was carried home in a state of in- 



128 MEMORY. 

sensibility, from which he soon recovered, but with- 
out any recollection of the accident. He felt that 
his head was hurt, but he had no idea how he had 
received the injury. After a short time he recol- 
lected that he had struck his head against a stone, 
but had no recollection how he had come to do so. 
After another interval, he recollected that he had 
been on the top of a wall, and had fallen from it and 
struck against the stone, but could not remember 
where the wall was. After some time longer, he re- 
covered the recollection of all the circumstances. 
Dr. Prichard mentions a gentleman who suffered a 
severe injury by a fall from his horse, and who, on 
his recovery, had no recollection of any thing re- 
lating to the accident, or for some time before it. 
A considerable time elapsed before his recollection 
of it began to return, and it was only as he repeat- 
edly rode over the country where the accident had 
happened, that the sight of the various objects 
gradually recalled the circumstances of the journey 
in which it occurred, and of the accident itself. 

A still more remarkable phenomenon connected 
with cases of this kind occurs in some instances in 
which there is perfect intelligence in regard to re- 
cent circumstances, but an obhteration of former 
impressions. Of this I have received the following 
striking example from an eminent medical friend. 
A respectable surgeon was thrown from his horse 
while riding in the countiy, and was carried into an 
adjoining house in a state of insensibility. From 
this he very soon recovered, described the accident 
distinctly, and gave minute directions in regard to 
his own treatment. In particular, he requested that 
he might be immediately bled ; the bleeding was 
repeated, at his own desire, after two hours ; and 
he conversed correctly regarding his feelings and 
the state of his pulse with the medical man who 
visited him. In the evening he was so much re- 
covered as to be able to be removed to his own 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 129 

house, and a medical friend accompanied him in the 
carriage. As they drew near home, the latter made 
some observation respecting precautions calculated 
to prevent unnecessary alarm to the wife and family 
of the patient, when, to his astonishment, he dis- 
covered that his friend had lost all idea of having 
either a wife or children. This condition continued 
durmg the following day, and it was only on the 
third day, and after further bleeding, that the cir- 
cumstances of his past life began to recur to his 
mind. On the other hand, remarkable instances 
occur of the permanency of impressions made upon 
the mind previously to such injuries, though the 
mental faculties are entirely obscured as to all sub- 
sequent impressions. An affecting example is men- 
tioned by Dr. Conolly : — a young clergyman, when 
on the point of being married, suffered an injury of 
the head by which his understanding was entirely 
and permanently deranged. He lived in this con- 
dition till the age of eighty ; and to the last talked 
of nothing but his approaching wedding, and ex- 
pressed impatience for the arrival of the happy day. 
It is chiefly in connexion with attacks of an apo- 
plectic nature that we meet with singular examples 
of loss of memory on particular topics, or extending 
only to a particular period. One of the most com- 
mon is loss of the memory of words, or of names, 
while the patient retains a correct idea of things 
and persons. The late Dr. Gregory used to men- 
tion a lady who, after an apoplectic attack, re- 
covered correctly her ideas of things, but could not 
name them. In giving directions respecting family 
matters, she was quite distinct as to what she wished 
to be done, but could make herself understood only 
by going through the house, and pointing to the va- 
rious articles. A gentleman whom I attended some 
years ago, after recovering from an apoplectic at- 
tack, knew his friends perfectly, but could not name 
them. Walking one day in the street, he met a 



130 MEMORY. 

gentleman to whom he was very anxious to com- 
municate something respecting a mutual friend. 
After various ineffectual attempts to make him un- 
derstand whom he meant, he at last seized him by 
the arm and dragged him through several streets to 
the house of the gentleman of whom he was speak- 
ing, and pointed to the name-plate on the door. 

A singular modification of this condition has been 
related to me. The gentleman to whom it referred 
could not be made to understand the name of an 
object if it was spoken to him, but understood it 
perfectly when it was written. His mental facul- 
ties were so entire, that he was engaged in most 
extensive agricultural concerns, and he managed 
them with perfect correctness, by means of a remark- 
able contrivance. He kept before him, in the room 
where he transacted business, a list of the words 
which were most apt to occur in his intercourse 
with his workmen. When one of these wished to 
communicate with him on any subject, he first heard 
what the workman had to say, but without under- 
standing him further than to simply catch the words. 
He then turned to the words in his written hst, and 
whenever they met his eye he understood them 
perfectly. These particulars I had from his son, a 
gentleman of high intelligence. Another frequent 
modification consists in putting one name for another, 
but always using the words in the same sense. An 
example of this also occurred in the gentleman last 
mentioned. He uniformly called his snuff-box a 
hogshead, and the association which led to this ap- 
peared to be obvious. In the early part of his life 
he had been in Virginia, and connected with the 
trade in tobacco ; so that the transition from snuff 
to tobacco, and from tobacco to a hogshead, seemed 
to be natural. Another gentleman affected in this 
manner, when he wanted coals put upon his fire al- 
ways called for paper, and when he wanted paper 
called for coals ; and these words he always used 



INFLUENCE OF DISEASE. 131 

in the same manner. In other cases, the patient 
seems to invent names, using words which to a 
stranger are quite unintelhgible ; but he always uses 
them in the same sense, and his immediate attend- 
ants come to understand what he means by them. 

Another remarkable modification of this condition 
of the mental powers is found in those cases in 
which there is loss of the recollection of a particular 
period. A clergyman, mentioned by Dr. Beattie, on 
recovering from an apoplectic attack, was found to 
have lost the recollection of exactly four years ; 
every thing that occurred before that period he re- 
membered perfectly. He gradually recovered, partly 
by a spontaneous revival of his memory, and partly 
by acquiring a kno'.vledge of the leading events of 
the period. A young lady who was present at a 
late catastrophe in Scotland, in which many people 
lost their hves by the fall of the gallery of a church, 
escaped without any injury, but with the complete loss 
of the recollection of any of the circumstances ; and 
this extended, not only to the accident, but to every 
thing that had occurred to her for a certain time before 
going to church. A lady whom I attended some 
years ago in a protracted illness, in which her mem- 
ory became much impaired, lost the recollection of 
a period of about ten or twelve years, but spoke 
with perfect consistency of things as they stood be- 
fore that time. 

As far as I have been able to trace it, the prin- 
ciple in such cases seems to be, that when the 
memory is impaired to a certain degree, the loss of 
it extends backwards to some event or some period 
by which a particularly deep impression had been 
made upon the mind. In the lady last mentioned, 
for instance, the period of which she lost the recol- 
lection was that during which she had resided in 
Edinburgh, and it extended back to her removal 
from another city in which she had hved for many 
years. During her residence in the latter, she had 



132 MEMORY. 

become the mother of a large family, and other 
events had occurred likely to make a deep impres- 
sion on her mind. The period of her residence in 
Edinburgh had been uniform and tranquil, and with- 
out any occurrence calculated to excite much atten- 
tion in a person of rather slender mental endow- 
ments. I do not know whether we can give a similar 
explanation of cases in which the loss of memory 
has extended only to particular subjects ; namely, 
by supposing that these subjects had been more 
slightly impressed upon the mind than those which 
were retained. A gentleman is mentioned by Dr. 
Beattie, who, after a blow on the head, lost his 
knowledge of Greek, and did not appear to have lost 
any thing else. 

While we thus review the manner in which the 
manifestations of mind are affected, in certain cases, 
by diseases and injuries of the brain, it is necessary 
that we^hould refer briefly to the remarkable in- 
stances in which the brain has been extensively 
diseased without the phenomena of mind being im- 
paired in any sensible degree. This holds true both 
in regard to the destruction of each individual part 
of the brain, and likewise to the extent to which the 
cerebral mass may be diseased or destroyed. In 
another work I have mentioned various cases which 
illustrate this fact in a very striking manner ; par- 
ticularly the case of a lady in whom one-half of the 
brain was reduced to a mass of disease ; but who 
retained all her faculties to the last, except that 
there was an imperfection of vision, — and had been 
enjoying herself at a convivial party in the house of 
a friend a few hours before her death. A man, 
mentioned by Dr. Ferriar, who died of an affection 
of the brain, retained all his faculties entire till the 
very moment of death, which was sudden : on ex- 
amining his head, the whole right hemisphere,— that 
is, one-half of his brain, — was found destroyed by sup- 



INFLtJENCE OF DISEASE. 133 

puration. In a similar case recorded by Diemer- 
broek, half a pound of matter was found in the 
brain ; and in one by Dr. Heberden, there was half 
a pound of water. A man, mentioned by Mr. O'Hal- 
loran, suffered such an injury of the head that a 
large portion of the bone was removed on the right 
side ; and extensive suppuration having taken place, 
there was discharged at each dressing, through the 
opening, an immense quantity of matter mixed with 
large masses of the substance of the brain. This 
went on for seventeen days, and it appears that 
nearly one-half of the brain was thrown out mixed 
with the matter ; yet the man retained all his intel- 
lectual faculties to the very moment of dissolution ; 
and through the whole course of the disease, his 
mind maintained uniform tranquillity. These re- 
markable histories might be greatly multiplied if it 
were required, but at present it seems only neces- 
sary to add the very interesting case related by Mr, 
Marshall. It is that of a man who died with a pound 
of water in his brain, after having been long in a 
state of idiocy, but who, a very' short time before 
death, became perfectly rational. 

The facts which have been thus briefly referred 
to present a series of phenomena of the most re? 
markable kind, but on which we cannot speculate 
in the smallest degree without advancing beyond 
the sphere of our limited faculties ; one thing, how- 
ever, is certain, that they give no countenance to 
the doctrine of materialism, which some have pre- 
sumptuously deduced from a very partial view of 
the influence of cerebral disease upon the manifes- 
tations of mind. They show us, indeed, in a very 
striking manner, the mind holding intercourse with 
the external world through the medium of the brain 
and nervous system; and, by certain diseases of these 
organs, they show this intercourse impaired or sus- 
pended ; but they show nothing more. In particulars 
M 



134 ABSTRACTION. 

they warrant nothing in any degree analogous to 
those partial deductions which form the basis of 
materialism. On the contrary, they show us the 
brain injured and diseased to an extraordinary ex- 
tent without the mental functions being affected in 
any sensible degree. They show us, further, the 
manifestations of mind obscured for a time, and 
yet reviving in all their original vigour, almost in 
the very moment of dissolution. Finally, they ex- 
hibit to us the mind, cut off from all intercourse 
with the external world, recalling its old impressions, 
even of things long forgotten ; and exercising its 
powers on those which had long ceased to exist, in 
a manner totally irreconcilable with any idea we can 
form of a material function. 



SECTION II. 

ABSTRACTION. 

By Abstraction we separate various facts from each 
other, and examine them individually. We sepa- 
rate, for example, the qualities of a substance, and 
contemplate one of them apart from the rest. This 
act of the mind is employed in two processes of the 
utmost importance. By the one, we examine a va- 
riety of objects, select the properties in which cer- 
tain numbers of them agree, and thus arrange them 
into classes, genera, and species. By the other, we 
take a more comprehensive view of an extensive 
collection of facts, and select one which is common 
to the whole. This we call generaUzing, or deduc- 
ing a general fact or general principle ; and the pro- 
cess is of extensive application in all philosophical 
inquiries. The particular points to be attended to 



ABSTRACTION. 1 35 

in conducting it will come under view in another 
part of our subject. The most important is, that the 
fact assumed as general really belongs to all the in- 
dividual instances, and has not been deduced from 
the examination of only a part of them. 

There have been disputes among writers on the 
science of mind, whether abstraction is to be con- 
sidered as a distinct mental operation, or is referable 
to judgment. But I have already stated that my ob- 
ject in this outline is to avoid all such discussions, 
and to allude simply to the actual processes of the 
mind in a practical view. One thing at least is clear, 
namely, that our abstractions must be corrected by 
reason, the province of which is to judge whether 
the process is performed correctly, and on sound 
principles. This, however, is distinct from the pri- 
mary act of the mind to which I now apply the 
term abstraction, which is simply the power of con- 
templating one property of a substance apart from 
its other properties. It thus disjoins things which 
by nature are intimately united, and which cannot 
be separated in any other manner. Reason does not 
appear to be immediately concerned in this, though 
it is most closely connected with the purposes to 
which the process is afterward applied; namely, 
classifying substances according to a certain agree- 
ment of properties, and fixing upon those which are 
common to all the individuals of a numerous series, 
in the act of generalizing; or deducing a general fact 
or general principle. 

I have formerly alluded to a period in the science 
of mind, when our ideas of external things were 
supposed to be certain actual essences, separated 
from the substances and conveyed to the thinking 
principle. In connexion w4th this theory there arose 
a controversy, whether, when we perform* the mental 
act of generalizing, there exists in nature any es- 
sence corresponding to a general idea ; or whether, 
in generalizing, we merely make use of an abstract 
term : whether, for example, in using the word man 



136 ABSTRACTION. 

we only employ a term, or Avhether we have the 
power of forming an idea of man in the abstract 
without thinking- of any individual man ; and, in the 
same manner, whether we can reason respecting a 
class of substances, without thinking of any of the 
individuals composing it. Hence arose two sects, 
whose disputes make a most remarkable figure in 
the history of intellectual science, namely,, the 
Nominalists and Realists. 

The controversies of these sects we now consider 
as little more than a matter of historical curiosity ; 
but, for several centuries, they divided the learned 
of Europe, and were often carried on with an asperity 
amounting to actual persecution. " The Nominal- 
ists," says Mosheim, " procured the death of John 
Huss, who was a Realist; and in their letter to 
Lewis King of France do not pretend to deny that 
he fell a victim to the resentment of their sect. The 
Realists, on the other hand, obtained, in the year 
1479, the condemnation of John de Wesalia, who was 
attached to the party of the Nominalists. These 
contending sects carried their fury so far as to charge 
each other with the sin against the Holy Ghost." — 
" The dispute," says Mr. Stewart, " was carried on 
with great warmth in the universities of France, 
Germany, and England, more particularly in the two 
former countries, where the sovereigns were led by 
some pohtical views to interest themselves deeply 
in the contest, and even to employ the civil power 
in support of their favourite opinions. The emperor 
Lewis of Bavaria, in return for the assistance which 
in his disputes with the pope, Occam had given him by 
his writings, sided w-ith the Nominahsts ; Lewis the 
Eleventh of France, on the other hand, attached 
himself to the Realists, and made their antagonists 
the objects of a cruel persecution." 

We find some difficulty in believing, in the present 
day, that the controversy which thus embroiled the 
continent of Europe in all the rancour of actual per- 
secution related to the question, whether, in em- 



ABSTRACTION. 137 

ploying- general terms, we use words or names only, 
or whether there is in nature any thing correspond- 
ing to what we mean by a general idea. It is well 
designed by Mr. Stewart as " one of the most curi- 
ous events which occur in the history of the human 
mind," 

The question is one of no practical importance, 
and when it is cleared from its connexion with the 
ancient doctrine of ideas, appears to be one of no 
difficulty. Without supposing that there is in nature 
any actual essence corresponding to a general idea, 
the truth seems to be, that we do" form a certain no- 
tion or conception of a quality in which several sub- 
stances agree, distinct from any one substance to 
which the quality belongs. Hence some have pro- 
posed the term Notionalist, or Conceptualist, as de- 
signating opinions distinct from those both of the 
Nominalists and Realists. But, according to the 
principles of modern science, we caimot consider 
the discussion as any thing more than an ingenious 
arguing on points of no real importance. The pro- 
cess which the mind really carries on in that mental 
operation to which these remarks have referred, con- 
sists simply in tracing relations or points of resem- 
blance in which certain individual- things agree, 
though they may in others be remarkably different. 
We then give a name to this common quality, and 
thus form the individuals into a class of which this 
quality is the distinguishing character. Thus we 
may take a number of animals differing remarkably 
from each other, and say they are all quadrupeds. 
We may take a number of substances very dissimi- 
lar in their external and mechanical properties, and 
say they are all acids. SoQie of these substances 
are solid, some fluid, and some gaseous; but the 
property of acidity is common to them all, and this 
accordingly becomes the name and the distinguishing 
character of the class into which we now arrange 
them. 

M3 



138 IMAGINATION. 



SECTION III. 

IMAGINATION. 



In the exercise of Imagination, we take the com- 
ponent elements of real scenes, events, or characters, 
and combine them anew by a process of the mind 
itself, so as to form compounds which have no ex- 
istence in nature. A painter, by this process, de- 
picts a landscape combining the beauties of various 
real landscapes, and excluding their defects. A poet 
or a noveUst, in the same manner, calls into being a 
fictitious character, endowed with those qualities 
with which it suits his purpose to invest him, places 
him in contact with other beings equally imaginary, 
and arranges, according to his will, the scenes in 
which he shall bear a part, and the line of conduct 
which he shall follow. The compound in these 
cases is entirely fictitious and arbitrary ; but it is 
expected that the individual elements shall be such 
as actually occur in nature, and that the combination 
shall not differ remarkably from what might really 
happen. When this is not attended to, as in a pic- 
ture or a novel, we speak of tlie work being extravar 
gant, or out of nature. But, avoiding combinations 
which are grossly at variance with reality, the framer 
of such a compound may make it superior to any 
thing that actually occurs. A painter may draw a 
combination of beauties in a landscape superior to 
any thing that is actually known to exist ; and a 
novelist may delineate a more perfect character than 
is met with in real life. It is remarked by Mr. 
Stewart, that Milton in his Garden of Eden has 
" created a landscape more perfect, probably, in all 
its parts, than has ever been reaUzed in nature, and 



DIAGINATION. 139 

certainly very different from any thing that this 
country exhibited at the time when he wrote." " It 
is a curious remark of Mr. Walpole," he adds, " that 
Milton's Eden is free from the defects of the Old 
English Garden, and is imagined on the same prin- 
ciples which it was reserved for the present age to 
carry into execution." 

The mode of artificial combination which results 
from the exercise of imagination is applicable chiefly 
to four kinds of composition. 

1. Fictitious narrative, in which the author deline- 
ates imaginary scenes or transactions ; and paints 
imaginary characters, endowing them with such 
qualities as may suit the purpose which he has in 
view. 

2. Composition or verbal address, directed to the 
passions, and intended to excite particular mental 
emotions. To this head are referable many of the 
combinations of the poet, and addresses calculated 
to operate upon the feelings of a popular assembly ; 
also, those which derive their character from the 
language of trope and metaphor. The genius of 
the orator, and the inventive powers of the poet, are 
exhibited in the variety and the novelty of the analo- 
gies, resemblances, illustrations, and figures, which 
he thus brings to bear upon his subject. 

3. Those unexpected and peculiar associations 
which form the basis of wit and humour. 

4. Combinations of objects of sense, calculated to 
produce menial emotions of a pleasurable or painful 
kind, as our impressions of the sublime, the beauti- 
ful, the terrible, or the ludicrous. The combinations 
of this class are chiefly referable to the head of ob- 
jects of taste, or the fine arts ; and are exemplified 
in the inventions of the painter and the statuary, in 
decorative architecture and artificial gardening, — we 
may add, theatrical exhibitions and music. 

The faciUty of rapidly forming in these several 



140 IMAGINATION. 

departments combinations calculated to produce the 
effect which is intended, constitutes what we call in- 
venfive genius. Similar powers of invention, founded 
on an exercise of imagination, may also be applied 
to the investigations of science. It may be employed, 
for example, in the contrivance of experiments cal- 
culated to aid an investigation or to illustrate a doc- 
trine ; and in the construction of those legitimate 
hypotheses which have often led to the most im- 
portant discoveries. 

The union of elements, in all such productions of 
the imagination, is regulated by the knowledge, the 
taste, and the intellectual habits of the author; and, 
we must add, by his moral principles. According to 
the views, the liabits, and the principles of him who 
frames them, therefore, they may either contribute 
to moral and intellectual improvement, or they may 
tend to mislead the judgment, vitiate the taste, and 
corrupt the moral feelings. 

Similar observations apply to the conduct of the 
imagination in individuals, and its influence in the 
cultivation of moral and intellectual character. There 
is certainly no power of the mind that requires more 
cautious management and stern control ; and the 
proper regulation of it cannot be too strongly im- 
pressed upon the young. The sound and proper 
exercise of it may be made to contribute to the cul- 
tivation of all that is virtuous and estimable in human 
character. It leads us, in particular, to place our- 
selves in the situation of others, to enter into their feel- 
ings and wants, and to participate in their distresses. 
It thus tends to the cultivation of sympathy and the 
benevolent affections ; and promotes all those feel- 
ings which exert so extensive an influence in the 
duties of fjiendship and the harmonies of civil and 
social intercourse. "We may even say that we exer- 
cise imagination when we endeavour to act upon that 
high standard of nj orals which requires us " to do to 



IMAGINATION. 141 

others as we would that they should do mito us :" 
for in this mental act we must imagine ourselves in 
the situation of other men, and, in their character, 
judge of our own conduct towards them. Thus a 
man deficient in imagination, though he maybe free 
from any thing unjust or dishonourable, is apt to be 
cold, contracted, and selfish, — regardless of the feel- 
ings and indififerent to the distresses of others. 
Further, we may be said to exercise imagination 
when we carry oiu- views beyond present and sensi- 
ble objects, and endeavour to feel the power of 
"things which are not seen," and. the reality of scenes 
and times which are yet to come. On the other 
hand, imagination may be employed for calling into 
being evils which have no existence, or for exagger- 
ating those which are real; for fostering malevolent 
feelings, and for imputing to those with whom we 
are connected motives and intentions which have no 
foundation in truth. Finally, an ill-regulated ima- 
gination may be employed in occupying the mind 
with waking dreams and vain delusions, to the ex- 
clusion of all those high pursuits which ought to 
employ the faculties of a rational being. 

There has been considerable difference of opinion 
in regard to the effects produced upon the mind by 
fictitious narrative. Without entering minutely upon 
the merits of this controversy, I think it may be con- 
tended, that two evils are likely to arise from much 
indulgence in works of fiction. The one is a tend- 
ency to give way to the wild play of the imagination ; 
a practice most deleterious, both to the intellectual 
and moral habits. The other is a disruption of the 
harmony which ought to exist between the moral 
emotions and the conduct, — a principle of extensive 
and important influence. In the healthy state of the 
moral feelings, for example, the emotion of sympa- 
thy excited by a tale of sorrow ought to be followed 
by some efforts for the relief of the sufferer. When 
such relations in real life are listened to from time 



143 IMAGINATION. 

to time without any such efforts, the emotion grad- 
ually becomes weakened, and that moral condition 
is produced which we call selfishness, or hardness 
of heart. Fictitious tales of sorrow appear to have 
a similar tendency; — the emotion is produced with- 
out the corresponding conduct ; and when this habit 
has been much indulged the result seems to be, that 
a cold and barren sentimentalism is produced, instead 
of the habit of active benevolence. If fictitious nar- 
ratives be employed for depicting scenes of vice, an- 
other evil of the greatest magnitude is likely to result 
from them, even though the conduct exhibited should 
be shown to end in remorse and misery : for by the 
mere familiarity with vice, an injury is done to the 
youthful mind, which is in no degree compensated 
by the moral at the close. 

Imagination, therefore, is a mental power of ex- 
tensive influence, and capable of bemg turned to 
important purposes in the cultivation of individual 
character. But to be so, it must be kept under the 
strict control both of reason and of virtue. If it be 
allowed to wander at discretion, through scenes of 
imagined wealth, ambition, frivohty, or pleasure, it 
tends to withdraw the mind from the important pur- 
suits of hfe, to w^eaken the habit of attention, and to 
impair the judgment. It tends, in a most material 
maimer, to prevent the due exercise of those nobler 
powers which are directed to the cultivation both of 
science and virtue. The state of a mind which has 
yielded itself to the influence of this delusive habit 
cannot be more forcibly represented than in the words 
of an eloquent writer : — " The influence of this habit 
of dwelling on the beautiful fallacious forms of ima- 
gination will accompany the mind into the most se- 
rious speculations, or rather musings, on the real 
world, and what is to be done in it, and expected; 
as the image which the eye acquires from looking at 
any dazzling object still appears before it wherever 
it turns. The vulgar materials that constitute the 



IMAGINATION. 143 

actual economy of the world will rise up to its sight 
in fictitious forms, which it cannot disenchant into 
plain reality, nor will even suspect to be deceptive. 
It cannot go about with sober, rational inspection, 
and ascertain the nature and value of all things around 
it. Indeed, such a mind is not disposed to examine 
with any careful minuteness the real condition of 
things. It is content with ignorance, because en- 
vironed with something more dehcious than such 
knowledge in the paradise which imagination creates. 
In that paradise it walks dehghted, till some impe- 
rious circumstance of real life call it thence, and 
gladly escapes thither again when the avocation is 
past. There every thing is beautiful and noble as 
could be desired to form the' residence of an angel. 
If a tenth part of the felicities that have been enjoyed, 
the great actions that have been performed, the bene- 
ficent institutions that have been established, and 
the beautiful objects that have been seen in that 
happy region, could have been imported into this 
terrestrial place, — what a delightful thing it would 
have been to awake each morning to see such a world 
once more."* 

To the same purpose are the words of another 
writer of the highest authority: — "To indulge the 
power of fiction, and send imagination out upon the 
wing, is often the sport of those who delight too 
much in silent speculation. He who has nothing 
external that can divert him must find pleasure in his 
own thoughts, and must conceive himself what he is 
not, — for who is pleased with what he is 1 He then 
expatiates in boundless futurity, and culls from all 
imaginable conditions that which for the present 
moment he should most desire ; amuses his desires 
with impossible enjoyments, and confers upon his 
pride unattainable dominion. The mind dances from 
scene to scene, unites all pleasures in all combina- 

* Foster's Essays. 



144 REASON. 

tions, and riots in delights which nature and fortune, 
with all their bounty, cannot bestow. In time, some 
particular train of ideas fixes the attention ; all other 
intellectual gratifications are rejected; the mind, in 
weariness or leisure, recurs constantly to the favour- 
ite conception, and feasts on the luscious falsehood 
whenever she is offended with the bitterness of truth. 
By degrees the reign of fancy is confirmed; she 
grows first imperious, and in time despotic. Then 
fictions begin to operate as realities, false opinions 
fasten upon the mind, and life passes in dreams of 
rapture or of anguish."* 



SECTION IV. 

OF REASON OR JUDGMENT. 

The most simple view which we can take of rea- 
son probably is, that it is the exercise of mind by 
which we compare facts with each other, and mental 
impressions with external things. The applications 
of this mental process may be referred to the follow- 
ing heads : — 

I. We compare facts with each other, so as to 
trace their rehitions, connexions, and tendencies; and 
to distinguish the connexions which are incidental 
from those which are fixed ajid uniform. 

What we call the relations of things, whether re- 
ferring to external events or mental processes, com- 
prehend all those facts which form the great objects 
of human knowledge, with respect either to the indi- 
viduals, or their tendencies towards each other. 

* Johnson's Raeiselas, 



REASON. 145 

They may be briefly enumerated in the following 
manner : — 

1. Relations of character, — or those marks, char- 
acters, or properties by which a substance may be 
recognised, and maybe distinguished from all others; 
for example, the botanical characters of a plant—the 
chymical properties of a mineral — the symptoms of 
a disease — sensible properties of colour, taste, smell, 
&c. — the mental endowments and moral qualities of 
individual men. 

2. Relations of resemblance and analogy, arising 
out of a comparison of the qualities of various indi- 
vidual substances or events. These admit of various 
degrees. When there is a close agreement between 
two events or classes of events, it constitutes resem- 
blance : when there are points of difference, it is 
analogy. In the latter case, we then trace the de- 
grees of analogy, depending upon the number of 
points in which the resemblance holds and the number 
of points in which there is a difference. On the rela- 
tions of resemblance also depend the arts of arrange- 
ment and classification ; and the use of those general 
terms by which we learn to express a great number 
of individual objects by a single term, derived from 
certain characters in which they agree, such as solids, 
fluids, quadrupeds, &c. We find a certain number 
of substances which agree so much in their proper- 
ties, that we class them together as one species. 
We then find other substances, which agree with 
these in a certain numbet of their properties, but 
differ m others. We dismiss the latter, and retain 
those only in which they all agree, and so form the 
whole into a genus. The individuals forming the 
genus are still found to agree in some of their prop- 
erties with various other substances, and, by leaving 
out of view those in which they differ, we again form 
this still larger number into a class or order. 

3. Nearly connected with the former, but still 
more extensive, is that important process by which, 



146 REASON. 

among a great series of facts, we trace an accord- 
ance, and thus deduce from the whole a general fact 
or general principle. 

4. Relations of composition ; comprehending the 
resolution of a substance into its elements or con- 
stituent parts, — the connexion of the parts as consti- 
tuting a whole — of the whole to the parts, and of the 
parts to each other. 

5. Relations of causation, or the tendencies of 
bodies to produce or be followed by certain actions 
upon each other in certain circumstances. These 
refer chiefly to that uniform sequence of events from 
which we derive our idea of the one being the cause 
of the other. But the class likewise includes other 
relations arising out of the same subject ; such as the 
relation of two events as the joint causes of a common 
effect, or the joint effects of a common cause ; or as 
forming links in a chain of sequences in which we 
have still to look for other events as the true ante- 
cedents or final results. It includes also that most 
important mental process by which, from the prop- 
erties of a known effect, we infer the powers and 
properties of an unknown cause. 

6. Relations of degree and proportion, as in those 
truths and relations which are the subjects of mathe- 
matics. 

7. The important question of moral relations, 
which does not properly belong to the present part 
of our inquiry, — including the relation of certain ac- 
tions to the great standard of moral rectitude, and 
to those principles which bind men together in the 
harmonies of social and domestic intercourse. 

These appear to include the principal relations of 
things which the mind requires to investigate in an 
intellectual point of view. The facts respecting them 
are acquired by attention and memory ; but it is the 
province of reason to separate from the mass so ac- 
quired those which are incidental and temporary 
from those which are uniform, — to ascertain, for ex- 
ample, those characters by which a substance may 



REASON. 147 

be certainly recognised, — the symptoms by which a 
disease may be disting^iished from other diseases 
whicj:i resemble it, — and the actions which a sub- 
stance may be confidently expected to produce upon 
other substances in particular circumstances. When 
the mental process required for doing so is performed 
in a legitimate manner, the deduction constitutes 
ti~uth, in regard to the particular point which is the 
immediate subject of it ; when the contrary, it leads 
to fallacy oy falsehood. Hence reason has sometimes ' 
been defined that exercise of mmd by which we dis- 
tinguish truth from falsehood. 

11. Having by the preceding processes ascertained 
the uniform tendencies of bodies to be followed by 
certain actions upon each other, Ave bring these ten- 
dencies into operation for the production of certain 
results. Hence reason has been considered also to 
be that power by which we combine means for ac- 
complishing an end ; but this, perhaps, may be re- 
garded rather as the practical application of the 
knowledge to which reason leads us, than as a pri- 
mary part of the province of reason itself. 

in. We compare mental impressions with external 
things, so as to correct the impressions of the niind 
in regard to the external world. Mental processes 
of the most important kind are connected with this 
application of reason. 

Reason or judgment, when duly exercised, con- 
ducts us through these various mental operations, 
and guides us towards the discovery of truth. It 
does so by enabling us to compare facts with facts, 
and events with events ; to weigh their relations, 
bearings, and tendencies ; and to assign to each cir- 
cumstance its proper weight and influence in the 
conclusions which we are to deduce from them. 
The person who does so Ave call a man of sound 



lis REASON. 

judgment, whose opinions and conclusions we re- 
ceive with confidence. On the contrary, we receive 
with distrust and suspicion the conckisions of a man 
of an opposite character, who forms his opinions and 
deductions hastily, — that is, from a limited number 
of facts, or a hasty and imperfect examination of 
their relations. 

A distinction has sometimes been made between 
the term reason, as used in the language of science, 
and as employed in tlie common affairs of life ; but 
there seems to be no real ground for the distinction. 

Reason, in the language of intellectual science, 
appears to be that process by which we judge cor- 
rectly of the true ajid uniform relations of facts, or 
events, and give to each circumstance its due influ- 
ence in the deductions. It is chiefly opposed to im- 
agination, in which the mind is allowed to ramble 
through chains of events which are connected by 
loose and casual associations, leading to no true re- 
sults. It is also distinguished from simple memory, 
in which facts or events are connected in the mind 
by certain principles of association, without a full 
view of their relations. Thus, when we find a per- 
son remembering an extensive collection of facts, 
and forming certain combinations among them, or 
deductions from them, without attending to points 
of difference which tend to other deductions, we say, 
his memory is better than his judgment. 

Reasoning, again, appears to be the continued ex- 
ercise of reason, when applied to the investigation 
of a particular subject, or a certain series of facts or 
events, so as to trace their relations or to establish 
a particular conclusion as deduced from such a se- 
ries. This process, however, which is commonly 
called the discursive faculty, is to be distinguished 
from the simple exercise of reason. It ought to be 
guided by reason ; that is, by a full view of the real 
relations of the facts about which it is exercised; 
but it is often allowed to fix on a slight and partial 



REASON. 149 

view of them ; or is applied ingeniously to discover 
relations of a particular kind only. Thus, we speak 
of a man who reasons closely, or with a c-orrect at- 
tention to the real relations of thing-s, and the true 
weight of every fact in the investigation ; of another 
who reasons loosely, or who is led away by casual 
relations and partial views, affording no true deduc- 
tions ; and of a third, who reasons ingeniously and 
plausibly, but not soundly, — that is, who argues on 
one side of a question, and contemplates facts in 
particular relations only, or as supporting particular 
opinions, neglecting those views of them which tend 
to a different eonchision. This art of ingenious rea- 
soning or disputation, accordingly, we shall after- 
ward have occasion to show, is not only to be distin- 
guished from the sound exercise of reason or judg- 
ment, but is often found directly opposed to it. 

In the language of theology, reason is distin- 
guished from revelation ; and means that exercise 
of the mind by which we deduce a certain know- 
ledge of the Deity from the power and wisdom dis- 
played in the works of creation, apart from any di- 
rect revelation of his character and will. 

In the language of common life, the mental pro- 
cess which we term reason or judgment appears to 
be the same, though the facts on which it is exer- 
cised may be different. A reasonable man is one 
who, both in the formation of his opinions and the 
regulation of his conduct, gives the due w^eight and 
influence to all the facts and considerations which 
ought to influence his decision. A man of the op- 
posite character is one who takes up his opinions 
upon slight, partial, and inadequate grounds ; and 
then cannot, or will not, admit the impression of 
facts or arguments which are calculated to correct 
these unsound deductions ; or who, in the regulation 
of his conduct, is led away by hasty impressions, or 
feeble and madequate motives, without giving due 
consideration to those which are calculated to lead 
N2 



150 REASON. 

him into a different course. The former we call a 
reasonable, considerate, thinking" man ; the latter 
we say is an unreasonable, inconsiderate man, who 
cannot or will not think. It also very often happens 
that the latter, having formed his conclusions, is 
obstinately tenacious of them; while the former is 
still open to the true and full impression of any new 
fact or argument that is proposed to him. Solornon 
has expressed in a very striking manner the ^leading 
features of two such characters, namely, of the man 
who takes lip opinions with little examination, and 
then adheres to them with inaccessible pertinacity; 
and him who forms them only after full and candid 
examination, and with a clear conception of the 
grounds on which they are formed : — " The sluggard 
is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can 
render a reason." 

The process of mind which we call reason or 
judgment, therefore, seems to be essentially the 
same, whether it be applied to the investigation of 
truth or the affairs of common hfe. In both cases, 
it consists in comparing and weighing facts, con- 
siderations, and motives, and deducing from them 
conclusions, both as principles of behef and rules of 
conduct. In doing so, a man of sound judgment 
proceeds with caution, and with a due consideration 
of all the facts which he ought to take into the in- 
quiry. Having formed his conclusions, he is still 
open to the influence of new facts, by which they 
may be corrected or modified ; but he is not to be 
shaken in his confidence by trivial statements or 
frivolous objections. Opposed to this there are two 
modifications of character which present an inter- 
esting subject for observation. Both form their con- 
clusions hastily, and without due examination of the 
facts and considerations which ought to influence 
them ; but their subsequent conduct is widely dif- 
ferent. The one is shaken in his conclusions by 
every new fact that is presented to him, and every 



REASON. 151 

slight objection that is brought against his induc- 
tions ; and the consequence is, that his opinions and 
his principles of conduct are constantly changing. 
The other, having framed his opinions, though on 
grounds the most inadequate, adheres to them with 
inaccessible firmness ; and seems totally proof 
against the force of any facts or arguments that can 
be brought against them. The former is the more 
hopeful character of the two, his error consisting 
in a want of attention, rather than of judgment ; or 
in a habit of framing his conclusions too hastily. 
By education or attention on his own part, his habit 
may be corrected in a greater or less degree ; but 
the latter appears to labour under a radical defect 
of judgment, which makes him insensible to the due 
force of the considerations and arguments which 
influence other men. In the affairs of hfe, the for- 
mer, after perhaps committing various indiscretions, 
acquires wisdom from experience ; that is, by hav- 
ing the fallacy of his conclusions in many instances 
forced upon him. The latter remains unchanged; 
retaining the same confidence in his own concki- 
sions, and the same contempt for every thing that 
can be opposed to them. This unfortunate con- 
dition of mind, though it may have had its origin in 
pecuharity of mental constitution or deficient edu- 
cation, is fostered and increased by indulgence, and 
by a neglect of cultivating the important habit of 
calm and candid investigation. The man seems at 
las-t to become totally insensible to the motives and 
evidences which influence other men ; and the more 
striking and convincing these are to others, the more 
remarkable appears the condition of that mind which 
does not feel or estimate their importance. This 
state of mind is emphatically ascribed, in the sacred 
writings, to the man who denies the existence of a 
great First Cause : — " The fool hath said in his heart 
there is no God." By some process of mind, known 
to himself, he has arrived at this conclusion ; and 



152 REASON. 

he is totally insensible to the manifold evidence, 
which meets him wherever he turns his eye, of its 
futility and folly. And surely, if there be in human 
things an affecting representation of a mind lost to 
every function of a healthy understanding, ijicapable 
of rising from effects to causes, or of tracing the re- 
lations of things, — a mind deserted by its rightful 
guardian, and left the unprotected victim of every 
wild delusion that flutters by, — it is to be found in 
him who, possessed of the senses of a living man, 
can stand before the fair face of creation, and say in 
his heart, " There is no God." 

In every exercise of judgment, it is of essential 
importance that the mind shall be entirely unbiassed 
by any personal feeling or emotion which might re- 
strain or influence its decisions. Hence the diffi- 
culty we feel in deciding on a subject in^ which we 
are deeply interested, especially if our inclinations 
and the facts and motives presented by the case be 
in any degree opposed to each other. Thus, we 
speak of a man who allows his feelings to influence 
his judgment; and of another, of a cool head, who 
allows no feeling to interfere with his decisions. 
Any particular emotion, which has been deeply in- 
dulged and fostered, comes in this manner to influ- 
ence the judgment in a most extraordinary degree. 
It is thus that a vitiated and depraved state of the 
moral feelings at last misleads the judgment, in re- 
gard to the great principles of moral rectitude ; and 
terminates in a state of mind emphatically described 
in the sacred writings, in which a man puts evil for 
good and good for evil, and is left to the influence 
of strong delusion, so that he " believes a he." This 
remarkable condition of the power of reasoning and 
judging we cannot refer to any principle with which 
we are acquainted ; but we must receive it as a fact 
in the history of our moral constitution which is 
not to be questioned. A poet has sung, that vice, 



REASON. 153 

which at first is hated as an odious monster, is, 
when seen too oft, endured, then pitied, then em- 
braced : and he has only added his evidence to a fact 
which has been received upon the testimony of the 
philosopher and the morahst in every age, and is 
acted upon as a fixed and uniform principle of our 
nature by all classes of men. 

Upon the grounds which have been briefly referred 
to in the above observations, it will appear, that the 
principles on which a man should foim his opinions 
are essentially the same with those by which he 
ought to regulate his conduct. If this conclusion 
be admitted, it will enable us to perceive the fallacy 
of a dogma which has often been brought forward 
with much confidence, — that a man is not responsible 
for his behef. When taken abstractly, this is true ; 
but in the practical application of it there is a great 
and dangerous fallacy. In the opinions which a man 
forms on any particular subject, he is indeed in- 
fluenced, not by his own will, but by the facts or evi- 
dence by which the doctrines are supported ; and, 
in this sense, a man may justly be said not to be re- 
sponsible for his beUef. But when we apply the 
principle to practical purposes, and especially to 
those truths of religious belief to which the dogma 
has been pointed, it may easily be seen to be as fal- 
lacious as it is dangerous. A man is undoubtedly 
responsible for the care with which he has informed 
himself of the facts and evidences by which his be- 
lief on these subjects ought to be influenced.; and for 
the care and anxiety with which he gives to each of 
these facts and evidences its due weight in the mo- 
mentous inquiry. He is further responsible for any 
degree of that vitiated and corrupted state of the 
moral feelings by which his judgment may have 
been biassed, so as to prevent him from approaching 
the subject with the sincere desire for truth of a 
pure and uncontaminated mind. If, in this sense, 
we say that a man is not responsible for his belief. 



154 REASON. 

we may quite as reasonably allege that he is not re- 
sponsible for his conduct, because he chooses on 
some slight and partial grounds to framfe for him- 
self principles of action, without taking into con- 
sideration those fundamental rules of moral rectitude 
by which mankind in general are expected to be in- 
fluenced. We may as well contend that the man is 
not responsible for his conduct who, by long fa- 
miliarity with vice, has lost sight of its malignity, 
and has come to approve and love that which he 
once contemplated with abhorrence. 

It appears, then, that the exercise of reason is 
precisely the same, and is guided by the same laws, 
whether it be applied to the investigation of truth 
or to the regulation of conduct. The former is 
more particularly connected with the further prose- 
cution of our inquiry; but the leading principles 
apply equally to the great questions of morals, and 
the important subject of religious belief. In prose- 
cuting the subject as a branch of intellectual science, 
it seems to resolve itself into two parts : — 

I. The use of reason in the investigation of truth. 

II. The use of reason in correcting the impres- 
sions of the mind in regard to external things. 

Before proceeding to these branches of the sub- 
ject, however, this may perhaps be the proper place 
for again stating in a few words, that in the preced- 
ing observations my object has been to confine my- 
self to facts, respecting the processes which the 
mind actually performs, without entering on the 
question how it performs them. On this subject we 
find great differences among philosophers, which I 
have alluded to only in an incidental manner. Some 
appear to have spoken in too unqualified terms re- 
specting various and distinct faculties Of the mind, 
and have enumerated a variety of these, correspond- 



REASON. 155 

ing to the various mental operations. Dr. Brown, 
on the other hand, has followed a very different 
course, by referring all our mental processes to the 
two principles of simple and relative suggestion. 
According to this eloquent and ingenious writer, we 
have no direct voluntary power over the succession 
of our thoughts ; but these follow each other in con- 
sequence of certain principles of suggestion, by 
which conceptions, in certain circumstances, call 
up or suggest other conceptions, which are in some 
manner related to them. We have the power only 
of fixing the mind more intensely upon some images 
of this series, when they arise, in consequence of 
approving of them, as referring to some subject of 
thought which is before us, while we disapprove 
of others of the series as less allied to it. The 
former become more fixed and vivid in consequence 
of this approbation, while the latter are allowed to 
sink back into oblivion. \Yhat systematic writers 
have called the faculty of conception is, according 
to this system, the simple presence in tlie mind of 
one of these suggested or recalled images. Memory 
is this simple suggestion combined with the impres- 
sion of past time. In imagination, again, which has 
been considered as a voluntary power of forming 
conceptions or images into new combinations by a 
peculiar mental process, Dr. Brown believes that we 
have only the power of perceiving images as they 
are brought up by estabhshed principles of sugges- 
tion, — approving of some which thus become fixed, 
and disapproving of others which thus pass away. 
In thus approving or disapproving of the suggested 
images, we are guided by a perception of their rela- 
tion to any particular subject which is before us, 
and which we may desire to cultivate XDr illustrate. 
According to this writer, therefore, what is usually 
called conception is simple suggestion ; memory is 
simple suggestion with a feeling of past time ; ima- 
gination is simple suggestion combined with desire 



156 REASON. 

and with a perception of relation. The relative 
suggestion of Dr. Brown, again, is that perception 
of relations arising out of the comparison of different 
facts or objects which we have treated of under the 
more familiar name of judgment; and the mental 
process usually called abstraction he resolves sim- 
ply into a perception of resemblances. Various ob- 
jections might be urged against this system ; and 
we may, perhaps, be allowed to doubt whether by 
means of it any thing has been gained to the science 
of mind. But the plan which I proposed to myself 
in this outline does not lead me into any considera- 
tion of it, or of those systems to which it is opposed. 
My object has been simply to inquire what the mind 
does, without entering on the question how it does 
so. On this ground, the division which has been 
adopted of distinct mental operations, not distinct 
faculties, appears to be that best calculated for prac- 
tical utihty. 



OF THE USE OP REASON IN THE INVESTIGATION 
OF TRUTH. 

In applying our reason to the investigation of 
truth in any department of knowledge, we are, in the 
first place, to keep in mind that there are certain 
intuitive articles of belief which lie at the foundation 
qf all reasoning. For, in every process of reasoning, 
we proceed by founding one step upon another 
which has gone before it; and when we trace such 
a process backwards, we must arrive at certain 
truths which are recognised as fundamental, re- 
quiring no proof and admitting of none. These are 



FIRST TRUTHS. 157 

usually called First Truths. They are not the 
result of any process of reasoning, bat force them- 
selves with a conviction of infallible certainty upon 
every sound understanding, without regard to its 
logical habits or powers of induction. The force 
of them is accordingly felt in an equal degree by all 
classes of men; and they are acted upon with 
absolute confidence in the daily transactions of life. 
This is a subject of great and extensive importance. 
The truths or articles of belief which are referable 
to it were briefly mentioned in a former part of our 
inquiry : they are chiefly the following : — 

I. A conviction of our own existence, as sentient 
and thinking beings ; and of mind, as something dis- 
tinct from the functions of the body. From the first 
exercise of perception we acquire a knowledge of 
two things ; namely, the thing perceived, and the 
sentient being who perceives it. In the same man- 
ner, from the exercise of any mental operation, such 
as memory, we acquire an impression of the thing 
remembered, of an essence or principle which re- 
members it, and of this essence as something en- 
tirely distinct from any function of the body. This 
last conviction must be considered as a first truth, 
or intuitive article of belief, standing on the same 
ground with the other truths which are referable to 
this class. It does not, as was formerly stated, rest 
upon any metaphysical or physiological argument, 
but upon an appeal made to the conviction of every 
man who attends to what is passing within. It re- 
solves itself into a consciousness of the various 
mental processes, impressions, and emotions, as re- 
ferable to one permanent and unchanging essence, 
while the body is known to be in a constant state 
of change ; and of these processes as being exer- 
cised without any necessary dependence upon pres- 
ent impressions from external things. Like other 
truths of this class, it is, consequently, unaffected by 
O 



158 REASON. 

sophisms which are brought against it; and the 
answer to these does not properly consist in any 
process of reasoning, but in this appeal to every 
man's absolute conviction. If brought into com- 
parison, indeed, the evidence which we have for the 
existence of mind is perhaps less liable to decep- 
tion than that which we have for the existence of 
matter. 

II. A confidence in the evidence of our senses in 
regard to the existence and the properties of ex- 
ternal things ; or a conviction that they have a real 
existence independently of our sensations. We 
have formerly referred to a celebrated doctrine, by 
which it was maintained that the mind perceives 
only its own ideas or impressions ; and that, conse- 
quently, we derive from our senses no evidence of 
the existence of external things. The only answer 
to such a sophism is, that a confidence in the evi- 
dence of our senses is a first truth, or intuitive prin- 
ciple of belief, admitting of no other proof than that 
which is derived from the universal conviction of 
mankind. 

III. A confidence in our own mental processes : 
that facts, for example, which are suggested to us 
by our memory really occurred. 

IV. A behef in our personal identity. This is 
derived from the combined operation of conscious- 
ness and memory ; and it consists in a remembrance 
of past mental feelings, and a comparison of them 
with present feelings as belonging to the same sen- 
tient being. There were formerly many disputes 
on this subject; some maintaining that the notion 
of personal identity is inconsistent with the different 
states in which the mind exists at different times, 
as love and hatred, joy and sorrow, — and also with 
the remarkable changes of character which often 



FIRST TRUTHS. 159 

take place at different periods of life. This was one 
of the sophisms of the schools, founded upon an ob- 
scure analogy with changes which take place in 
material things, and is not at all appHcable to mind. 
The only answer to the paradox is, that every man, 
under every variety of mental emotion, and every 
possible change of character, retains an absolute 
conviction that the sentient being whom he calls 
himself remains invariably the same ; and that in all 
the affairs of life, whether referring to the past or 
the future, every man acts upon this conviction. 

V. A conviction that every event must have a 
cause, and a cause adequate to the effect ; and that 
appearances, showing a correct adaptation of means 
to an end, indicate design and intelhgence in the 
cause. These, as fundamental truths, are quite dis- 
tinct from the question relating to the connexion 
of any two specified events as cause and effect. 
The latter belongs to another part of our inquiry. 

VI. A confidence in the uniformity of nature ; or, 
that the same substance will always exhibit the 
same characters ; and that the same cause under the 
same circumstances will always be followed by the 
same effect. This, as a first truth, is a fundamental 
and instinctive conviction. The province of experi- 
ence, we have already seen, is to ascertain the par- 
ticular events which are so connected as to be in- 
cluded under the law. 

Our confidence in the uniformity of nature is the 
foundation of all the calculations which we make for 
the future in regard to our protection or comfort, or 
even for the continuance of our existence ; and 
without it the whole system of human things would 
be thrown into inextricable confusion. It is refer- 
able to the two heads now stated ; namely, uni- 
formity of characters, and uniformity of sequences 
or operations. 



160 REASON. 

By uniformity of characters, in any substance, we 
mean that the substance will always continue to ex- 
hibit the same combination of characters ; so that, 
when we have ascertained its presence by some 
of them, we conclude that it also possesses the 
others. These characters may be numerous, and 
referable to various classes ; such as the botanical 
characters of a plant, the chj'^mical properties of a 
mineral, sensible qualities of smell, taste, and colour, 
and capabilities of action upon other bodies. Such 
is our confidence in the undeviating uniformity of 
nature, that whatever number of these qualities we 
have ascertained to belong to a substance, we ex- 
pect to find in every specimen of it in all time 
coming. For example, I find a substance w^hich, by 
its smell and colour, I know to be opium. Without 
any further information, I decide with confidence on 
its taste, its composition, its chymical affinity, its 
action on the human body, and the characters of the 
plant from which it was derived ; and 1 never calcu- 
late upon the possibihty of being deceived in any 
of these particulars. 

Our confidence in the uniformity of the sequences 
or operations of nature resolves itself into a convic- 
tion of the continuance of that order which experi- 
ence has shown us to exist in a uniform manner in 
the succession of phenomena. The conviction 
itself is an original or instinctive principle, felt and 
acted upon by all classes of men in the daily trans- 
actions of life. It is from experience that we learn 
the particular cases to which we are warranted in 
applying it ; or, in other words, the successions of 
phenomena which, there is sufficient ground for be- 
lieving, have occurred in a certain order in time past. 
These we expect with perfect confidence to con- 
tinue to be equally uniform, or to occur in the same 
order in time to come. The error to be guarded 
against in such investigations is, assuming the past 
uniformity of phenomena on insufficient grounds; ^ 



FIRST TRUTHS. 161 

or, in other words, concluding that events have 
always occurred in a certain order because we have 
seen them occur in that order in a few instances. A 
principle assumed in this manner may of course dis- 
appoint us if applied to future phenomena ; but in 
this case there is no deviation from the uniformity 
of nature : the error consisted in assuming such a 
uniformity where none existed. 

The uniformity of the sequences of phenomena is 
the foundation of our idea of causation in regard to 
these phenomena ; that is to say, when we have ob- 
served one event uniformly follow another event, 
we consider the first as cause, and the second as 
effect ; and, when this relation has been ascertained 
to be uniform, we conclude that it will continue to 
be uniform ; or that the same cause in the same cir- 
cumstances will always be followed by the same 
effect. This expectation will of course disappoint 
us if we have assumed the relation on inadequate 
grounds; or have considered two events as cause 
and effect which have been only accidentally com- 
bined in a few instances. To entitle us to assume 
that the relation will be uniform in time to come, we 
must have full and adequate grounds for believing 
that it has been uniform in time past. 

In the great operations of nature a very extensive 
observation often enables us to trace a remarkable 
uniformity even in regard to events which at first 
sight appear to be most irregular and uncertain. 
Thus, the most uncertain of all things is human life, 
as far as respects individuals ; but the doctrine of 
the continuance of life in regard to a large body of 
men is, by extensive observation, reduced almost to 
a certainty. Nothing is more uncertain than the 
proportion of males and females that shall be born 
in one family ; but in great communities this also 
is uniform. There is much uncertainty in the char- 
acter of different seasons, but there are facts which 
give probability to the conjecture that in a long 
03 



162' REASON. 

series of years there may also be discovered a re- 
markable uniformity. An impression of this kind 
was carried so far by the ancients as to lead to the 
doctrine of the Annes Magnus, or Platonic year, in 
which it was believed that the whole series of 
human events would be acted over again. 

The uniform successions of phenomena are, with 
reasonable care, easily ascertained in regard to ma- 
terial things ; and when they are ascertained, we 
rely upon their uniform continuance ; or, if we find 
a deviation in any instance, we easily ascertain the 
incidental cause "by which the sequence is inter- 
rupted, and can provide against the interference of 
the same or any similar cause in future instances. 
There is greater uncertainty when our researches 
lefer to the phenomena of mind, or the actions 
of living bodies. The causes of this uncertainty 
were formerly mentioned. It arises partly from 
the greater difficulty of ascertaining the true rela- 
tions, — that is, of tracing causes to their true effects, 
and effects to their true causes ; and partly from the 
tendency to these being interrupted in future in- 
stances by some new cause, in regard to which we 
cannot calculate either the existence or the precise 
effects. Hence, for example, the uncertainty of 
human laws ; one of the contingencies by which 
they are interrupted being the chances of evading 
them. If we could conceive a case in which every 
crime was with certainty detected, and every criminal 
brought to punishment, it is probable that the effect 
of human laws would be nearly as certain as the 
oppration of material causes. But the criminal, in 
the first instance, calculates on the chance of 
evading detection, and, even in the event of detec- 
tion, of escaping punishment ; and thus the tendency 
of the wisest laws is constantly interrupted in a 
manner which no human wisdom can calculate upon 
or prevent. There is often a similar uncertainty in 
human character in other situations : for example, 



FIRST TRUTHS. 163 

in judging how an individual will act in particular 
circumstances, or be influenced by particular mo- 
tives ; for a motive which we have found to induce 
a particular line of conduct in one individual may- 
fail in producing the same result in another, being 
prevented by circumstances in his moral condition 
which entirely elude our observation. 

Yet there is a uniformity in moral phenomena 
which, though it may be ascertained with greater 
difficulty than the order of natural phenomena, we 
calculate upon with similar confidence when it has 
been ascertained. Thus, a man may have acquired 
such a character for integrity, that we rely upon his 
integrity in any situation in which he may be placed, 
with the same confidence with which we rely on the 
uniformity of nature ; and there is a man distin- 
guished by veracity and fidelity to his promise, of 
whom we say, in common language, that his word 
is as good as his bond. In such examples as these, 
indeed, our confidence is founded, not upon any laws 
which have been observed in regard to the whole 
species, but on a uniformity which has been ob- 
served in regard to the individuals, or rather a class 
to which the individuals belong. There are also, 
however, laws which apply to mankind in general, 
and on which we rely as far as they go, — namely, 
principles of conduct in which we confide, as regu- 
lating every man of a sane mind, whatever may be 
our knowledge of his previous habits of judging or 
acting. It is in this manner, for example, as for- 
merly stated, that we regulate our confidence in tes- 
tim.ony. If a man who is either a stranger to us or 
bears a character of doubtful veracit)^ relates cir- 
cumstances which tend greatly to promote his own 
purposes, we calculate on the probability of fabrica- 
tion, and reject his testimony ; and if we even sus- 
pect that he has a purpose to serve, a similar im- 
pression is produced. If, on the contrary, we are 
satisfied that the circumstances are indiflferent to 



164 REASON. 

him, and that he has no purpose to answer, we give 
greater credit to his testimony. If, further than 
this, we perceive that the statement operates against 
himself, conveying an imputation against his own 
conduct, or exposmg him to contempt, ridicule, or 
personal injury, we are satisfied that nothing could 
make him adhere to such a testimony but an honest 
conviction of its truth. Under the former circum- 
staiices, Vv'e believe only a man whom we consider 
as a person of known and established veracity ; un- 
der the latter, we believe any man whom we con- 
sider to be of a sane mind. Thus, in both instances, 
we proceed upon a certain uniformity of moral phe- 
nomena ; only that we refer them to two classes, — 
namely, one which is ascertained to be uniform in 
regard to the whole species, and another which is 
uniform only in regard to a certain order, that is, 
all men of integrity and veracity. In the one case, 
we rely upon the uniformity in every instance ; in 
the other, we do not rely upon it until we are satis- 
fied that the individual example belongs to that or- 
der in which the other kind of moral uniformity has 
been ascertained. 

There are other inquiries closely connected with 
the uniformity of moral relations ; but at present 
we must allude to them very briefly. We have every 
reason to believe that there are moral causes, that 
is, truths and motives, which have a tendency to in- 
fluence human volition and human conduct with a 
uniformity similar to that with which physical agents 
produce their actions upon each other. These moral 
causes, indeed, do not operate in every instance, or 
in all circumstances ; but neither do physical causes. 
Substances in chymistry, for example, have certain 
tendencies to act upon each other, which are uni- 
form and necessary ; but no action takes place un- 
less the substances are brought into certain circum- 
stances which are required for brmging these ten- 
dencies into operation. They must, in the first place, 



FIRST TRUTHS. 165 

be brought into contact ; and, besides this, many of 
them require other collateral circumstances, as a 
particular temperature, or a particular state of con- 
centration or dilution. It is the same with moral 
causes : their tendencies are uniform, and there are 
principles in the mind of man which these are 
adapted for acting upon. But they require certain 
circumstances in the man on whom they are expected 
to act, without which they produce no influence upon 
him. It is necessary, for example, that he be fully in- 
formed in regard to them as truths ; and that his atten- 
tion be directed to them with such a degree of in- 
tensity as shall bring him fully under their influence 
as statements addressed to his understanding ; also, 
that there be a certain healthy state of his moral 
feelings, — for this has a most extensive influence on 
the due operation of moral causes. Without these 
the most powerful moral causes may produce no ef- 
fect upon a man ; as the most active chymical agents 
may fail eiitirely of their actions, if the substances 
are not placed in the requisite circumstances of tem- 
perature, dilution, or concentration. 

These considerations seem to bear an important 
reference to a question which has been much argued, 
namely, that respecting hberty, necessity, and the 
freedom of the will. On a subject on which some 
of the wisest and the best of men have been found 
on opposite sides, I would express myself with be- 
coming caution and diffidence ; but perhaps some of 
the obscurity in which the question has been involved 
arises from the want of a clear definition of the terms 
in which it has been argued ; and by not fully distin- 
guishing between will or simple volition^ and desire or 
inclination. Will, or simple volition, is the state of 
mind which immediately precedes action; and the 
action following upon this is not only free, but it is 
absolutely impossible to suppose it should be other- 
wise. A man is not only free to do what he wills, 
but we cannot conceive a case in which he could 



166 REASON. 

exert a power of not doing- what he wills, or of doing 
what he wills not. Impulse or restraint from with- 
out, acting upon his bodily organs, could alone inter- 
fere with his following, in this sense, the tendency 
of his will, or simple volition. The only idea, indeed, 
that we can form of free agency, or freedom of the 
will, is, that it consists in a man being able to do 
what he wills, or to abstain from doing what he wills 
not. Necessary agency, on the other hand, would 
consist in the man being compelled, by a force from 
without, to do what he wills not, or prevented from 
doing what he wills. 

The real hearing of the inquiry does not lie in this 
connexion between the volition and the act, but in 
the origin or cause of the volition, or in the connex- 
ion between the vohtion and the desire ; and this will 
be seen to be entirely distinct. A man, for example, 
may desire, or have an inclination to, that which he 
has not the power to will ; because he maybe under 
the influence of motives and principles which prevent 
the inclination from being followed by volition, with 
as absolute a necessity as we observe in the se- 
quences of natural phenomena. Thus, also, we may 
say to a man of strict integrity and virtue that he has 
not the power to commit murder or robbery, or any 
act of gross injustice or oppression. He may reply 
that he has the power to do it if he willed ; and this 
is granted, for this is free agency ; but it is not the 
question in dispute. We do not say that he has not 
the power to do any or all of these acts if he willed, 
but that he has not the power to will such deeds. 
He is under the influence of motives and principles 
which make it as much a matter of necessity for 
him not to will such acts, as it is for a stone not to 
rise from the earth's surface contrary to its gravity. 
Such a necessity as this, if we must retain the term, 
so far from being unfavourable to the interests of 
virtue and morals, or opposed to the practice of ex- 
horting men to virtue, seems, on the contrary, to 



FIRST TRUTHS. 167 

hold out the strongest encouragement in doing so ; 
and to be, in fact, the only scheme on which we can 
expect an argument or motive to have any influence 
upon human conduct. For it represents man as pos- 
sessed of certain uniform principles in his natiu-e 
which are capable of being acted upon by certain 
moral causes, truths, laws, or motives, with a uni- 
formity similar to that which we observe in physical 
phenomena, provided he can be brought under their 
influence, and into those circumstances which are 
required for their due operation. These circum- 
stances are, — that the moral causes, laws, motives, 
or truths, shall be brought before his understanding; 
that he shall direct his attention to them with suita- 
ble intensity ; and that he is free from that degree 
of corruption of his moral feelings, or any of those 
distorted moral habits which we know to produce a 
most extensive influence on the operation of moral 
causes. To suppose a kind of moral liberty opposed 
to such a necessity as this, would be to represent 
man as a being possessed of no fixed or uniform 
principles, — not to be calculated upon as to his con- 
duct in any instance, — and not capable of being acted 
upon by any motive or principle except the blind 
caprice of the moment. To endeavour to act upon 
such a being, by persuading him to virtue or dis- 
suading him from vice, would be like expecting fixed 
results in chymistry, by bringing substances to act 
upon each other, the actions of which we had pre- 
viously found to be without any kind of uniformity. 
This is, in fact, precisely the situation of the maniac, 
whom, accordingly, we never expect to guide or in- 
fluence by motives or arguments, but by external 
restraint. He may act harmlessly, or he may act 
mischievously ; but we never can calculate upon his 
actions in any one instance ; we therefore shut him 
up, so as to prevent him from being dangerous to the 
community. 
Necessity, then, as applied to the operation of 



168 REASON. 

moral causes, appears simply to correspond with the 
uniformity which we observe in the operation of 
physical causes. We calculate that a man of a cer- 
tain character will act in a particular manner in par- 
ticular circumstances, or that he will be acted upon 
in a certain manner by particular truths and motives, 
when they are presented to him, — by a principle of 
uniformity similar to that with which we expect an 
acid to act in a particular manner upon an alkali. 
The action of the acid we know to be uniform, but 
we know also, that no action will take place till the 
substances are brought fully into contact, and in cer- 
tain circumstances which are required for their ac- 
tion ; — and the action of moral causes is uniform, 
but they exert no influence on a man till he is fully 
acquainted with them, — directs his attention to them 
with suitable care, — and is besides in a certain heal- 
thy state of moral feeling. It is thus that we cal- 
culate on the full and uniform operation of moral 
causes on some individuals, and not on others; 
namely, by having previously ascertained that the for- 
mer are in those intellectual and moral circumstances 
which are required for their action. When, in ano- 
ther individual, we find these causes fail in their na- 
tural actions, we endeavour, as far as may be in our 
power, to supply those collateral circumstances, — 
by instructing him in the facts, truths, or motives;— 
by rousing his attention to their importance ; — by 
impressing them upon him in their strongest char- 
acters, and by all such arguments and representations 
as we think calculated to fix the impression. All 
this we do under a conviction, that these causes 
have a certain, fixed, uniform, or necessary action, 
in regard to human volition and human conduct ; 
and it is this conviction which encourages us to per- 
severe in our attempts to bring the individual under 
their influence. If we had not this conviction, we 
should abandon the attempt as altogether hopeless j 
because we could have no ground on which to form 



FIRST TRUTHS. IQ9 

any calculation, and no rules to guide us in our meas- 
ures. Precisely in the same manner, whea we find 
a chymical agent fail of the effect which we expect 
from it, we add it in larger quantity, or in an in- 
creased state of concentration, or at a higher tem- 
perature, — or with some other change of circum- 
stances calculated to favour its action ; and we per- 
severe in these measures, under a conviction that its 
action is perfectly uniform or necessary, and will 
take place whenever these circumstances have been 
provided for. On the same principle, we see how 
blame may attach to the intelligent agent in both 
cases, though the actions of the causes are uniform 
and necessary. Such is the action of chymical 
agents, — bat blame may attach to the chymist who 
has not provided them in the necessary circumstances 
as to quantity, concentration, and temperature. Such 
is the action of moral causes, — but deep guilt may 
attach to the moral agent, who has been proof against 
their influence. There is guilt in ignorance, when 
knowledge was within his reach ; — there is guilt in 
heedless inattention, when truths and motives of the 
highest interest claimed his serious consideration ; 
— there is guilt in that corruption of his moral feel- 
ings which impedes the action of moral causes, be- 
cause this has originated, in a great measure, in a 
course of vicious desires, and vicious conduct, by 
which the mind, famiharized with vice, has gradu- 
ally lost sight of its malignity. During the whole 
of this course, also, the man felt that he was a free 
agent; — that he had power to pursue the course 
which he followed, — and that he had power to re- 
frain from it. When a particular desire was first 
present to his mind, he had the power immediately 
to act with a view to its accomplishment; or he had 
the power to abstain from acting, and to direct his 
attention more fully to the various considerations 
and motives which were calculated to guide his de- 
termination. In acting as he did, he not only with- 



170 REASON. 

held his attention from those truths which were thus 
calculated to operate upon him as a moral being ; 
but he did still more direct violence to an impulse 
within, which warned him that he was wandering 
from the path of rectitude. The state of moral 
feeling which gradually results from this habitual 
violation of the indications of conscience, and this 
habitual neglect of the serious consideration of 
moral causes, every individual must feel to be at- 
tended with moral guilt. The effect of it is not only 
to prevent the due operation of moral causes on his 
future vohtions, but even to vitiate and distort the 
judgment itself, respecting the great principles of 
moral rectitude. Without attempting any explana- 
tion of this remarkable condition of the mental func- 
tions, its actual existence must be received as a fact 
in the constitution of human nature, which cannot 
be called in question ; and it offers one of the most 
remarkable phenomena that can be presented to him 
who turns his attention to the moral economy of 
man. 

Before concluding this incidental allusion to a much 
controverted subject, I may be allowed to remark, 
that the term necessity, as applied to moral pheno- 
mena, is not fortunate, and perhaps not philosophi- 
cal; and something would perhaps be gained in con 
ducting the inquiry, if, for necessity^ we were to sub- 
stitute uniformity. In strict propriety, indeed, the 
terms necessity and necessary ought to be applied 
only to mathematical truth. Of physical relations, 
all that we know is the fact of their uniformity ; and 
it would appear equally philosophical to apply the 
same term to mental phenomena. On this principle, 
therefore, we should say, — that the tendency of 
moral causes or niotives is not necessary, but uni- 
form ; and that on this depends all our confidence in 
the uniformity of human character, and in the power 
of truths, motives, or arguments, to produce par- 
ticular results on human conduct. To suppose the 



FIRST TRUTHS. 171 

mind possessed of a power of determining, apart 
from all the influence of moral causes or motives, 
would be to overthrow this confidence, and to re- 
duce our whole calculations on human character to 
conjecture and uncertainty. When, indeed, we talk 
of a self-determining- power of the will, we seem to 
use a combination of words without any definite 
meaningr. For the will is not distinct from the being 
who wills ; and to speak of an individual deter- 
mining' his will, is only saying, in other words, that 
he wills. He wills some act for some reason, which 
is known to himself: if communicated to another, 
the reason might not appear a satisfactory one, — 
but still it is to him the reason which induced him 
to will the act, and this appears to be all that we can 
make of the subject. A power of determining, 
without any reason, appears to be not only unphilo- 
sophical, but, in point of fact, inapplicable to any 
conceivable case. Ignorance, inattention, or gross 
perversion of the moral feehngs may make the 
worse reason appear the better; but we cannot con- 
ceive a case, in which an individual could exert a 
power of determining without any reason, or ac- 
cording to what appears to him at the tjme to be a 
weaker reason, in opposition to one which appears 
a stronger. It will also, I think, be found that the 
warmest advocates for philosophical liberty, and a 
self-determining power, in actual practice recognise 
as much as others the principle of the uniformity 
of moral causes. Thus, if we find a person acting 
in a manner widely different from that which we ex- 
pected from him, all men concur in saying, " what 
motive could induce him to act in that manner ?" 
and if we cannot reconcile his conduct to any con- 
ceivable motive, we say, " it really looks like insan- 
ity." Another may remark, " his conduct indicates 
a singular want of consideration ;" — thus clearly re- 
cognising the existence of certain motives or moral 
causes, which would have led the man into a differ- 



172 REASON. 

ent line of conduct, had he allowed his attention to 
fix upon them. The doctrine of a self-determining 
power should remove every difficulty in such a case, 
to those who believe in it ; but I am not aware that 
it ever was made use of for such a purpose. It will 
also be found to agree with the universal conviction 
of mankind, that the circumstance which gives to 
an action the character of merit or demerit is en- 
tirely the motive from which it was done ; and that 
if we could conceive such a thing as an action per- 
formed by the impulse of a free self-determining 
power apart from any influence of motives or moral 
causes, no man of sane mind would for a moment 
allow to such an act the character of virtue. On the 
contrary, it is familiar to every one, that we often find 
in a man's motive an excuse for conduct in which 
we think he has acted wrong. We say, he erred in 
judgment, but his motive was good ; and this mode 
of reasoning meets with the cordial concurrence of 
the whole mass of mankind. 



The First Truths, or intuitive principles of belief, 
which have been the subject of the preceding ob- 
servations, are of the utmost practical importance, 
as they furnish the true and only answer to many 
of the sophisms of the scholastic philosophy, and to 
many skeptical arguments of more modern times. 
They admit of no other evidence than an appeal to 
the consciousness of every man, that he does and 
must beheve them. " We believe them," says Dr. 
Brown, "because it is impossible not to believe 
them." — "In all these cases," says Mr. Stewart, 
" the only account that can be given of our belief is, 
that it forms a necessary part of our constitution, 
against which metaphysicians may argue, so as to 



FIRST TRUTHS. 173 

perplex the judgment, but of which it is impossible 
to divest ourselves for a moment, when we are called 
to employ our reason, either in the business of life or 
in the pursuits of science." 

It is likewise to be kept in mind, as was formerly- 
stated, that our idea of reasoning necessarily sup- 
poses the existence of a certain number of truths, 
which require and admit of no evidence. The maxim 
indeed, is as old as the days of x4.ristotle, and has 
never been called in question, " that, except some 
first principles be taken for granted, there can be 
neither reason nor reasoning ; that it is impossible 
that every truth should admit of proof, otherwise 
proof would extend in infinitum, which is incompati- 
ble with its nature ; and that, if ever men attempt 
to prove a first principle, it is because they are ig- 
norant of the nature of proof."* As these truths, 
therefore, do not admit of being called in question 
by any sound understanding, neither do they admit 
of being supported by any process of reasoning; 
and, when paradoxes or sophisms in opposition to 
them are proposed, any attempt to argue with such, 
upon logical principles, only leads to discussions as 
absurd as themselves. Of attempts of both kinds, 
many examples are to be met with among the writers 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Des 
Cartes and Hobbes ; and even some eminent persons, 
of more modern times, are not entirely free from 
them. Thus, Des Cartes, Malebranche, and others, 
thought it necessary to prove that external objects, 
and the sentient beings with whom we are connected, 
have a real existence, whether we think of them or 
not, and are not merely ideas in our own minds. 
Berkeley showed the weakness of this argument, 
and on this founded the well-known doctrine by 
which he denied the real existence of material things. 
■ Many of the dogmas of modern sophistical writers, 

* Aristotle's Metaphysics, book ir. 
P2 



174 REASON. 

such as Mr. Hume, have consisted of attempts to 
overturn, by processes of argument, these funda- 
mental or first truths. On the other hand, the un 
satisfactory nature of some of the rephes to these 
sophisms, depends upon the attempts to combat them 
having been made by reasonings, of which the sub- 
ject is not susceptible. For these principles admit 
of no proof by processes of reasoning, and conse- 
quentl)^ are in no degree affected by demonstrations 
of the fallacy of attempts to establish them by such 
processes. An interesting illustration of this has 
been reserved by Mr. Stewart, in a correspondence 
between Mr. Hume and Sir Gilbert Elliot.* " From 
the reply to this letter," says Mr. Stewart, " by Mr. 
Hume's very ingenious and accomplished corres- 
pondent, we learn that he had drawn from Mr. 
Hume's metaphysical discussions, the only sound 
and philosopliical inference : — that the lameness of 
the proofs offered by Des Cartes and his successors, 
of some fundamental truths, universally acknow- 
ledged by mankind, proceeded, not from any defect 
in th€ evidence, but on the contrary, from their 
being self-evident, and consequently unsusceptible of 
demonstration." The same view of Mr. Hume's 
skeptical reasonings was taken by other eminent 
persons, by whom his system was attacked, — particu- 
larly Reid, Beattie, and Oswald; and on the conti- 
nent, the nature and importance of these first truths 
had been at an earlier period illustrated in a full and 
able manner by Father Buffier. 

Various characters have been proposed, by which 
these primary and fundamental truths may be dis- 
tinguished. One of those given by Father Buffier 
appears to be the best, and to be alone sufficient to 
identify them. It is, that their practical influence 
extends even to persons who affect to dispute their 
authority ; in other words, that in all the affairs of 

» Introductory Essay to the Appendix of the Encycloptedia Britannica 



FIRST TRUTHS. 175 

life, the most skeptical philosopher acts, as much as 
the mass of mankind, upon the absolute belief of 
these truths. Let a person of this description, for 
example, be contending very keenly, in regard to 
something which deeply concerns his interest or his 
comfort, — he would scarcely be satisfied by being 
told, that the thing about which he contends has no 
real existence, and that he who contends about it so 
eagerly is himself a nonentity, or, at best, nothing 
more than an idea. Let him be taking cognizance 
of an offence committed against him ten years ago, 
— he never doubts that he is still the person against 
whom the offence was committed. Let him lay 
plans for future advantage or comfort, — it is done 
under a full conviction that he is still to continue the 
mdividual who may enjoy them. Has a building 
started up on his premises, which he did not expect 
to see, — he immediately asks, who ordered the ma- 
sons, and would be very ill satisfied by being told, 
that the thing had appeared without any known 
cause, by a fortuitous combination of atoms. How- 
ever much he may reason to the contrary, he shows 
no doubt, in his own practice, that every event must 
have an adequate cause. The same mode of rea- 
soning will be seen to apply to the other truths which 
belong to the class under consideration, — namely, 
that those who argue against them act in ail cases 
on a belief of their truth. 

The distinction between a process of reasoning, 
and the act of the mind, in arriving at these funda- 
mental and instinctive truths, is a principle of the 
utmost practical importance. For a chain of correct 
reasoning requires logical habits, and a certain cul- 
tivation of the mental powers; and consequently, 
it is confined to a comparatively small number of 
mankind. But the process here referred to is the 
spontaneous and immediate induction of the im- 
tutored mind, and a correct exercise of it requires 
onl^',' that the mind shall not be debased by depravity, 



176 REASON. 

nor bewildered by the refinements of a false philo- 
sophy. The truths .which we derive from it accord- 
ingly, do not concern the philosopher alone, but are 
of daily and essential importance to the whole mass 
of mankind. Let us take for example, the princi- 
ple referred to under the fifth head, namely, our in- 
tuitive conviction that every change or event must 
have an adequate cause. This is a principle of daily 
application, and one which is acted upon with ab- 
solute confidence in the ordinary affairs of life by 
al) classes of men. By the immediate and un- 
conscious exercise of it, we infer the skill of one 
workman from works indicating skill, and the vigour 
of another, from works indicating strength. We 
infer from every work, not only a cause, but a cause 
which^ both in degree and kind, is exactly propor- 
tioned to the effect produced. From a chronometer, 
which varies only a second in a year, we infer ex- 
quisite skill in the artist ; and from the construction 
of the Pyramids of Eg^'pt, the united strength of a 
multitude of men. We never suppose for a moment 
that the minute skill of the artist raised the pyramid, 
or that the united force of the multitude constructed 
the chronometer ; still less, that these monuments 
of art started into their present condition without a 
cause. We infer with absolute certainty in botli 
cases an adequate cause; that is a caiise distin- 
piished in the one case by design and mechanical 
power,— in the other, by design, adaptation, and ex- 
quisite skill. 

The principle which is thus acted upon, in the or- 
dinary affairs of life, with a conviction of infallible 
certainty, is precisely the same by which, from the 
stupendous works of creation, we infer by the most 
simple step of reasoning the existence of a'great First 
Cause. This cause also we conclude to be a de- 
signing and intelligent mind, infinite in wisdom and 
boundless in power ; and by a very slight and natural 
extension of the same principle, we arrive with equal 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 177 

certainty at the conviction of this cause being* the 
first, — not arising out of any thing- preceding it, con- 
sequently self-existent and eternal. All this is not 
such a process of reasoning as requires logical habits, 
and admits of debate, deliberation, or doubt; — the 
metaphysician may bewilder himself in its very sim- 
plicity; but the uncontaminated mind finds its way 
to the conclusion with unerring certainty, and with 
a conviction which is felt to be not only satisfactory, 
but irresistible. 



When we proceed from these first or intuitive ar- 
ticles of belief to the further investigation of truth in 
any department of knowledge, various mental pro- 
cesses are brought into operation ; but in regard to 
all of them reason is our ultimate guide in judging 
whether they are performed in a legitimate manner, 
and upon principles calculated to lead to the discov- 
ery of truth. These processes may be chiefly re- 
ferred to the following heads : — 

L To make a careful collection of facts reiating to 
the subject, and to abstain from deducing any conclu- 
sions till we have before us such a series as seems 
calculated to warrant them. The first operation of 
reason therefore is, to judge when we have a suffi- 
cient number of facts for this purpose. 

II. To separate from the mass those facts which 
are connected with it incidentally, and to retain those 
only which we have reason to consider as uniform 
and essential. In some sciences this is accomplished 
by repeated and varied experiments ; and in those 
departments which do not admit of this, it is done 
by cautious and extensive observation. Our object 
in both cases is to ascertain how many of the cir- 
cumstances observed, and what particular combina- 
tions of them uniformly accompany each other, or 



17& REASON. 

are really connected with the effects which are pro- 
duced. In this careful clearing of our statement 
from all incidental combinations consists that faith- 
ful observation of nature winch forms the first step 
in every scientific investig-ation. It is opposed to 
two errors, both equally to be avoided, namely, leav- 
ing out of view, or not assigning an adequate value 
to, important and essential facts ; and giving a place 
and an importance to those which are incidental and 
trivial. In every scientific investigation this is a 
process of the utmost importance ; and there is an- 
other nearly connected with it, namely, to judge of 
the authenticity of the facts. This also is a mental 
process of the utmost delicacy. In conducting it, 
there are two extremes from which the exercise of 
sound judgment ought equally to guard us, namely, 
receiving facts upon imperfect evidence, and reject- 
ing those which have a sufficient title to credit ; in 
other words, credulity and skepticism. Both these 
extremes are equally unworthy of a mind which is 
guided by sound reason. 

III. To compare facts with each other, so as to 
trace their resemblances or to ascertain those char- 
acters or properties in which a certain number Of 
facts or substances agree. We thus arrange them 
into classes, genera, and species. 

IV. To compare facts or events with each other, 
so as to trace their relations and sequences ; espe- 
cially that relation of uniform sequence on which is 
founded our notion of cause and effect. This deli- 
cate and most important process consists entirely in 
a patient observation of facts, and of their relation 
to each other. When, in a certain number of in- 
stances, we find two events following one another 
without any exception, we come to consider the se- 
quence as uniform, and call the one cause and the 
Other effect; and when, in other instances we are 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. 179 

disappointed in finding" suc?i a succession, this con- 
fidence is shaken, unless we can discover a cause by 
which the sequence was interrupted. Reason, acting 
upon extensive observation, must here guide us ; on 
the one hand to judge of the uniformity of the se- 
quences, and, on the other, to account for apparent 
deviations. 

V. To review an extensive collection of facts, so 
as to discover some general fact common to the 
whole. This is the process which we call general- 
izing, or the induction of a general principle. The 
result of it is the last and greatest object of human 
science, and that to which all the other steps are 
preliminary and subservient. An ordinary mind is 
satisfied with the observation of facts as they pass 
before it, and those obvious relations which obtrude 
themselves upon its notice ; but the philosopher ana- 
lyzes the phenomena, and thus discovers their more 
minute relations. His genius is distinguished above 
the industry of the mere observer of facts, when he 
thus traces principles of accordance among facts 
which, to the vulgar eye, appear remote and dis- 
similar. A remarkable example of this is familiar to 
every one. Between the fall of an apple from a tree 
and the motions of the heavenly bodies a common 
mind would have been long ere it discovered any 
kind of relation; but on such a relation Newton 
founded those grand principles by which he brought 
to light the order and harmony of the universe- For 
it was this simple fact that first suggested to him the 
great principle of physical science, that matter at- 
tracts matter in the reciprocal ratio of their masses. 

In a practical view, these processes may be referred 
to three heads, — namely, collecting authentic facts, 
—tracing causation, — and deducing general princi- 
ples. Here various mental operations are brought 
into action, especially attention, memory, concep- 



180 REASON. 

tion, and abstraction ; but it is the province of reason 
to judge whether these are conducted in a legitimate 
manner, or, in other words, to distinguish truth from 
falsehood. It may therefore be important to keep 
in mind what those circumstances are in which con- 
sist truth and falsehood, in reference to any depart- 
ment of knowledge. 

I. In collecting facts, it is required in the first 
place that they shall be authentic ; secondly, that the 
statement shall include a full and fair view of all the 
circumstances which ought to be taken into our in- 
vestigation of the case ; and thirdly, that it shall not 
include any facts which are not connected with the 
subject, or whose connexion is only incidental. 
"When we have thus formed a collection of facts, 
authentic, full, and essential, the statement, in as far 
as relates to the facts, constitutes truth. When any 
of the facts are not authentic ; when important facts 
are left out of the statement, or misrepresented ; or 
when facts are taken into it, which, though true, have 
no real relation to the subject; this constitutes fal- 
lacy or falsehood. 

II. In considering two events as connected in the 
manner of cause and effect; when this relation is 
deduced from a full and extensive observation of the 
sequence being uniform, — this is truth. When it is 
assumed upon inadequate grounds, that is, from the 
observation of a connexion which is only incidental 
or limited, — this is either falsehood or hypothesis ; 
for the relation may be assumed upon grounds which, 
though not actually false, are yet not sufficient to 
establish it as true — namely, on observation which 
is too limited in extent. This is conjecture or hy- 
pothesis ; and it is in some cases a legitimate process, 
provided it be used only as a guide for further ob- 
servation, and be not received as true, until such 
observation shall have been sufficient to confirm it» 



LAWS OF INVESTIGATION. . 181 

III. In deducing from a large collection of facts 
a general fact or general principle ; when this induc- 
tion is made from a full examination of all the indi- 
vidual cases to which the general fact is meant to 
apply, and actually does apply to them all, — this is 
truth. When it is deduced from a small number of 
observations, and extended to others to which it 
does not apply, — this is falsehood. As in the former 
case, however, a general principle may be produced 
hypothetically or by conjecture ; that is, it may be 
assumed as general so far as we at present know. 
This process is often legitimate and useful as a guide 
in further inquiry, if it be employed for this purpose 
only, and the result be not received as truth until it 
be established by sufficient observation. A great 
and not unfrequent error is, that when such hypo- 
thetical principles are proposed in a confident man- 
ner, they are very often received as true ; and the 
consequence is, that a degree of observation is re- 
quired for exposing their fallacy, perhaps as extensive 
as, if properly employed, might have been sufficient 
to discover the truth. Those who are acquainted 
with the history of medical doctrines will be best 
able to judge of the accuracy of this observation, 
and to estimate the extensive influence which this 
error has had in retarding the progress of medical 
science. 

The proper rules to be observed, in deducing a 
general principle, are therefore opposed, in the first 
place to the error of hasty generalizing, or deducing 
such a principle from a limited number of facts. 
They are further opposed to another error, prevalent 
in the hypothetical systems of the old philosophy, by 
which phenomena were referred to principles alto"- 
gether fictitious and imaginary, or, in other words, 
which could not be shown to be facts. In opposi- 
tion to both these errors the great rule of induction 
in modern science is, that the principle which is as- 
sumed as general shall be itself a fact, and that the 
Q 



182 REASON. 

fact shall be universal. Thus, what we call the law 
of gravitation is primarily nothing more than the 
fact that bodies fail to the earth ; and that this is true 
of all bodies, without a single exception. Of the 
cause of this fact, or the hidden principle on which 
it depends, we know nothing ; and all the investiga- 
tions of Newton were carried on independently even 
of the attempt to discover it. "When Newton," 
says Mr. Stewart, " showed that the same law of 
gravity extends to the celestial spaces, and that the 
power by which the moon and planets are retained 
in their orbits is precisely similar in its effects to that 
which is manifested in the fall of a stone ; he left 
the efficient cause of gravity as much in the dark as 
ever, and only generalized still further the conclu- 
sions of his predecessors." 

False investigation maybe briefly referred to three 
heads, — fallacies in facts, — false inductions, — and 
false reasoning. 

I. Fallacies in Facts. A statement of facts is 
fallacious when any of the alleged facts are not true, 
— when it includes facts not relating to the subject, 
— and when important facts are omitted. This last 
error is most frequently exemplified in those cases in 
which facts are collected on one side of a question, 
or in support of a particular doctrine. To the same 
class we may likewise add those instances in which 
statements are received as facts, which are not facts 
but opinions. 

II. False Induction includes false causation and 
false generalization. False causation is, when two 
events are considered as cause and effect without 
sufficient reason, and which are, in fact, only inci- 
dentally combined : — when events are considered as 
cause and effect which are only joint effects of a com- 
mon cause ; and when, of two events reallv con- 



FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION. 183 

nected as cause and effect, we mistake the order of 
the sequence, considering that as the cause which is 
really the effect, and that as the effect which is really 
the cause. The error of false causation is most apt 
to occur in those sciences in which there is peculiar 
difficulty in tracing effects to their true causes, and 
causes to their true effects. These, as formerly 
mentioned, are exemplified by medicine and political 
economy. A physician, for example, ascribes the 
cure of a patient to a remedy which he has taken, 
though it perhaps had no influence on his recovery; 
and a political declaimer refers some circumstance 
of national distress or commercial embarrassment 
to certain public measures which happened to corres- 
pond in time, but were in fact entirely unconnected. 
False generalization, again, as was lately stated, in- 
cludes general principles which are deduced from a 
limited number of facts ; and hypotheses which can- 
not be shown to be facts, but are entirely fictitious 
and imaginary. 

III. False Reasoning. This consists either., — in 
applying to the explanation of facts, principles 
which are unsound, — in applying sound principles 
to facts which have no relation to them, — or in de- 
ducing conclusions which do not follow from these 
facts and principles. 

Reasoning is usually divided into two parts which 
have been called the intuitive and the discursive. 
Intuitive reasoning, or intuitive judgment, is when 
the truth of a proposition is perceived whenever it 
is announced. This applies to axioms or self-evi- 
dent truths, — and to first truths or fundamental ar- 
ticles of belief, formerly referred to, which rest upon 
the absolute conviction of the whole mass of man- 
kind. In discursive reasoning, again, some of these 
axioms or first truths are applied to particular facts, 
so as to deduce from the connexion new conclu-' 



184 REASON. 

sions. Thus, when we say that " every event must 
have an adequate cause," we state a principle of in- 
tuitive judgment. When we then collect from the 
phenomena of nature various examples of adaptation 
and design, and, applying that intuitive principle to 
these facts, arrive at the conclusion that the uni- 
verse is the work of an intelligent and designing First 
Cause, — this is discursive reasoning. The new prin- 
ciple or conclusion thus deduced may be applied in 
a similar manner to the deduction of farther con- 
clusions, and so on through what we call a chain of 
reasoning. Any particular piece of reasoning, then, 
may generally be resolved into the following ele- 
ments : — 

1. Certain principles or propositions which are 
stated either as axioms, as first truths, or as deduc- 
tions from some former process of reasoning. 

2. Certain facts or relations of facts, derived either 
from observation or testimony, which are stated as 
true, and to which the principles are to be in some 
manner apphed. 

3. Certain new conclusions deduced from the ap- 
plication of the principles to the facts. 

In examining the validity of such a process, we 
have not only to attend to the correctness of the 
principles and the authenticity of the alleged facts, 
but likewise to inquire whether the facts are of that 
class to which the principles are legitimately appli- 
cable ; for the principles may be true, and the facts 
authentic, and yet the reasoning may be unsound, 
from the principles being applied to the facts to 
which they have no relation. 

This method of examining, separately, the ele- 
ments of an argument, appears to correspond with 
the ancient syllogism ; and this, accordingly, when 
divested of its systematic shape, is the mental'process 
which we perform, whenever we either state, or ex- 
amine any piece of reasoning. If I say, for example, 
**the greatest kings are mortal, for they are but 



FALLACIES IN INVESTIGATION. 185 

men;" I appear to state a very simple proposition; 
but it is in fact a process of reasoning which involves 
all the elements of the syllogism ; namely, — 

1. The general fact or proposition, that all men 
are mortal. 

2. The fact referable to the class of facts which 
are included under this proposition, — that kings are 
men. 

3. The deduction from this conneaon, that kings 
are mortal. 

For the validity and efficacy of such a process, two 
things are necessaiy, namely, — 

1. That the general proposition which forms the 
first part of the statement, or, in logical language, 
the major proposition, be absolutely and universally 
true, or true without exceptian in regard to facts of 
a certain class, — and be admitted as such by those 
to whom the reasoning is addressed. 

2. That the fact referred to it, or the minor propo- 
sition, be admitted or proved to be one of that class 
of facts which are included under the general propo- 
sition. 

The conclusion then follows by a very simple 
process. If either of the two former propositions 
be deficient or untrue, the argument is false. Thus, 
if I had varied the statement as follows, — " Angels, 
like other human beings, are mortal ;" — there is a 
fallacy which, when put into the syllogistic form, is 
immediately apparent ; thus, — 

All human beings are mortal, 
Angels are buman beings ; 
Therefore, angela are mortal. 

The general or major proposition here is true ; but 
the minor is not one of the class of facts which 
are included under it ; therefore the conclusion is 
false. If I had said again, " Angels, like other cre- 
ated beings, are mortal ;" the fallacy is equally ap- 
Barent, though from a different source ; thus, 
Q2 



186 



All created beings are mortal, 
Angels are created beings : 
Tnerefore, angels are mortal. 



Here the minor proposition is true, or is a fact in- 
cluded under the first ; but the first, or major, is not 
true, for we have no ground to beUeve that all cre- 
ated beings are mortal. On the other hand, when 
a general fact is assumed as true of a certain class 
of cases, we must not assume the converse as true 
of those which are not included in the class ; thus, 
from the proposition, that all human beings are mor- 
tal, we are not entitled to infer that angels, who are 
not human beings, are immortal. Whether this 
conclusion be true or not, the argument is false ; 
because the conclusion does not arise out of the 

{)remises ; — for, from the admitted general fact, that 
luman beings are mortal, it does not follow, that all 
who are not human beings are not mortal. Yet this 
will be found a mode of ifallacious reasoning of very 
frequent occurrence. The rule to be kept in mind for 
avoiding such fallacies is, — that a general truth, 
which applies invariably to a certain class, may be 
applied to any individual which can be shown to be 
included in that class : — but that we are not entitled 
to extend it to any which cannot be shown to be- 
long to the class ; — and that we are not to assume 
the reverse to be true of those which do not belong 
to it. On the other hand, Ave are not to assume a 
property as belonging to a class* because we have 
ascertained it to belong to a certain number of indi- 
viduals. This error comes under another part of 
our subject, and has been already alluded to under 
the head of false generahzation. The syllogism, 
therefore, cannot properly be considered an engine 
for the discovery of truth, but rather for enabling 
us to judge of the application of, and deductions 
from, truths previously ascertained. For, before 
we can construct such a process as constitutes the 
syllogism, we require to have premised that most 



FALLACIES IN INVESTKJATION. 187 

important process of investigation, by which a fact 
is ascertained to be general in regard to all the in- 
dividuals of a class, — and likewise, that certain indi- 
viduals specified in the argument belong to this 
class. Thus, the syllogism was nothing more than 
that process of mind which we exercise every time 
when we examine the validity, of an argument, 
though w^e may not always put it into this syste- 
matic form. And yet there may often be advantage 
in doing so, as it enables us to examine the elements 
of the arguments more distinctly apart. It is re- 
lated of an eminent English barrister, afterward a 
distinguished judge, that, on one occasion, he was 
completely puzzled by an argument adduced by his 
opponent in an important case, and that he did not 
detect the fallacy, till he went home and put it into 
the form of a syllogism. Though a syllogism, there- 
fore, may not lead to any discovery of truth, it may 
be an important instrument in the detection of so- 
phistry, by directing the attention distinctly and 
separately, to the various elements which compose 
a statement or an argument, and enabhng us to de- 
tect the part in which the sophistry is involved. 

In every process of reasoning there are two dis- 
tinct objects of attention, or circumstances to be ex- 
amined, before w^e admit the validity of the argument. 
These are, — the premises or data which the reasoner 
assumes, and which he expects us to admit as true ; 
— and the conclusions which he proposes to found 
upon these premises. The premises again consist 
of three parts, which we require to examine separ- 
ately and rigidly. These are, — 

1. Certain statements v»^hich he brings forward as 
facts, and which he expects to be admitted as such. 

2. Certain principles or propositions which he as- 
sumes as first truths, or articles of belief universally 
admitted. 

Z, Certain other propositions which he refers to, 



188 REASON. 

as deductions from former processes of investigation, 
or processes of reasoning. 

If the statements referable to these three heads 
are admitted as true, the argument proceeds, and 
we have only to judge of validity or correctness of 
his farther deductions. If they are not at once ad- 
mitted, the argument cannot proceed till we are 
satisfied on these. preliminary points. If we do not 
admit his facts, we require him to go back to the 
evidence on which they rest. If we do not admit 
the general propositions which he assumes, we re- 
quire the processes of reasoning or investigation on 
which these are founded. When we are at last 
agreed upon these premises, we proceed to judge of 
the conclusions which he proposes to deduce from 
them. 

The circumstances now referred to may be con- 
sidered as the essential parts of a process of rea- 
soning, in a logical view; but ttiere is another point 
which we require to keep carefully in mind in ex- 
amining such a process, and that is, the use of terms. 
Much of the confusion and perplexity in reasoning 
consists in the ambiguity of the terms ; this is re- 
ferable to three heads, namely : 1. Terms of a vague 
and indefinite character, the precise import of which 
has not been defined. 2. Terms employed in a sense 
in some respect different from their common and 
recognised acceptation. 3. Varying the import of 
a term, so as to use it in different meanings in dif- 
ferent parts of the same argument ; or employing it 
at different times in different degrees of comprehen- 
sion and extension. 

In examining the validity of a process of reason- 
ing, then, the mental operation which we ought to 
perform may be guided by the following considera- 
tions : — 

1. What statements does the author propose as 
matters of fact ; — are these authentic ; are they all 



A PROCESS OF REASONING. 189 

really bearing upon, or connected with, the subject; 
do they comprise a full and fair view of all the facts 
which ought to be brought forward in reference to 
the inquiry ; or have we reason to suspect that any 
of them have been disguised or modified, — that im- 
portant facts have been omitted or kept out of view, 
— that the author has not had sufficient opportunities 
of acquiring the facts which he ought to have been 
possessed of, — or that he has been collecting facts 
on one side of a question, or in support of a particu- 
lar opinion 1 

2. What propositions are assumed, either as first 
or intuitive truths, or as deductions arising out of 
former processes of investigation ; and are we satis- 
fied that these are all legitimate and correct 1 In par- 
ticular, does he make any statement in regard to two 
or more events being connected as cause and effect; 
and is this connexion assumed on sufficient grounds : 
— does he assume any general principle as applicable 
to a certain class of facts ; is this principle in itself 
a fact, and does it really apply to all the cases which 
he means to include under it ; have we any reason to 
beheve that it has been deduced from an insufficient 
number of facts, — or is it a mere fictitious hypothesis, 
founded upon a principle which cannot be proved to " 
have a real existence 1 

3. Do these assumed principles and facts really 
belong to the same subject, — or, in other words, do 
the facts belong to that class to which the principles 
apply 1 

4. Are the leading terms which he employs fully 
and distinctly defined as to their meaning; does he 
employ them in their common and recognised ac- 
ceptation; and does he uniformly use them in the 
same sense ; or does he seem to attach different 
meanings to the same term in diflferent parts of his 
argument? 

5. What are the new conclusions which he deduces 
trom the whole view of the subject; are these cor-' 



190 REASON. 

rect and valid ; and do they really follow from the 
premises laid down in the previous parts of his argu- 
ment ] For on- this head it is always to be kept in 
mind that a conclusion may be true, while it does 
not follow from the argument which has been brought 
to prove it : in such a case the argument is false. 

Much of the confusion, fallacy, and sophistry of 
reasoning arises from these points not being suffi- 
ciently attended to, and distinctly and rigidly investi- 
gated. An argument may appear fair and consecu- 
tive, but when we rigidly examine it we may find 
that the reasoner has, in his premises, contrived to 
introduce some statement which is not true in point 
of fact, or some bold general position which is not 
correct, or not proved ; or that he has left out some 
fact, or some principle, which ought to have been 
brought forward in a prominent manner, as closely 
connected with the inquiry. Hence the necessity 
for keeping constantly in view the various sources 
of fallacy to which every process of reasoning is 
liable, and for examining the elements rigidly and 
separately before we admit the conclusion. 

A process of reasoning is to be distinguished from 
• a process of investigatioA ; and both may be illus- 
trated in the following manner: — All reasoning must 
be founded upon facts, and the ascertained relations 
of these facts to each other. The nature of these 
relations has already been mentioned, as referable to 
the various heads of resemblance, cause, effect, &c. 
The statement of an ascertained relation of two facts 
to each other is called a proposition, such as, — that 
A is equal to B ; that C has a close resemblance to 
D ; that E is the cause of F, «fec. These statements, 
propositions, or ascertained relations are discovered 
by processes of investigation. In a process of rea- 
soning, again, we take a certain number of such 
propositions or ascertained relations, and deduce 
from them certain other truths or relations, arising 



A PROCESS OF REASONING. 191 

out of the mutual coimexion of some of these propo- 
sitions to each other. Thus, if I state as proposi- 
tions, ascertained by processes of investigation, that 
A is equal to B, and that B is equal to C, I imme- 
diately decide by a single step of reasoning that A 
is equal to C, in consequence of the mutual relation 
M'hich both A and C have to B. Such a process may 
be rendered more complicated in two ways. 

1. By the number of such ascertained relations, 
which we require to bear in mind and compare with 
each other before we arrive at the conclusion. Thus 
the relation that A is equal to E might rest on such 
a series of relations as the following : — A is equal to 
B ; B is the double of C ; C is the half of D ; D is 
equal to E : therefore A is equal to E. 

2. By propositions which are the conclusions of 
one or more steps in a process becoming the prem- 
ises in a subsequent step. Thus, — I may take as one 
process A is equal to B, and B is equal to C ; there- 
fore A is equal to C ; — and, as a distinct process, C 
is equal to D, and D is equal to E ; therefore C is 
equal to E. The conclusions from these two pro- 
cesses I then take as the premises in a third process 
— thus : it has been proved that A is equal to C, and 
that C is equal to E ; therefore A is equal to E. 

In examining the validity of such processes, there 
are two circumstances or objects of inquiry which 
we ought to keep constantly in view. (1.) Have we 
confidence in the accuracy of the alleged facts, and 
ascertained relations which form the premises ? — Can 
we rely on the process of investigation by which it 
is said to have been ascertained that A is equal to B, 
and that B is equal to C, &c. ? (2.) Are the various 
propositions in the series so related as to bring out 
a new truth or new relation ? For it is to be kept in 
mind that a series of propositions may all be true, 
and yet lead to nothing ; such propositions, for ex- 
ample, as that A is equal to B, C is equal to D, E is 
equal to F. There is here no mutual relation, and 



192 REASON. 

no new truth arises out of the series. But when I 
say A is equal to B, and B is equal to C, a new truth 
is immediately disclosed in consequence of the rela- 
tion which both A and C have to B ; namely, that A 
is equal to C. 

, Inventive genius, in regard to processes of reason- 
ing, consists in finding out relations or propositions 
which are thus capable of disclosing new truths or 
new relations; and in placing them in that order 
. which is calculated to show how these new relations 
arise out of them. This is the exercise of a reflect- 
ing mind ; and there may be much acquired know- 
ledge, that is, many facts accumulated by memory 
alone, without any degree of this exercise or habit 
of reflection. But both are required for forming a 
well-cultivated mind; the memory must be stored 
with information, that is, ascertained facts and ascer- 
tained relations ; and the power of reflection must 
be habituated to discover new truths or new rela- 
tions by a comparison of these facts and ascertained 
relations with each other. For the discovery of new 
truths may consist either of new facts or of new 
relations among facts previously known. Thus, it 
might happen that we had long been familiar with 
two facts, without being aware that they had any 
particular connexion. If we were then to ascertain 
that the one of these was the cause of the other, il 
would be a real and important discovery of a new 
truth, though it would consist only of a new relation 
between facts which had long been known to us. 

A process of reasoning, as we have seen, consists 
of two parts, namely, the premises and the conclusion 
deduced from them. If the premises be admitted as 
true, the remaining part of the process becomes com- 
paratively simple. But it often happens that a rea- 
soner must begin by establishing his premises. This 
is most remarkably exemplified in what we call a 
chain of reasoning, consisting of numerous distinct 



FALLACIES IN REASONING. 193 

arguments or steps, so arranged that the conclusion 
from one step becomes an essential part of the prem- 
ises in the next ; and this may be continued through 
a long series. The process then becomes much 
more complicated, and in judging of the accuracy of 
the reasoning we require to examine carefully every 
part of it as we proceed, to guard against the intro- 
duction of fallacy* Without this attention it may 
often happen that the more advanced parts of an 
argument may appear fair and consecutive, while a 
fallacy has been allowed to creep into some part of 
it, which, in fact, vitiates the whole. In the pre- 
ceding observations we have endeavoured to point 
out some of the leading cautions to be observed in 
this respect, especially in regard to the admission 
of facts, the assumption of causation, and the deduc- 
tion of general principles ; and also the sources of 
fallacy to be kept in view in conducting these pro- 
cesses. But there is another class of fallacies which, 
thoughless immediately connected with our inquiries, 
it may be right briefly to point out in relation to this 
subject. These are what may be called logical fal- 
lacies, or perversions of reasoning. In regard to 
them, as well as to those formerly mentioned, it is 
to be kept in mind, that however obvious they may 
appear when simply stated, this is by no means the 
case when they are skilfully involved in a long pro- 
cess of reasoning. The fallacies of this class may 
be chiefly referred to the following heads : — 

I. When a principle is assumed which, in fact, 
amounts to the thing to be proved ; slightly disguised, 
perhaps, by some variation in the terms. This is 
commonly called petitio principii, or begging the 
question. When simply stated, it appears a fallacy 
not likely to be admitted ; but will be found one of 
very frequent occurrence. It is indeed remarkable 
to observe the facility with which a dogma, when it 
has been boldly and confidently stated, is often ad- 
R 



194 REASON. 

mitted by numerous readers, without a single inquiiy 
into the evidence on which it is founded. 

II. When a principle is assumed without proof; 
when this is employed to prove something else ; and 
this is again applied in some way in support of the 
first assumed principle. This is called reasoning in 
a circle ; and the difficulty of detecting it is often iu 
proportion to the extent of the circle, or the number 
of principles which are thus made to hang upon one 
another. 

III. A frequent source of fallacy is when a rea- 
soner assumes a principle, and then launches out 
into various illustrations and analogies, which are 
artfully made to bear the appearance of proofs. The 
cautions to be kept in mind in such a case are, that 
the illustrations may be useful and the analogies 
may be of importance, provided the principle has 
been proved; but that if it has not been proved, the 
illustrations must go for nothing, and even analogies 
seldom have any weight which can be considered as 
of the nature of evidence. Fallacies of this class 
are most apt to occur in the declamations of public 
speakers ; and when they are set off with all the 
powers of eloquence, it is often difficult to detect 
them. The questions which the hearer should pro- 
pose to himself in such cases are. Does this really 
contain any proof bearing upon the subject, or is it 
mere illustration and analogy, in itself proving no- 
thing? — if so, has the reasoner previously established 
his principle ; or has he assumed it, and trusted to 
these analogies as his proofs 1 

IV. A fallatry somewhat analogous to the preceding 
consists in arguing for or against a doctrine on the 
ground of its supposed tendency, leaving out of view 
the primary question of its truth. Thus, a specu- 
lator in theology will contend in regard to a doctrine 



FALLACIES IN REASONING. 195 

which he opposes, that it is derogatory to the char- 
acter of the Deity; and, respecting another which 
he brings forward, that it represents the Deity in an 
aspect more accordant with the benignity of his char- 
acter. The previous question in all such cases is, 
not what is most accordant with our notions respect- 
ing the Divine character, but what is truth. 

V. When a principle which is true of one case, or 
one class of cases, is extended by analogy to others 
which differ in some important particulars. The 
caution to be observed here is, to inquire strictly 
whether the cases are analogous, or whether there 
exists any difference which makes the principle not 
applicable. We have formerly alluded to a remark- 
able example of this fallacy in notions relating to the 
properties of matter being applied to mind, without 
attention to the fact that the cases are so distinct as 
to have nothing in common. An examjjle somewhat 
analogous is found in Mr. Hume's objection to mira- 
cles, that they are violations of the established order 
of nature. The cases, we have seen, are not analo- 
gous ; for miracles do not refer to the common 
course of nature, but to the operation of an agency 
altogether new and peculiar. Arguments founded 
upon analog^", therefore, require to be used with the 
utmost caution, when they are employed directly for 
the discovery or the establishment of truth. But 
there is another purpose to which they may be ap- 
plied with much greater freedom, namely, for repel- 
ling objections. Thus, if we find a person bringing 
objections against a particular doctrine, it is a sound 
and valid mode of reasoning to contend that he re^ 
ceives doctrines which rest upon the same kind of 
evidence ; or that similar objections might be urged 
with equal force against truths which it is impossible 
to call in question. It is in this manner that the ar- 
l^ment from analogy is employed in the valuable 
work of Bishop Butler. He does not derive from the 



196 REASON. 

analogy of nature any direct argument in support of 
natural or revealed religion ; but shows that many of 
the objections which are urged against the truths of 
religion might be brought against circumstances in 
the economy and course of nature which are known 
and undoubted facts. 

VI. A fallacy the reverse of the former is used by 
sophistical writers ; namely, -when two cases are 
strictly analagous they endeavour to prove that they 
are not so by pointing out trivial differences not cal- 
culated in any degree to weaken the force of the 
analogy. 

VII. When a true general principle is made to 
apply exclusively to one fact, or one class of facts, 
while it is equally true of various others. This is 
called, in logical language, the non-distribution of 
the middle term. In an example given by logical 
writers, one is supposed to maintain that corn is 
necessary for life, because food is necessary for life, 
and corn is food. It is true that food is necessary 
for hfe, but this does not apply to any one particular 
kind of food"; it means only, that food of some kind 
or other is so. When simply stated, the fallacy of 
such a position is at once obvious, but it may be in- 
troduced into an argument in such a manner as not 
to be so immediately detected. 

VIII. When an acknowledged proposition is in- 
verted, and the converse assumed to be equally true. 
We may say, for example, that a badly governed 
country must.be distressed; but we are not entitled 
to assume that every distressed country is badly 
governed; for there may be many other sources 
of national distress. I may say, " all wise men live 
temperately," but it does not follow that every man 
who lives temperately is a wise man. This fallacy 
was formerly referred to under the syllogism* It 



FALLACIES IN REASONING. 197 

is, at the same time, to be kept in mind that some 
propositions do admit of being inverted, and still 
remain equally true. This holds most remarkably 
of propositions which are universally negative, as 
in an example given by writers on logic. "No 
ruminating animal is a beast of prey." ' It follows, 
as equally true, that no beast of prey ruminates. 
But if I were to vary the proposition by saying, " all 
animals which do not ruminate are beasts of prey," 
this would be obviously false ; for it does not arise 
out of the former statement. 

IX. A frequent source of fallacy among sophis- 
tical writers consists in boldly applying a character 
to a class of facts, in regard to which it carries a 
general aspect of truth without attention to import- 
ant distinctions by which the statement requires to 
be modified. Thus, it has been objected to our be- 
lief of the miracles of the sacred writings, that they 
rest upon the evidence of testimony, and that testi- 
mony is fallacious. Now, when we speak of testi- 
mony in general, we may say with an appearance 
of truth that it is fallacious ; but, in point of fact, 
testimony is to be referred to various species ; and, 
though a large proportion of these may be fallacious, 
ihere is a species of testimony on which we rely 
with absolute confidence ; — that is, we feel it to be 
as improbable that this kind of testimony should de- 
ceive us, as that we should be disappointed in our 
■expectation of the uniformity of nature. The kind 
of sophism now referred to seems to correspond 
with that which logical writers have named the fal- 
lacy of division. It consists in applying to facts in 
their separate state what only belongs to them col- 
lectively. The converse of it is the fallacy of com- 
position. It consists in applying to the facts col- 
lectively what belongs only to them, or to some 
of them, in their separate state ; — as if one were to 
show that a certain kind of testimony is absolutely 
R2 



198 REASON. 

to be relied on, and thence were to contend that 
testimony in general is worthy of absolute confi- 
dence. 

X. A frequent fallacy consists in first overturning 
an unsound argument, and thence reasoning against 
the doctrine which this argument was meant to sup- 
port. This is the part of a mere casuist, not of a 
sincere inquirer after truth ; for it by no means fol- 
lows that a doctrine is false because unsound argu- 
ments have been adduced in support of it. We 
have formerly alluded to some remarkable example* 
of this fallacy, especially in regard to those im- 
portant principles commonly called first truths ; 
which, we have seen, admit of no processes of 
reasoning, and consequently are in no degree af- 
fected by arguments exposing the fallacy of such 
processes. We learn from this, on the other hand, 
the importance of avoiding all weak and incon- 
clusive arguments, or doubtful statements ; for, in- 
dependently of the opening which Ihey give for 
sophistical objections, it is obvious that on other 
grounds the reasoning is only encumbered by them. 
ft is the part of the casuist to rest the weight of his 
objections on such weak points, leaving out of view 
those which he cannot contend with. It may even 
happen that a conclusion is true, though the whole 
reasoning may have been weak, unsound, and ir- 
relevant. The casuist, of course, in such a case 
attacks the reasoning, and not the conclusion. On 
the other hand, there may be much in an argument 
which is true, or which may be conceded ; while the 
most important part of it is untrue, and the conclusion 
false. An inexperienced reasoner, in such a case, 
thinks it necessary to combat every point, and thus 
■exposes himself to sound replies from his adversary 
on subjects which are of no importance. A skilful 
reasoner concedes or passes over all such positions, 
and rests his attack on those in which the fallacy 



FALLACIES IN REASONING. 199 

is really involved. An example illustrative of this 
subject is familiar to those who are acquainted with 
the controversy respecting our idea of cause and 
effect. Mr. Hume stated in a clear manner the doc- 
trine that this idea is derived entirely from our ex- 
perience of a uniform sequence of two events ; and 
founded upon this an argument against our belief in 
a great First €ause. This led to a controversy 
respecting the original doctrine itself; and it is not 
many years since it was contended by respectable 
individuals that it is nothing less than the essence 
of atheism to maintain that our notion of cause and 
effect originates in the observation of a uniform se- 
quence. It is now, perhaps, universally admitted 
that this doctrine is correct, and that the sophism 
of Mr. Hume consisted in deducing from it conclu- 
sions which it in no degree warranted. This im- 
portant distinction we formerly alluded to ; namely, 
that our idea of cause and effect in regard to any 
two individual events is totally distinct from our in- 
tuitive impression of causation, or our absolute con- 
viction that every event must have an adequate 
cause. 

XI. A sophism somewhat connected with the 
former consists in disproving a doctrine, and on that 
account assuming the opposite doctrine to be true. 
It may be true, but its truth does not depend upon 
the falsehood of that which is opposed to it; yet 
this will be found a principle of not unfrequent 
occurrence in unsound reasonings. 

XII. Fallacies are often introduced in what may 
be termed an oblique manner; or, as if upon a gene- 
rally admitted authority. The effect of this is to 
take off the appearance of the statement being made 
directly by the author, and resting upon his own 
authority, by which we might be led to examine its 
truth. For this purpose it is put, perhaps, in the 



200 REASON. 

form of a question; or is introduced by such ex- 
pressions as the following: — "it is a remarkable 
fact," — " it is somewhat singular," — " it has been 
argued with much justice," — " it will be generally 
admitted," &c. 

XIII. Fallacy may arise from leaving the main 
subject of discussion, and arguing upon points which 
have but a secondary relation to it. This is one 
of the resources of the casuist when he finds him- 
self in the worst of the argument. Nearly allied to 
this, is the art of skilfully dropping part of a state- 
ment, w^hen the reasoner finds he cannot support it, 
and going on boldly with the remainder as if he still 
maintained the whole. 

XIV. Much of the fallacy and ambiguity of pro- 
cesses of reasoning depends entirely, as formerly 
stated, on the use of terms. This may consist in 
two contending parties using the same word in dif- 
ferent meanings without defining what their mean- 
ings are ; in one or both using terms in a sense dif- 
ferent from their commonly recognised acceptation, 
or in using them in one sense in one part of the 
argument, and in another in a different part of it. 
Such disputes, accordingly, are often interminable; 
and this mode of disputation is one of the great re- 
sources of the casuist, or of him who argues for 
victory, not for truth. The remedy is, that every 
reasoner shall be required clearly to define the terms 
which he employs; and that in every controversy 
certain premises or prehminaries shall be fixed in 
which the parties are agreed. The ambiguity of 
term.s is in fact so extensive a source of fallacy that 
scarcely any sophistical argument will be found free 
from it ; as in almost every language the same term 
is used with great diversity of meanings. Let us 
take, for example, the term faith. It means a mere 
system of opinions, confidence in testimony, reliance 



FALLACIES IN REASONING. 201 

on the integrity, fidelity, and stability of character 
of other beings, an act of the understanding in 
regard to abstract truth presented to it, and a 
mental condition by which truths of another descrip- 
tion exert a uniform influence over the moral feel- 
ings, the will, and the whole character. In the con- 
troversies which have arisen out of this word, it will 
probably be found that these various meanings have 
not been sufficiently distinguished from each other. 
A celebrated passage in the " Spirit of Laws" has 
been justly referred to as a remarkable example of 
the same kind of sophism. " The Deity," says 
Montesquieu, " has his laws ; the material world, its 
laws ; intelligences superior to man, their laws ; 
the brutes, their laws ; man, his laws." In this 
short passage the term laws is employed, probably, 
in four senses, remarkably different. 

XV. There are various other sources of fallacy, 
consisting chiefly in the use of arguments which 
cannot be admitted as relevant in regard to the pro- 
cess of reasoning, though they may carry a certain 
weight in reference to the individuals concerned. 
Among these nlay be reckoned appeals to high 
authorities, to popular prejudices, or to the passions 
of the multitude ; and what is called the argumentum 
ad hominem. If a person, for example, be arguing in 
support of a particular rule of conduct, we may 
retort upon him that his own conduct in certain in- 
stances was in direct opposition to it. This may be 
very true in regard to the individual, but can have 
no influence in the discussion of the question. 

XVT. One of the most common sources of fallacy 
consists of distorted views and partial statements ; 
— such as facts disguised, modified, or collected 
on one side of a question ; — or arguments and au- 
thorities adduced in support of particular opinions, 
leaving out of view those which tend to different 



202 REASON. 

conclusions. Mis-statement, in one form or another, 
may indeed be considered as a most fruitful source 
of controversy ; and, amid the contests of rival dis- 
putants, the chief difficulty which meets the candid 
inquirer after truth, is to have the subject presented 
to his mind without distortion. Hence the import- 
ance, in every inquiry, of suspending our judginent, 
and of patiently devoting ourselves to clear the 
subject from all imperfect views and partial state- 
ments. Without the most anxious attention to this 
rule, a statement may appear satisfactory, and a de- 
duction legitimate, which are in fact leading us 
widely astray from the truth. 

After every possible care in any process of rea- 
soning, we may still find, in many cases, a degree 
of doubt, and even certain varieties of opinion in re- 
gard to the import and bearing of the argument. 
This arises partly from actual differences in the 
power of judging, or what we call, in common lan- 
guage, vigour of mind ; and partly from differences 
in attention, or in the habit of applying the judgment 
closely to the elements of an inquiry. Hence the 
varieties of opinion that may be held by different 
individuals on the same subject, and with the same 
facts before them ;. and the degree of uncertainty 
which attends various processes of reasoning. — 
There is one species of reasoning which is free 
from all this kind of uncertainty, namely, the mathe- 
matical ; and the superiority of it depends upon the 
following circumstances : — 

1. Nothing is taken for granted, or depends upon 
mere authority ; and, consequently, there is no room 
for fallacy or doubt in regard to the premises on 
which the reasoning is founded. No examination 
of facts is required in any degree analogous to that 
which is necessary in physical science. The mathe- 
■ matician, indeed, proceeds upon assumptions of 
such a kind that it is in his own power to clear 



MATHEMATICAL REASONING. 203 

them from all ambiguity, and from every thing not 
connected with the subject. 

2. In the farther progress of a mathematical argu- 
ment, if we have any doubt of a proposition which is 
assumed as the result of a former process, we have only 
to turn to the demonstration of it, and be immediately 
satisfied. Thus, if any step of a process be founded 
upon the principle that all the angles of a triangle 
are equal to two right-angles, or that the square of 
the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares 
of the two sides, should we have any doubt of the 
truth of these conclusions, the demonstration of 
them is before us. But if an argument be founded 
on the principle that the heavenly bodies attract one 
another with a force which is directly as their 
quantity of matter, and inversely as the square of 
their distance ; this great principle must be received 
on the authority of the eminent men by whom it 
was ascertained, — the mass of mankind having nei- 
ther the power nor the means of verifjing it. 

3. All the terms are fully and distinctly defined, 
and there is no room for obscurity or ambiguity in 
regard to them. 

4. The various steps in a process of mathematical 
reasoning follow each other so closely and consecu- 
tively, as to carry a constant conviction of absolute 
certainty; and, provided we are in possession of 
the necessary premises, each single step is short, 
and the result obvious. 

5. The proper objects of mathematical reasoning 
are quantity and its relations ; and these are capable 
of being defined and measured with a precision of 
which the objects of other kinds of reasoning are 
entirely unsusceptible. It is, indeed, always to be 
kept in mind, that mathematical reasoning is only 
appHcable to subjects which can be defined and 
measured in this manner, and that all attempts to 
extend it to subjects of other kinds have led to the 
greatest absurdities. 



204 REASON. 

Notwithstandinor the high degree of precision 
which thus distinguishes mathematical reasoning, 
the study of mathematics does not, as is commonly- 
supposed, necessarily lead to precision in other 
species of reasoning, and still less to correct inves- 
tigation in physical science. The explanation that 
is given of the fact seems to be satisfactory. The 
mathematician argues certain conclusions from cer- 
tain assumptions, rather than from actual ascertained 
facts ; and the facts to which he may have occasion 
to refer are so simple, and so free from all extraneous 
matter, that their truth is obvious, or is ascertained 
without difficulty. By being conversant with truths 
of this nature, he does not learn that kind of caution 
and severe examination which is required in physi- 
cal science, — for enabling us to judge whether the 
statements on which we proceed are true, and 
whether they include the whole truth which ought 
to enter into the investigation. He thus acquires a 
habit of too great facility in the admission of data 
or premises, v/hich is the part of every investigation 
which the physical inquirer scrutinizes with the most 
anxious care,— and too great confidence in the mere 
force of reasoning, without adequate attention to 
the previous processes of investigation on which all 
reasoning must be founded. It has been, accord- 
ingly, remarked by Mr. Stewart, and other accurate 
observers of intellectual character, that mathemati- 
cians are apt to be exceedingly credulous, in regard 
both to opinions and to matters of testimony ; while, 
on the other hand, persons who are chiefly conver- 
sant with the uncertain sciences, acquire a kind of 
skepticism in regard to statements, which is apt to 
lead them into the opposite error. These observa- 
tions, of course, apply only to what we may call a 
mere mathematician, — a character wliich is now 
probably rare, since the close connexion was estab- 
lished between the mathematical and physical sci- 
ences in the philosophy of Newton. 



REASONTNO. 205 

In the various steps constituting a process of rea- 
soning', or a process of investigation, in any depart- 
ment of knowledge, our guide is reason or judgment. 
Its peculiar province is to give to each fact or each 
principle, a proper place and due influence in the 
inquiry, and to trace the real and true tendency of 
it in the conclusion. It is, of course, assisted by 
other mental operations, as memory, conception, 
and abstraction, but especially by attention, — or a 
deliberate and careful appHcation of the mind to 
each fact and each consideration which ought to 
have a place in the inquiry. This is entirely a vol- 
untary exercise of the mind, strengthened and made 
easy by habit, or frequent exercise, and weakened 
or impaired by disuse or misapplication ; and there 
is, perhaps, nothing which has a greater influence 
in the formation of character, or in determining the 
place which a man is to assume among his fellow- 
men. 

This sound exercise of judgment is widely dis- 
tinct from the art of ingenious disputation. The 
object of the former is to weigh, fully and candidly, 
all the relations of things, and to give to each fact 
its proper weight in the inquiry: the aim of the 
latter is to seize with rapidity particular relations, 
and to find facts bearing upon a particular view of a 
subject. This habit when much exercised tends 
rather to withdraw the attention from the cultiva- 
tion of the former. Thus, it has not unfrequently 
happened, that an ingenious pleader has made a bad 
judge ; and that acute and powerful disputants have 
perplexed themselvesbytheirownsubtleties,tillthey 
have ended by doubting of every thing. The same 
observation apphes to controversial writing; and 
hence the hesitation with which we receive the ar- 
guments and statements of a keen controvertist, and 
the necessity for hearing both sides. In making 
use of this caution, we may not accuse the reasoner 
S 



206 REASON. 

of any unsound arguments or false statements. 
We only charge him with acting the part of an in- 
genious pleader, who brings forward the statements 
and arguments calculated to favour one side of a 
question, and leaves those of the opposite side out 
of view. The candid inquirer, like the just judge, 
considers both sides, and endeavours, according to 
the best of his judgment, to decide between them 
To the same principle we trace the suspicion with 
which we receive the statements of an author, who 
first brings forward his doctrine, and then proceeds to 
collect facts in support of it. To a similar process 
we may ascribe the paradoxical opinions in which 
sophistical writers have landed themselves, often 
on subjects of the highest importance, and which 
they have continued to advocate, with much appear- 
ance of an honest conviction of their truth. It 
would be unjust to suppose that these writers have 
always intended to impose upon others; they have 
very often imposed upon themselves ; but they have 
done so by their own voluntary act, in a misappli- 
cation of their reasoning powers. They have di- 
rected their attention, exclusively or chiefly, to one 
view of a subject, and have neglected to direct it, 
with the same care, to the facts and considerations 
which tend to support the opposite conclusions. 

In regard to the sound exercise of judgment, it is 
farther to be remarked, that it may exist without 
the habit of observing the various steps in the men- 
tal process which is connected with it. Thus we 
find men of that character to which we give the 
name of strong sound sense, who form just and 
comprehensive conclusions on a subject, without 
being able to explain to others the chain of thought 
by which they arrived at them; and who, when 
they attempt to do so, are apt to bewilder them- 
selves, and fall into absurdities. Such persons, ac- 
cordingly, are adapted for situations requiring both 



ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. 207 

soundness of judgment and promptitude inaction; 
but they make a bad figure in public speaking or 
reasoning. They are, indeed, possessed of a faculty 
more valuable than any thing that metaphysics or 
logic can furnish ; but a due attention to these 
sciences might increase their usefulness, by enabling 
them to communicate to others the mental process 
which led to their decisions. A person of this de- 
scription, according to a well-known anecdote, when 
appointed to a judicial situation in one of the colo- 
nies, received from an eminent judge the advice to 
trust to his own good sense in forming his opinions, 
but never to attempt to state the grounds of them. 
" The judgment," said he, " will probably be right, 
the argument will infallibly be wrong." When 
this strong sound judgment, and correct logical 
habits, are united in the same individual, they form 
the character of one who arrives at true conclusions 
on any subject to which his attention is directed, 
and, at the same time, carries others along with 
him to a full conviction of their truth. 

We have, then, ever}^ reason to believe that, 
though there may be original differences in the 
power of judgment, the chief source of the actual 
varieties in this important function is rather to be 
found in its culture and regulation. On this subject 
there are various considerations of the highest in- 
terest, claiming the attention of those who wish to 
have the understanding trained to the investigation 
of truth. These are chiefly referable to two heads ; 
namely, the manner in which the judgment suffers 
from deficient culture ; and the manner in which it 
is distorted by want of due regulation. 

I. The judgment is impaired by deficient culture. 
This is exemplified in that listless and indifferent 
habit of the mind in which there is no exercise of 
correct thinking, or of a close and continued apjili- 



208 REASON. 

cation of the attention to subjects of real importance. 
The mind is engrossed by frivolities and trifles, or 
bewildered by the wild play of the imagination ; and, 
in regard to opinions on the most important sub- 
jects, it either feels a total indifference, or receives 
them from others without the exertion of thinking or 
examining for itself. The individuals who are thus 
affected either become the dupes of sophistical 
opinions imposed upon them by other men, or spend 
their lives in frivolous and unworthy pursuits, with 
a total incapacity for all important inquiries. A 
slight degree removed from this condition of mind 
is another, in which opinions are formed on shght 
and partial examination, perhaps from viewing one 
side of a question, or, at least, without a full and 
candid direction of the attention to all the facts 
which ought to be taken into the inquiry. Both 
these conditions of mind may perhaps originate partly 
in constitutional peculiarities or erroneous educa- 
tion ; but they are fixed and increased by habit and 
indulgence, until, after a certain time, they probably 
become irremediable. They can be corrected only 
by a diligent cultivation of the important habit 
which, in common language, we call sound and cor- 
rect thinking ; and which is of equal value, whether 
it be applied to the formation of opinions, or to the 
regulation of conduct. 

II. The judgment is vitiated by want of due regu- 
lation ; and this may be ascribed chiefly to two 
sources, — prejudice and passion. Prejudice consists 
in the formation of opinions before the subject has 
been really examined. By means of this, the atten- 
tion is misdirected, and the judgment biassed, in a 
manner of which the individual is often in a great 
measure unconscious. The highest degree of it is 
exemplified in that condition of the mind in which a 
man first forms an opinion which interest or incli- 
nation may have suggested ; then proceeds to col- 



ITS CULTURE AND REGULATION. 209 

lect arguments in support of it ; and concludes by- 
reasoning himself into the behef of what he wishes 
to be true. It is thus that the judgment is apt to be 
misled, in a greater or less degree, by party spirit 
and personal attachments or antipathies ; and it is 
clear that all such influence is directly opposed to 
its sound and healthy exercise. The same observa- 
tions apply to passion, or the influence exerted by 
the moral feelings. The most striking example of 
this is presented by that depraved condition of the 
mind, which distorts the judgment in regard to the 
great principles of moral rectitude. " A man's un- 
derstanding," sa3"s Mr. Locke, " seldom fails him in 
this part, unless his ^^^ll would have it so ; if he 
takes a wrong course, it is most commonly because 
he goes wilfully out of the way, or at least chooses 
to be bewildered ; and there are few, if any, who 
dreadfully mistake, that are willing to be right." 

These facts are worthy of much consideration, 
and they appear to be equally interesting to all 
classes of men, whatever may be the degree of their 
mental cultivation, and Avhatever the subjects are to 
which their attention is more particularly directed. 
There is one class of truths to which they apply with 
peculiar force, — namely, those which relate to the 
moral government of God, and the condition of man 
as a responsible being. These gi'eat truths and the 
evidence on which they are founded are addressed 
to our judgment as rational beings ; they are pressed 
upon our attention as creatures destined for another 
state of existence ; and the sacred duty from which 
no individual can be absolved is a voluntary exercise 
of his thinking and reasoning powers, — it is solemnly, 
seriously, and deliberately to consider. On these 
subjects a man may frame any system for himself, 
and may rest in that sj^stem as truth ; but the solemn 
inquiry is, not what opinions he has formed, but in 
what manner he has formed them. Has . he ap- 
proached the great inquiry with a sincere desire to 
S2 



210 REASON. 

discover the truth ; and has he brought to it a mind, 
neither misled by prejudice, nor distorted by the 
condition of its moral feelings ; — has he directed his 
attention to all the facts and evidences with an in- 
tensity suited to their momentous importance ; and 
has he conducted the whole investigation with a deep 
and serious feeling that it carries with it an interest 
which reaches into eternity 1 Truth is immutable 
and eternal, but it may elude the frivolous or pre- 
judiced inquirer ; and, even when he thinks his con- 
clusions are the result of much examination, he 
may be resting his highest concerns in delusion and 
falsehood. 

The human mind, indeed, even in its highest state 
of culture, has been found inadequate to the attain- 
ment of the true knowledge of the Deity ; but light 
from heaven has shone upon the scene of doubt and 
of darkness, which will conduct the humble inquirer 
through every difficulty, until he arrive at the full 
perception and commanding influence of the truth ; 
— of truth such as human intellect never could have 
reached, and which, to every one who receives it, 
brings its own evidence that it comes from God. 

Finally, the sound exercise of judgment has a re- 
markable influence in producing and maintaining that 
tranquillity of mind which results from a due appli- 
cation of its powers, and a correct estimate of the 
relations of things. The want of this exercise leads- 
a man to be unduly engrossed with the frivolities of 
life, unreasonably elated by its joys, and unreason- 
ably depressed by its sorrows. A sound and well- 
regulated judgment tends to preserve from all such 
disproportioned pursuits and emotions. It does so, 
by leading us to view all present things in their true 
relations, to estimate aright their relative value, and 
to fix the degree of attention of which they are 
worthy ; — it does so. in a more especial manner, by 



REASON. 211 

leading us to compare the present life, which is so 
rapidly passing over us, with the paramount im- 
portance and overwhelming interest of the life which 
is to come. 



^11. 

OF THE USE OF REASON IN CORRECTING THE IMPRESSIONS 

OF THE MIND IN REGARD TO EXTERNAL THINGS. 

This subject leads to an investigation of great and 
extensive interest, of which I cannot hope to give 
more than a slight and imperfect outline. My 
anxiety is, that what is attempted may be confined 
to authentic facts, and the most cautious conclu- 
sions ; and that it may be of some use in leading" to 
farther inquiry. 

We have seen the power which the mind possesses 
of recalling the vivid impressions of scenes or 
events long gone by, in that mental process which 
we call conception. We have seen also its power 
of taking the elements of actual scenes, and forming 
them into new combinations, so as to represent to 
itself scenes and events which have no real exist- 
ence. We have likewise observed the remarkable 
manner in which persons, events, or scenes, long 
past, perhaps forgotten, are recalled into the mind 
by means of association ; — trains of thought taking 
possession of the mind in a manner which we often 
cannot account for, and bringing back facts or occur- 
rences which had long ceased to be objects of at- 
tention. These remarkable processes are most apt 
to take place when the mind is in that passive state 
which we call a revery ; and they are more rarely ob- 
served when the attention is actively exerted upon 
any distinct and continued subject of thought. 



212 REASON. 

During the presence in the mind of such a repre- 
sentation, whether recalled by conception or asso- 
ciation, or fabricated by imagination, there is proba- 
bly, for the time, a kind of belief of its real and 
present existence. But, on the least return of the 
attention to the affairs of life, the vision is instantly 
dissipated ; and this is done by reason comparing 
the vision with the actual state of things in the ex- 
ternal world. The poet or the novelist, it is probable, 
feels himself, for the time, actually imbodied in the 
person of his hero, and in that character judges, 
talks, and acts in the scene which he is depicting. 
This we call imagination; but were the vision not 
to be dissipated on his return to the ordinary rela- 
tions of life, — were he then to act in a single in- 
stance in the character of the being of his imagina- 
tion, — this would constitute insanity. 

The condition of mind here referred to does actu- 
ally take place ; namely, a state m which the visions 
or impressions of the mind itself are believed to have 
a real and present existence in the external world, 
and in which reason fails to correct this hehef by the 
actual relations of external things. There are two 
conditions in which this occurs in a striking man- 
ner ; namely, insanity and dreaming. Considered as 
mental phenomena, they have a remarkable affinity 
to each other. The great difference between them 
is, that in insanity the erroneous impression being 
permanent affects the conduct; whereas in dream- 
ing, no influence on the conduct is produced, because 
the vision is dissipated upon awaking. The differ- 
ence, again, between the mind under the influence 
of imagination, and in the state now under con- 
sideration is, that in the former the vision is built 
up by a voluntary effort, and is varied or dismissed 
at pleasure ; while in dreaming and insanity this 
power is suspended, and the mind is left entirely 
under the influence of the chain of thoughts which 
happens to be present, without being able either to 



REASON. 213 

vary or dismiss it. The particular chain or series 
seems, in general, perhaps always, to depend upon 
associations previously formed; the various ele- 
ments of \vhich bring up one another in a variety 
of singular combinations, and in a manner which we 
often cannot trace, or in any degree account for. 
The facts connected with this branch of the subject 
form one of the most interesting parts of this in- 
vestigation. 

There are some other affections which come un- 
der the same class ; but insanity and dreaming are 
the two extreme examples. In dreaming, the bodily 
senses are in a great measure shut up from external 
impressions; and the influence of the will upon 
bodily motions is also suspended, so that no actions 
in general follow. We shall afterward see that 
there are exceptions to this ; but it is the common 
state in dreaming. In insanity, on the other hand, 
the bodily senses are awake to impressions from 
without, and bodily motion is under the influence of 
the will; hence the maniac acts, under his erroneous 
impressions, in a manner which often makes him 
dangerous to the community. There is an aflfection 
which holds an intermediate place between these 
two extremes, and presents a variety of interesting 
phenomena. This is somnambulism. It differs from 
dreaming in the senses being, to a certain degree, 
awake to external things : though that power is sus- 
pended by which the mental impressions are cor- 
rected by the influence of the external world. Thus, 
the somnambulist often understands what is said to 
him, and can converse with another person in a 
tolerably connected manner, though always with 
some reference to his erroneous mental impressions. 
He acts, also, under the influence of these ; but the 
remarkable difference between him and the maniac 
is, that the somnambulist can be roused from his 
vision, and then the whole is dissipated. There are 
eases, indeed, in which the hallucination is more 



214 REASON. 

permanent, and cannot be at once interrupted in 
this manner: — these of course come to border on 
insanity. 

There is still a fourth condition connected with 
this curious subject ; namely, that in which a person 
awake, and in other respects in possession of his 
rational powers, perceives spectral illusions. This, 
we shall see, is allied in a singular manner to the. 
affections now referred to. 

The subject therefore, divides itself into four parts, 
which will form the separate topics of the following 
observations : — 

1. Dreaming. 

2. Somnambulism. 

3. Insanity. 

4. Spectral Illusions. 

The causes of these remarkable conditions of the 

mental functions are entirely beyond the reach of our 
inquiries ; but the phenomena connected with them 
present a subject of most interesting investigation. 



I.— DREAMING. 

The peculiar condition of the mmd in dreaming 
appears to be referable to two heads : — 

1. The impressions which arise in the mind are 
believed to have a real and present existence ; and 
this belief is not corrected, as in the waking state, 
by comparing the conception with the things of the 
external world. 

2. The ideas or images in the mind follow one an- 
other according to associations over Avhich we have 
no control ; we cannot, as in the waking state, vary 
the series, or stop it at our will. 

One of the most curious objects of investigation 
is to trace the manner in which the particular viisions 



DREAMING. 215 

or series of images arise. "VMien considered in this 
view, a gi-eat variety may be observed in dreams. 
Some of those which we are able to trace most dis- 
tinctly appear to be the following : — 

1. Recent events, and recent mental emotions, 
mingled up into one continuous series with each 
other, or with old events, by means of some feel- 
ing which had been in a greater or less degree allied 
to each of them, though in other respects they were 
entirely unconnected. We hear, perhaps, of a dis- 
tressing accident ; we have received some unpleas- 
ant news of an absent friend ; and we have been 
concerned in some business which gave rise to anx- 
iety : a dream takes place, in which all these are 
combined together; we are ourselves connected 
with the accident ; the absent friend is in our com- 
pany ; and the person with whom the business was 
transacted also appears in the scene. The only bond 
of union among these occurrences was, that each of 
them gave rise to a similar kind of emotion ; and the 
train was prrobably excited by some bodily feeling of 
uneasiness, perhaps an oppression at the stomach, at 
the time when the dream occurred. Without this, 
the particular series might not have taken place at 
all ; or some of the elements of it might have oc- 
curred in a totally different association. The absent 
friend might have appeared in connexion with old 
and pleasing recollections, comhined perhaps with 
persons and events associated with these, and with- 
out any reference to the painful intelligence by 
which the attention had been directed to him. We 
meet a person whom we have not seen for many 
years, and are led to inquire after old friends, and to 
allude to events long past. Dreams follow, in which 
these persons appear, and other persons and occur- 
rences connected with them ; but the individual, 
whose conversation gave rise to the series, does not 
appear in it, because he was not connected with the 



216 REASON* 

particular chain of events which was thus recalled 
into the mind. 

A woman who was a patient in the Clinical Ward 
of the infirmary of Edinburgh, under the care of Dr. 
Duncan, talked a great deal in her sleep, and made 
numerous and very distinct allusions to the cases 
of other sick persons. These allusions did not ap- 
ply to any patients who were in the ward at that 
time ; but, after some observation, they were found 
to refer correctly to the cases of individuals who 
were there when this woman was a patient in the 
ward two years before. 

11. Trains of images brought up by association 
with bodily sensations. Examples of this kind are 
of frequent occurrence. By the kind attention of 
my friend Dr. James Gregory, I have received a most 
interesting manuscript by his late eminent father, 
which contains a variety of curious matter on this 
subject. In this paper. Dr. Gregory mentions of 
himself that, having on one occasion gone to bed 
with a vessel of hot water at his feet, he dreamed 
of walking up the crater of Mount Etna, and of 
feeling the ground warm under him. He had at an 
early period of his hfe visited Mount Vesuvius, and 
actually felt a strong sensation of warmth in his 
feet when walking up the side of the crater; but it 
was remarkable that the dream was not of Vesuvius, 
but of Etna, of which he had only read Brydone's de- 
scription. This was probably from the latter im- 
pression having been the more recent. On another 
occasion, he dreamed of spending a winter at Hud- 
son's Bay, and of suffering much distress from the 
intense frost. He found that he had thrown off the 
bedclothes in his sleep ; and, a few days before, he 
had been reading a very particular account of the 
state of the colonies in that country during winter. 
Again, when suffering from toothache, he dreamed 
of undergoing the operation of tooth-drawing, with 



DREAMING. 217 

the additional circumstance that the operator drew 
a sound tooth, leaving the aching one in its place. 
But the most striking anecdote in this interesting 
document is one in which similar dreams were pro- 
duced in a gentleman and his wife, at the same time, 
and by the same cause. It happened at the period 
when there was an alarm of French invasion, and 
almost every man in Edinburgh Avas a soldier. All 
things had been arranged in expectation of the land- 
ing of an enemy ; the first notice of w^hich was to 
be given by a gun from the castle, and this was to 
be followed by a chain of signals calculated to alarm 
the country in all directions. Further, there had 
been recently in Edinburgh a splendid military spec- 
tacle, in w^hich five thousand men had been drawn 
up in Prince's Street, fronting the castle. The gen- 
tleman to whom the dream occurred, and who had 
been a most zealous volunteer, was in bed between 
two and three o'clock in the morning, when he 
dreamed of hearing the signal gim. He was imme- 
diately at the castle, witnessed the proceedings for 
displaying the signals, and saw and heard a great 
bustle over the town from troops and artillery assem- 
bling, especially in Prince's Street. At this time he 
was roused by his wife, w^ho awoke in a fright in 
consequence of a similar dream, connected with 
much noise and the landing of an enemy, and con- 
cluding with the death of a particular friend of her 
husband's, who had served with him as a volunteer 
during the late war. The origin of this remarkable 
concurrence was ascertained, in the morning, to be 
the noise produced in the room above by the fall of 
a pair of tongs which had been left in some very 
awkward position in support of a clothes-screen. 
Dr. Reid relates of himself, that the dressing ap- 
plied after a blister on his head having become 
ruffled so as to produce considerable uneasiness, he 
dreamed of falling into the hands of savages iand be- 
ing scalped by them. 

T 



218 REASON. 

To this part of the subject are to be referred some 
remarkable cases in which, in particular individuals, 
dreams can be produ'^ed by whispering into their 
ears when they are asleep. One of the most cu- 
rious as well as authentic examples of this kind has 
been referred to by several writers : I find the par- 
ticulars in the paper of Dr. Gregory, and they were 
related to him by a gentleman who witnessed them. 
The subject of it was an officer in the expedition to 
Louisburg in 1758, who had this peculiarity in so 
remarkable , a degree, that his companions in the 
transport were in the constant habit of amusing 
themselves at his expense. They could produce in 
him any kind of dream by wliispering into his ear, 
especially if this was done by a friend with whose 
voice he was familiar. At one time they conducted 
him through the whole progress of a quarrel, which 
ended in a duel ; and, wiien the parties were sup- 
posed to be met, a pistol was put into his hand, 
which he fired, and was awakened by the report. 
On another occasion they found him asleep on the 
top of a locker or bunker in the cabin, when they 
made him believe he had fallen overboard, and ex- 
horted him to save himself by swimming. He im- 
mediately imitated all the motions of swimming. 
They then told him that a shark was pursuing him, 
and entreated him to dive for his life. He instantly 
did so with such force as to throw himself entirely 
from the locker upon the cabin floor, by which he 
was much bruised, and awakened of course. After 
the landing of the army at Louisburg, his friends 
found him one day asleep in his tent, and evidently 
much annoyed by the cannonading. They then 
made him believe that he was engaged, when he ex- 
pressed great fear, and showed an evident disposition 
to run away. Against this they remonstrated, but 
at the same time increased his feais by imitating 
the groans of the woimded and the dying ; and when 
he asked, as he often did, who was down, they 



PRE AMINO. 219 

named his particular friends. At last they told him 
that the man next himself in the line had fallen, 
when he instantly sprung from his bed, rushed out 
of the tent, and was roused from his danger and his 
dream together by falling over the tent-ropes. A 
remarkable circumstance in this case was, that after 
these experiments he had no distinct recollection 
of his dreams, but only a confused feeling of oppres- 
sion or fatigue ; and used to tell his friends that he 
was sure they had been playing some trick upon 
him. A case entirely similar is related in Smellie's 
Natural History, the subject of Avhich was a medical 
student at the university of Edmburgh. 

A singular fact has often been observed in dreams 
which are excited by a noise; namely, that the 
same sound awakes the person, and produces a 
dream which appears to him to occupy a consider- 
able time. The following example of this has been 
related to me : — A gentleman dreamed that he had 
enlisted as a soldier, joined his regiment, deserted, 
was apprehended, carried back, tried, condemned to 
be shot, and at last led out for execution. After all 
the usual preparations a gun was fired ; he awoke 
with the report, and found that a noise in an adjoin- 
ing room had both produced the dream and awaked 
him. The same want of the notion of time is ob- 
served in dreams from other causes. Dr. Gregory 
mentions a gentleman who, after sleeping in a damp 
place, was for a long time liable to a feeling of suf- 
focation whenever he slept in a lying posture ; and 
this was always accompanied by a dream of a skel- 
eton which grasped him violently by the throat. 
He could sleep in a sitting posture without any un- 
easy feeling ; and after trying various expedients he 
at last had a sentinel placed beside him, with orders 
to awake him whenever he sunk down. On one oc- 
casion he was attacked by the skeleton, and a severe 
and long struggle ensued before he awoke. On 
finding fault with his attendant for allowing him to 



220 REASON. 

lie so long in such a state of suffering, he was as- 
sured that he had not lain an instant, but had been 
awakened the moment he began to sink. The gen- 
tleman after a considerable time recovered from the 
affection. A friend of mine dreamed that he crossed 
the Atlantic, and spent a fortnight in America. In 
embarking on his return, he fell into the sea ; and, 
having awoke with the fright, discovered that he had 
not been asleep above ten minutes. 

in. Dreams consisting of the revival of old asso- 
ciations respecting things which had entirely passed 
out of the mind, and which seemed to have been 
forgotten. It is often impossible to trace the man- 
ner in which these dreams arise ; and some of the 
facts connected with them scarcely appear referable 
to any principle with which we are at present ac- 
quainted. The following example.occurred to a par- 
ticular fiiend of mine, and may be relied upon in its 
most minute particulars : — 

The gentleman was at the time connected with 
one of the principal banks in Glasgow, and was at 
his place at the teller's table, where money is paid, 
when a person entered demanding payment of a 
sum of six pounds. There were several people wait- 
ing, who were, in turn, entitled to be attended be- 
fore him ; but he was extremely impatient, and rather 
noisy; and, being besides a remarkable stammerer, 
he became so annoying, that another gentleman re- 
quested my friend to pay him his money and get rid 
of him. He did so, accordingly, but with an expreg- 
sion of impatience at being obliged to attend to him 
before his turn, and thought no more of the transac- 
tion. At the end of the year, which was eight or 
nine months after, the books of the bank could 
not be made to balance, the deficiency being exactly 
six pounds. Several days and nights had been 
spent in endeavouring to discover the error, but with- 
out success ; when, at last, my friend returned home. 



DREAMING. 221 

much fatigued, and went to bed. He dreamed of be- 
ing at his place in the bank, — and the whole trans- 
action with th3 stammerer, as now detailed, passed 
before him in all its particulars. He awoke under 
a full impression that the dream was to lead him to 
a discovery of what he was so anxiously in search 
of; and, on examination, soon discovered that the 
sum paid to this person in the manner now men- 
tioned had been neglected to be inserted in the book 
of interests, and that it exactly accounted for the 
error in the balance. 

This case, upon a little consideration, will appear 
to be exceedingly remarkable, because the impres- 
sion recalled in this singular manner was one of 
which there was no consciousness at the time when 
it occurred ; and, consequently, we cannot suppose 
that any association took place which could have 
assisted in recalling it. For the fact upon which 
the importance of the case rested was, not his having 
paid the money, but having neglected to insert the 
payment. Now of this there was no impression 
made upon the mind at the time, and we can scarcely 
conceive on what principle it could be recalled. The 
deficiency being six pounds, we may, indeed, suppose 
the gentleman endeavouring to recollect whether 
there could have been a payment of this sum made 
in any irregular manner which could have led to an 
omission, or an error ; but, in the transactions of an 
extensive bank, in a great commercial city, a pay- 
ment of six pounds, at the distance of eight or nine 
months, could have made but a very faint impres- 
sion ; and, upon the whole, the case presents, per- 
haps, one of the most remarkable mental phenomena 
connected with this curious subject. The following 
is of the same nature, though much less extraordi- 
nary, from the shortness of the interval ; and it may 
perhaps be considered as a simple act of memory, 
though, for the same reason as in the former case, 
we cannot trace any association which could have 
T 2 



222 REASON. 

recalled the circumstance : — A gentleman who was 
appointed to an office in one of the principal banks 
in Edinburgh found, on balancing his first day's 
transactions, that the money under his charge was 
deficient by ten pounds. After many fruitless at- 
tempts to discover the cause of the error, he went 
home, not a little annoyed by the result of his first 
experiment in banking. In the night, he dreamed 
that he was at his place in the bank, and that a gen- 
tleman who was personally known to him pre- 
sented a draught for ten pounds. On awaking, he 
recollected the dream, and also recollected that the 
gentleman who appeared in it had actually received 
ten pounds. On going to the bank, he found that 
he had neglected to enter the payment, and that the 
gentleman's order had by accident fallen among 
some pieces of paper, which had been thrown on 
the floor to be swept away. 

I have formerly referred to some remarkable cases 
in which languages long forgotten were recovered 
during a state of delirium. Something very analo- 
gous seems to occur in dreaming, of which I have 
received the following example from an able and 
intelligent friend. In his youth he was very fond 
of the Greek language, and made considerable pro- 
gress in it ; but afterward, being actively engaged 
in other pursuits, he so entirely forgot it that he can- 
not even read the words. But he has often dreamed 
of reading Greek works which he had been accus- 
tomed to use at college, and with a most vivid im- 
pression of fully understanding them. 

A further and most interesting illustration of the 
class of dreams referred to under this head, is found 
in an anecdote lately pubhshed b)"- the distinguished 
author of the Waverley novels, and considered by 
him as authentic :— " Mr. R. of Bowland, a gentle- 
man of landed property in the vale of Gala, was 
prosecuted for a very considerable sum, the accu- 
mulated arrears of teind (or tithe), for which he 



DREAMING. 223 

was said to be indebted to a noble family, the titulars 
(lay impropriators of the tithes). Mr. R. was 
strongly impressed with the behef that his father 
had, by a form of process peculiar to the law of 
Scotland, purchased these lands from the titular, and 
therefore that the present prosecution was ground- 
less. But, after an industrious search among his 
father's papers, an investigation of the pubhc re- 
cords, and a careful inquiry among all persons who 
had transacted law-business for his father, no evi- 
dence could be recovered to support his defence. 
The period was now near at hand when he con- 
ceived the loss of his lawsuit to be inevitable, and 
he had formed his determination to ride to Edin- 
burgh next day, and make the best bargain he could 
in the way of compromise. He went to bed with 
this resolution, and with all the circumstances of the 
case floating upon his mind, had a dream to the fol- 
io wing purpose : — His father, who had been many 
years dead, appeared to him, he thought, and asked 
him Avhy he was disturbed in his mind. In dreams 
men are not surprised at such apparitions. Mr. R. 
thought that he informed his father of the cause of 
his distress, adding that the payment of a consider- 
able sum of money was the more unpleasant to him, 
because he had a strong consciousness that it was 
not due, though he was unable to recover any evi- 
dence in support of his belief. ' You are right, my 
son,' replied the paternal shade ; ' I did acquire right 
to these teinds, for payment of which you are now 
prosecuted. The papers relating to the transaction 

are in the hands of Mr. , a writer (or attorney), 

who is now retired from professional business, and 
resides at Inveresk, near Edinburgh. He was a 
person whom I employed on that occasion for a 
particular reason, but who never, on any other occa- 
sion, transacted business on my account. It is very 

possible,' pursued the vision, ' that Mr. may have 

forgotten a matter which is now of a very old date ; 



224 REASON. 

but you may call it to his recollection by this token, 
that when I came to pay his account, there was 
difficulty in getting change for a Portugal piece of 
gold, and that we were forced to drink out the bal- 
ance at a tavern.' 

"Mr. R. awaked in the morning, with all the 
words of his vision imprinted on his mind, and 
thought it worth while to ride across the country 
to Inveresk, instead of going straight to Edinburgh. 
When he came there he waited on the gentleman 
mentioned in the dream, a very old man ; without 
saying any thing of the vision, he inquired whether 
he remembered having conducted such a matter for 
his deceased father. The old gentleman could not 
at first bring the circumstance to his recollection; 
but, on mention of the Portugal piece of gold, the 
whole returned upon his memory ; he made an im- 
mediate search for the papers, and recovered them, 
— so that Mr. R. carried to Edinbugh the documents 
necessary to gain the cause which he was on the 
verge of losing."* 

There is every reason to believe that this very 
interesting case is referable to the principle lately 
mentioned ; that the gentleman had heard the cir- 
cumstances from his father, but had entirely for- 
gotten them, until the frequent and intense applica- 
tion of his mind to the subject with which they were 
connected at length gave rise to a train of associa- 
tion which recalled them in the dream. To the same 
principle are referable the two following anecdotes, 
which I have received as entirely authentic. A 
gentleman of the law in Edinburgh had mislaid an 
important paper, relating to some affairs on which 
a public meeting was soon to be held. He had been 
making most anxious search for it for many days ; 
but the evening of the day preceding that on which 
the meeting was to be held had arrived, without his 

* Notes to the new edition of the Wavorley Novels, toI. t. 



DREAMING. 225 

being able to discover it. He went to bed under 
great anxiety and disappointment, and dreamed that 
the paper was in a box appropriated to the papers of 
a particular family, with which it was in no way con- 
nected: — it was accordingly found there in the morn- 
ing. — Another individual, connected with a public 
office, had mislaid a paper of such importance, that 
he was threatened with the loss of his situation if 
he did not produce it. After a long but unsuccess- 
ful search, under intense anxiety, he also dreamed 
of discovering the paper in a particular place, and 
found it there accordingly. , 

IV. A class of dreams which presents an interest- 
ing subject of observation includes those in which 
a strong propensity of character, or a strong mental 
emotion is imbodied into a dream, and by some 
natural coincidence, is fulfilled. A murderer men- 
tioned by Mr. Combe had dreamed of committing 
murder some years before the event took place. 
But more remarkable still are those instances, many 
of them authentic, in which a dream has given no- 
tice of an event which was occurring at the time, 
or occurred soon after. The following story has 
been long mentioned in Edinburgh, and there seems 
no reason to doubt its authenticity : — A clergyman 
had come to this city from a short distance in the 
country, and was sleeping at an Inn, when he 
dreamed of seeing a fire, and one of his children in 
the midst of it. He awoke with the impression, and 
instantly left town on his return home. When he 
arrived within sight of his house, he found it on fire, 
and got there in time to assist in saving one of his 
children who, in the alarm and confusion, had been 
left in a situation of danger. Without calling in 
question the possibihty of supernatural communica- 
tion in such cases, this striking occurrence, of which 
1 believe there is little reason to doubt the truth, 
may perhaps be accounted for on simple and natural 



226 REASON. 

principles. Let us suppose, that the gentleman had 
a servant who had shown great carelessness in re- 
gard to fire, and had often given rise to his mind to 
a strong apprehension that he might set fire to the 
house. His anxiety might be increased by being 
from home, and the same circumstance might make 
the servant still more careless. Let us further sup- 
pose that the gentleman, before going to bed, had, 
in addition to this anxiety, suddenly recollected 
that there was on that day, in the neighbourhood 
of his house, some fair or periodical merry-making, 
from which the servant was very likely to return 
home in a state of intoxication. It was most natural 
that these impressions should be imbodied into a 
dream of his house being on fire, and that the same 
circumstances might lead to the dream being fulfilled. 
A gentleman in Edinburgh was affected with aneu- 
rism of the popliteal artery, for which he was under 
the care of two eminent surgeons, and the day was 
fixed for the operation. About two days before the 
time appointed for it, the wife of the patient dreamed 
that a change had taken place in the disease, in con- 
sequence of which the operation would not be re- 
quired. On examining the tumour in the morning, 
the gentleman was astonished to find that the pulsa- 
tion had entirely ceased ; and, in short, this turned 
out to be a spontaneous cure. To persons not pro- 
fessional it may be right to mention that the cure 
of popliteal aneurism without an operation is a very 
uncommon occurrence, not happening in one out of 
numerous instances, and never to be looked upon as 
probable in any individual case. It is likely, how- 
ever, that the lady had heard of the possibility of 
such a termination, and that her anxiety had very 
naturally imbodied this into a dream ; the fulfilment 
of it at the very time when the event took place is 
certainly a very remarkable coincidence. The fol- 
lowing anecdotes also I am enabled to give as en- 
tirely authentic. A lady dreamed that an aged female 



DREA»nNO. 227 

relative had been murdered by a olack sen'ant, 
and the dream occurred more than once. She was 
then so impressed by it that she went to the house 
of the lady to whom it related, and prevailed upon a 
gentleman to watch in an adjoining room during the 
following night. Ahout three o'clock in the morn- 
ing, the gentleman, hearing footsteps on the stair, 
left his place of concealment, and met the servant 
carrying up a quantity of coals. Being questioned as 
to where he was going, he replied, in a confused and 
hurried manner, that he was going to mend his mis- 
tress' fire, — which, at three o'clock in the morning, 
in the middle of summer, was evidently impossible ; 
and, on further investigation, a strong knife was found 
concealed beneath the coals. Another lady dreamed 
that a boy, her nephew, had been drowned along 
with some young companions with whom he had en- 
gaged to go on a sailing excursion in the Frith of 
Forth. She sent for him in the morning, and, with 
much difficulty, prevailed upon him to give up his 
engagement ; — his companions went and were all 
drowned. A gentleman dreamed that the devil car- 
ried him down to the bottom of a coal-pit, where 
he threatened to burn him, unless he would agree 
to give himself up to his service. This he refused 
to do, and a warm altercation followed. He was 
at last allowed to depart, upon condition of sending 
down an individual whom the devil named, a worth- 
less character well known in the neighbourhood. 
A few days after, this person was found drowned, 
and under circumstances which gave every reason 
to believe that his death had been voluntary. A 
lady in Edinburgh had sent her watch to be repaired : 
along time elapsed without her being able to re- 
cover it, and, after many excuses, she began to sus- 
pect that something was wrong. She now dreamed 
that the watchmaker's boy, by whom the watch 
was sent, had dropped it in the street, and injured 
it in such a manner that it could not be repaired. 



228 REASON. 

She then went to the master, and, without any allu- 
sion to her dream, put the question to him directly; 
when he confessed that it was true. 

Such coincidences derive their wonderful char- 
acter from standing alone and apart from those 
numerous instances in which such dreams take place 
without any fulfilment. An instance of a very sin- 
gular kind is mentioned by Mi\ Joseph Taylor, and 
is given by him as an undoubted fact. A young 
man who was at an academy a hundred miles from 
home dreamed that he went to his father's house in 
the night, tried the front-door, but found it locked ; 
got in by a back-door, and finding nobody out of bed, 
went directly to the bedroom of his parents. He 
then said to his mother, whom he found awake, 
" Mother, I am going a long journey, and am come 
to bid you good-by." On this she answered under 
much agitation, " Oh, dear son, thou art dead !" He 
instantly awoke and thought no more of his dream, 
until, a few days after he received a letter from his 
father inquiring very anxiously after his health, in 
consequence of a frightful dream his mother had on 
the same night in which the dream now mentioned 
occurred to him. She dreamed that she heard some 
one attempt to open the front-door, then go to the 
back-door, and at last come into her bedroom. She 
then saw it was her son, who came to the side of 
her bed, and said, " Mother, I am going a long jour- 
ney, and am come to bid you good-by ;" on which 
she exclaimed, " Oh, dear son, thou art dead !" But 
nothing unusual happened to any of the parties ; — 
the singular dream must have originated in some 
strong mental impression which had been made on 
both the individuals about the same time ; and to 
have traced the source of it would have been a mat- 
ter of great interest. 

On a similar principle, we are to account for some 
of the stories of second sight : — A gentleman sitting 
by the fire on a stormy night, and anxious about 



DREAMING. 229 

some of his domestics who are at sea in a boat, 
drops asleep for a few seconds, dreams very natu- 
rally of drowning men, and starts up with an ex- 
clamation that his boat is lost. If the boat returns 
in safety, the vision is no more thought of. If it is 
lost, as is very likely to happen, the story passes 
for second sight ; and it is, in fact, one of the anec- 
dotes that are given as the most authentic instances 
of it. 

It is unnecessary to multiply examples of the fulfil- 
ment of dreams on the principles which have now 
been mentioned ; but I am induced to add the fol- 
lowing, as it is certainly of a very interesting kind, 
and as I am enabled to give it as entirely authentic 
in all its particulars. A most respectable clergyman 
in a country parish of Scotland, made a collection 
at his church for an object of pubhc benevolence, in 
which he felt deeply interested. The amount of 
the collection, which was received in ladles carried 
through the church, fell greatly short of his expec- 
tation ; and, during the evening of the day, he fre- 
quently alluded to this with expressions of much disap- 
pointment. In the following night he dreamed that 
three one-pound notes had been left in one of the ladles, 
having been so compressed that they had stuck in 
the comer when the ladle was emptied. He was 
so impressed by the vision, that at an early hour 
in the morning he went to the church, found the 
ladle which he had seen in his dream, and drew 
from one of the corners.of it three one-pound notes. 
This interesting case is perhaps capable of explana- 
tion upon simple principles. It appears, that on 
the evening preceding the day of the collection, 
the clergyman had been amusing himself by calculat- 
ing what sum his congregation would probably con- 
tribute, and that in doing so, he had calculated on a 
certain number of families, who would not give him 
less than a pound each. Let us then suppose that 
a particular ladle, which he knew to have been pre- 
U 



23(1 REASON. 

sented to three of these families, had been emptied 
in his presence, and found to contain no pound notes. 
His first feehng would be that of disappointment ; 
but, in afterward thinking of the subject, and con- 
necting it with his former calculation, the possibility 
of the iKdle not having been fully emptied might 
dart across his mind. This impression, which per- 
haps he did not himself recollect, might then be im- 
bodied into the dream, which, by a natural coinci- 
dence, was fulfilled. 

The four classes which have now been mentioned 
appear to include the principal varieties of dreams j 
and it is often a matter of great interest to trace 
the manner in which the particular associations 
arise. Cases of dreams are indeed on record, which 
are not referable to any of the principles which 
have been mentioned, and which do not admit of 
explanation on any principles which we are able ta 
trace. Many of these histories, there is every rea- 
son to believe, derive their marvellous character 
from embellishment and exaggeration; and in some 
instances which have been related to me in the most 
confident manner, I have found this to be the case 
after a little investigation. Others, however, da 
not admit of this explanation, and we are compelled 
to receive them as facts which we can in no degree 
account for. Of this kind I shall only add the fol- 
lowing example ; and i shall do so without any at- 
tempt at explanation, and without any other com- 
ment than that its accuracy may be relied on in all 
its particulars. Two ladies, sisters, had been for 
several days in attendance upon their brother, who 
was ill of a common sore throat, severe and pro- 
tracted, but not considered as attended with danger. 
At the same time, one of them had borrowed a 
watch from a female friend, in consequence of her 
own being under repair; — this watch was one to 
which particular value was attached on account of 



DREAMING. 231 

some family associations, and some anxiety was ex- 
pressed that it might not meet with any injury. The 
sisters were sleeping together in a room communi- 
cating with that of their brother, when the elder of 
them awoke in a state of great agitation, and having 
roused the other, told her that she had had a fright- 
ful dream. "I dreamed," she said, "that Mary's 
watch stopped ; and that, when I told you of the 
circumstance, you rephed, much worse than that 
has happened, for — — 's breath has stopped also," — 
naming their brother, who was ill. To quiet her 
agitation, the younger sister immediately got up, 
and found the brother sleeping quietly, and the 
watch, which had been carefully put by in a drawer, 
going correctly. The following night the very same 
dream occurred, followed by similar agitation, which 
was again composed in the same manner, — the 
brother being again found in a quiet sleep, and the 
watch going well. On the following morning, soon 
after the family had breakfasted, one of the sisters 
was sitting by her brother, while the other was 
writing a note in the adjoining room. "When her 
note was ready for being sealed, she was proceeding 
to take out, for this purpose, the watch alluded to, 
which had been put by in her writing-desk ; — she 
was astonished to find it had stopped. At the same 
instant she heard a scream of intense distress from 
her sister in the other room, — their brother, who 
had still been considered as going on favourably, had 
been seized with a sudden fit of suffocation, and 
had just breathed his last. 

There are various other circumstances relating 
to the philosophy of dreams, which may be mentioned 
very briefly. It has been alleged that we never 
dream of objects which we have not seen. On this 
I cannot decide ; but we certainly dream of things 
in combinations in which they never occurred to us. 
Our dreams appear to be very much influenced by 



232 REASON. 

the intensity of our conceptions, and, in this respect, 
there is ^eat variety in regard to the objects of the 
different senses. Our most vivid conceptions are 
certainly of objects of sight ; and they appear to be 
much less distinct in regard to tastes, smells, and 
even sounds. Accordingly, I think dreams are 
chiefly occupied with objects of sight ; and I am not 
sure that we dream of tastes, or smells, or even of 
sounds, except when a sound actually takes place 
as in several instances which have been mentioned. 
This, indeed, only applies to simple sounds, for we 
certainly dream of persons speaking to us, and of 
imderstanding what they say, — but I am not sure 
that this is necessarily accompanied with a concep- 
tion of sound. I am informed by a friend, who is a 
keen sportsman, that he often dreams of being on 
shooting excursions ; — that he starts his game, and 
points his gun, but never succeeds in firing it. It 
sometimes seems to miss fire, but in general there 
appears to be something wrong with the lock, so 
that it cannot be moved. A gentleman, mentioned 
by Dr. Darwin, had been for thirty years so deaf 
that he could be conversed with only in writing, or 
by forming letters with the fingers. He assured 
Dr. Darwin, that he never dreamed of persons con- 
versing with him except by the fingers or in writing, 
and that he never had the impression of hearing 
them speak. Two persons who had long been blind 
also informed him, that they never dreamed of visible 
objects since the loss of their sight. Mr. Bew, 
however, in the Manchester Memoirs, mentions a 
blind gentleman who dreamed of the figure, though 
he could not distinguish the varieties, of the human 
countenance ; and Smelhe mentions of Dr. Black- 
lock, who lost his sight at the age of a few months, 
that in his dreams he had a distinct impression of 
a sense which he did not possess when awake. He 
described his impression by saying that when 
awake there were three ways by which he could 



DREAMIN0. S33 

distin^ish persons, namely, — ^by hearing them 
speak, by feeling the head and shoulders, and by 
attending to the sound and manner of their breath- 
ing. In his dreams, however, he had a vivid im- 
pression of objects in a manner distinct from any 
of these modes. He imagined that he was united 
to them, by a kind of distant contact, which was 
effected by threads or strings passing from their 
bodies to his own. 

On a similar principle, probably, we may explain 
the fact that dreams refer chiefly to persons or 
events which we have actually seen, though they 
are put into new combinations ; and that we more 
rarely dream of objects of simple memory unless 
they have been strongly associated with some object 
of conception. Thus we seldom dream of events or 
characters in ancient history. Dr. Beattie, indeed, 
mentions having dreamed of crossing the Alps with 
Hannibal ; but such dreams, I think, are very rare. 
It would be curious to observe their occurrence, and 
to trace the train that leads to them. 

It appears, then, that the mental operations which 
take place in dreaming consist chiefly of old concep- 
tions and old associations, following one another 
according to some principle of succession ovei 
which we have no control. But there are facts on 
record which show mental operations in dreams of a 
much more intellectual character. Many people 
have been conscious of something like composition 
in dreams. Dr. Gregory mentions that thoughts 
which sometimes occurred to him in dreams, and 
even the particular expressions in which they were 
conveyed, appeared to him afterward when awake 
so just in point of reasoning and illustration, and so 
good in point of language, that he has used them in 
his college lectures, and in his written lucubrations. 
Condorcet related of himself, that when engaged in 
some profound and obscure calculations, he was 
often obliged to leave them in an incomplete state, 
U 2 



234 REASON. 

and retire to rest ; and that the remaining steps, and 
the conclusion of his calculations, had more than 
once presented themselves in his dreams. Dr. 
Franklin also informed Cabanis that the bearings 
and issue of political events, which had puzzled him 
when awake, were not unfrequently unfolded to him 
in his dreams. A gentleman of Edinburgh, whose 
name is deeply associated with the literature of his 
country, had been one day much anmsed by reading 
a very witty epigram by Piron on the French 
Academy. In a dream the following night he com- 
posed a parody or imitation of it, much at the ex- 
pense of a learned society in Edinburgh, and some 
individuals of this city. A gentleman had been 
reading an account of cruelties practised upon some 
Christians in Turkey by the mutilation of their 
noses and ears. In a dream the following night he 
witnessed the execution of a punishment of this 
kind, and heard a Turk who was standing by address 
the sufferer in some doggerel rhymes, which he dis- 
tinctly recollected and repeated in the morning. 
Another gentleman invented a French verb in a 
dream. He thought he was in a very close sort of 
penthouse with such a number of persons that they 
were threatened with suffocation, as there appeared 
no way of letting in air. In this state he called out, 
" ilfaut detoiterJ''' There is no such word, but it was 
evidently formed from toit, the roof of a building. 

The following anecdote has been preserved in a 
family of rank in Scotland, the descendants of a dis- 
tinguished lawyer of the last age: — This eminent 
person had been consulted respecting a case of great 
importance and much difficulty; and he had been 
studying it with intense anxiety and attention. 
After several days had been occupied in this 
manner, he was observed by his wife to rise from 
his bed in the night and go to a writing-desk 
which stood in the bedroom. He then sat down 
and wrote a long paper, which he put carefully by 



DREAMING. 2S5 

in-.the desk and returned to bed. The following 
morning he told his wife that he had a most interest- 
ing dream; — that he had dreamed of dehvering a 
clear and luminous opinion respecting a case which 
had exceedingly perplexed him; and that he would 
give any thing to recover the train of thought which 
had passed before him in his dream. She then di- 
rected him to the writing-desk, where he found the 
opinion clearly and fully written out, and which was 
afterward found to be perfectly correct. 

There can be no doubt that many dreams take 
place which are not remembered, as appears from 
the fact of a person talking in his sleep so as to be 
distinctly understood without remembering any 
thing of the impression that gave rise to it. It is 
probable, also, that the dreams which are most dis- 
tinctly remembered are those which occur during 
imperfect sleep, or when the sleep begins to be 
broken by an approach towards waking. Another 
very peculiar state has perhaps occurred to most 
people, in which there is a distressing dream, and at 
the same time an impression that it probably is 
only a dream. This appears to take place in a still 
more imperfect state of sleep, in which there is the 
immediate approach to waking, and to the exercise 
of the reasoning powers. But there are some very 
singular facts on record of this kind of reasoning 
being applied to dreams for the purpose of dissi- 
pating them. Dr. Beattie mentions of himself, that 
in a dream' he once found himself standing in a very 
peculiar situation on the parapet of a bridge. Re- 
collecting, he says, that he never was given to pranks 
of this nature, he began to fancy that it might be a 
dream, and determined to throw himself headlong, in 
the belief that this would restore his senses, which 
accordingly took place. In the same manner Dr. 
Reid cured himself of a tendency to frightful dreams, 
with which he had been annoyed from his early 
years. He endeavoured to fix strongly on his mind 



236 REASON. 

the impression that all such dangers in dreams are but 
imaginary ; and determined, whenever in a dream he 
found himself on the brink of a precipice, to throw 
himself over, and so dissipate the vision. By per- 
severing in this method he so removed the propen- 
sity that for forty years he was never sensible of 
dreaming, though he was very attentive in his ob- 
servation on the subject. 

Some persons are never conscious of dreaming; 
and a gentleman, mentioned by Locke, was not sen- 
sible of dreaming till he had a fever at the age of 
twenty-six or twenty-seven. 

A leading peculiarity in the phenomena of dream- 
ing is the loss of power over the succession of our 
thoughts. We have seen that there are some ex- 
ceptions to this, but the fact applies to by far the 
greater number of dreams, and some curious phe- 
nomena appear to be referable to it. Of this kind 
are probably some of those singular instances of 
imaginary difficulties occurring in dreams on subjects 
on which none could be felt in the waking state. It 
is not uncommon for a clergyman to dream that he 
is going to preach, and cannot find his text; or for 
a clergyman of the Church of England, that he can- 
not fiiid the place in the prayer-book. This, I think, 
can only be explained by supposing that in the 
chain of ideas passing through the mind the church 
and prayer-book had come up, but had then led off 
into some other train, and not into that of actually 
going on with the service ; while, at the same time, 
there arose in the mind a kind of impression that, 
under these circumstances, it ought to have been 
gone on with. 

The remarkable analogy between dreaming and 
insanity has already been "referred to; and 1 shall 
only add the following illustration: — Dr. Gregory 
mentions a maniac who had been for some time 
under his care, and entirely recovered. For a week 
after his recovery hewas harassed during his dreawa 



i 



SOMNAMBULISM. 237 

by the same rapid and tumultuous thoughts, and the 
same violent passions by which he had been agi- 
tated during his insanity'. 

The slight outline which has now been given of 
dreaming, may serve to show that the subject is not 
only curious but important. It appears to be 
worthy of careful investigation, and there is much 
reason to believe that an extensive collection of 
authentic facts, carefully analyzed, would unfold 
principles of verj^ great interest in reference to the 
philosophy of the mental powers. 



II.— SOMNAMBULISM. 

Somnambulism appears to differ from dreaming 
chietly in the degree in which the bodily functions 
are aifected. The mind is fixed in the same manner 
as in dreaming upon its own impressions as pos- 
sessing a real and present existence in external 
things ; but the bodily organs are more under the 
control of the will, so that the individual act^ under 
the influence of his erroneous conceptions, and 
holds conversation in regard to them. He is also, 
to a certain degree, susceptible of impressions from 
without through his organs of sense ; not, however, 
so as to correct his erroneous impressions, but 
rather to be mixed up with them. A variety of re- 
markable phenomena arise out of these peculiarities, 
which will be illustrated by a slight outline of this 
singular affection. 

The first degree of somnambulism generally shows 
itself by a propensity to talk during sleep ; the per- 
son giving a full and connected account of what 
passes before him in dreams, and often revealing his 
own secrets or those of his friends. Walking 
during sleep is the next degree, and that from 
which the affection derives its name. The phe- 



238 REASON. 

nomena connected with this form are familiar to 
every one. The individual gets out of bed ; dresses 
himself; if not prevented, goes out of doors ; walks 
frequently over dangerous places in safety ; some- 
times escapes by a window, and gets to the roof of 
a house ; after a considerable interval, returns and 
goes to bed; and all that has passed conveys to his 
mind merely the impression of a dream. A young 
nobleman, mentioned by Horstius, living in the 
citadel of Breslau, was observed by his brother, 
who occupied the same room, to rise in his sleep, 
wrap himself in a cloak, and escape by a window to 
the roof of the building. He there tore in pieces a 
magpie's nest, wrapped the young birds in his cloak, 
returned to his apartment, and went to bed. In the 
morning he mentioned the circumstances as having 
occurred in a dream, and could not be persuaded 
that there had been any thing more than a dream, 
till he was shown the magpies in his cloak. Dr. 
Prichard mentions a man who rose in his sleep, 
dressed himself, saddled his horse, and rode to the 
place of a market which he was in the habit of at- 
tending once every week : and Martinet mentions a 
man who was accustomed to rise in his sleep and 
pursue his business as a saddler. There are many 
instances on record of persons composing during 
the state of somnambulism; as of boys rising in 
their sleep and finishing their tasks which they had 
left incomplete. A gentleman at one of the Eng- 
lish universities had been very intent during the 
day in the composition of some verses which he 
had not been able to complete : during the following 
night he rose in his sleep and finished his composi- 
tion ; then expressed great exultation, and returned 
to bed. 

In these common cases the affection occurs 
during ordinary sleep ; but a condition very analo- 
gous is met with, coming on in the daytime in 
paroxysms, during which the person is affected in 



SOMNAMBULISM. 239 

the same manner as in the state of somnambulism, 
particularly with an insensibility to external impres- 
sions : this presents some singular phenomena. 
These attacks in some cases come on without any 
warning ; in others, they are preceded by a noise or 
a sense of confusion in the head. The individuals 
then become more or less abstracted, and are either 
unconscious of any external impression, or very 
confused in their notions of external things. They 
are frequently able to talk in an intelligible and con- 
sistent manner, but always in reference to the im- 
pression which is present in their own minds. 
They in some cases repeat long pieces of poetry, 
often more correctly than they can do in their 
waking state, and not unfrequently things which 
Ihey could not repeat in their state of health, or of 
which they were supposed to be entirely ignorant. 
In other cases, they hold conversation with ima- 
ginary beings, or relate circumstances or conversa- 
tions which occurred at remote periods, and which 
they were supposed to have forgotten. Some have 
been known to sing in a style far superior to any 
thing they could do in their waking state ; and there 
are some well-authenticated instances of persons in 
this condition expressing themselves correctly in 
languages with which they were imperfectly ac- 
quainted. I had lately under my care a young lady 
who is liable to an affection of this kind, which 
comes on repeatedly dining the day, and continues 
from ten minutes to an hour at a time. Without 
any warning, her body becomes motionless, her eyes 
open, fixed, and entirely insensible; and she be- 
comes totally unconscious of any external impres- 
sion. She has been frequently seized while playing 
on the piano, and has continued to play over and 
over a part of a tune with perfect correctness, but 
without advancing beyond a certain point. On one 
occasion, she was seized after she had begun to 
play from the book a piece of music which was new 



240 REASOK. 

to her. During the paroxysm, she continned the 
part which she had played, and repeated it five or 
six times with perfect correctness; but, on- coming 
out of the attack, she could not play it without the 
book. 

During the paroxysms the individuals are, in some 
instances, totally insensible to any thing that is said 
to them ; but in others, they are capable of holding 
conversation with another person with a tolerable 
degree of consistency, though they are influenced to 
a certain degree by their mental visions, and are 
very confused in their notions of external things. 
In many cases, again, they are capable of going on 
with the manual occupations in which they had 
been engaged before the attack. This occurred re- 
markably in a watchmaker's apprentice mentioned 
by Martinet. The paroxysms in him appeared once 
in fourteen days, and commenced with a feeling of 
heat extending from the epigastrium to the head. 
This was followed by confusion of thought, and this 
by complete insensibility ; his eyes were open, but 
fixed and vacant, and he was totally insensible to 
any thing that was said to him, or to any external 
impression. But he continued his usual employ- 
ment, and was always much astonished, on his re- 
covery, to find the change that had taken place in 
his work since the commencement of the paroxysm* 
This case afterward passed into epilepsy. 

Some remarkable phenomena are presented by 
this singular affection, especially in regard to exer- 
cises of memory, and the mamier in which old asso- 
ciations are recalled into the mind ; also in the dis- 
tinct manner in which the indi\iduals sometimes 
express themselves on subjects with which they 
had formerly shown but an imperfect acquaintance. 
In some of the French cases of epidemic " extase," 
this :: has been magnified into speaking unknown 
languages, predicting future events, and describing 



SOMNAMBULISM. 241 

occurrences of which the persons could not have 
possessed any knowledge. These stories seem in 
some cases to resolve themselves merely into em- 
belhshment of what really occurred, but in others 
there can be no doubt of connivance and imposture. 
Some facts however appear to be authentic, and are 
sufficiently remarkable. Two females, mentioned 
by Bertrand, expressed themselves during the par- 
oxysm very distinctly m Latin. They afterward 
admitted that they had some acquaintance with the 
language, though it was imperfect. An ignorant 
servant-girl, mentioned by Dr. Dewar, during par- 
oxysms of this kind, showed an astonishing know- 
ledge of geography and astronomy ; and expressed 
herself in her own language in a manner which, 
though often ludicrous, showed an understanding 
of the subject. The alternations of the seasons, for 
example, she explained by saying that the earth was 
set a-gee. It was afterward discovered that her no- 
tions on these subjects had been derived from over- 
hearing a tutor giving instructions to the young 
people of the family. A woman who was some 
time ago in the Infirmary of Edinburgh, on account 
of an affection of this kind, during the paroxysms 
mimicked the manner of the physicians, and re- 
peated correctly some of their prescriptions in the 
Latin language. 

Another very singular phenomenon, presented by 
some instances of this affection, is what has been 
called, rather incorrectly, a state of double con- 
sciousness. It consists in the individual recollect- 
ing, during a paroxysm, circumstances which oc- 
curred in a former attack, though there was no 
remembrance of them during the interval. This, as 
well as various other phenomena connected with 
the affection, is strikingly illustrated in a case de- 
scribed by Dr. Dyce of Aberdeen, in the Edinburgh 
Philosophical Transactions. The patient was a ser- 
vant-girl, and the affection began with fits of som- 
X 



242 REASON. 

nolency, which came upon her suddenly during the 
day, and from which she could, at first, be roused 
by shaking, or by being taken out into the open air. 
She soon began to talk a great deal during the at- 
tacks, regarding things which seemed to be passing 
before her as a dream ; and she was not at this time 
sensible of any thing that was said to her. On one 
occasion she repeated distinctly the baptismal ser- 
vice of the Church of England, and concluded with 
an extemporary prayer. In her subsequent par- 
oxysms she began to understand what was said to 
her, and to answer with a considerable degree of 
consistency, though the answers were generally to 
a certain degree influenced by her hallucinations. 
She also became capable of following her usual em- 
ployments during the paroxysm ; at one time she 
laid out the table correctly for breakfast, aiKl re- 
peatedly dressed herself and the children of the 
family, her eyes remaining shut the whole time. 
The remarkable circumstance was now discovered 
that during the paroxysm she had a distinct recol- 
lection of what took place in former paroxysms, 
though she had no remembrance of it during the in- 
tervals. At one time she was taken to church while 
under the attack, and there behaved with propriety, 
evidently attending to the preacher ; and she was at 
one time so much affected as to shed tears. In the 
interval she had no recollection of having been at 
church ; but in the next paroxysm she gave a most 
distinct account of the sermon, and mentioned par- 
ticularly the part of it by which she had been so 
much affected. 

This woman described the paroxysm as coming 
on with a cloudiness before her eyes and a noise in 
the head. During the attack her eyelids were gene- 
rally half-shut ; her eyes sometimes resembled those 
of a person affected with amaurosis, that is, with a 
dilated and insensible state of the pupil, but some- 
times they were quite natural. She had a dull va- 



SOMNAMBULISM. 243 

cant look ; but, when excited, knew what was said 
to her, though she often mistook the person who 
was speaking ; and it was observed, that she seemed 
to discern objects best which were faintly illumi- 
nated. • The paroxysms generally continued about 
an hour, but she could often be roused out of them; 
she then yawned and stretched herself, like a per- 
son awaking out of sleep, and instantly knew those 
about her. At one time, during the attack, she read 
distinctly a portion of a book which was presented 
to her ; and she often sung, both sacred and common 
pieces, incomparably better. Dr. Dyce affirms, than 
she could do in the waking state. The affection 
continued to recur for about six months, and ceased 
when a particular change took place in her con- 
stitution. 

Another very remarkable modification of this af- 
fection is referred to by Mr. Combe, as described by 
Major Ellioj;, professor of mathematics in the United 
States' Military Academy at West Point. The pa- 
tient was a young lady of cultivated mind, and the 
affection began with an attack of somnolency, which 
was protracted several hours beyond the usual time. 
When she came out of it, she was found to have lost 
every kind of acquired knowledge. She immediately 
began to apply herself to the first elements of edu- 
cation, and was making considerable progress, when, 
•after several months, she was seized with a second 
fit of somnolency. She was now at once restored 
to all the knowledge which she possessed before the 
first attack, but without the least recollection of any 
thing that had taken place during the interval. After 
another interval she had a third attack of som- 
nolency, which left her in the same state as after the 
first. In this manner she suffered these alternate 
conditions for a period of four years, with the very 
remarkable circumstance that during the one state 
she retained all her original knowledge, but during 
the other, that only which she had acquired since 



244 REASON. 

the first attack. During the healthy interval, for ex- 
ainple, she was remarkable for the beauty of her 
penmanship, but during the paroxysm wrote a poor 
awkward hand. Persons introduced to her during 
the paroxysm she recognised only in a subsequent 
paroxysm but not in the interval ; and persons whom 
she had seen for the first time during the healthy 
interval she did not recognise during the attack. 

In reference to this very curious subject, the 
author is induced to add a fact which has been re- 
cently communicated to him. A young woman of 
the lower rank, aged nineteen, became insane about 
two years ago ; but was gentle, and applied herself 
eagerly to various occupations. Before her insanity 
she had been only learning to read, and to form a 
few letters ; but during her insanity she taught her- 
self to write perfectly, though all attempts of others 
to teach her failed, as she could not attend to any 
person who tried to do so. She has intervals of 
reason, which have frequently continued three weeks, 
sometimes longer. During these she can neither 
read nor write; but immediately on the return of 
her insanity she recovers her power of writing, and 
can read perfectly. 

Of the rem^irkable condition of the mental facul- 
ties, exemplified in these cases, it is impossible to 
give any explanation. Something very analogous 
to it occurs in other aff"ections, though in a smaller 
degree. Dr. Prichard mentions a lady who was liable 
to sudden attacks of delirium, which, after continuing 
for various periods, went off as suddenly, leaving 
her at once perfectly rational. The attack was often 
so sudden that it commenced while she was engaged 
in interesting conversation ; and on such occasions 
it happened, that on her recovery from the state of 
delirium she instantly recurred to the conversation 
she had been engaged in at the time of the attack, 
though she had never referred to it during the con- 
tinuance of the affection. To such a degree was 



i 



INSANITY. 245 

this carried, that she would even complete an un- 
finished sentence. During the subsequent paroxj'srn, 
again, she would pursue the train of ideas which 
had occupied her mind in the former. Mr. Combe 
also mentions a porter, who in a state of intoxica- 
tion left a parcel at a wrong house, and when sober 
could not recollect what he had done with it. But 
the next time he got drunk, he recollected where he 
had left it, and went and recovered it. 



III.— INSANITY. 

Reason we have considered to be that exercise 
of mind by which we compare facts with each other, 
and mental impressions with external things. By 
means of it we. are enabled to judge of the relations 
of facts, and of the agreement between our impres- 
sions and the actual state of things in the external 
world. We have seen also that peculiar power 
which is possessed by the mind in a healthy state, — 
of arresting or changing the train of its thoughts at 
pleasure, — of fixing the attention upon one, or trans- 
ferring it to another, — of changing the train into 
something which is analogous to it, or of dismiss- 
ing it altogether. This power is, to a greater or less 
degree, lost in insanity ; and the result is one of 
two conditions. Either the mind is entirely under 
the influence of a single impression, without the 
power of varying or dismissing it, and comparing it 
with other impressions ; or it is left at the mercy of 
a chain of impressions which have been set in mo- 
tion, and which succeed one another according to 
some principle of comiexion over which the indi- 
vidual has no control. In both cases the mental 
impression is beheved to have a real and present 
existence in the external world ; and this false be- 
lief is not corrected by the actual state of things as 
they present tiiemselves to the senses, or by any 
X2 



246 REASON. 

facts or considerations which can be communicated 
by other sentient beings. Of the cause of this re- 
markable deviation from the healthy state of the 
mental functions we know nothing-. We may trace 
its connexion with concomitant circumstances in the 
bodily functions, and we may investigate certain 
effects which result from it ; but the nature of the 
change and the manner in which it is produced are 
among those points in the arrangements of the Al- 
mighty Creator which entirely elude our researches. 
It appears, then, that there is a remarkable analogy 
between the mental phenomena in insanity and in 
dreaming; and that the leading peculiarities of both 
these conditions are referable to two heads : — 

1. The impressions which arise in the mind are 
believed to be real and present existences, and this 
belief is not corrected by comparing the conception 
with the actual state of things in the external world. 

2. The chain of ideas or images which arise fol- 
low one another according to certain associations 
over which the individual has no control ; he cannot, 
as in a healthy state, vary the series or stop it at 
his will. 

In the numerous forms of insanity, we shall see 
these characters exhibited in various degrees ; but 
we shall be able to trace their influence in one degree 
or another through all the modifications ; and, in the 
higher states, or what we call perfect mania, we see 
them exemplified in the same complete manner as in 
dreaming. The maniac fancies himself a king pos- 
sessed of boundless power, and surrounded by every 
form of earthly splendour ; and, with all his bodily 
senses in their perfect exercise, this hallucination is 
in no degree corrected by the sight of his bed of straw 
and all the horrors of his cell. 

From this state of perfect mania the malady is 
traced through numerous gradations to forms which 
exhibit slight deviations from the state of a sound 
mind. But they all show, in one degree or another, 



INSANITY. 247 

the same leading characters, namely, that some im- 
pression has taken possession of the nlind, and influ- 
ences the conduct in a manner in which it would not 
affect a sound understanding; and that this is not 
corrected by facts and considerations which are cal- 
culated immediately to relieve the erroneous impres- 
sion. The lower degrees of this condition we call 
eccentricity; and, in common language, we often talk 
of a man being crazed upon a particular subject. 
This consists in giving to an impression or a fancy 
undue and extravagant importance, without taking 
into account other facts and considerations which 
ought to be viewed in connexion with it. The man 
of this character acts with promptitude upon a single 
idea, and seems to perceive nothing that interferes 
with it; he forms plans, and sees only important 
advantages which would arise from the accomplish- 
ment of them, without perceiving difficulties or objec- 
tions. The impression itself may be correct, but an 
importance is attached to it disproportioned to its 
true tendency ; or consequences are deduced from, 
and actions founded upon it^ which would not be 
warranted in the estimate of a sound understanding. 
It is often difficult to draw the hue between certain 
degrees of this condition and insanity ; and, in fact, 
they very often pass into each other. This will be 
illustrated by the following example : — 

A clergyman in Scotland, after showing various 
extravagances of conduct, was brought before a jury 
to be cognosced ; that is, by a form of Scotch law to 
be declared incapable of managing his own affairs, 
and placed under the care of trustees. Among the 
acts of extravagance alleged against him was, that 
he had burnt his library. When he was asked by 
the jury what account he could give of this part of 
his conduct, he replied in the following terms : — " In 
the early part of ray life I had imbibed a liking for a 
most unprofitable study, namely, controversial divin- 
ity. On reviewing ray library, I found a great part 



248 REASON. 

of it to consist of books of this description, and I 
was so anxious that my family should not be led to 
follow the same pursuit, that I determined to burn 
the whole." He gave answers equally plausible to 
questions which were put to him respecting other 
parts of his conduct ; and the result was, that the jury 
found no sufficient ground for cognoscing him ; but 
in the course of a fortnight from that time he was in 
a state of decided mania. 

It is, therefore^ incorrect to say of insanity, as has 
been said, that the maniac reasons correctly upon 
unsound data. His data may be unsound, that is, 
they may consist of a mental image which is purely 
visionary, as in the state of perfect mania lately re- 
ferred to; but this is by no means necessary to con- 
stitute the disease ; for his premises may be sound, 
though he distorts them in the results which he de- 
duces from thenj. This was remarkably the case in 
the clergyman now mentioned. His premises were 
sound and consistent, namely, his opinion of the un- 
profitable nature of the study of controversial divin^ 
ity, and his anxiety that his family should not prose- 
cute it. His insanity consisted in the rapid and j 
partial view which he took of the means for accom- | 
plishing his purpose, — burning his whole library. 
Had he sold his library, or that part of it which con- 
sisted of controversial divinity, the measure woul(J 
havtf been in correct relation to the object which he 
had in view ; and if we suppose that, in going over 
his library, he had met with some books of an im- 
moral tendency, to have burnt these to prevent them 
from falling into the hands of any individual would 
have been the act both of a wise and a virtuous man. 
But to burn his whole library to prevent his family 
from studying controversial divinity, was the sug- 
gestion of insanity, — distorting entirely the true rela-p 
tion of things, and carrying an impression, in itself 
correct, into consequences which it in no degree 
warranted. 



INSANITY. 249 

A. remarkable peculiarity in many cases of insanity 
is, a great activity of mind, and rapidity of concep- 
tion, — a tendency to seize rapidly upon incidental or 
partial relations of things, — and often a fertility of 
imagination which changes the character of the mind, 
sometimes without remarkably distorting it. The 
memory, in such cases, is entire, and even appears 
more ready than in health ; and old associations are 
called up with a rapidity quite unknown to the indi- 
vidual in his sound state of mind. A gentleman, 
mentioned by Dr. Willis, who was liable to periodi- 
cal attacks of insanity, said that he expected the 
paroxysms with impatience, because he enjoyed dur- 
ing them a high degree of pleasure. " Every thing 
appeared easy to me. No obstacles presented them- 
selves, either in theory or practice. My memory 
acquired, all of a sudden, a singular degree of per- 
fection. Long passages of Latin authors occurred 
to my mind. In general I have great difficulty in 
finding rhythmical terminations, but then I could 
write verses with as great facihty as prose." "1 
have often," says Pinel, " stopped at the chamber- 
door of a literary gentleman who, during his parox- 
ysms, appears to soar above the mediocrity of intel- 
lect that was familiar to him, solely to admire his 
newly-acquired powers of eloquence. He declaimed 
upon the subject of the revolution with all the force, 
the dignity, and the purity of language that this very 
interesting subject could admit of. At other times 
he was a man of very ordinary abilities." 

It is this activity of thought and readiness of asso- 
ciation that gives to maniacs of a particular class an 
appearance of great ingenuity and acuteness. Hence 
they have been said to reason acutely upon false 
premises ; and one author has even alleged that a 
maniac of a particular kind would make an excellent 
logician. But to say that a maniac reasons either 
soundly or acutely is an abuse of terms. He reasons 
plausibly and ingeniously ; that is, he catches rapidly 



250 REASON. 

hicidental and partial relations ; and from the rapidity 
with which they are seized upon, it may sometimes 
be difficult at first to detect their fallacy. He might 
have made a skilful logician of the schools, whose 
ingenuity consisted in verbal disputes and frivolous 
distinctions ; but he never can be considered as exer- 
cising that sound logic, the aim of which is to trace 
the real relations of things, and the object of which 
is truth. 

The peculiar character of insanity, in all its modi- 
fications, appears to be, that a certain impression 
has fixed itself upon the mind in such a manner as 
to exclude all others ; or to exclude them from that 
influence which they ought to have on the mind in 
its estimate of the relations of things. This impres- 
sion may be entirely visionary and unfounded; or it 
may be in itself true, but distorted in the applications 
which the unsound mind makes of it, and the conse- 
quences which are deduced from it. Thus, a man 
of wealth fancies himself a beggar, and in danger of 
dying of hunger. Another takes up the same im- 
pression who has, in fact, sustained some consider- 
able loss. In the one, the impression is entirely 
visionary, like that which might occur in a dream ; 
in the other, it is a real and true impression, carried 
to consequences which it does not warrant. 

There is great variety in the degree to which the 
mind is influenced by the erroneous impression. In 
some cases it is such as entirely excludes all others, 
even those immediately arising from the evidence 
of the senses, as in the state of perfect mania for- 
merly referred to. In many others, though in a less 
degree than this, it is such as to change the whole 
character. The particular manner in which this 
more immediately appears will depend, of course, 
upon the nature of the erroneous impression. A 
person formerly most correct in his conduct and 
habits may become obscene and blasphemous ; acr 



INSANITI'. 251 

customed occupations become odious to him ; the 
nearest and most beloved friends become objects of 
his aversion and abhorrence. Much interesting mat- 
ter of observation often arises out of these pecuhari- 
ties ; and it is no less interesting to observe during 
convalescence the gradual return to former habits 
and attachments* A young lady, mentioned by Dr. 
Rush, who had been for some time confined in a 
lunatic asylum, had shown for several weeks every 
mark of a sound mind except one,^ — she hated her 
father. At length, she one daj^ acknowledged with 
pleasure the return of her filial attachment, and was 
soon after discharged, entirely recovered. Even 
when the erroneous impression is confined to a single 
subject, it is remarkable how it absorbs the attention, 
to the exclusion of other feelings of a most intense 
and powerful kind. I knew a person of wealth who 
had fallen into a temporary state of melancholic hal- 
lucination, in connexion with a transaction in busi- 
ness which he regretted having made, but of which 
the real effect was of a trifling nature. While in this 
situation, the most severe distress occurred in his 
family, by the death of one of them under painful 
circumstances, without his being affected by it in the 
sUghtest degree. 

The uniformity of the impressions of maniacs is 
indeed so remarkable that it has been proposed by 
Pinel as a test for distinguishing real from feigned 
insanity. He has seen melancholies confined in the 
Bicetre for twelve, fifteen, twenty, and even thirty 
years ; and through the whole of that period their 
hallucination has been limited to one subject. Others, 
after a course of years, have changed from one hal- 
lucination to another. A man, mentioned by him, 
was for eight years constantly haunted with the idea 
of being poisoned : he then changed his hallucination, 
became sovereign of the world and extremely happy, 
and thus continued for four years. 

The sudden revival of old impressions, after haV' 



252 REASON. 

ing been long entirely suspended by mental hallucina- 
tions, presents some of the rnost singular phenomena 
connected with this subject. Dr. Prichard mentions 
an interesting case of this kind from the American 
Journal of Science. A man had been employed for 
a day with a beetle and wedges in splitting pieces of 
wood for erecting a fence. At night, before going 
home, he put the beetle and wedges into the hollow 
of an old tree, and directed his sons, who had been 
at work in an adjoining field, to accompany him next 
morning to assist in making the fence. In the night 
he became maniacal, and continued in a state of in- 
sanity for several years,* during which time his mind 
was not occupied with any of the subjects with which 
he had been conversant when in health. After seve- 
ral years his reason returned suddenly, and the first 
question he asked was whether his sons had brought 
home the beetle and wedges. They, being afraid of 
entering upon any explanation, only said that they 
could not find them ; on which he arose from his bed, 
went to the field where he had been at work so many 
years before, and found, where he had left them, the 
wedges and the iron rings of the beetle, the wooden 
part being entirely mouldered away. — A lady, men- 
tioned in the same journal, had been intensely en- 
gaged for some time in a piece of needlework. 
Before she had completed it, she became insane, and 
continued in that state for seven years, after which 
her reason returned suddenly. One of the first ques- 
tions she asked related to her needlework, though 
she had never alluded to it, so far as was recollected, 
during her illness. I have formerly alluded to the 
remarkable case of a lady who was liable to periodi- 
cal parox.ysms of delirium, which often attacked her 
so suddenly, that in conversation she would stop in 
the middle of a story, or even of a sentence, and 
branch off into the subject of her hallucination. On 
the return of lier reason, she would resume the con- 
versation in whi^h she was engaged at the time of 



INSANITY. 258 

the attack, beginning exactly where she had left off, 
though she had never alluded to it during the deli- 
rium ; and on the next attack of delirium she would 
resume the subject of hallucination with which she 
had been occupied at the conclusion of the former 
paroxysm. In some cases there is a total loss of the 
impression of time respecting the period occupied by 
the attack, which on the partial recovery of the pa- 
tient shows itself by singular fancies. A man, men- 
tioned by Haslam, maintained that he had seen the 
seed sown in a particular field, and on passing it again 
three or four days after saw the reapers at work 
cutting down the corn. The interval, of w^hich he 
had thus lost entirely the impression, had been spent 
in a state of furious insanity; from this he had in 
so far recovered as, by a mere act of observation 
and memory, to form this notion, but not so far as, 
by an act of comparison or judgment, to perceive its 
absurdity. 

Among the most singular phenomena connected 
with insanity we must reckon those cases in which 
the hallucination is confined to a single point, while 
on every other subject the patient speaks and acts 
like a rational man; and he often shows the most 
astonishing power of avoiding the subject of his dis- 
ordered impression, when circumstances make it 
advisable for him to do so. A man, mentioned by 
Pinel, who had been for some time confined in the 
Bicetre, was, on the visitation of a commissary, or- 
dered to be discharged as perfectly sane, after a long 
conversation in which he had conducted himself with 
the greatest propriety. The officer prepared the 
proces verbal for his discharge, and gave it him to put 
his name to it, when he subscribed himself Jesus 
Christ, and then indulged in all the reveries con- 
nected with that delusion. Lord Erskine gives a 
very remarkable history of a man who indicted Dr. 
Munro for confining him without cause in a mad- 
house. He underwent the mo^ rigid examination 
Y 



254 REASON. 

by the counsel of the defendant without discovering 
any appearance of insanity, until a gentleman came 
into court who desired a question to be put to him 
respecting a princess with whom he had corres- 
ponded in cherry -juice. He immediately talked about 
the princess in the most insane manner, and the cause 
was at an end. But this having taken place in West- 
minster, he commenced another action in the city of 
London, and on this occasion no effort could induce 
him to expose his insanity ; so that the cause was 
dismissed only by bringing against him the evidence 
taken at Westminster. On another occasion Lord 
Erskine examined a gentleman who had indicted his 
brother for confining him as a maniac, and the ex- 
amination had gone on for great part of a day with- 
out discovering any trace of insanity. Dr. Sims 
then came into court, and informed the counsel that 
the gentleman considered himself as the Saviour of 
the world. A single observation addressed to him 
in this character showed his insanity, and put an end 
to the cause. Many similar cases are on record. 
Several years ago a gentleman in Edinburgh who 
was brought before a jury to be cognosced, defeated 
every attempt of the opposite counsel to discover 
any trace of insanity, until a gentleman came into 
court who ought to have been present at the begin- 
ning of the case, but had been accidentally detained. 
He immediately addressed the patient by asking him 
what were his latest accounts from the planet Saturn, 
and speedily eUcited ample proofs of insanity. 

Of the nature and cause of that remarkable con- 
dition of the mental faculties which gives rise to the 
phenomena of insanity, we know nothing. We car* 
only observe the facts, and endeavour to trace among 
them some general principle of connexion : and 
even in this there is great difficulty, chiefly from 
the want of observations particularly directed to 
this object. There would be much interesting sub- 



INSANITY. 255 

ject of inquir^^ in tracing the origin of the particular 
chain of ideas which arise in individual cases of in- 
sanity; and Ukewise the manner in which similar 
impressions are modified in different cases, either by 
circumstances in the natural disposition of the indi- 
vidual, or by the state of his bodily functions at the 
time. From what has been observed, it seems prob- 
able that in both these respects there is preserved 
a remarkable analogy to dreaming. The particular 
hallucinations may be chieflj'- referred to the foUow^- 
ing heads • — 

I. Propensities of character, whichhadbeenkeptun- 
der restraint by reason or by external circumstances, 
or old habits which had been subdued or restrained, 
developing themselves without control, and leading 
the mind into trains of fancies arising out of them. 
Thus, a man of an aspiring ambitious character may 
imagine himself a king or great personage ; while 
in a man of a timid, suspicious disposition, the miitd 
may fix upon some supposed injury, or loss eithex* 
of property or reputation. 

IT. Old associations recalled into the mind, and 
mixed up perhaps with more recent occurrences, in 
the same manner as we often see in dreaming. A 
lady, mentioned by Dr. Gooch, -who became insane 
in consequence of an alarm from a house on fire in 
her neighbourhood, imagined that she was the Vir- 
gin Mary, and had a luminous halo round her head. 

III. Visions of the imagination which have for- 
merly been indulged in, of that kind which we call 
waking dreams, or castle-building, recurring to the 
mind in this condition, and now believed to have a 
real existence. I have been able to trace this source 
of the hallucination. In one case, for example, it 
turned upon an office to which the individual ima- 
gined he had been appointed ; and it was impossible 



256 REASOf^. 

to persuade him to the contrary, or even that the 
office was not vacant. He afterward acknowledged 
that his fancy had at various times been fixed upon 
that appointment, thoug-h there were no circum- 
stances that warranted him in entertaining any ex- 
pectation of it. In a man, mentioned by Dr. Mori- 
son, the hallucination turned upOn circumstances 
which had been mentioned when his fortune was 
told by a gipsy. 

IV. Bodily feelings giving rise to trains of asso- 
ciations, in the same extravagant manner as in 
dreaming. A man, mentioned by Dr. Rush, ima- 
gined that he had a Caffre in his stomach, who had 
got into it at the Cape of Good Hope, and had oc- 
casioned him a constant uneasiness ever since. In 
such a case, it is probable, that there had been some 
fixed or frequent uneasy feeling at the stomach, and 
that about the commencement of his complaint, lie 
had been strongly impressed by some transaction in 
which a Caffre was concerned. 

V. There seems reason to believe that the hallu- 
cinations of the insane are often influenced by a cer- 
tain sense of the new and singular state in which 
their mental powers really are, and a certain feeling, 
though confused and ill-defined, of the loss of that 
power over their mental processes which they pos- 
sessed when in health. To a feeling of this kind, 1 
am disposed to refer the impression so common 
among the insane of being under the influence of 
some supernatural power. They sometimes repre- 
sent it as the working of an evil spirit, and some- 
times as witchcraft. Very often they describe it as 
a mysterious and undue influence which some indi- 
vidual has obtained over them : and this influence 
they often represent as being carried on by means 
of electricity, galvanism, or magnetism. This im- 
pression being once established of a mysterious 



INSANITY. 257 

agency, or a mysterious change in the state and fe.el- 
ings of the individual, various other incidental asso- 
ciations may be brought into connexion with it, ac- 
cording as particular circumstances have made a 
deep impression on the mind. A man, mentioned 
by Pinel, who had become insane during the French 
revolution, imagined that he had been guillotined; 
that the judges had changed their mind after the 
sentence was executed, and had ordered his head to 
be put on again; and that the persons intrusted 
with this duty had made a mistake, and put a wrong 
head upon him. Another individual, mentioned by 
Dr. Conolly, imagined that he had been hanged, and 
brougljt to life by means of galvanism ; and that the 
whole of his hfe had not been restored to him. 

Out of the same undefined feeling of mental pro- 
cesses very different from those of their healthy 
state probably arises another common impression, 
namely, of intercourse with spiritual beings, visions, 
and revelations. The particular character of these, 
perhaps, arises out of some previous processes of 
the mind, or strong propensity of the character; 
and the notion of a supernatural revelation may 
proceed from a certain feeling of the new and pecu- 
liar manner in which the impression is fixed upon 
the mind. A priest, mentioned by Pinel, imagined 
that he had a commission from the Virgin Mary to 
murder a certain individual, who was accused of in- 
fidelity. It is probable that the patient in this case 
had been naturally of a violent and irascible dispo- 
sition ; that he had come in contact with this per- 
son, and had been annoyed and irritated by infidel 
sentiments uttered by him ; and that a strong feel- 
ing in regard to him had thus been excited in his 
mind, which, in his insane state, was formed into 
this vision. 

When the mental impression is of a depressing 
character, that modification of the disease is pro- 
Y3 



258 REASON. 

duced which is called melancholia. It seems to dif- 
fer from mania merely in the subject of hallucina- 
tion, and accordingly we find the two modifications 
pass into each other, — the same patient being at one 
time in a state of melancholic depression, and at 
another of maniacal excitement. It is, however, 
more common for the melancholic to continue In 
the state of depression, and generally in reference 
to one subject; and the difference between him and 
the exalted maniac does not appear to depend upon 
the occasional cause. For we sometimes find per- 
sons who have become deranged in connexion with 
overwhelming calamities, show no depression, nor 
even a recollection of their distresses, but the high- 
est state of exalted mania. The difference appears 
to depend chiefly upon constitutional peculiarities 
of character. 

The most striking peculiarity of melancholia is 
the prevailing propensity to suicide ; and there are 
facts connected vvith this subject which remarkably 
illustrate what may be called the philosophy of in- 
sanity. When the melancholic hallucination has 
fully taken possession of the mind, it becomes the 
sole object of attention, without the power of vaiy- 
ing the impression, or of diiecting the thoughts to 
any facts or considerations calculated to remove or 
palliate it. The evil seems overwhelming and irre- 
mediable, admitting neither of palliation, consola- 
tion, nor hope. For the process of mind calculated 
to diminish such an impression, or even to produce 
the hope of a paUiation of the evil, is precisely that 
exercise of mind which, in this singular condition, 
is lost or suspended ; namely, a power of changing- 
the subject of thought, of transferring the attention 
to other facts and considerations, and of comparing 
the mental impression with these, and vvith the ac- 
tual state of external things. Under such a convic- 
tion of overwhelming and hopeless misery, the feel- 
ing naturally arises of life being a burden, and this 



INSANITY. 259 

is succeeded by a determination to quit it. When 
such an association has once been formed, it also 
fixes itself upon the mind, and fails to be corrected 
by those considerations which oug:ht to remove it. 
That it is in this manner the impression arises, and 
not from any process analogous to the determination 
of a sound mind, appears, among- other circum- 
stances, from the singular manner in which it is 
often dissipated; namely, by the accidental produc- 
tion of some new impression, not calculated in any 
degree to influence the subject of thouglit, but 
simply to give a momentary direction of the mind 
to some other feeling. Thus a man, mentioned by 
Pinei, had left his house in the night with the deter- 
mined resolution of drowning himself, when he was 
attacked by robbers. He did his best to escape from 
them, and, having done so, returned home, the reso- 
lution of suicide being entirely dissipated. A 
woman, mentioned, I believe, by Dr. Burrows, had 
her resolution changed in the same manner, by 
something falling on her head after she had gone 
out for a similar purpose. 

A very singular modification occurs in sorne of 
these cases. With the earnest desire of death, 
there is combined an impression of the criminality 
of suicide ; but this, instead of correcting the hallu- 
cination, only leads to another and most extraordi- 
nary mode of effecting the purpose ; namely, by 
committing murder, and so dying by the hand of 
justice. Several instances are on record in which 
this remarkable mental process was distinctly traced 
and avowed ; and in vvhich there was no mixture of 
malice against the individuals who were murdered. 
On the contrary, they were generally children; and 
in one of the cases, the maniac distinctly avow^ed 
his resolution to commit murder, with a view of 
dying by a sentence of law, and at the same time, 
his determination that his victim should be a child, 
as he should thus avoid the additional guilt of send- 



260 REASON. 

ing a person out of the world in a state of unrepented 
sin. The mental process in such a case presents a 
most interesting subject of reflection. It appears to 
be purely a process of association, without the 
power of reasoning. I should suppose that there 
had been at a former period, during a comparatively 
healthy state of the mental faculties, a repeated 
contemplation of suicide, which had been always 
checked by an immediate conviction of its dreadful 
criminality. In this manner, a strong connexion 
had been formed, which, when the idea of suicide 
afterward came into the mind during the state of 
insanity, led to the impression of its heinousness, 
not by a process of reasoning, but by simple asso- 
ciation. The subsequent steps are the distorted 
reasonings of hisanity, mixed with some previous 
impression of the safe condition of children dying 
in infancy. This explanation, I think, is strongly 
countenanced by the consideration, that had the 
idea of the criminality of suicide been in any de- 
gree a process of reasoning, a corresponding con- 
viction of the guilt of murder must have followed it. 
I find, however, one case which is at variance with 
this hypothesis. The reasoning of that unfortunate 
individual was, that if he committed murder and 
died by the hand of justice, there would be time for 
making his peace with the Almighty between the 
crime and his execution, which would not be the 
case if he should die by suicide. This was a spe- 
cies of reasoning, — but it was purely the reasoning 
of insanity. 

Attempts have been made to refer insanity to dis- 
ease of bodily organs, but hitherto without much 
success. In some instances we are able to trace a 
connexion of this kind ; but in a large proportion 
we can trace no bodily disease. On this subject, as 
well as various other points connected with the phe- 
nomena of insanity, extensive and careful observa- 



INSANITY. 261 

tion will be required before we are entitled to ad- 
vance to any conclusions. In regard to what have 
been called the moral causes of insanity, also, I sus- 
pect there has been a good deal of fallacy, arising 
from considering as a moral cause what was really 
a part of the disease. Thus we find so many cases 
of msanity referred to eiToneous views of religion, 
so many to love, so many to ambition, &c. But 
perhaps it may be doubted whether that which was 
m these cases considered as the cause, was not 
rather, in many instances, a part of the hallucination. 
This, I think, applies in a peculiar manner to the 
important subject of religion, which, by a common 
but very loose mode of speaking, is often mentioned 
as a frequent cause of insanity. When there is a 
constitutional tendency to insanity, or to melancholy, 
one of its leading modifications, every subject is dis- 
torted to which the mind can be directed, and none 
more frequently or more remarkably than the great 
questions of religious belief. But this is the effect, 
not the cause ; ajid the frequency of this kind of 
hallucination, and the various forms which it as- 
sumes, may be ascribed to the subject being one to 
which the minds of all men are so naturally directed 
in one degree or another, and of which no man living 
can entirely divest himself. Even when the mind 
does give way under a great moral cause, such as 
overwhelming misfortunes, we often find that the 
hallucination does not refer to them, but to some- 
thing entirely distinct : — striking examples of this 
are mentioned by Pinel. 

Insanity is, in a large proportion of cases, to be 
traced to hereditary predisposition ; and this is often 
so strong that no prominent moral cause is neces- 
sary for the production of the disease, and probably 
no moral treatment would have any effect in pre- 
venting it. We must, however suppose, that where 
a tendency to insanity exists, there may be, in many 
cases^ circumstajices in mental habits or mental 



262 REASON. 

discipline, calculated either to favour or to counter- 
act the tendency. Insanity frequently commencea 
with H state in which particular impressions fix 
themselves upon the mind in a manner entirely dis- 
proportioned to their true relations ; and in which 
these false impressions fail to be corrected by the 
judgment comparing them with other impressions, 
or with external things. In so far as mental habits 
maybe supposed to favour or promote such a condi- 
tion, this may be likely to result from allowing the 
mind to wander away from the proper duties of life, 
or to luxuriate amid scenes of the imagination ; and 
permitting mental emotions, of whatever kind, to be 
excited in a manner disproportioned to the true rela- 
tions of the objects which give rise to them; in 
short, from allowing the mind to ramble among ima- 
ginary events, or to be led away by slight and casual 
relations, instead of steadily exercising the judg- 
ment in the investigation of truth. We might refer 
to the same head, habits of distorting events, and of 
founding upon them conclusions which they do not 
warrant. These, and other propensities and habits 
of a similar kind, constitute what is called an ill- 
regulated mind. Opposed to it is that habit of cool 
and sound exercise of the understanding by which 
events are contemplated in their true relations and 
consequences, and mental emotions arise out of them 
such as they are really calculated to produce. Every 
one must be familiar with the difference which ex- 
ists among different individuals in this respect ; and 
even in the same individual at different times. We 
trace the influence of the principle in the impression 
which is made by events coming upon us suddenly 
and unexpectedly ; and the manner in which the emo- 
tion is gradually brought to its proper bearings, as 
the mind accommodates itself to the event, by con- 
templating it in its true relations. In such a mental 
process as this, we observe the most remarkable 
diversities among various individuals. In some, the 



INSANITY. 263 

mind rapidly contemplates the event in all its rela- 
tions, and speedily arrives at the precise impression 
or emotion which it is in truth fitted to produce. In 
others, this is done more slowly, perhaps more im- 
perfectly, and probably not without the aid of sug- 
gestions from other minds ; while, in some, the first 
impression is so strong and so permanent, and re- 
sists in such a manner those considerations which 
might remove or moderate it, that we find difficulty 
in drawing the line between it and that kind of false 
impression which constitutes the lower degree of 
insanity. Habits of mental application must also 
exert a great influence ; and we certainly remark a 
striking difference between those who are accus- 
tomed merely to works of imagination and taste, 
and those whose minds have been rigidly exercised 
to habits of calm and severe inquiry. A fact is men- 
tioned by Dr. ConoUy which, if it shall be confirmed 
by farther observation, would lead to some most im- 
portant reflections. He states that it appears from 
the registers of the Bicetre, that maniacs of the more 
educated classes consist almost entirely of priests, 
artists, painters, sculptors, poets, and musicians ; 
while no instance, it is said, occurs of the disease in 
naturaUsts, physicians, geometricians, or chymists. 

The higher degrees of insanity are in general so 
distinctly defined in their characters as to leave no 
room for doubt in deciding upon the nature of the 
affection. But it is otherwise in regard to many of 
the lower modifications ; and great discretion is often 
required in judging whether the conduct of an indi- 
vidual, in particular instances, is to be considered as 
indicative of insanity. This arises from the princi- 
ple, which must never be lost sight of, that in such 
cases we are not to decide simply from the facts them- 
selves, but by their relation to other circumstances, 
and to the previous habits and character of the 
individual. There are many peculiarities and eecen- 



264 REASON. 

tricities of character which do not constitute in- 
sanity ; and the same peculiarities may afford reason 
for suspecting insanity in one person and not in an- 
other; namely, when in the former they have ap- 
peared suddenly, and are much opposed to his pre- 
vious uniform character: while, to the latter, they 
have been long known to be habitual and natural. 
Thus, acts of thoughtless prodigality and extrava- 
gance may, in one person, be considered entirely in 
accordance with his uniform character ; while the 
same acts, committed by a person formerly distin- 
guished by sedate and prudent conduct, may give 
good ground for suspecting insanity, — and in fact 
constitute a form in which the affection very often 
appears. In ordinary cases of insanity, a man's con- 
duct is to be tried by a comparison with the average 
conduct of other men ; but, in many of the cases 
now referred to, he must be compared with his for- 
mer self. 

Another caution is to be kept in mind, respecting 
the mental impressions of the individual in these 
slight or suspected cases of insanity; that an im- 
pression which gives reason for suspecting insanity 
in one case, because we know it to be entirely un- 
founded and imaginary, may allow of no such conclu- 
sion in another, in which it has some reasonable or 
plausible foundation. Insane persons indeed often 
relate stories which hang together so plausibly and 
consistently, that we cannot say whether we are to 
consider them as indicative of insanity, until we 
have ascertained whether they have any foundation, 
or are entirely imaginary. In one instance, which 
was referred to in the discussions respecting a late 
remarkable case, the principal fact alleged against 
the individual was, his having taken up a suspicion 
of the fidelity of his wife. But it turned out to be 
a very general opinion among his neighbours (hat 
the impression was well-founded. The same prin- 
ciple applies to the antipathies against intimate 



INSANITY PUNISHMENT OF THE INSANE. 265 

friends which are often so remarkable in the insane. 
They may be of such a nature as decidedly to mark 
the hallucination of insanity, — as when a person ex- 
presses a dislike to a child, formerly beloved, on the 
ground that he is not really his child, but an evil 
spirit which has assumed his form. This is clearly 
insanity ; but if the antipathy be against a friend or 
relative, without any such reason assigned for it, we 
require to keep in view the iiiquin,', whether the im- 
pression be the result of hallucination, or whether 
the relative has really given any ground for it. In all 
slight or doubtful cases, much discretion should be 
used in putting an individual under restraint, and 
still more in immediately subjecting him to confine- 
ment in an asylum for hmatics. But there is one 
modification in which all such delicacy must be dis- 
pensed with, namely, in those melanchohc cases 
which have shown any tendency to suicide. When- 
ever this propensity has appeared, no time is to be 
lost in taking the most effectual precautions; and 
the most painful consequences have very often re- 
sulted in cases of this description, from misplaced 
delicacy and delay. 

The subject of hallucination in insanity we have 
seen may be either entirely imaginary and ground- 
less, or may be a real event viewed in false relations, 
and carried to false consequences. This view of the 
subject bears upon an important practical point 
which has been much agitated, namely, the liability 
of maniacs to punishment ; and which has been ably 
and ingeniously argued by Lord Erskine in his de- 
fence of Hatfield, who fired at his majesty King 
George III. The principle contended for by this 
eminent person is, that when a maniac commits a 
crime under the influence of an impression which is 
entirely visionary, and purely the hallucination of 
insanity, he is not the object of punishment ; but 
that, though he may have shown insanity in other 
Z 



266 REASON. 

things, he is liable to punishment if the impression 
under which he acted was true, and the human pas- 
sion arising out of it was directed to its proper ob- 
ject. He illustrates this principle by contrasting the 
case of Hatfield with that of Lord Ferrers. Hatfield 
had taken a fancy that the end of the world was at 
hand, and that the death of his majesty was in some 
way connected with important events which were 
about to take place. Lord Ferrers, after showing 
various indications of insanity, murdered a man 
against whom he was known to harbour deep-rooted 
resentment, on account of real transactions in which 
that individual had rendered himself obnoxious to 
him. The former, therefore, is considered as an 
example of the pure hallucination of insanity ; the 
latter as one of human passion founded on real 
events and directed to its proper object. Hatfield, 
accordingly, was acquitted ; but Lord Ferrers was 
convicted of murder, and executed. The contrast 
between the two cases is sufficiently striking ; but 
it may be questioned whether it will bear all that 
Lord Erskine has founded upon it. There can be 
no doubt of the first of his propositions, that a per- 
son acting under the pure hallucination of insanity, 
in regard to impressions which are entirely un- 
founded, is not the object of punishment. But the 
converse does not seem to follow; namely, that the 
man becomes an object of punishment merely be- 
cause the impression was founded in fact, and be- 
cause there was a human passion directed to its 
proper object. For it is among the characters of 
insanity not only to call up impressions which are 
entirely visionary, but also to distort and exaggerate 
those which are true, and to carry them to conse- 
quences which they do not warrant in the estimation 
of a sound mind. A. person, for instance, who has 
suffered a loss in business which does not affect his 
circumstances in any important degree may imagine, 
under the influency of hallucination, that he is a 



INSANITY PUNISHMENT OF THE INSANE. 267 

ruined man, and that his family is reduced to beg- 
gary. Now, were a wealthy man under the influ- 
ence of such hallucination to commit an outrage on 
a person who had defrauded him of a trifling sum, 
the case would afford the character mentioned by 
Lord Erskine, namely, human passion founded upon 
real events, and directed to its proper object : but 
no one, probably, would doubt for a moment that 
the process was as much the result of insanity as 
if the impression had been entirely visionary. In 
this hypothetical case, indeed, the injury, though 
real, is shght ; but it does not appear that the prin- 
ciple is necessarily affected by the injury being great, 
or more in relation to the result which it leads to 
according to the usual course of human passion. It 
would appear probable, therefore, that in deciding a 
doubtful case, a jury ought to be guided, not merely 
by the circumstances of the case itself, but by the 
evidence of insanity in other things. This, accord- 
ingly, appears to have been the rule on which a jury 
acted in another important case mentioned by Lord 
Erskine, in which an unfortunate female, under the 
influence of insanity, murdered a man who had se- 
duced and deserted her. Here was a real injury of 
the highest description, and human passion founded 
upon it and directed to its proper object ; but the 
jury, on proof of derangement in other things, ac- 
quitted the prisoner, who, accordingly, soon passed 
into a state of " undoubted and deplorable insanity." 
In the case of Lord Ferrers, also, it would appear 
that the decision proceeded, not so much upon the 
principle of human passion directed to its proper 
object, as upon an impression that his lordship's pre- 
vious conduct had been indicative of uncontrolled 
violence of temper, rather than actual insanity. 

Some of the points which have been briefly alluded 
to seem to bear on the practical part of this im- 
portant subject, — the moral treatment of insanity. 



1268 REASON. 

Without entering on any lengthened discussion, 
some leading principles may be referred to the fol- 
lowing heads : — 

I. It will be generally admitted that every attempt 
to reason with a maniac is not only fruitless, but 
rather tends to fix more deeply his erroneous impres- 
sion. An important rule in the moral management 
of the insane will therefore probably be, to avoid 
every allusion to the subject of their hallucination, 
to remove from them every thing calculated by as- 
sociation to lead to it, and to remove them from 
scenes and persons likely to recall or keep up the 
erroneous impression. Hence, probably, in a great 
measure arises the remarkable benefit of removing 
the insane from their usual residence, friends, and 
attendants, and placing them in new scenes, and en- 
tirely under the care of strangers. The actual effect 
of this measure is famihar to every one who is in any 
degree conversant w ith the management of the insane. 
That the measure may have its full effect, it appears 
to be of importance that the patient should not, for 
a considerable time, be visited by any friend or ac- 
quaintance; but should be separated from every 
thing connected with his late erroneous associa- 
tions. The danger also is well known which attends 
premature return to home and common associates ; 
— immediate relapse having often followed this, in 
cases which had been going on for some time in the 
most favourable manner. 

II. Occupation. This is referable to two kinds, 
namely, bodily and mental. The higher states of 
mania in general admit of no occupation ; but, on 
the contrary, often require coercion. A degree be- 
low this may admit of bodily occupation ; and when 
this can be accomplished in such a manner as fully 
to occupy the attention and produce fatigue, there is 



INSANITY MORAL TREATMENT. 269 

reason to believe that much benefit may result from 
it. Dr. Gregory used to mention a farmer in the 
north of Scotland who had acquired uncommon 
celebrity in the treatment of the insane; and his 
method consisted chiefly in having: them constantly 
employed in the most severe bodily labour. As 
soon, also, as the situation of the patient will admit 
of it, mental occupation must be considered as of the 
utmost importance : it should not consist merely of 
desultory employment or amusement, but should 
probably be regulated by two principles : — 1. Occu- 
pations calculated to lead the mind gradually into a 
connected series of thought. When the mental 
condition of the patient is such as to make it prac- 
ticable, nothing answers so w ell as a course of his- 
tory, the leading events being distinctly written out 
in the form of a table, with the dates. Thus the at- 
tention is fixed in an easy and connected manner ; 
and in cases which admit of such occupation being 
continued the effect is often astonishing. 2. En- 
deavouring to discover the patient's former habits 
and favourite pursuits, at a period previous to the 
hallucination, and unconnected with it; and using 
means for leading his attention to these. I have 
already alluded to the complete suspension of all 
former pursuits and attachments which often takes 
place in insanity, and to a return of them as being 
frequently the most marked and satisfactory symp- 
tom of convalescence. This is, in such cases, to be 
considered as a sign, not a cause of the improve- 
ment ; but there seems every reason to believe that 
the principle might be acted upon with advantage in 
the moral treatment of certain forms of insanity. 
On a similar principle, it is probable that in many 
cases much benefit might result from moral manage- 
ment calculated to revive associations of a pleasing 
kind, in regard to circumstances anterior to the oc- 
currence of the malady. 

Z2 



270 REASON. 

III. Careful classification of the insane, so that 
the mild and peaceful melancholic may not be har- 
assed by the ravings of the maniac. The import- 
ance of this is obvious; but of still greater im- 
portance it will probably be, to watch the first 
dawnings of reason, and instantly to remove the pa- 
tient from all associates by whom his mind might 
be again bewildered. The following case, mentioned 
by Pinel, is certainlj'^ an extreme one, but much im- 
portant reflection arises out of it in reference both 
to this and the preceding topic : — A musician con- 
fined in the Bicetre, as one of the first symptoms 
of returning reason, made some slight allusions to 
his favourite instrument. It was immediately pro- 
cured for him ; he occupied himself with music for 
several hours every day, and his convalescence 
seemed to be advancing rapidly. But he was then 
unfortunately allowed to come frequently in^o con- 
tact with a furious maniac, by meeting him in the 
gardens. The musician's mind was unhinged ; his 
violin was destroyed ; and he fell back into a state 
of insanity which was considered as confirmed and 
hopeless. 

Cases of decided insanity in general admit of little 
moral treatment, until the force of the disease has 
been broken in some considerable degree. But 
among the numerous modifications which come un- 
der the view of the physician, there are various 
forms in which, by judicious moral management, a 
great deal is to be accomphshed. Some of these 
affections are of a temporary nature, and have so 
httle influence on a man's general conduct in life, 
that they are perhaps not known beyond his own 
family, or confidential friends. In some of these 
cases the individual is sensible of the singular change 
which has taken place in the slate of his mental 
powers, and laments the distortion of his feelings 
and affections. He complains, perhaps, that he has 
lost his usual interest in his family, and his usual 



INSANITY MORAL TREATMENT. 271 

affection for them ; and that he seems to be deprived 
of every feeling of which he was formerly suscepti- 
ble. The truth is, that the mind has become so oc- 
cupied by the erroneous impression as to be inac- 
cessible to any other, and incapable of applying to 
any pursuit, or following out a train of thought. 

A most interesting affection of this class often 
comes under the observation of the physician, con- 
sisting of deep but erroneous views of religion, 
generally accompanied with disturbed sleep and con- 
siderable derangement of the system, and producing 
a state of mind closely bordering upon insanity. It 
occurs most commonly in young persons of acute 
and susceptible feelings, and requires the most deli- 
cate and cautious management. Two modes of 
treatment are frequently adopted in regard to it, 
both equally erroneous. The one consists in hur- 
rying the individual into the distraction of company, 
or a rapid journey ; the other, in urging religious dis- 
cussions, and books of profound divinity. Both are 
equally injudicious, especially the latter; for every 
attempt to discuss the important subject to which 
the distorted impression refers only serves to fix 
the hallucination more deeply. The mode of treat- 
ment which 1 have always found most beneficial 
consists of regular exercise, with attention to the 
general health ; and in enforcing a course of read- 
ing of a nature likely to fix the mind, and carry it 
forward in a connected train. Light reading or 
mere amusement will not answer the purpose. A 
regular course of history, as formerly mentioned, 
appears to succeed best, and fixing the attention by 
writing out the dates and leading events in the form 
of a table. When the mind has been thus gradually 
•exercised for some time in a connected train of 
thought, it is often astonishing to observe how it 
will return to the subject which had entirely over- 
powered it, with a complete dissipation of former 
erroneous impressions. A frequent complaint at 



272 REASON. 

the commencement of such an exercise is, that the 
person finds it impossible to fix the attention, or to 
recollect the subject of even a few sentences: this 
is part of the disease, and by perseverance gradually 
disappears. This experiment 1 have had occasion 
to make many times, and it has always appeared lo 
me one of extreme interest. I do not say that it 
has uniformly succeeded, for the aflfection frequently 
passes into confirmed insanity ; but it has succeeded 
in a sufficient number of instances to g^ive every en- 
couragement for a careful repetition of it. The same 
observations and the same mode of treatment apply 
to the other forms of partial hallucination. The 
plan is, of course, to be assisted by regular exercise, 
and attention to the general health, which is usually 
much impaired. The affections are particularly 
connected in a very intimate manner with a disor- 
dered state of the stomach and bowels, and with 
derangements in the female constitution. Means 
adapted to these become, therefore, an essential part 
of the management. 

There has been considerable discussion respecting 
the distinction between insanity and idiocy. It has 
been said, that the insane reason justly on false prem- 
ises ; and that idiots reason falsely on sound premises. 
This does not seem to be well founded. It would 
appear that a maniac may reason either upon false 
or true premises ; but that, in either case, his reason- 
ing is influenced by distorted views of the relations 
of things. The idiot, on the other hand, does not 
reason at all ; that is, though he may remember the 
facts, he does not trace their relations. Idiocy ap- 
pears to consist, in a greater or less degree, in a 
simply impaired or weakened state of the mental 
powers ; but this is not insanity. On the contrary, 
we have seen that, in the insane, certain mental 
powers may be in the highest state of activity, — the 
memory recalling things long gone by, — the iraagi 



INSANITY — IDIOCY. 273 

nation forming- brilliant associations, — every faculty 
in the highest activity except the power of tracing 
correct relations. I have already referred to a gen- 
tleman mentioned by Pinel, who possessed during the 
paroxysm a brilliancy of conception and readiness 
of memory which were not natural to him. Another, 
mentioiied by the same writer, who was infatuated 
with the chimera of perpetual motion, constructed 
pieces of mechanism which were the result of the 
most profound combinations, at the time when he 
was so mad that he believed his head to have been 
changed. A female, mentioned, I believe, by Rush, 
sang with great beauty and sweetness, which she 
could not do when she was sane ; and a musician 
played, when insane, much better than when he was 
well. 

In that remarkable obliteration of the mental facul- 
ties, on the other hand, which Ave call idiocy, fatuity, 
or dimentia, there is none of the distortion of m- 
sanity. It is a simple torpor of the faculties, in the 
higher degrees amounting to total insensibility to 
every impression; and some remarkable facts are 
connected with the manner in which it arises with- 
out bodily disease. A man, mentioned by Dr. Rush, 
was so violently affected by some losses in trade 
that he was deprived almost instantly of all his 
mental faculties. He did not take notice of any 
thing, not even expressing a desire for food, but 
merely taking it when it was put into his mouth. A 
servant dressed him in the morning, and conducted 
him to a seat in his parlour, where he remained the 
whole day, wdth his body bent forward, and his eyes 
fixed on the floor. In this state he continued nearly 
five years, and then recovered completely and rather 
suddenly. The account which he afterward gave 
of his condition during this period was, that his mind 
was entirely lost ; and that it was only about two 
months before his final recovery that he began to 
have sensations and thoughts of any kind. These 



a74 REASON. 

at first served only to convey fears and apprehen- 
sions, especially in the night-time. Of perfect 
idiocy produced in the same manner by a moral 
cause an affecting example is given by Pinel : — Two 
j'oung men, brothers, were carried off by the con- 
scription, and, in the first action in which they were 
engaged, one of them was shot dead by the side of 
the other. The survivor was instantly struck with 
perfect idiocy. He was taken home to his father's 
house, where another brother was so affected by the 
sight of him, that he was seized in the same man- 
ner ; and in this state of perfect idiocy, they were 
both received into the Bicetre. I have formerly re- 
ferred to various examples of this condition super- 
vening on bodily disease. In some of them the 
affection was permanent ; in others it was entirely 
recovered from. 

The most striking illustration of the various shades 
of idiocy is derived from the modifications of intel- 
lectual condition observed in the cretins of the Val- 
lais. These singular beings are usually divided into 
three classes, which receive the name of cretins, 
semi-cretins, and cretins of the third degree. The 
first of these classes, or perfect cretins, are in point 
of intellect, scarcely removed above mere animal 
life. Many of them cannot speak, and are only so 
far sensible of the common calls of nature, as to go, 
when excited by hunger, to places where they have 
been accustomed to receive their food. The rest of 
their time is spent, either in basking in the sun, or 
sitting by the fire without any trace of intelligence. 
The next class, or semi-cretins, show a higher de- 
gree of intelligence ; they remember common events, 
understand what is said to them, and express them- 
selves in an intelligent manner on the most common 
subjects. They are taught to repeat prayers, but 
scarcely appear to annex any meaning to the words 
which they employ ; and they cannot be taught to 
read or write, or even to number their fingers. The 



INSANITY IDIOCY CRETINISM. 275 

cretins of the third degree learn to read and write, 
though with very little understanding of what .they 
read, except on the most common topics. But'they 
are acutely alive to their own interest, and extremely 
litigious. They are without prudence or discretion 
in the direction of their affairs, and the regulation 
of their conduct ; yet obstinate, and unwiUing to be 
advised. Their memory is good as to what they 
have seen or heard, and they learn to imitate what 
they have observed in various arts, as machinery, 
painting, sculpture, and architecture ; but it is mere 
imitation without invention. Some of them learn 
music in the same manner; and others attempt poetry 
of the lowest kind, distinguished by mere rhyme. It 
is said that none of them can be taught arithmetic, 
but I do not know whether this has been ascertained 
to be invariably true ; — there is no doubt that it is 
a very general peculiarity. 

The imbecile in other situations show characters 
very analogous to these. Their memory is often 
remarkably retentive ; but it appears to be merely a 
power of retaining facts or words in the order and 
connexion in which they have been presented to 
them, without the capacity of tracing relations, and 
forming new associations. In this manner, they 
sometimes acquire languages, and even procure a 
name for a kind of scholarship ; and they learn to 
imitate in various arts, but without invention. Their 
deficiency appears to be in the powers of abstracting, 
recombining, and tracing relations ; consequently they 
are deficient in judgment, for which these processes 
are necessary. The maniac, on the other hand, 
seizes relations acutely, rapidly, and often ingeni- 
ously, — but not soundly. They are only incidental 
relations, to which he is led by some train of asso- 
ciation existing in his own mind ; but they occupy 
his attention in such a manner that he does not ad- 
mit the consideration of other relations, or compare 



276 REASON. 

them with those which have fixed themselves upon 
his mind. 

The states of idiocy and insanity, therefore, are 
clearly distinguished in the more complete examples 
of both ; but many instances occur in which they 
pass into each other, and where it is difficult to say 
to which of the affections the case is to be referred. 
I beheve they may also be, to a certain extent, com- 
bined ; or that there may be a certain diminution of 
the mental powers existing along with that distortion 
which constitutes insanity. They likewise alternate 
with one another, — maniacal paroxysms often leav- 
ing the patient, in the intervals, in a state of idiocy. 
A very interesting modification of another kind is 
mentioned by Pinel : — Five young men were received 
into the Bicetre, whose intellectual faculties ap- 
peared to be really obliterated ; and they contmued 
in this state for periods of from three to upwards of 
twelve months. They were then seized with par- 
oxysms of considerable violence, which continued 
from fifteen to twenty-five days, after which they 
all entirely recovered. 

Idiocy can seldom be the subject either of medical 
or moral treatment ; but the peculiar characters of 
it often become the object of attention in courts of 
law, in relation to the competency of imbecile per- 
sons to manage their own affairs ; and nmch diffi- 
culty often occurs in tracing the line between com- 
petency and incompetency. Several years ago a 
case occurred in Edinburgh, which excited much 
discussion, and shows, in a striking manner, some of 
the peculiarities of this condition of the mental facul- 
ties : — A gentleman of considerable property hav- 
ing died intestate, his heir-at-law was a younger 
brother, who had always been reckoned very de- 
ficient in intellect ; and consequently, his relatives 
now brought an action into the Court of Session, 
for the purpose of finding liim incompetent, and ob- 
taining the authority of the court for putting him 



INSANITY— IDIOCY. 277 

under trustees. In the investig-ation of this case, 
various respectable persons deponed that they had 
long known the individual, and considered him as de- 
cidedly imbecile in his understanding, and incapable 
of managing his affairs. On the other hand, most 
respectable evidence was produced, that he had been, 
when at school, an excellent scholar in the languages, 
and had repeatedly acted as a private tutor to boys; 
that he was remarkably attentive to his own interest, 
and very strict in making a bargain ; that he had 
been proposed as a candidate for holy orders, and, 
on his first examination in the languages, had ac- 
quitted himself well; but that, in the subsequent 
trials, in which the candidate is required to deliver 
a discourse, he had been found incompetent. The 
Court of Session, after long pleadings, decided that 
this individual was incapable of managing his affairs. 
The case was then appealed to the House of Lords, 
where after farther protracted proceedings, this de- 
cision was affirmed. I was well acquainted with 
this person, and was decidedly of opinion that he 
was imbecile in his intellects. At my suggestion 
the following experiment was made in the course 
of the investigation. A small sum of money was 
given him, with directions to spend it, and present 
an account of his disbursement, with the addition 
of the various articles. He soon got rid of the mo- 
ney, but was found totally incapable of this very 
simple process of arithmetic, though the sum did 
not exceed a few shillings. This individual, then, it 
would appear, possessed the simple state of mem- 
ory, which enabled him to acquire languages ; but 
was deficient in the capacity of combining, reflecting, 
or comparing. His total inability to perform the 
most simple process of arithmetic was a prominent 
character in the case, analogous to what I have al- 
ready stated in regard to the cretins. In doubtful 
cases of the kind, I think this might be employed as 
a negative test with advantage ; for it probably will 
A a 



278 REASON. 

not be doubted that a person who is incapable of 
such a process is incompetent to manage his affairs. 

It is a singular fact that the imbecile are, in gene- 
ral, extremely attentive to their own interest, and 
perhaps most commonly cautious in their proceed- 
ings. Ruinous extravagance, absurd schemes, and 
quixotic ideas of liberality and magnificence are more 
aUied to insanity ; the former may become the dupes 
of others, but it is the latter who are most likely to 
involve and ruin themselves. 

Before leaving the subject of Insanity, there is a 
point of great interest which may be briefly referred 
to. It bears, in a very striking manner, upon what 
may be called the pathology of the mental powers ; 
but I presume not to touch upon it, except in the 
slightest manner. In the language of common life, 
we sometimes speak of a moral insanity, in which a 
man rushes headlong through a course of vice and 
crime, regardless of every moral restraint, of every 
social tie, and of all consequences, whether more 
immediate or future. Yet, if we take the most 
melancholy instance of this kind that can be fur- 
nished by the history of human depravity, the indi- 
vidual may still be recognised, in regard to all phys- 
ical relations, as a man of a sound mind ; and he may 
be as well qualified as other men for the details of 
business, or even the investigations of science. He 
is correct in his judgment of all the physical relations 
of things; but, in regard to their moral relations, 
every correct feeling appears to be obliterated. If 
a man, then, may thus be correct in his judgment of 
all physical relations while he is lost to every moral 
relation, we have strong ground for believing that 
there is in his constitution a power distinct from rea- 
son, but which holds the same sway over his moral 
powers that reason does among his intellectual ; and 
that the influence of this power may be weakened or 
lost, while reason remains unimpaired. This is the 
moral principle, or the power of conscience. It has 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 279 

been supposed by some to be a modification of rea- 
son, but the considerations now referred to appear 
to favour the opinion of their being distinct. That 
this power should so completely lose its sway while 
reason remains unimpaired is a point in the moral 
constitution of man which it does not belong to the 
physician to investigate. The fact is unquestion- 
able ; the solution is to be sought for in the records 
of eternal truth. 



IV.— SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

The theory of spectral illusions is closely con- 
nected with that of the affections treated of in the 
preceding parts of this section ; and I shall conclude 
this subject with a very brief notice of some of the 
most authentic facts relating to them, under the fol- 
lowing heads : — 

I. False perceptions, or impressions made upon 
the senses only, in which the mind does not partici- 
pate. Of this class there are several modifications, 
which have been referred to under the subject of 
Perception. I add in this place the following addi- 
tional examples : — A gentleman of high mental en- 
dowments, now upwards of eighty years of age, of 
a spare habit, and enjoying uninterrupted health, has 
been for eleven years liable to almost daily visita- 
tions from spectral figures. They in general present 
human countenances ; the head and upper parts of 
the body are distinctly defined ; the lower parts are, 
for the most part, lost in a kind of cloud. The fig- 
ures are various, but he recognises the same coun- 
tenances repeated from time to time, particularly of 
late years that of an elderly woman, with a pecu- 
liarly arch and playful expression, and a dazzhng 
brilliancy of eye, who seems just ready to speak to 
him. They appear also in various dresses, such as 



280 REASON. 

that of the age of Louis XIV. ; the costume of an- 
cient Rome ; that of the modern Turks and Greeks ; 
but more frequently of late, as in the case of the fe- 
male now mentioned, in an old-fashioned Scottish 
plaid of Tartan, drawn up and brought forward over 
the head, and then crossed below the chin, as the 
plaid was worn by aged women in his younger days. 
He can seldom recognise among the vspectres any 
figure or countenance which he remembers to have 
seen ; but his own face has occasionally been pre- 
sented to him, gradually undergoing the change from 
youth to manhood, and from manhood to old age. 
The figures appear at various times of the day, both 
night and morning; they continue before him for 
some time, and he sees them almost equally well 
with his eyes open or shut, in full daylight or in 
darkness. They are almost always of a pleasant 
character, and he seems to court their presence as a 
source of amusement to him. He finds that he can 
banish them by drawing his hand across his eyes, or 
by shutting and opening his eyelids once or twice 
for a second or two ; but on these occasions they 
often appear again soon after. The figures are some- 
times of the size of life, and sometimes in miniature ; 
but they are always defined and finished with the 
clearness and minuteness of the finest painting. 
They sometimes appear as if at a considerable dis- 
tance, and gradually approach until they seem almost 
to touch his face ; at other times they float from side 
to side, or disappear in ascending or descending. In 
general, the countenance of the spectre is presented 
to him; but on some occasions he sees the back of 
the head, both of males and females, exhibiting va- 
rious fashions of wigs and headdresses, particularly 
the flowing full-bottomed wig of a former age. At 
the time when these visions began to appear to him, 
he was in the habit of taking little or no wine, and 
this has been his common practice ever since ; but 
he finds that any addition to his usual quantity of 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 281 

wine increases the number and vivacity of the visions. 
Of the effect of bodily ilhiess he can give no account, 
except that once, when lie had a cold and took a few 
drops of laudanum, the room appeared entirely filled 
with peculiarly brilliant objects, gold and silver or- 
naments, and precious gems ; but the spectral visions 
were either not seen or less distinct. Another gen- 
tleman, who died some time ago at the age of eighty, 
for several years before his death never sat down to 
table at his meals without the impression of sitting 
down with a large party dressed in the fashion of 
iifty years back. This gentleman was blind of one 
eye, and the sight of the other was very imperfect ; 
on this account he wore over it a green shade, and 
he had often before him the image of his own coun- 
tenance, as if it were reflected from the inner sur- 
face of the shade. A very remarkable modification 
of this class of illusions has been communicated to 
me by Dr. Devvar of Stirling. It occurred in a lady 
who was quite blind, her eyes being also disorganized 
and sunk. She never walked out without seeing a 
little old woman with a red cloak and a crutch, who 
seemed to walk before her. She had no illusions 
when within doors. 

II. Real dreams, though the person was not at the 
time sensible of having slept, nor, consequently, of 
having dreamed. A person, under the influence of 
some strong mental impression, drops asleep for a 
few seconds, perhaps without being sensible of it; 
some scene or person connected with the impression 
appears in a dream, and he starts up under the con- 
viction that it was a spectral appearance. I have 
formerly proposed a conjecture by which some of 
the most authentic stories of second sight may be 
referred to this principle ; others seem to be refer- 
able to the principle to be mentioned under the next 
head. Several cases mentioned by Dr. Hibbert are 
also clearly of the nature of dreams. The analogy 
Aa3 



282 REASON. 

between dreaming and spectral illusions is also beau- 
tifully illustrated by an anecdote which I received 
lately from the gentleman to whom it occurred, an 
eminent medical friend. Having sat up late one 
evening, under considerable anxiety about one of his 
children, who was ill, he fell asleep in his chair, and 
had a frightful dream, in which the prominent figure 
was an immense baboon. He awoke with the fright, 
got up instantly, and walked to a table which was in 
the middle of the room. He was then quite awake 
and quite conscious of the articles around him ; but 
close by the wall, in the end of the apartment, he 
distinctly saw the baboon making the same horrible 
grimaces which he had seen in his dream ; and the 
spectre continued visible for about half a minute. 

in. Intense mental conceptions so strongly im- 
pressed upon the mind as for the moment to be be- 
lieved to have a real existence. This takes place 
when, along with the mental emotion, the individual 
is placed in circumstances in which external impres- 
sions are very shght; as solitude, faint light, and 
quiescence of body. It is a state closely bordering 
upon dreaming, though the vision occurs while the 
person is in the waking state. The following ex- 
ample is mentioned by Dr. Hibbert : — A gentleman 
was told of the sudden death of an old and intimate 
friend, and was deeply affected by it. The impres- 
sion, though partially banished by the business of the 
day, was renewed from time to time by conversing 
on the subject with his family and other friends. 
After supper, he went by himself to walk in a small 
court behind his house, which was bounded by ex- 
tensive gardens. The sky was clear, and the night 
serene ; and no light was falling upon the court from 
any of the windows. As he walked down stairs, he 
was not thinking of any thing connected with his 
deceased friend; but when he had proceeded at a 
slow pace about half-way across the court, the figure 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 283 

of his friend started up before him in a most distinct 
manner at the opposite angle of the court. " He 
was not in his usual dress, but in a coat of a diifer- 
ent colour, which he had for some months left off 
wearing. I could even remark a figured vest which 
he had also worn about the same time ; also a col- 
oured silk handkerchief around his neck, in which I 
had used to see him in a morning; and my powers 
of vision seemed to become more keen as I gazed 
on the phantom before me." The narrator then 
mentions the indescribable feeling which shot 
through his frame ; but he soon recovered himself, 
and walked briskly up to the spot, keeping his eyes 
intently fixed upon the spectre. As he approached 
the spot it vanished, not by sinking into the earth, 
but seeming to melt insensibly into air.* 

A similar example is related by a most intelligent 
writer in the Christian Obser^-er for October, 1829 ; — 
"An intimate friend of my early years, and most 
happy in his domestic arrangements, lost his wife 
under the most painful circumstances, suddenly, just 
after she had apparently escaped from the dangers 
of an untoward confinement with her first child. A 
few weeks after this melancholy event, while trav- 
elling during the night on horseback, and in all prob- 
abihty thinking over his sorrows, and contrasting 
his present cheerless prospects with the joys which 
so lately gilded the hours of his happy home, the 
form of his lost relative appeared to be presented to 
him at a little distance in advance. He stopped his 
horse, and contemplated the vision with great trepi- 
dation, till in a few seconds it vanished away. 
Within a few days of this appearance, while he was 
sitting in his solitary parlour late at night, reading 
by the light of a shaded taper, the door, he thought, 
opened, and the form of his deceased partner en- 
tered, assured him of her complete happiness, and 

• Hibbert m Arparitions, p. 470. Second ediHon, 



284 REASON. 

enjoined him to follow her footsteps.'' This second 
appearance was probably a dream ; the first is dis- 
tinctly referable to the principles stated in the pre- 
ceding observations. 

An interesting case referable to this head is de- 
scribed by Sir Walter Scott, in his late work on 
Demonology and Witchcraft : — " Not long after the 
death of a late illnstrions poet, who had filled, while 
living, a great station in the eye of the public, a lite- 
rary friend, to whom the deceased had been well 
laiown, was engaged during the darkening twilight 
of an autumn evening in perusing one of the publica- 
cations whicli professed to detail the habits and 
opinions of the distinguished individual who was 
now no more. As the reader had enjoyed the inti- 
macy of the deceased to a considerable degree, he 
was deeply interested in the publication, which con- 
tained some particulars relating to himself and other 
friends. A visiter was sitting in the apartment, who 
was also engaged in reading. Their sitting-room 
opened into an entrance-hall rather fantastically 
fitted up with articles of armour, skins of wild ani- 
mals, and the like. It was when laying down his 
book, and passing into this hall, through which the 
moon was beginning to shine, that the individual of 
whom I speak saw right before him, and in a stand- 
ing posture, the exact representation of his departed 
friend, whose recollection had been so strongly 
brought to his imagination. He stopped for a single 
moment, so as to notice the wonderful accuracy 
with which fancy had impressed upon the bodily eye 
the peculiarities of dress and posture of the illus- 
trious poet. Sensible, however, of the delusion, he 
felt no sentiment save that of wonder at the extra- 
ordinary accuracy of the resemblance, and stepped 
onwards towards the figure, which resolved itself as 
he approached into the various materials of which 
it was composed. These were merely a screen oc- 
' cupied by great-coats, shawls, plaids, and such other 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 285 

articles as usually are found in a country entrance- 
hall." 

On this part of the subject I shall only add the 
following example, which I have received from Dr. 
Andrew Combe : — A gentleman, a friend of his, has 
in his house a number of phrenological casts, among 
which is particularly conspicuous a bust of Curran. 
A servant-girl belonging to the family, after under- 
going great fatigue, awoke early one morning, and 
beheld at the foot of her bed the apparition of Cur- 
ran. He had the same pale and cadaverous aspect 
as in the bust, but he was now dressed in a sailor's 
jacket, and his face was decorated with an immense 
pair of whiskers. In a state of extreme terror she 
awoke her fellow-servant, and asked Avhether she 
did not see the spectre. She, however, saw nothing, 
and endeavoured to rally her out of her alarm ; — but 
the other persisted in the reahty of the apparition, 
which continued visible for several minutes. The 
gentleman, it appears, keeps a pleasure yacht, the 
seamen belonging to which are frequently in the 
house. This, perhaps, was the origin of the sailor's 
dress in which the spectre appeared ; and the im- 
mense whiskers had also probably been borrowed 
from one of these occasional visiters. 

To the same principle we are probably to refer 
the stories of the apparitions of murdered persons 
haunting the murderer, until he was driven to give 
himself up to justice : many examples of this kind 
are on record. Similar effects have resulted in other 
situations from intense mental excitement. A gen- 
tleman, mentioned by Dr. Conolly, when in great 
danger of being wrecked in a boat on the Eddystone 
rocks, said he actually saw his family at the moment. 
In similar circumstances of extreme and immediate 
danger, others have described the history of their 
past lives being represented to them in such a vivid 
manner, that at a single glance the whole was before 
them, without the power of banishing the impres* 



286 REASON. 

sion. To this head we are also to refer some of the 
stories of second sight, — namely, by supposing that 
they consisted of spectral illusions arising out of 
strong mental impression, and by some natural 
coincidence fulfilled in the same manner as we have 
seen in regard to dreams. Many of these anecdotes 
are evidently embellished and exaggerated ; but the 
following I have received from a most respectable 
clergyman, as being to his personal knowledge 
strictly true : In one of the Western Isles of Scot- 
land, a congregation was assembled on a Sunday 
morning, and in immediate expectation of the appear- 
ance of the clergyman, when a man started up, ut- 
tered a scream, and stood looking to the pulpit with 
a countenance expressive of terror. As soon as 
he could be prevailed on to speak, he exclaimed, 
" Do you not see the minister in the pulpit dressed 
in a shroud !" — A few minutes after this occurrence 
the clergyman appeared in his place, and conducted 
the service, apparently in his usual healih ; but in a 
day or two after was taken ill and died before the 
following Sunday. 

The effect of opium is well known in giving aii 
impression of reality to the visions of conception 
or imagination: several striking examples of this 
will be found in the Confessions of an Opium-Eater. 
These are in general allied, or actually amount to 
the delusions of delirium, but they are sometimes 
entirely of a different nature. My respected friend, 
the late Dr. Gregory, was accustomed to relate a 
remarkable instance which occurred to himself. He 
had gone to the north country by sea to visit a lady, 
a near relation, in whom he felt deeply interested, 
and who was in an advanced state of consumption. 
In returning from the visit, he had taken a moderate 
dose of laudanunj, with the view of preventing sea- 
sickness, and was lying on a couch in the cabin, when 
the figure of the lady appeared before him in so dis- 
tinct a manner that her actual presence could not 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 287 

have been more vivid. He was quite awake, and 
fully sensible that it was a phantasm produced by 
the opiate, along with his intense mental feeling, but 
he was unable by any eifort to banish the vision. 

Some time ago 1 attended a gentleman affected 
with a painful local disease, requiring the use of 
large opiates, but which often failed in producing 
sleep. In one watchful night there passed before 
him a long and regular exhibition of characters and 
transactions, connected with certain occurrences 
which had been the subject of much conversation in 
Edinburgh some time before. The characters suc- 
ceeded each other with all the regularity and vivid- 
ness of a theatrical exhibition : he heard their con- 
versation and long speeches that were occasionally 
made, some of which were in rhyme ; and he dis- 
tinctly remembered, and repeated next day, long 
passages from these poetical effusions. He was 
quite awake, and quite sensible that the whole was 
a phantasm ; and he remarked that when he opened 
his eyes the vision vanished, but instantly reappeared 
whenever he closed them. 

IV. Erroneous impressions connected with bodily 
disease, generally disease in the brain. The illu- 
sions, in these cases, arise in a manner strictly an- 
alogous to dreaming, and consist of some former cir- 
cumstances recalled into the mind, and believed for 
the time to have a real and present existence. The 
diseases in connexion with which they arise are 
generally of an apoplectic or inflammatory charac- 
ter, — sometimes epileptic ; and they are very fre- 
quent in the affection called delirium tremens, which 
is produced by a continued use of intoxicating 
liquors. Dr. Gregory used to mention in his lectures 
a gentleman liable to epileptic fits, in whom the 
paroxysm was generally preceded by the appearance 
of an old woman in a red cloak, who seemed to come 
up to him, and strike him on the head with her 



288 REASON. 

crutch ; at that instant he fell down in the fit. It is 
probable that there was in this case a sudden attack 
of headache connected with the accession of the 
paroxysm, and that this led to the vision in the same 
manner as bodily feelings give rise to dreams. One 
of the most singular cases on record of spectral 
illusions referable to this class, is that of Nicolai, a 
bookseller in Berlin, as described by himself, and 
quoted by Dr. Ferriar : — By strong mental emotions 
he seems to have been thrown into a state border- 
ing upon mania ; and, while in this condition, was 
haunted constantly, while awake, for several months, 
by figures of men, women, animals, and birds. A 
similar case is mentioned by Dr. Alderston :* — A 
man who kept a dram-shop saw a soldier endeavour- 
ing to force himself into his house in a menacing 
manner ; and, in rushing forward to prevent him, 
he was astonished to find it a phantom. He had af- 
terward a succession of visions of persons long dead, 
and others who were living. This man was cured 
by bleeding and purgatives : and the source of his 
first vision was traced to a quarrel which he had 
some time before wdth a drunken soldier. A gentle- 
man from America, who is also mentioned by Dr. 
Alderston, was seized with severe headache, and 
complained of troublesome dreams ; and, at the same 
time, had distinct visions of his wife and family, 
whom he had left in America. In the state of deli- 
rium tremens such visions are common, and assume 
a variety of forms. I have known a patient de- 
scribe distinctly a dance of fairies going on in the 
floor of the apartment, and give a most minute ac- 
count of their figures and dresses. 

Similar phantasms occur in various forms, in feb- 
rile diseases. A lady whom I attended some years 
ago on account of an inflammatory affection of the 
ehest, awoke her husband one night, at the cora- 

* Edlnburgli Medical Journal, vol. vl. 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 289 

mencement of her disorder, and begged him to get 
up instantly. She said she had distinctly seen a 
man enter the apartment, pass the foot of her bed, and 
go into a closet which entered from the opposite side 
of the room. She was quite awake, and fully con- 
vinced of the reahty of the appearance ; and, even 
after the closet was examined, it was found almost 
impossible to convince her that it was a delusion. 
There are numerous examples of this kind on record. 
The writer in the Christian Observer, lately referred 
to, mentions a lady who, during a severe illness, re- 
peatedly saw her father, who resided at the distance 
of many hundred miles, come to her bedside, and, 
withdrawing the curtain, address her in his usual 
voice and manner. A farmer, mentioned by the 
same writer, in returning from a market, was deeply 
affected by a most extraordinary brilliant light, 
which he thought he saw upon the road, and by an 
appearance in the hght, which he supposed to be our 
Saviour. He was greatly alarmed, and spurring his 
horse, galloped home ; remained agitated during the 
evening; was seized with typhus fever, then pre- 
vailing in the neighbourhood, and died in about ten 
days. It was afterward ascertained that on the 
morning of the day of the supposed vision, before 
he left home, he had complained of headache and 
languor ; and there can be no doubt that the spectral 
appearance was connected with the commencement 
of the fever. Entirely analogous to this, but still 
more striking in its circumstances, is a case which 
I have received from an eminent medical friend; 
and the subject of it was a near relation of his own, 
a lady about fifty. On returning one evening from 
a party, she went into a dark room to lay aside 
some part of her dress, when she saw distinctly be- 
fore her the figure of death, as a skeleton, with his 
arm uplifted, and a dart in hand. He instantly 
aimed a blow at her with the dart, which seemed to 
strike her on the left side. The same night she was 
Bb 



290 REASON. 

seized with fever, accompanied by symptoms of in- 
flammation in the left side ; but recovered after a 
severe illness. So strongly was the vision impressed 
upon her mind, that even for some time after her re- 
covery she could not pass the door of the room 
in which it occurred, without discovering agitation, 
— declaring that it was there she met with her 
illness. 

A highly intelligent friend, whom I attended 
several years ago, in a mild but very protracted 
fever, without delirium, had frequent interviews 
with a spectral visiter, who presented the appear- 
ance of an old gray-headed man, of a most benig- 
nant aspect. His visits were always conducted 
exactly in the same manner : he entered the room 
by a door which was on the left-hand side of the 
bed, passed the end of the bed, and seated himself 
on a chair on the right-hand side : he then fixed 
his eyes upon the patient with an expression of in- 
tense interest and pity, but never spoke ; continued 
distinctly visible for some seconds, and then seemed 
to vanish into air. His visits were sometimes re- 
peated daily for several days, but sometimes he 
missed a day : — and the appearance continued for 
several weeks. The same gentleman on another 
occasion, when in perfect health, sitting in his par- 
lour in the evening, saw distinctly in the corner of 
the room a female figure in a kneeling posture, who 
continued visible for several seconds.^ 

In a lady, whose case is mentioned in the Edin* 
burgh Journal of Science for April, 1830, there was 
an illusion aflfecting both sight and hearing. She 
repeatedly heard her husband's voice calling to her 
by name, as if from an adjoining room ; and on one 
occasion, saw his figure most distinctly, standing 
before the fire in the drawing-room, when he had 
left the house half an hour before. She went and 
sat down within two feet of the figure, supposing it 
to be her husband, and was greatly astonished that 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 291 

he did not answer when she spoke to him. The 
figure continued visible for several minutes, then 
moved towards a window at the farther end of the 
room, and there disappeared. A few days after this 
appearance, she saw the figure of a cat lying on the 
hearth-rug ; and, on another occasion, while adjust- 
ing her hair before a mirror, late at night, she saw 
the countenance of a friend, dressed in a shroud, 
reflected from the mirror, as if looking over her 
shoulder. This lady had been for some time in 
bad health, being affected with pectoral complaints, 
and much nervous debility. A remarkable feature 
of this case was the illusion of hearing ; and of this 
I have received another example from a medical 
friend in England. A clergyman, aged fifty-six, 
accustomed to full living, was suddenly seized with 
vomiting, vertigo, and ringmg in his ears, and con- 
tinued in rather an alarming condition for several 
days. During this time, he had the sound in his 
ears of tunes most distinctly played, and in accurate 
succession. This patient had, at the same time, a 
very remarkable condition of vision, such as I have 
not heard of in any other case. All objects appeared 
to him inverted. This peculiarity continued three 
days, and then ceased gradually ; — the objects by 
degrees changing their position, first to the hori- 
zontal, and then to the erect. 

V. To these sources of spectral illusions, we are 
to add, though not connected with our present sub- 
ject, those which originate in pure misconception; 
the imagination working up into a spectral illusion 
something which is really a very trivial occurrence. 
Of this class is an anecdote, mentioned by Dr. Hib- 
bert, of a whole ship's company being thrown into 
the utmost state of consternation by the apparition 
of a cook who had died a few days before. He was 
distinctly seen walking ahead of the ship, with a 
peculiar gait, by which he was distinguished wheni 



L 



292 REASON. 

alive, from having one of his legs shorter than the 
other. On steering the ship towards the object, it 
was found to be a piece of floating wreck. A story- 
referable to the same principle is related by Dr. 
Ferriar : — A gentleman travelling in the Highlands 
of Scotland was conducted to a bedroom which 
was reported to be haunted by the spirit of a man 
who had there committed suicide. In the night he 
awoke under the influence of a frightful dream, and 
found himself sitting up in bed with a pistol grasped 
in his right-hand. On looking round the room he 
now discovered, by the moonlight, a corpse dressed 
in a shroud reared against the wall, close by the 
window; the features of the body, and every part 
of the funeral apparel being perceived distinctly. 
On recovering from the first impulse of terror, so 
far as to investigate the source of the phantom, it 
was found to be produced by the moonbeams form- 
ing a long bright image through the broken window. 
Two esteemed friends of mine, while travelling in 
the Highlands, had occasion to sleep in separate 
beds in one apartment. One of them, having awoke 
in the night, saw by the moonlight a skeleton hang- 
ing from the head of his friend's bed,— every part 
of it being perceived in the most distinct manner. 
He instantly got up to investigate the source of the 
illusion, and found it to be produced by the moon- 
beams falling upon the drapery of the bed, which 
had been thrown back, in some unusual manner, on 
account of the heat of the weather. He returned 
to bed and soon fell asleep. But having awoke 
again some time after, the skeleton was still so dis- 
tinctly before hmi, that he could not sleep without 
again getting up to trace the origin of the phantom. 
Determined not to be disturbed a third time, he now 
brought down the curtain into its usual state, and 
the skeleton appeared no more, 



CNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 293 



PART I Y. 

APPLICATION OF THE RULES OF PHILO- 
SOPHICAL INVESTIGATION TO MEDICAL 
SCIENCE. 

There has been much difference of opmion among 
philosophers in regard to the place which medicine 
is entitled to hold among the physical sciences ; for 
while one has maintained that it "rests upon an 
eternal basis, and has within it the power of rising 
to perfection," it has been distinctly asserted by 
another, that "almost the only resource of medicine 
is the art of conjecturing." " The following apo- 
logue," says D'Alembert, " made by a physician, a 
man of wit and of philosophy, represents very well 
the state of that science. Nature," says he, " is 
fighting with disease ; a blind man armed with a 
club, that is, the physician, comes to settle the differ- 
ence. He first tries to make peace ; when he can- 
not accomplish this, he hfts his club and strikes at 
random ; if he strikes the disease, he kills the dis- 
ease ; if he strikes nature, he kills nature." " An 
eminent physician," says the same writer, " renounc- 
ing a practice which he had exercised for thirty 
years, said, ' I am wearied of guessing.' " 

The uncertainty of medicine, which is thus^ a 
theme both for the philosopher and the humourist, is 
deeply felt by the practical physician in the daily 
exercise of his art. It becomes, therefore, an in- 
quiry of the utmost importance, — what the sources 
of this uncertainty are, — where that point is in our 
researches at which its influeace begins, — and, when 
Bb2 



294 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

we arrive at this point, what the means are by which 
it may be diminished. 

The perfect uniformity of all the phemonena of 
nature we have seen to be the foundation of the 
certainty of results in physical science. For when 
the order and relations of these phenomena have 
once been ascertained, we calculate with confidence 
that they will continue to observe the same order. 
Proceeding upon this confidence, in relations which 
have been observed regarding the heavenly bodies, 
the astronomer foretels their positions even at very 
distant periods. In the same manner, the chymist, 
having ascertained the actions which take place 
when certain substances are brought into contact, 
and the new combinations which follow, decides 
with confidence that, in every instance in which 
these agents are brought together, the same actions 
will take' place, and will be followed by the same 
combinations. This confidence, which lies at the 
foundation of all science, we have seen to be an 
original or instinctive principle, and not the result 
of experience ; but it is the province of experience 
to ascertain the particular sequences to which it 
may be applied ; in other words, to distinguish casual 
relations and sequences from those which we are 
entitled to consider as uniform. 

The uncertainty of medicine resolves itself chiefly 
into an apparent want of that uniformity of phe- 
nomena, which is so remarkable in other branches 
of physical science. There are, in particular, two 
departments of our inquiries, in which we feel con- 
tinually the effect of this want of uniformity,— the 
characters and the progress of disease, and the 
action of external agents upon the body. 

Since medicine was first cultivated as a science, 
a leading object of attention has ever been to as- 
certain the characters or symptoms by which par- 
Iticular internal diseases are indicated, and by which 



TTNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 295 

they are distinguished from other diseases which 
resemble them. But, with the accumulated experi- 
ence of ages bearing upon this important subject, 
our extended observation has only served to con- 
vince us how deficient we are in this department, 
and how often, even in the first step in our progress, 
we are left to conjecture. A writer of high eminence 
has even hazarded the assertion that those persons 
are most confident in regard to the characters of 
disease whose knowledge is most limited, and that 
more extended observation generally leads to doubt. 
After showing the uncertainty of the symptoms 
which are usually supposed to indicate effusion in 
the thorax, Morgagni adds the remarkable assertion 
to which I here allude : " qui enim plura corpora 
inspexerunt, hi saltem, cum illi nil dubitant, epsi 
dubitare didicerunt." If such uncertainty hangs 
over our knowledge of the characters of disease, it 
will not be denied that at least an equal degree of un- 
certainty attends its progress. We have learned, for 
example, the various modes by which internal in- 
flammation terminates, — as resolution, suppuration, 
gangrene, adhesion, and effusion ; but, in regard to 
a particular case of inflammation which is before us, 
how little notion can we form of what will be its 
progress, or how it will terminate. 

An equal or even a more remarkable uncertainty 
attends all our researches on the second head to 
which I have referred, namely, the action of exter- 
nal agents upon the body. These engage our atten- 
tion in two respects, — as causes of disease, and as 
remedies ; and in both these views the action of 
them is fraught with the highest degree of uncer- 
tainty. In regard to the action of external agents 
as causes of disease, we may take a single example 
in the effects of cold. Of six individuals who have 
been exposed to cold in the same degree, and, so 
far as we can judge, under the same circumstances, 
one may be seized with inflammation of the lungs, 



296 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

one with diarrhoea, and one with rheumatism, while 
three may escape without any injury. Not less 
remarkable is the uncertainty in regard to the action 
of remedies. One case appears to yield with readi- 
ness to the remedies that are employed ; on another, 
which we have every reason to believe to be of the 
same nature, no effect is produced in arresting its 
fatal progress; while a third, which threatened to 
be equally formidable, appears to cease without the 
operation of any remedy at all. 

With these complicated sources of uncertainty, 
which meet us at every step in our medical inquiries, 
it is almost unnecessary to contrast the perfect uni- 
formity of phenomena, on a confidence in which we 
proceed in other departments of science. When 
we mix together pieces of zinc, sulphuric acid, and 
water, we pronounce with perfect confidence that 
the water will be decomposed, hydrogen evolved, 
the metal oxidated, the oxyd dissolved, and sulphate 
of zinc produced ; we pronounce with equal confi- 
dence on all the properties, mechanical and chymi- 
cal, of the new compound which is thus to be 
formed; and in no case have we the smallest doubt 
of the exact occurrence of every step in this com- 
plicated process. With what different feelings we 
contemplate, in its commencement, a case of dan- 
gerous internal disease, — its probable progress and 
termination, and the effect wliich our remedies are 
likely to produce in arresting it, — those best can 
tell who have most experienced them. 

The certainty of a science, as was formerly stated, 
depends upon two circumstances; namely, the fa- 
ciHty with which we ascertain the true relations 
and tendencies of things, or trace effects to their 
true causes, and causes to their true effects ; and 
the confidence with which we rely on the actions, 
dependent on these relations, continuing to occur 
in all cases with perfect uniformity. This confi- 



UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 297 

dence we easily attain in those sciences in which 
we have to deal only with inanimate matter. We 
do so by means of experiments, in which, by placing 
the substances in various circumstances towards 
each other, we come to ascertain their true tenden- 
cies with perfect certainty, and to separate them 
from the influence of all associations which are 
only casual and incidental. Having thus discovered 
their tendencies or actions, we rely with confidence 
on these continuing to be uniform ; and should we 
in any instance be disappointed in the action which 
we wish to produce, we are able to trace the cause 
by which the expected result has been prevented, 
and to obviate the effect of its interference. 

In both these respects we find in medicine a de- 
gree of uncertainty which marks a striking distinc- 
tion between it and the purely physical sciences. 

I. There is great difficulty in medicine in tracing 
effects to their true causes, and causes to their true 
eflfects. This difficulty has already been illustrated 
by the same cause appearing to produce in different 
instances different diseases, or no disease at all ; and 
by a disease seeming to subside under the use of a 
remedy which, in a similar case, fails to produce the 
smallest benefit. When we find our researches thus 
encumbered with uncertainty, we cannot, as in other 
sciences, clear them from the influence of casual re- 
lations by means of direct experiment ; but are 
obliged to trust chiefly to the slow course of obser- 
vation, as the relations happen to be presented to us. 
Hence just conclusions are arrived at slowly, and 
we may be obliged to go on through a long course 
of observations, before we arrive at any results 
which we feel to be worthy of confidence. Hence 
also arises the great temptation to grasp at partial 
and premature conclusions, from which medical 
science has suffered so much injury. For when 
Buch conclusions are brought forward with confidence, 



298 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

as long a course of observation may be required for 

exposing their fallacy as might have been sufficient 
for ascertaining the truth. In this respect we see 
the remarkable difference between medicine and the 
purely physical sciences ; as, in the latter, a single 
experiment may often be sufficient to overturn the 
most plausible hypothesis, or to establish one which 
has been proposed only in conjecture. 

II. Even after we have ascertained the true rela- 
tions and tendencies of things, we are constantly 
liable to disappointment in medicine, when we en- 
deavour to produce certain results by bringing these 
tendencies into action. This arises from the silent 
operation of a new order of causes, by which the 
phenomena of disease are varied and modified; and 
b}' which the action of external agents is aided, 
modified, or counteracted in a manner which alto- 
gether eludes our researches. The causes which 
thus operate are certain powers in the living body 
itself, the action of which is entirely beyond our 
control ; and others arising out of the peculiarities 
of age, sex, temperament of body and mind, and 
mental emotions; constituting a class of agents of a 
most powerful kind, of which it is impossible to es- 
timate the combined operation. It is farther to be 
kept in view, that these various agents may be act- 
ing together, or in opposition to each other, or under 
a variety of combinations; and that, in reference to 
our attempts to act upon the body by remedies, they 
may be operating in concert with, or in opposition 
to these attempts. Hence arises a most extensive 
source of uncertainty in all our investigations, of 
which it is impossible to calculate the effect, or the 
extent. Hence also arises that apparent want of 
uniformity in the phenomena of disease, by which 
we are so much impeded in our r-esearches; and 
that want of uniformity in the action of remedies, 
by which our efforts in njedicine are so often dis- 
appointed, 



UNCERTAINTY OF MEDICINE. 299 

ni. Another source of uncertainty in the practi- 
cal art of medicine is the difficulty which we find 
in applying to new cases the knowledge which we 
have acquired from observation. This application 
is made upon the principle either of experience or 
analogy. We are said to proceed upon experience 
when the circumstances in the new case are the 
same as in those cases from which our knowledge 
was derived. When the circumstances are not the 
same, but similar, we proceed upon analogy ; and 
our confidence in the result is weaker than when 
we proceed upon experience. The more numerous 
the points of resemblance are, the greater is our 
confidence, because it approaches the more nearly 
to that which we derive from experience ; and the 
fewer the points of resemblance, our confidence is 
more and more diminished. When, in the practice 
of medicine, we apply to new cases the knowledge 
acquired from others which we believe to have been 
of the same nature, the difficulties are so great, that 
it is doubtful whether in any case we can properly 
be said to act upon experience, as we do in other 
departments of science. For we have not the means 
of determining with certainty, that the condition of 
the disease, the habit of the patient, and all the cir- 
cumstances which enter into the character of the 
affection, are in any two cases precisely the same : • 
and if they differ in any one particular, we cannot 
be said to act from experience, but only from analogy. 
The difficulties and sources of uncertainty which 
meet us at every stage of such investigations are, 
in fact, so great and numerous, that those who have 
had the most extensive opportunities of observation 
will be the first to acknowledge that our pretended 
experience must, in general, sink into analogy, and 
even our analogy too often into conjecture. 

In a science encumbered with so many difficulties, 
and encompassed by so many sources of error, it is 
obvious what cause we have for proceeding with the 
Utmost caution, and for advancing from step to step 



300 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

with the greatest circumspection. In attempting a 
slight outline of a subject so extensive and so im- 
poitant, I shall confine myself to a few leading rules 
of a strictly practical nature. 

The objects to be kept in view in all our investi- 
gations appear to be the following : — 

T. To acquire an extensive collection of well-au- 
thenticated facts. 

II. To arrange, classify, combine, or separate 
these facts. 

III. To trace among the facts, sequences, or rela- 
tions, particularly the relation of cause and effect. 

IV. From an extensive collection of facts to de- 
duce general facts or general principles. 



SECTION I. 

OP THE ACQUISITION AND RECEPTION OF FACTS* 

The foundation of all knowledge must be a care- 
ful and extensive acquisition of facts ; and the first 
duty of an inquirer in any department of science is 
to bind himself down to such a patient accumula- 
tion, bewaring of all premature attempts to combine 
or generalize them. 

In the acquisition of facts, we depend partly on 
our own observation, and partly on the testimony 
of others. The former source is necessarily limited 
in extent, but it is that in which we have the greater 
confidence ; for, in receiving facts on the testimony 
of others, we require to be satisfied, not only of the 
veracity of the narrators, but also of their habits as 



RECEPTION OF FACTS. 301 

philosophical observers, and of the opportunities 
which they have had of ascertaining the facts. In 
the degree of evidence which we require for new 
facts, we are also influenced, as was formerly stated, 
by their probability, or their accoidance with facts 
previously known to us ; and for facts which appear 
to us improbable, we require a higher amount of 
testimony than for those in accordance with our 
previous knowledge. This necessary caution, how- 
ever, while it preserves us from credulity, should 
not, on the other hand, be allowed to engender skep- 
ticism ; for both these extremes are equally unworthy 
of a mind which devotes itself with candour to tlie 
discovery of truth. 

In forming a collection of facts, therefore, in 
reference to any investigation, we may state the 
cautions to be observed, and the errors to be guarded 
against, as chiefly referable to the following points : 

I. Receiving facts on the testimony of persons 
of doubtful veracity, or whom we suspect of having 
purposes to answer by disguising, colouring, or 
modifying them. 

II. Receiving facts on the testimony of persons 
of whom we have doubts of their opportunities of 
acquiring correct information, or of their powers 
and habits of accurate observation : receiving, for 
example, important statements on the authority of 
hasty and superficial observers, or of incompetent 
persons, not professional. 

III. Partial statements of facts bearing upon one 
view of a subject, or one side of a question, or col- 
lected in support of a particular doctrine. This, 
when simply stated, will be universally admitted to 
be an error of the first magnitude in every scientific 
investigation ; and yet, I imagine, it would not be 
difficult, even in very recent times, to find some 

C c 



302 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

remarKable examples of it. There is, indeed, 
scarcely any doctrine which may not in the hands 
of an ingenious person be wrought up in this man- 
ner into a fair system, amply supported by facts ; 
and it is obvious that nothing can be more contrary 
to the rules of sound inquiry. On this ground, we 
may even make it a rule to receive with suspicion 
the statements of a writer, when we find him first 
proposing his doctrine, and then proceeding to collect 
from all quarters facts in support of it. Such a 
mode of investigation must be considered as con- 
trary to the principles of fair induction ; for these 
lead us first to take a full view of the facts, and then 
to trace the principles or doctrines which arise out 
of them. 

IV. Receiving as facts on which important con- 
clusions are to be founded circumstances which are 
trivial, incidental, or foreign to the subject. For 
example, in the investigation of affections of the 
spinal cord, appearances have been often considered 
as indicative of disease, which we have good reason 
to believe have arisen merely from the position of 
the body after death. In the same manner, in the 
investigation of a certain class of diseases, an im- 
portant place has been assigned to slight appearances 
in the gastro-intestinal membrane, which, we have 
reason to believe, are entirely incidental, and worthy 
of no confidence in a pathological inquiry. 

V. Receiving as facts statements which falsely 
obtain that name. The sources of fallacy to be kept 
in view under this head are chiefly the following: — 

(1.) Receiving as facts statements which are not 
facts but opinions. — A person dies after being affected 
with a certain set of symptoms, and we find, on ex- 
amination after death, the usual appearances of hy- 
drocephalus. Another is seized with similar symp- 
toms, and recovers. He is therefore said to have 



RECEPTION OF FACTS. 303 

recovered from hydrocephalus, and such a statement 
is often given as a medical fact. The man's recov- 
ery from certain symptoms is a fact; that he recov- 
ered from hydrocephalus is not a fact, but an opinion. 

(2.) Receiving as a fact a statement which only 
assumes the relation of facts. — A person recovers 
from a particular disease, while he was using a par- 
ticular remedy. His recovery is ascribed to the 
effect of the remedy ; and the cure of the disease by 
this remedy is often given as a medical fact. The 
man's recover}' is a fact ; and that he used the remedy 
is another fact; but the connexion of the remedy 
with his recovery we are not entitled to assume as 
a fact : — It is tracing between the facts the relation 
of cause and effect, — a process of the utmost delicacy, 
and not to be admitted on any occasion without the 
greatest caution. 

(3.) Receiving as facts general statements, or the 
generalization of facts. One of the most common 
examples of this error occurs, when a statement is 
given of a symptom or set of symptoms as certainly 
diagnostic of any particular disease, or of a par- 
ticular morbid condition of an internal organ. Such 
a statement we hold to be of no value, unless we 
have absolute confidence in the narrator, both in 
regard to his habits as a philosophical observer, and 
to the extent of the observations on which his state- 
ment is founded. But, with every possible advan- 
tage in these respects, we are to exercise the utmost 
caution before we receive the relation thus stated 
as a fact ; for it is to be kept in mind, that it is not 
properly a fact, but a generalization of facts. Some 
writers, for instance, have maintained with much 
confidence that a particular state of rigidity of some 
of the limbs is distinctly characteristic of ramoUisse- 
ment of the brain. But farther observation has 
shown that the disease may exist without this symp- 
tom, and that this condition of the limbs may appear 
in connexion with other diseases. Their observation 



304 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

of facts was in so far correct, that this state of 
limbs does very often accompany ramollissement of 
the brain; the error consisted in giving it as a gene- 
ral fact, or a fact applicable to all cases of ramol- 
lissement — which is without foundation. Yet such 
statements, when brought forward with confidence, 
are often received as facts, and rested upon as estab- 
lished principles ; and then the facts by which their 
fallacy might be detected are apt to be overlooked 
or forgotten. 

This may perhaps be considered as one of the 
most prevailing errors in the modern science of 
medicine ; and it is indeed astonishing to observe the 
confidence with which such statements are brought 
forward, and the facility with which they are received 
as equivalent to facts, without attention to the mani- 
fold sources of fallacy with which they are encum- 
bered. Does a writer, for example, tell us he has 
ascertained that the spinal cord is diseased in all 
cases of tetanus. If we knew that such a state- 
ment had been founded on the careful observation 
of a hundred cases, it would be of value ; if it was 
deduced from a few, its value is greatly diminished. 
But even if it had been deduced from the larger 
number, certain doubts would still arise in con- 
sidering the relation thus stated as a fact. "We 
should naturally ask ourselves, — was the narrator 
qualified to judge of the facts and their relations, — 
were the cases referred to all really cases of tetanus, 
— were the appearances in the cord such as could 
properly be considered as indicating disease, or might 
any of them have been mere changes of colour, or 
other incidental appearances, which might have taken 
place after deafli, or might have been the effect of the 
convulsion rather than its cause, — or were they such 
changes as may be found in other cases without any 
symptoms of tetanus 1 Other sources of fallacy will 
come into view, if the statement be, that the nar- 
rator has uniformly found a certain remedy of great 



RECEPTION OF FACTS. 305 

efficacy in a particular disease. Here, in the first 
place, similar questions occur as in the former 
instance ; — on how many cases did he found his 
statement, — how did he ascertain the disease, — and 
was he qualified to decide that it really was a case 
of the disease which he alleges ] But, supposing all 
these questions to be answered in a satisfactory man- 
ner, others still arise, namely, — had the alleged treat- 
ment really any influence on the recovery of the 
patients, — did they get well in consequence of the 
treatment, or in spile of it, or altogether indepen- 
xiently of it, — have not similar cases recovered spon- 
taneously, or under modes of treatment entirely 
<iifferent] Such is the uncertainty of causation and 
generalization in medicine ; and such is the danger 
of receiving general statements as equivalent to facts. 

VI. In forming a collection of facts on which we 
are to found any conclusions, it is always to be kept 
in mind that fallacy may arise from the absence of 
important facts, as well as from the reception of 
statements which are untrue. Hence the erroneous 
conclusions that may be deduced from statements 
which are strictly true; and hence the fallacious 
systems that are built up with every appearance of 
plausibility and truth, when facts are collected on 
one side of a question, .or in support of a particular 
doctrine. 

In forming a collection of facts, therefore, as the 
preliminary step in any inquiry, the following rules 
ought to be kept strictly and constantly in view before 
we advance to any conclusions : — 

I. That all the facts be fully ascertained, — that 
those collected by ourselves be derived from sufl[i- 
cient observation, — and that those which we receive 
from others be received only on the testimony of 
persons fully qualified to judge of their accuracy, 
C c2 



306 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

and who have had sufficient opDortunities of ac- 
quiring them. 

II. That the statement include a full and fair view 
of all the facts which ought to be taken into the in- 
vestigation ; that none of them be disguised, or modi- 
fied so as to be made to bear upon a particular doc- 
trine ; and that no essential facts be wanting. 

III. That the statement do not include facts which 
are trivial, incidental, or foreign to the subject. 

IV. That we do not receive as facts statements 
which are not facts, but opinions or general as- 
sumptions. 



SECTION II. 

OF ARRANGING, COMBINING, AND SEPARATING FACTS. 

The precautions now suggested appear to be those 
which it is necessary to keep in view in making a 
collection of facts respecting any subject under in- 
vestigation. Our next step is to arrange the facts 
according to the characters in which they agree ; to 
separate from the mass those which appear to be 
only fortuitous or occasional concomitants ; and to 
place by themselves those which we have reason to 
consider as a uniform and legitimate series or se- 
quence. This is the first step towards tracing the 
relations of the facts ; and in every investigation it 
is a process of the utmost consequence. In the other 
departments of physical science this object is accom- 
plished by means of experiments. These are so con- 
trived as to bear distinctly upon particular points; 
and by the result of thera we are enabled to separate 



COMBINING AND SEPARATING FACTS. 307 

associations which are incidental from those which 
are uniform ; or, in other words, to ascertain what 
number of the circumstances which we find asso- 
ciated in a particular series are really connected with 
the result which follows. In medicine this is a pro- 
cess of greater diiSculty, because we are obliged to 
trust to the slower course of minute and long-con- 
tinued observation. 

The rules to be observed under this head are essen- 
tial to every department of medical inquiry; but, 
perhaps, they are peculiarly important in our obser- 
vations respecting the phenomena of disease. By 
this, we mean such an acquaintance with the symp- 
toms which characterise particular diseases, and the 
morbid appearances in the cases which are fatal, as 
shall enable us to trace the relation between the 
symptoms and the nature and seat of the disease. 
A full collection of uniform and essential facts on 
these subjects, cleared as far as we are able from 
all incidental combinations, is the only true founda- 
tion of medical science ; and every system, however 
ingenious, which rests upon any other, can be nothing 
better than hypothesis and conjecture. It is an es- 
sential but difficult part of medical investigation, 
and one which we must conduct with much patience, 
without allowing ourselves to be seduced by theory 
or system from the path of rigid observation. In 
prosecuting it we must be cautious in considering 
our conclusions as perfect, but make it our constant 
study by further observation to clear them more and 
more from every source of error. 

Whatever leads the mind from the importance and 
the difficulty of this investigation is injurious to medi- 
cal science. The error to be chiefly avoided is a 
fondness for system ; and I must confess my suspi- 
cion that, in this respect, a zeal for nosology has 
been unfavourable to the progress of medicine. The 
nosologist proceeds upon the principle that the char- 
acters of disease are, to a certain extent, fixed and 



308 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

determined, like the botanical characters of a plant, 
or the chymical properties of a mineral. Hence it 
too frequently happens that individual cases are com- 
pared with the system, instead of the system being 
corrected by further observation. In this manner 
young practitioners are in danger of attempting to 
ascertain a disease by its agreement with the noso- 
logical characters, and are drawn away from that 
minute attention to the phenomena which alone can 
lead to correct diagnosis. Thus, a medical man 
might argue with regard to a case indicating disease 
in the brain, that there can be no effusion, because 
the pulse has never been below the natural standard, 
or because the pupils are not dilated ; or, with regard 
to an affection of the abdomen, that there is no in- 
flammation, because the pulse is strong and the 
bowels open. Nosology, it is true, teaches him that 
in hydrocephalus, at a certain period, the pulse be- 
comes slow, and the pupils dilated ; and that, in intes- 
tinal inflammation, the pulse is small and the bowels 
obstructed ; but no great extent of observation is re- 
quired to show that the symptoms now mentioned 
are not uniform or essential to these diseases. Such 
a confidence in system must be equally injurious to 
the improvement of the individual, and to the pro- 
gress of medical science ; and the examp^ ;s now 
given will be sufficient to illustrate the importance 
of the rule which these obsei vations are intended to 
convey, — separating facts which are occasional or 
incidental from those which are uniform and essential. 
On this subject I shall only add the following anec- 
dote, which I lately received from a medical man of 
very high intelligence. At an early period of his 
career as a naval surgeon he was left in charge of a 
ship on the West India station, when several sailors 
presented themselves with an affection of the legs, 
the nature of which was entirely new to him. Hav- 
ing expressed his difficulty to one of the officers, not 
medical, he was promptly told that the disease was 



TRACING CAUSATION. 309 

scurvy, and that if he exammed the gums of his pa- 
tients he would find sufficient evidence. To this he 
rephed that the thing- was impossible, because in the 
nosology of Dr. Cullen it was expressly specified 
that scurvy occurs " in regione frigida." He was, 
however, soon convinced that the disease was really 
scurvy, though it occurred in the West Indies ; and, 
as he added, received a most important lesson, — to 
observe for himself, instead of trusting to systems. 



SECTION III. 

OF TRACING AMONG FACTS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND 
EFFECT. 

Our knowledge of cause and effect, in reference to 
any two particular events, is founded entirely upon 
the observation of a uniform sequence of the events ; 
or of the one following the other in a uniform man- 
ner in a great number of instances. The greater 
the number of instances is in which the sequence 
has taken place, with the greater confidence, as for- 
merly remarked, do we expect it to take place again 
under similar circumstances ; and every single in- 
stance in which it does not occur weakens this con- 
fidence, unless we can discover some adequate cause 
by which the sequence was interrupted. The result 
of this confidence is, that when we observe the first 
of two such events, we expect the second to follow 
it ; and that when we observe the second, we con- 
clude the first has preceded it : the first we call cause, 
the second effect. 

In every department of science it is a step of the 
utmost delicacy to assign to two events this relation ; 
and manifold errors arise from assigning it on inade- 



310 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

quate grounds, — that is, on an insufficient number of 
observations. In medical science we have further 
to contend vv^ith peculiar difficulties and sources of 
error. These have been already mentioned as re- 
ferable to two classes, — namely, the difficulty of 
tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to 
their true effects ; and the manner in which the real 
tendencies of antecedents or causes are modified or 
counteracted by a new series of causes which elude 
our observation. From these pecuharities it often 
happens that the true antecedents of important events 
are of an obscure and hidden nature ; while the ap- 
parent relations would lead us to associate them with 
antecedents more immediately under our view, but 
whose connexion with the results is entirely inci- 
dental. Other obstacles arise from difficulty in ascer- 
taining the facts themselves, and in tracing the order 
of the sequences; as, in doing so, we are often 
obliged to trust to obscure indications of actions 
which are going on in internal parts, and which are 
themselves liable to much uncertainty. Thus, a com- 
plicated source of difficulty pervades the whole sub- 
ject of medical causation, and makes it one of the 
most delicate topics that can engage the attention of 
the philosophical inquirer. 

There are three particular views in which, in medi- 
cal investigations, we have occasion to trace among 
successive events the relation of uniform sequence, 
— namely, the effects of external agents as causes 
of disease, — the effects of external agents as reme- 
dies, — arid the connexion of certain morbid condi- 
tions of internal organs v^^ith certain symptoms by 
which these become known to us. In regard to all 
these objects of research, it is of importance to keep 
in mind the sources of fallacy to which we are liable, 
in assigning to a succession of events the relation of 
uniform sequence, or, in other words, in considering[ 
the one as the cause of the other. 



TRACING CAUSATION. 311 

I. The connexion which we observe may be en- 
tirely accidental. That causation should be assigned 
on g-rounds so slight as to admit of this explanation 
may appear improbable ; but no person acquainted 
with the history of medicine will find difficulty in 
pointing out examples of it, especially in the effects 
which are often ascribed to remedies on the slightest 
possible grounds. In this manner, by some bold and 
confident assertion, founded probably on very limhed 
observation, a remedy is frequently brought into re- 
pute as nearly infallible in a certain class of diseases, 
which we find in a very short time consigned to 
oblivion. 

II. The events may be closely connected, but not 
as cause and effect. They may be effects of a third 
event, which is the cause of both ; or they may be 
parts in a sequence in which we have still to discover 
the true antecedent. Thus, in the examination of 
the bodies of those who have died of hydrocephalus, 
the liver has frequently been found in a state of dis- 
ease ; and, upon this ground, diseased liver has been 
stated as one of the causes of hydrocephalus. This 
must be considered as an example of false causation, 
for, in its reference to hydrocephalus, diseased liver 
cannot be considered in any other light than as an- 
other effect of a common cause, — namely, as a result 
of that unhealthy state of the constitution in which 
hydrocephalus is mot;t apt to occur. When the na- 
ture of croup was first investigated, the formation 
of a new membrane was observed in the larynx, and 
this was considered as the cause of croup. Further 
investigation, however, showed that this was but 
one of a chain of sequences, the real antecedent of 
which is inflammation of the membrane lining the 
larynx. 

III. The events may be really connected as cause 
and efieci, while there is difficulty in assigning to 



312 MEDICAL SCIENCE* 

them their places in the sequence ; that is, in deter- 
mining which is cause and which is effect. This 
occurs when, in ascertaining the facts themselves 
and the order of their sequence, we are obhged to 
trust to external indications of actions which are 
going on in internal parts. It is a difficulty of fre- 
quent occurrence ; and want of due attention to it 
appears to have been the source of much fallacious 
reasoning. In the investigations, for example, re- 
specting the nature of continued fever, various mor- 
bid appearances have been observed in the internal 
parts ; and each of these has in its turn been confi- 
dently assigned as the cause of fever. Thus, one 
has placed the seat and cause of fever in the brain; 
another in the spinal cord ; a third in the gastro- 
intestinal membrane ; and, according to one of the 
latest doctrines, inflammation of the mucous follicles 
of Peyer and Brunner has been confidently stated as 
the cause of every modification of fever. It does not 
belong to this part of our inquiry to examine minutely 
the comparative merit of these systems. In all of 
them there is a correct observation of facts, and 
probably a real relation of cause and effect ; the error 
consists in fixing the order of the sequence ; for a 
very shght view of the subject is sufficient to show- 
that the morbid appearances on which they rest must 
be considered as effects, or incidental concomitants 
of fever, — not as its cause. This kind of false causa- 
tion may also occur in other subjects. In certain 
states of the weather, for example, many people are 
in the habit of saying that a shower brings a change 
of the wind. There is every reason to believe that 
there is between the two events a real connexion of 
causation, but the meteorologist rather tells us that 
the change of the wind produces the shower. 

IV. When we observe a particular change m the 
living body, and trace an apparent relation between 
it and some external agent which seems to be the 



TRACING CAUSATION. 313 

Immediate antecedent, it may very often happen that 
other agents are concerned which elude our ohser- 
vation ; though they have been the real antecedents 
or agents in the change which has taken place, or 
have contributed to it in a very great degree. This 
is a priucipte of most extensive application in medical 
causation, and is one of the chief sources of its diffi- 
culty and uucertainty. The agents referred to are 
chiefly certain powers in the living body itself. These 
in all cases exert a greater or less influence in the 
changes which are the objects of our inquiries, and 
in many cases are the sole agents in producing re- 
sults which we falsely and ignorantly ascribe to our 
remedies. When a disease has terminated favour- 
ably our treatment may have b^en proper, and may 
have co-operated v/ith these powers; it may have 
been totally inefficient and harmless, and have had 
no influence whatever in producing the result ; or it 
may have been improper and hurtful, and yet these 
powers may both have thrown ofl" the disease, and 
have counteracted the effects of our blind inter- 
ference. It is unnecessary to allude, also, to the ex- 
tensive influence which, in certain classes of diseases, 
is produced by passions and affections of the mind, 
often of so delicate a nature that even the person 
who is the subject of them shall not be aware of 
their influence. 

The sources of false causation in regard to the 
action of remedies, therefore, may be chiefly referred 
to the following heads : — 

1. The disease being thrown off" by the powers 
of the constitution itself, or removed by some cir- 
cumstances either external or mental, which are not 
taken into account, or perhaps not known ; while 
the recovery of the patient is ascribed to some 
remedy which he was using at the time, but which 
had no influence whatever in producing it. From 
this source have arisen the many instances of inert 
or trivial remedies acquiring a temporary reputation, 



314 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

which have been afterward .entirely neglected, ot 
even expunged from the pharmacopcsia. The only 
means of avoiding this error is by using the utmost 
caution in assigning effects to particular remedies, 
and doing so only after extensive and easeful obser- 
vation. On the other hand, we are not entitled to 
decide a priori that any particular substance to 
which certain effects are ascribed is inert or un- 
worthy of attention. Candid and careful observa- 
tion of facts must be our guide in this case as well 
as in the former. 

This source of false causation is particularly to 
be kept in view in regard to those diseases which 
are greatly influenced by adventitious causes; such 
as mental emotions, or the patient's external cir- 
cumstances. A gentleman, immersed in the busi- 
ness or the pleasures of a great city, becomes dis- 
ordered in his health, dyspeptic and hypochondriacal. 
He receives much good advice from his medical 
friend, which he professes to follow with impHcit 
confidence, and proceeds to do so amid the anxieties 
of business, bad air, late hours, luxurious dinners, 
and nearly the total want of bodily exercise. De- 
riving no benefit from all that is done for him, he 
hears of some celebrated water, which has acquired 
great reputation in the cure of stomach complaints, 
and at length makes up his mind to resort tliither, 
though with little hope of deriving benefit from any 
thing. He now lays aside all bushiess, lives by rule, 
keeps early hours, and is all day long in the open 
air. He soon recovers excellent health, and cor- 
dially concurs in spreading the fame of the water 
by which a cure so wonderful has been accom- 
plished. An anecdote has been related of a physi- 
cian in London having advised a dyspeptic patient, 
who had baffled all his remedies, to go down and 
consult a celebrated physician in Inverness, whose 
name he gave him. On arriving there, he soon dis- 
covered that there was no such person to be found. 



TRACIIfG CAUSATION. 315 

He then returned to London, somewhat nettled at 
the trick which had been practised upon him, 
though he was obhged to acknowledge that he was 
cured of his disorder. 

On this subject we are especially to keep in mind 
the extensive class of diseases which are acted upon 
in a most powerful manner by causes entirely men- 
tal. These are the numerous and ever-varying mal- 
adies which are included under the terms dyspeptic, 
hj^pochondriacal, and nervous. Man}' of them have 
their origin in mental emotions which elude observa- 
tion ; and a very large proportion are entirely refer- 
able to indolence 'and inaction, — to that vacuity of 
mind attending the unfortunate condition in which 
there is no object in hfe but to find amusement for 
the passing hour. When, on patients of this de- 
scription, the dexterous empiric produces results 
which the scientific physician had failed to accom- 
plish, we are too apt to accuse him, in sweeping 
terms, of practising upon their credulity. He in 
fact employs a class of remedies of the most power- 
ful kind, to which the other perhaps attaches too 
little importance ; namely, mental excitement and 
mental occupation, — the stimulus of having some- 
thing to hope and something to do. Examples of 
this kind must have occurred to every practical 
physician. I have known a young lady, who had 
been confined to bed for months, and had derived no 
benefit from the most careful medical treatment, 
restored to health by the excitement of a marriage 
taking place, in the family. Changes of circum- 
stances, also, or misfortunes which called for new 
and unusual exertion, have often been known to 
produce similar results ; and it is a matter of old and 
frequent observation that diseases of the nervous 
class disappear during periods of public alarm and 
political convulsion. Nor is it only On diseases of 
this nature that remarkable effects are produced by 
mental causes ; for mental excitement is known to 



316 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

operate in a powerful manner on diseases of a much 
more tangible character. Dr. Gregory was accus- 
tomed to relate the case of a naval officer, who had 
been for some time laid up in his cabin, and entirely- 
unable to move, from a violent attack of gout, when 
notice was brought to him that the vessel was on 
fire: in a few minutes he was on deck, and the 
most active man in the ship. Cases of a still more 
astonishing kind are on record. A woman, men- 
tioned by Diemerbroeck, who had been many years 
paralytic, recovered the use of her limbs when she. 
was much terrified during a thunder-storm, and was 
making violent efforts to escape from a chamber in 
which she had been left alone. A man, affected in 
the same manner, recovered as suddenly, when his 
house was on fire ; and another, who had been ill for 
six years, was restored to the use of his paralytic 
limbs during a violent paroxysm of anger. 

2. Referring symptoms to a cause which is alto- 
gether hypothetical, 'and then assigning to particular 
remedies the power of removing this cause. To 
this head we may refer the remedies which were at 
one time supposed to expel morbific matter in fever, 
— those which are believed to purify the blood, to 
remove congestions at the origin of the nerves, to 
equalize the circulation, &c. 

3. Mistaking the nature of a disease, and repre- 
senting a remedy as having cured an affection which 
did not exist. There is ground for believing that 
this error has frequently occurred in medical sci- 
ence, and has been the source of many statements, 
in which remarkable effects have been ascribed to 
particular modes of treatment in various formidable 
diseases. There seems little reason to doubt, that 
in this manner hysterical affections have sometimes 
been mistaken for epilepsy or tetanus,— abdominal 
distention for peritonitis,— chronic bronchial affec- 
tions for consumption, — febrile oppression in chil- 
dren for hydrocephalus, — irritable urethra or bladder 



TRACING CAUSATION. 317 

for stricture or calculus, — and affections of the 
bowels for diseases of the liver. IMany similar ex- 
amples will occur to those who are conversant with 
the history of medicine. The error may occur to 
the respectable practitioner from misapprehension, 
arising out of the uncertainty of the art ; but it also 
appears to be one of the great resources of the em- 
piric. When we hear, therefore, of marvellous 
cures of formidable diseases, our first inquiry ought 
to be, not merely whether the patient recovered, but 
what evidence there is that the alleged disease ever 
existed. 

Such are the difficulties and uncertainties of 
medical causation; and such is the ground for cau- 
tion in considering two events as connected in the 
manner of cause and effect. Among the sources of 
this difficulty, there are several circumstances which 
are entirely beyond our reach, and the influence of 
which upon our researches we cannot hope entirely 
to overcome ; but, by keeping steadily in view the 
sources of error by which we are surrounded, we 
may avoid any very fallacious conclusions, and may 
make some progress towards the truth. In regard 
to the effects of medicines, in particular, there are 
two opposite errors to be equally avoided; namely, 
an implicit confidence in the power of particular 
remedies, and a total skepticism in regard to the re- 
sources of medicine. Both these extremes are 
equally unworthy of persons of calm philosophical 
observation ; and they who advance carefuUy in the 
middle course, not misled by the temptation to hasty 
conclusions, and cautioned but not discouraged by 
the dangers of concluding falsely, are most likely to 
contribute something towards diminishing the un- 
certainty of medicine. 

Before leaving the subject of causation, I would 
briefly allude to a confusion which has been intro- 
duced into the language of medicine by the division 
Dd2 



318 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

of the causes of disease into predisposing, ex- 
citing-, and proximate. It is well known that a 
cause which appears to produce a disease in one in- 
stance will, in another, be followed by no result, or 
by a disease of a different kmd. Attempts have 
accordingly been made to investigate the circum- 
stances which produce a tendency to be affected by 
particular diseases at certain times, — and these have 
received the name of predisposing causes, or some- 
times of occasional causes. The effluvia of marshes, 
for example, are considered as the exciting cause 
of intermittent fever; but the disease is not pro- 
duced in all who are exposed to this effluvia. Vari- 
ous circumstances, such as fatigue and intemper- 
ance, are said to act as the predisposing or occa- 
sional causes. But, in other situations, fatigue and 
intemperance were never known to produce inter- 
mittent fever ; and they cannot, therefore, in correct 
language, be said to be connected with the disease 
in the manner of cause. The term proximate cause, 
again, has been applied to minute changes which 
take place in certain functions of the body so as to 
constitute particular diseases. Such speculations 
are, in general, in a great measure hypothetical ; 
but, even if they were ascertained to be true, they 
must be considered as constituting the nature and 
essence of the disease, and could not be regarded in 
the light of a cause. If these observations shall be 
considered as entitled to any weight, it will follow 
that the term cause ought to be restricted to that 
which has commonly been called the exciting cause. 



DEDUCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 319 



SECTION IV. 

OF DEDUCING GENERAL FACTS OR GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 

Having, with the cautions which have been re- 
ferred to, collected a body of authentic facts, and 
having traced among- these facts the relation of uni- 
form sequence, or uniform conjunction, the next' 
step in our investigation is to bring together a num- 
ber of these facts, or classes of facts, and to en- 
deavour to deduce from them general principles. 

By the process of mind which we call abstraction, 
we separate one property of a substance from its 
other properties, or one fact from a chain of facts, 
and contemplate it apart. When we thus view a 
number of substances, or a number of classes of 
facts, and separate an individual property or indi- 
vidual fact which is common to them all, we may 
then contemplate this fact or property as character- 
istic of the whole class : and the process co'nstitutes 
generalizing, or deducing a general fact, or general 
principle. 

Generahzing is to be distinguished fj'om classifica- 
tion, though the mental process concerned is in both 
essentially the same. We class together a certain 
number of substances by a property in which they 
agree ; and, in doing so, we specify and enumerate 
the individual substances included in the class. 
Thus, we may take a number of substances differing 
widely in their external and mechanical properties, 
some being solid, some fluid, and some gaseous, and 
say they are all acids. The class being thus formed, 
and consisting of a defined number of substances 
which agree in the property of acidity, vi^e may next 
investigate some other property which is common 



320 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

to all the individuals of the class, and belongs to no 
other, and say, for example, that all acids redden 
vegetable-blues. The former of these operations is 
properly classification ; the latter is generalizing in 
reference to the .class. In the former, we take or 
exclude individual substances, according as they 
possess or not the .property on which the classifica- 
tion rests; in performing the latter, the property 
which is assumed must belong to all the individuals 
without a single exception, or, if it does not, it must 
be abandoned as a general fact or general principle 
in reference to the class. In classifying, we may 
use every freedom regarding individuals in taking or 
excluding them. In generaUzing, we must not ex- 
clude a single individual ; for the principle which 
does not include every one of them, — tliat is, the 
proposed fact which is not true of all the individ- 
uals is not a general fact, and consequently cannot 
be admitted as a geneial principle. For in physical 
science, to talk of exceptions to a general rule is 
only to say, in other words, that the rule is not gene- 
ral, and, consequently, is unworthy of confidence. 
If one acid were discovered which does not redden 
vegetable-blues, it would belong to a history of these 
substances to state that a certain number of them 
have this property ; but the property of reddening 
vegetable-blues would require to be abandoned as a 
general fact or general principle applicable to the 
class of acids. 

A general law, or general principle, then, is no- 
thing more than a general fact, or a fact which is 
invariably true of all the individual ca&es to which 
it professes to apply. Deducing such facts is the 
great object of modern science ; and it is by this pe- 
culiar character that it is distinguished from the an- 
cient science of the schools, the constant aim oi 
which was to discover causes. The general law ol 
gravitation, for example, is nothing more than the 
general fact, or fact invariably true, that all bodies, 



DEDUCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES, 821 

when left unsupported, fall to the ground. There 
were at one time certain apparent exceptions to the 
univei'sality of this law, namely, in some very light 
bodies, which were not observed to fall. But a Uttle 
farther observation showed that these are prevented 
from falUng by being lighter than the atmosphere, 
and that in vacuo they observe the same law as the 
heaviest bodies. Tlie apparent exceptions being 
thus brought under the law, it became general, 
namely, the, fact universally true, that all unsup- 
ported bodies fall to the ground. Now, of the cause 
of this phenomenon we know nothing; and what we 
call the general law, or general principle of gravita- 
tion, is nothing more than a univeisal fact, or a fact 
that is true without a single exception. But having 
ascertained the fact to be invariably and universally 
true, we assume it as a part of the established order 
of nature, and proceed upon it with as much confi- 
dence as if we knew the mysterious agency on 
which the phenomencm depends. The establishment 
of the fact as universal brings us to that point in the 
inquiry which is the limit of our powers and capaci- 
ties, and it is sufficient to the purposes of science. On 
the same principle, it is familiar to every one that 
extensive discoveries have been made in regard to 
the properties and laws of heat ; but we do not know 
what heat is, whether a distinct essence, or, as has 
been supposed by some philosophers, a peculiar mo- 
tion of the minute atoms of bodies. 

In the same manner, the person who first observed 
iron attracted by the magnet observed a fact which 
was to him new and unaccountable. But the same 
phenomenon having been observed a certain number 
of times, a belief would arise that there existed be- 
tween it and the substances concerned a connexion 
of cause and effect. The result of this belief would 
be, that when the substances were brought togetlier 
the attraction would be expected to take place. Ob- 
servations would then probably be made with other 



822 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

substances, and farther observations with the same 
substances ; and it being found that the attraction 
took place between iron and the magnet only, and 
that between these it took place in every instance, 
the general principle would be deduced, or the fact 
universally true in all instances, that the magnet at- 
tracts iron. The same observation applies to the 
other remarkable property derived from the magnet, 
namely, pointing to the north. The phenomenon 
received the name of magnetism, and the laws were 
then investigated by which it was regulated ; but 
what we call magnetism is still nothing more than a 
mode of expressing the universal fact, that the mag- 
net attracts iron, and points to the north. On what 
hidden influence these remarkable phenomena de- 
pend we are still as ignorant as the man who first 
observed them ; and, however mteresting it would 
be to know it, the knowledge is not necessary to the 
investigation of the laws of magnetism. 

These may, perhaps, be considered as fair exam- 
ples of the inductive philosophy, as distinguished 
from the hypothetical systems of the era which pre- 
ceded it. According to theses, the constant aim of 
the inquirer was the explanation of phenomena ; and 
in the case before us a theory would have been con- 
structed calculated to account for the attraction by 
the fluxes and refluxes of some invisible fluid or 
ether, which would have been described with as 
much minuteness as if there had been real ground 
for believing it to exist. Strikingly opposed to all 
such speculations is the leading principle of the in- 
ductive philosophy, that the last object of science is 
to " ascertain the universality of a fact." 

"The study of nature," says an eminent writer, 
*^ is the study of facts, not of causes." In conformity 
with this truth, the objects of science may perhaps 
be defined to be, to observe facts ; to trace their re- 
lations and sequences; and to ascertain the facts 
which are universal. It consists in simply tracing 



DEDrCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 323 

the order which is observed by the phenomena of 
nature ; the efficient causes of these phenomena 
being- considered as beyond the reach of the human 
faculties, and, consequently, not the legitimate ob- 
jects of scientific inquiry. It is thus strikingly op- 
posed to the old philosophy, the constant aim of 
which was the explanation of phenomena, and which 
has therefore received the name of " the philosophy 
of causes." 

This important distinction between induction and 
hypothetical speculation, which is now so firmly 
established in other departments of science, it is to 
be feared has not been so fully recognised in medical 
investigations. ' On the contrary, every one who is 
acquainted with the histor}^ of medical doctrines 
will probably admit that medicine is still deeply 
tinged v/ith the philosophy of causes ; in other words, 
that there is a remarkable tendency to refer phe- 
nomena to certain obscure principles, which cannot 
be shown to be facts, and, consequently, cannot be 
considered as the objects of legitimate inquiry. It 
is unnecessary in this place to refer more particu- 
larly to fictitious and hypothetical principles of this 
description, which, one after another^ have held a 
prominent place in medical science. If the rules of 
the inductive philosophy are to be applied to medi- 
cine, the immediate effect of them must be to banish 
all such speculations as contrary to the first rules of 
sound investigation. They are entirely fictitious 
principles, framed to correspond with the phenomena 
instead of being deduced from them. It is also ill 
general beyond the reach of observation either to 
establish or overturn them ; and the only mode of 
detecting their character is to bring them to the test 
of the inquiry,-— Are they facts 1 and are the facts 
universal ? 

The rules to be observed in deducing general prin- 
ciples appear, therefore, to be the following : — 

L That the principle assumed be itself a fact. 



1^24 



MEDICAL SCIENCE. 



2. That it be true, without a single exception, of 
all the individual cases; or, in other words, that the 
fact be universal. 

I. The first of these rules is opposed to a practice 
lately referred to, which must be admitted to have 
been very prevalent in medical science, namely, 
that of referring phenomena to fictitious principles 
which caimot be shown to be facts. Of the princi- 
ples of this class, which at various periods have held 
a prominent place in medical doctrine, some have 
had their day, and are now forgotten ; but it may be 
doubted whether they were inferior in value to those 
which have succeeded them. We do not now hear 
of viscidity of the blood, lentor of the fluids, or 
rigidity of the solids ; of morbific matter in the blood, 
of hot or cold humours, of obstruction of the animal 
spirits, and other doctrines, by which various phe- 
nomena were explained by the inquirers of former 
times ; but, perhaps, those of more recent date can 
scarcely be considered as more satisfactory. It may 
certainly, at least, be a question whether we can 
concede the character of facts to irregular exfite- 
ment of the nervous system, hepatic derangement, 
as that term is very commonly employed, and the 
numerous modifications under which we meet with 
the doctrines of determination, irritation, congestion, 
sympathy,- and spasm. 

II. Tfte second rul6 is opposed to the error of 
hasty generalizing, or of deducing a general state- 
ment from a limited number of facts. We can avoid 
this error only by keeping steadily in view that 
general principles deiive their whole value from 
being universal facts, or facts that are true without 
a single exception, in regard to all the individual 
eases to which the principle is meant to apply. 
When they are deduced prematurely, that is, from a 
limited number of facts, or a partial view of their 



DEDUCING GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 325 

minute characters, they fail entirely of the purposes 
which they are meant to serve, and, when trusted, 
lead us into error. I have formerly alluded to seve- 
ral examples of hasty generalizing in medical sci- 
ence. Some writers have maintained that a certain 
state of rigidity of the limbs is distinctly character- 
istic of ramollissement of the brain ; and others con- 
sider every modification of fever as depending upon 
inflammation of the gastro-intestinal membrane. 
This rigidity of the hmbs is a frequent occuirence 
in ramollissement of the brain, and in many cases 
of fever there is disease of the gastro-intestinal 
membrane. As a part of the history of the aflec- 
tions, therefore, these are important facts ; but they 
are not true of all the cases of ramollissement and 
of fever, and, consequently, cannot be admitted as 
general principles in reference to these affections ; 
for though they are facts, the facts are not uni- 
versal. 

In a science such as medicine, indeed, requiring an 
accumulation of facts which must often be the re- 
sult of the labour of ages, partial generalizing may 
sometimes be admitted merely as a help t^o the 
memory ; provided we keep constantly in view the 
imperfect nature of such deductions, and be con- 
stantly attentive to correct them by farther obser- 
vations. But when imperfect results of this kind 
are received as established principles, they retard 
our progress in search of truth, or even lead us far- 
ther and farther away from it. The confidence is 
truly remarkable with which such premature deduc- 
tions in medicines are brought forward, and the fa- 
cility with which they are often received, without 
examination, as established principles ; much labo- 
rious investigation indeed is often devoted to no 
other purpose than showing them to be fallacious. 
The zeal for hypothetical systems is considerably 
gone by ; but this tendency to misomid generalizing 
must be viewed as one of the chief errors which at 
E e 



326 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

present retard the progress of medical science ; and 
it may, perhaps, be contended, that medicine will 
never attain a place among the inductive sciences 
till inquirers agree to act steadily upon the rule — 
that every medical doctrine shall be a fact, and that 
the fact shall be universal. 

There are two respects in which a fondness for 
generalizing, in medicine, may be abused, and may 
lead to errors of a practical nature. The one con- 
sists in assuming a fact as general which is not 
really true of all the individual cases ; — various ex- 
amples of this have been already referred to. The 
other arises from extending a fact or principle which 
is true of one class of cases to others with which 
it is not connected. Thus, a medical man, who de- 
cides upon general principles without attending to 
individual facts, may pronounce a patient to labour 
under consumption, when he perceives expec- 
toration of a purulent character. Admitting that 
purulent expectoration may occur in all cases of 
consumption, the sound observer knows, that it is 
not confined to this disease, but also occurs in others 
of a much less dangerous character. 

For a legitimate theor}^ then, it is required that 
the principle which is assumed be true, and that 
it be common to all the cases. But there are cer- 
tain instances, in which a principle ascertained to 
be true in regard to one set of cases may be ex- 
tended by conjecture to others, in regard to which 
its existence is only hypothetical. This may be 
called legitimate hypothesis, or anticipation of prin- 
ciples ; and it differs in this respect from the ficti- 
tious theories already referred to, that it is liable 
to be either established or overturned by the progress 
of observation. In this mamier, the theory of gravi- 
tation was hypothetically extended to the motions 
of the heavenly bodies long before the observations 
of Newton had actually established the truth of the 



LEGITIMATE USE OF HYPOTHESIS. 827 

doctrine ; and the same principle is of legitimate 
use in medical investigations. Thus there has been 
some difference of opinion in regard to the origin 
of the affection which is called ramollissement of the 
brain ; a conjecture has been offered, that it is a re- 
sult of inflammation in that particular structure. 
Now this, at first, was mere hypothesis or conjecture ; 
but it was hypothesis only in regard to the relation 
of facts, or the application of a known principle. 
For the principle which is assumed, namely, inflam- 
mation, is a real and true principle ; its relation to 
this particular aflfection is the hypothesis. It is such 
an hypothesis, or anticipation of a principle, as 
serves to guide us in observation, and which, by 
such observation, is likely to be soon either estab- 
lished or overturned. Hypothesis of this kind is 
to be considered as a legitimate guide to inquiry, and 
may be of extensive use in medicine when kept un- 
der proper regulation. But it is to be regretted that 
such conjectures, if brought forward with confidence, 
are too often received without further investigation 
as estabUshed principles. In this manner, the pro- 
per use of them is entirely lost, and they rather lead 
to error and fallacy. 

The laws in regard to such hypotheses, therefore, 
are, that they shall be considered as nothing more 
than conjecture until such obsen^ations or experi- 
ments have been made as are sufficient to ascertain 
their truth ; and that, if they aje not thus verified, 
they shall be instantly abandoned. To the process 
now mentioned, some writers have proposed to ap- 
ply the term theory, as distinct from hypothesis ; 
and to restrict the latter term to the fictitious prin- 
ciples formerly mentioned, namely, those which 
cannot be proved to have any real existence. 
Others apply the term hypothesis to both kinds of 
principles, vvhether fictitious or legitimate, and call 
the latter a theory only after its truth has been 
established. But the fact seems to be, that the two 



328 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

terms are used in philosopliical writings in an unde- 
fined and indiscriminate n)amier. 

In every scientific investigation, it is to be kept in 
mind, that efficient causes are beyond our reach. 
The object of our research are physical causes only, 
by w^hich we mean nothing more than the uniform 
sequences of events as ascertained by extensive ob- 
servation. What we call the explanation of phe- 
nomena consists in being able to trace distinctly all 
the links of such a chain of sequences, so as to pei- 
ceive their uniform relation to each other. Thus, 
there may be many instances in which we are ac- 
quainted with facts forming part of such a chain, 
and are satisfied that they are so connected, while 
we cannot explain their connexion. This is occa- 
sioned by the want of some fact which forms an in- 
termediate part of the chain, and the discovery of 
which would enable us to see the relation of the 
whole sequence, or, in common language, to explain 
the phenomena. Such a chain of facts was, at one 
time, presented by the rise of water in a vacuum to 
the height of thirty-two feet. The circumstances 
were well known, as well as their uniform relation ; 
that is to say, the fact of a vacuum, the fact of thi- 
water rising, and the fact of this uniformly takint: 
place. But the phenomenon could not be explained ; 
for an intermediate fact was required to show the 
manner in which these known facts were connected. 
The doctrine of nature abhorring a vacuum afforded 
no explanation, for it furnished no fact ; but the fact 
required was supplied by the discoveries of Torri- 
celli on atmospheric pressure. The chain of events 
was then filled up, or, in common language, the phe- 
nomenon was accounted for. 

There are, indeed, many cases in which the inves- 
tigation of intermediate events in the chain of se- 
quences is beyond our reach. In these, we must be 
satisfied with a knowledge of the facts, and their ac- 
tual connexion as we observe them, without being 



SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. 329 

able to trace the events on which the connexion de- 
pends. This happens in some of the great pheno- 
mena of nature, such as gravitation and magnetism. 
We know the facts, but we camiot account for them ; 
that is, we are ignorant of certain intermediate 
facts by which those we do know are connected to- 
gether. If, in such cases, we amuse ourselves with 
visionary hypothesis or conjecture instead of facts, 
we wander from the path of philosophical inquiry. 
Of this nature were the vortices of Des Cartes, and 
the doctrine of an invisible ether, which was at one 
time proposed to explain the phenomena of gravita- 
tion. Other examples of the same kind are to be 
met witli in the old philosophy ; and those who are 
acquainted with the history of medicine need not be 
told that such speculations have also been frequent 
in medical science. 



If we would contribute something towards di- 
minishing the uncertainty of medical researches, 
and introducing a greater degree of precision into 
medical reasonings, there are certain rules which 
we ought to keep steadily in view, both in conduct- 
ing our own inquiries, and examining the investiga- 
tions of others. These may be briefly recapitulated 
in the following manner as arising out of the pre- 
ceding observations : — 

I. We should endeavour to have all our terms fully 
and distinctly defined. If we speak, for example, 
of a person being bilious, or labouring under biliary 
derangement, or derangement of the chylopoietic 
viscera, let it be explained what particular condition 
of the biliary or digestive organs we mean to ex- 
press by these terms ; or, if this cannot be done> let 
Ee3 



330 MEDICAL SCIENCE. 

it at least be clearly understood what particular 
s5'mptoms we include under them. The same ob- 
servation applies to various other terms of an 
equally indefinite character, which have been for- 
merly' mentioned. If they were defined in this 
manner, they would be merely names, and no harm 
could result from the use of them ; but, as they are 
frequently employed, they seem to have no explicit 
signification. 

II. In making- a statement of facts, or examining 
a statement made by another person, we should be 
satisfied that the facts are authentic, — that they are 
fully and fairly stated, — and that no important facts 
are left out of view, disguised, or modified. It is 
also necessary that no facts betaken into the state- 
ment which are not really connected with the sub- 
ject. I formerly alluded to examples of this last 
error, — appearances being considered as indicating 
diseases of internal organs, which are incidental or 
trivial, perhaps taking place after death, or under cir- 
cumstances not connected with diseased action. 

III. When we find two events placed in a state of 
contiguity to each -other, we should use the utmost 
caution in considering them as connected in the man- 
ner of cause and effect. Nothing warrants us in 
assuming this relation but such an extent of obser- 
vation as shows the connexion to be constant an(] 
uniform; and we should keep in view the various 
sources of fallacy, formerly referred to, which en- 
compass the whole subject of medical causation. 

IV. In deducm* general conclusions, or general 
doctrines, we must beware, on the one hand, of as- 
suming imaginary principles whicli cannot be proved 
really to exist; and, on the other, of deducing prin- 
ciples or doctrines from a limited number of facts. 
We must remember that such deductions are of no 



SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. 331 

\'alue, unless they are invariably true in regard to all 
the cases to which they are meant to refer. 

V. In examining a statement made by any writer, 
there is cause for exercising similar caution. The ' 
credibility of a narrator of medical statements does 
not rest upon his veracity only, or the total absence 
of any intention to deceive. With perfect sincerity 
and conviction of the truth of what he delivers, he 
may present fallacious statements. This may hap- 
pen from a partial narration of facts, — from unsound 
.causation, — and from delivering as equivalent to a 
fact what is really a general statement. In regard 
to these, we require to be satisfied, not only of his 
veracity, but of his habits as an observer, and the 
extent of the observations on which his statement 
is founded. In all cases of this kind, therefore, we 
ought to exercise such a mental process as the fol- 
lowing : — 

1. Are the terms which the author employs fully 
and distinctly defined ; and are they employed in the 
usual and recognised meaning 1 

2. Are the facts authentic; are they fully and 
fairly stated ; do they all relate to the subject ; have 
we reason to suspect that any important facts have 
been omitted, disguised, or modified, or that facts 
have been collected on one side only of a question ; 
does the statement include any points which, though 
called facts, are merely assumptions requiring to be 
proved ? 

3. What events does the author consider as con- 
nected in the manner of cause and effect; have we 
reason to believe that this relation has been assumed 
upon an extent of observation which proved it to be 
constant and uniform; what does he propose as 
general principles or doctrines ; are these facts ; and 
are they true in regard to all the cases to which he 
applies them ? 

4. What are the new conclusions which he pro- 



332 MEDlCAL SCIENCE. 

poses to deduce from his whole view of the subject ; 
and are these legitimate deductions from such of 
his preniises as we admit to be authentic 1 

The rules thus shortly proposed, I submit as those 
which ought to guide us in all our inquiries. "With- 
out constant attention to them, numerous facts may- 
pass before us from which we can derive no real 
knowledge ; and many ingenious and plausible doc- 
trines may be presented which tend only to lead us 
into error. In the same manner, the benefit which 
a physician derives from his own opportunities of^ 
observation, in common language called his expe-* 
rience, is not in proportion to the period of time 
over which it has extended, or the number of facts 
which have passed under his view. It must depend 
on the attention with which he has observed these 
facts, and traced their relations to each other ; on 
the anxiety with which he has separated incidental 
relations from those wiiich are uniform; and the 
caution with which he has ventured on assuming the 
relation of cause and effect, or has advanced to 
general principles. It must depend, further, on the 
jealousy and suspicion with which he has received 
even his own conclusions', and tlie care with which 
he has corrected them from time to time by further 
observations. Finally, it nmst depend on the judg- 
ment with which he applies the knowledge thus ac- 
quired to the investigation and treatment of new 
cases; by tracing promptly the points of affinity be- 
tween the case under his view and those cases on 
which his knowledge was founded ; by discovering 
real points of resemblance where there is an ap- 
parent difference, and real points of difference where 
there is an apparent resemblance. Tl^e farther a 
physician advances in this course of rigid inquiry, he 
becomes more sensible of the difficulties with which 
his science is encumbered, more suspicious of all 
general conclusions, and more anxious to bring them 



SUGGESTIONS FOR MEDICAL INVESTIGATION. SdS 

to tlie test of minute and extensive observation ; in 
particular, he learns to exercise more and more cau- 
tion in considering any one event in medicine as the 
cause of another. In real acquisition, consequently, 
his progress is slow ; for much of his improvement 
consists in detecting the fallacy of systems which 
he once considered as established, and the instability 
of principles in which he once confided as infallible. 
But these discoveries prepare the way for his actual 
progress, and the conclusions at which he does ar- 
rive then fall upon his mind with all the authority 
of truth. 



334 CHARACTERS OF 



PART V. 

VIEW OF THE QUALITIES AND ACQUIRE- 
MENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE A WELL- 
REGULATED MIND. 

In concluding this outline of facts regarding the 
intellectual powers and the investigation of truth, 
we may take a slight review of what those qualities 
are which constitute a well-regulated mind, and 
which ought to be aimed at by those who desire 
either their own mental culture, or that of others 
who are under their care. The more important con- 
siderations may be briefly recapitulated in the fol- 
lowing manner : — 

I. The cultivation of a habit of steady and con- 
tinuous attention; or of properly directing the mind 
to any subject which is before it, so as fully to con- 
template its elements and relations. This is neces- 
sary for the dae exercise of every other mental pro- 
cess, and is the foundation of all improvement of 
character, both intellectual and moral. We shall 
afterward have occasion to remark, how often so- 
phistical opinions and various distortions of character 
may be traced to errors in this first act of the mind, 
or to a misdirection and want of due regulation of 
the attention. There is, indeed, every reason to be- 
lieve that the diversities in the power of judging, in 
different individuals, are much less than we are apt 
to imagine; and that the remarkable differences ob- 
served in the act of judging are rather to be ascribed 
to the manner in which the mind is previously di- 
rected to the facts on which the judgment is after- 



A WELL41EGULATED MIND. 335 

ward to be exercised. It is related of Sir Isaac 
Newton that when he was questioned respecting the 
mental qualities which formed the pecuHarity of his 
character, he referred it entirely to the power which 
he had acquired of continuous attention. 

II. Nearly connected with the former, and of 
equal importance, is a careful regulation and control 
of the succession of our thoughts. This remarkable 
faculty is very much under the influence of cultiva- 
tion, and on the power so acquired depends the im- 
portant habit of regular and connected thinking. It 
is primarily a voluntary act ; and in the exercise of 
it in different individuals there are the most remark- 
able differences. In some the thoughts are allowed 
to wander at large without any regulation, or are 
devoted only to frivolous and transient objects; 
while others habitually exercise over them a stern 
control, directing them to subjects of real import- 
ance, and prosecuting these in a regular and con- 
nected manner. This important habit gains strength 
by exercise, and nothing, certainly, has a greater in- 
fluence in giving tone and consistency to the whole 
character. It may not, indeed, be going too far to 
assert that our condition, in the scale both of moral 
and intellectual beings, is in a great measure deter- 
mined by the control which we have acquired over 
the succession of our thoughts, and by the subjects 
on which they are habitually exercised. 

The regulation of the thoughts is, therefore, a 
high concern ; in the man who devotes his attention 
to it as a study of supreme importance, the first 
great source of astonishment will be the manner in 
which his thoughts have been occupied in many an 
hour and many a day that has passed over him. 
The leading objects to which the thoughts may be 
directed are referable to three classes. (1.) The or- 
dinary engagements of life, or matters of business, 
with which every man is occupied in one degree or 



336 CHARACTERS OF 

another ; including concerns of domestic arrange- 
ment, personal comfort, and necessary recreation. 
Each of these deserves a certain degree of attention, 
but this requires to be strictly guided by its real and 
relative importance ; and it is entirely unworthy of 
a sound aud regulated mind to have the attention 
solely or chiefly occupied with matters of personal 
comfort, or of trivial importance, calculated merely 
to afford amusement for the passing hour. (2.) Vi- 
sions of the imagination built up by the mind itself 
when it has nothing better to occupy it. The mind 
cannot be idle, and when it is not occupied by sub- 
jects of a useful kind, it will find a resource in those 
which are frivolous or hurtful, — in mere visions, 
waking dreams, or fictions, in which the mind wan- 
ders from scene to scene, unrestrained by reason, 
probability, or truth. No habit can be more opposed 
to a healthy condition of the mental powers ; and 
none ought to be more carefully guarded against by 
every one who would cultivate the high acquire- 
ment of a well-regulated mind. (3.) Entirely op- 
posed to the latter of these modes, and distinct also 
in a. great measure from the former, is the habit of 
following out a connected chain of thoughts on sub- 
jects of importance and of truth, whenever the mind 
is disengaged from the proper and necessary atten- 
tion to the ordinary transactions of life. The par- 
ticular subjects to which the thoughts are directed 
in cultivating this habit will vary in different indi- 
viduals ; but the consideration of the relative value 
of them does not belong to our present subject. 
The purpose of these observations is simply to im- 
press the value of that regulation of the thouglits 
by which they can always find an occupation of in- 
terest and importance distinct from the ordinary 
transactions of life, or the mere pursuit of frivolous 
engagements; and also totally distinct from that de- 
structive habit by which the mind is allowed to run 
to waste amid visions and fictions unworthy of a 
waking man. 



A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 337 

III. The cultivation of an active inquiring- state 
of mind which seeks for information from every 
source that comes within its reach, whether in read- 
ing, conversation, or personal observation. With 
this state of mental activity ought to be closely con- 
nected attention to the authenticity of facts so re- 
ceived ; avoiding the two extremes of credulity and 
skepticism. 

IV. The habit of correct association; that is, 
connecting facts in the mind according to their true 
relations, and to the manner in which they tend to 
illustrate each other. This, as we have formerly 
seen, is one of the principal means of improving the 
memory ; particularly of the kind of memoiy which 
is an essential quality of a cultivated mind ; namely, 
that which is founded not upon incidental con- 
nexions, but on true and important relations. Nearly 
c Hied to this is the habit of reflection, or of tracing 
carefully the relations of facts, and the conclusions 
and principles which arise out of them. It is in 
this manner, as was formerly mentioned, that the 
philosophical mind often traces remarkable relations, 
and deduces important conclusions; while to the 
common understanding the facts appear to be very 
remote or entirely unconnected. 

V. A careful selection of the subjects to which the 
mind ought to be directed. These are, in some 
respects, different in different persons, according to 
their situations in hfe ; but there are certain objects 
of attention which are peculiarly adapted to each 
individual, and there are some which are equally in- 
teresting to all. In regard to the latter, an appro- 
priate degree of attention is the part of every wise 
man; in regard to the former, a proper selection is 
the foundation of excellence. One individual may 
waste his powers in that desultory application of 
them which leads to an imperfect acquaintance with 

Ff 



338 CHARACTERS OF 

a variety of subjects ; while another allows his life 
to steal over him in listless inactivity, or application 
to trifling pursuits. It is equally melancholy to see 
high powers devoted to unworthy objects ; such as 
the contests of party on matters involving no import- 
ant principle, or the subtleties of sophistical con- 
troversy. For rising to eminence in any intellectual 
pursuit, there is not a rule of more essential im- 
portance than that of doing one thing at a time; 
avoiding distracting and desultory occupations ; and 
keeping a leading object habitually before the mind, 
as one in which it can at all times find an interesting 
resource when necessary avocations allow the 
thoughts to recur to it. A subject which is culti- 
vated in this manner, not by regular periods of study 
merely, but as an habitual object of thought, rises 
up and expands before the mind in a manner which 
is altogether astonishing. If along with this habit 
there be cultivated the practice of constantly wTiting 
such views as arise, we perhaps describe that state 
of mental discipline by which talents of a very 
moderate order may be applied in a conspicuous and 
useful manner to any subject to which they are de- 
voted. Such writing need not be made at first with 
any great attention to method, but merely put aside 
for future consideration; and in this manner the dif- 
ferent departments of a subject will develop and 
arrange themselves as they advance in a manner 
equally pleasing and wonderful. 

VI. A due regulation and proper control of the 
imagination ; that is, restricting its range to objects 
which harmonize with truth, and are adapted to the 
real state of things with which the individual is or 
may be connected. We have seen how much the 
character is influenced by this exercise of the mind ; 
that it may be turned to purposes of the greatest 
moment, both in the pursuits of science and in the 
cultivation of benevolence and virtue ; but that, on 



A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 339 

the other hand, it may be so employed as to debase 
both the moral and intellectual character. 

VII. The cultivation of calm and correct judg- 
ment — applicable alike to the formation of opinions, 
and the regulation of conduct. This is founded, as 
we have seen, ttpon the habit of directing the atten- 
tion distinctly and steadily to all the facts and con- 
siderations bearing upon a subject ; and it consists 
in contemplating them in their true relations, and 
assigning to each the degree of importance of which 
it is worthy. This mental habit tends to guard us 
against forming conclusions, either with listless in- 
attention to the views by which we ought to be influ- 
enced, — or with attention directed to some of these, 
while we neglect others of equal or greater import- 
ance. It is, therefore, opposed to the influence of 
prejudice and passion, — to the formation of sophis- 
tical opinions, — to party spirit, — and to every pro- 
pensity which leads to the adoption of principles on 
any other ground than calm and candid examination, 
guided by sincere desire to discover the truth. In 
the purely physical sciences, distorted opinions are 
seldom met with, or make httle impression, be- 
cause they are brought to the test of experiment, 
and thus their fallacy is exposed. Bat it is other- 
wise in those departments which do not admit of 
this remedy. Sophisms and partial inductions are, 
accordingly, met with in medicine, political econo- 
my, and metaphysics ; and too often in the still 
higher subjects of morals and religion. In the 
economy of the human mind, it is indeed impossible 
to observe a more remarkable phenomenon than the 
manner in which a man who, in the ordinary affairs 
of life, shows the general characters of a sound un- 
derstanding, can thus resign himself to the influence 
of an opinion founded upon partial examination. 
He brings ingeniously to the support of his dogma 
every fact and argument that can possibly be turned 



340 CHARACTERS OF 

to its defence ; and explains away or overlooks 
every thing that tends to a different conclusion; 
M'hile he appears anxious to convince others, and 
really seems to have persuaded himself, that he is 
eng-aged in an honest investigation of truth. This 
propensity gains strength by indulgence, and l^he 
mind, which has yielded to its influence, advances 
from one pretended discovery to another, — mistaking 
its own fancies for the sound conclusions of the un- 
derstanding, until it either settles down into some 
monstrous sophism, or perhaps concludes by doubt- 
ing of every thing. 

The manner in which the most extravagant opin- 
ions are maintained by persons who give way to this 
abuse of their powers of reasoning, is scarcely more 
remarkable than the facility with which they often 
find zealous proselytes. It is, indeed, difficult to 
trace the principles by which various individuals are 
influenced in thus surrendering their assent, with 
little examination, often on subjects of the highest 
importance. In some it would appear to arise from 
the mere pleasure of mental excitement ; in others, 
from the love of singularity, and the desire of ap- 
pearing wiser than their neighbours ; while, in not a 
few, the will evidently takes the lead in the mental 
process, and opinions are seized upon with avidity, 
and embraced as truth, which recommend them- 
selves to previously existing inclinations of the 
heart. But whatever may be the exphtuation, the 
influence of the principle is most extensive ; and 
sentiments of the most opposite kinds may often be 
traced to the faeihty with which the human mind re- 
ceives opinions which have been presented to it by 
some extrinsic influence. This influence may be of 
various kinds. It may be the power of party, or 
the persuasion of a plausible and persevering indi- 
vidual : it may be the supposed infallibility of a par- 
ticular system ; it may be the mere empire of 
fashion, or the pretensions of a false philosophy. 



A WELL-REGULATED ML\D. 341 

The particular result, also, may differ, according- as 
one or other of these causes may be in operation. 
But the intellectual condition is the same ; and the 
distortion of character which arises out of it, 
whether bigotry, superstition, or skepticism, may be 
traced to a similar process ; namely, to an influ- 
ence which directs the mind upon some other prin- 
ciple than a candid investigation of truth. In a simi- 
lar manner we may perhaps account for the facts, 
that the lowest superstition and the most daring 
skepticism frequently pass into each other ; and that 
the most remarkable examples of both are often met 
with in the same situations, namely, those in which 
the human mind is restrained from free and candid 
inquiry. On the other hand, it would appear that 
the universal toleration, and full liberty of conscience, 
which characterize a free and enlightened country, 
are calculated to preserve from the two extremes of 
superstition and skepticism. In other situations, it 
is striking to remark how often those who revolt 
from the errors of a false faith take refuge in in- 
fideUty. 

The mental qualities which have been referred to 
in the preceding observations, constituting an active, 
attentive, and reflecting mind, should be carefully 
cultivated by all who desire their own mental im- 
provement. The man who has cultivated them with 
adequate care habitually exercises a process of 
mind which is equally a source of improvement 
and of refined enjoyment. Does a subject occur 
to him, either in conversation or reflection, in 
which he feels that his knowledge is deficient, he 
commences, without delay, an eager pursuit of 
the necessary Information. In prosecuting any in- 
quiry, whether by reading or observation, his at- 
tention is acutely alive to the authenticity of facts, 
— the validity of arguments, — the accuracy of pro- 
cesses of investigation, — principles which are iUus- 
. Ff2 



342 CHARACTERS OF 

trated by the facts and conclusions deduced from 
them, — the character of observers, — the style of 
writers ; and thus, all the circumstances which 
come before him are made acutely and individually 
the objects of attention and reflection. Such a man 
acquires a confidence in his own powers and re- 
sources to which those are strangers who have not 
cultivated this kind of mental discipline. The in- 
tellectual condition arising out of it is applicable 
alike to every situation in which a man can bt^ 
placed, — whether the affairs of ordinary life, tht- 
pursuits of science, — or those higher inquiries and re- 
lations which concern him as a moral being. 

In the affairs of ordinary life, this mental habit 
constitutes what we call an intelligent thinking man, 
whose attention is alive to all that is passing before 
him, — who thinks acutely and eagerly on his own 
conduct and that of others, — and is constantly de- 
riving useful information and subjects of reflection 
from occurrences which, by the listless mind, are 
passed by and forgotten. This habit is not neces- 
sarily connected with acquired knowledge, or with 
what is commonly called intellectual cultivation: 
but is often met with, in a high degree, in persons 
whose direct attainments are of a very limited kind. 
It is the foundation of caution and prudence in the 
affairs of life, and may perhaps be considered as the 
basis of that quality, of more value to its possessor 
than any of the sciences, which is commonly called 
sound good sense. It is the origin also, of what we 
call presence of mind, — or a readiness in adapting 
resources to circumstances. A man of this charac- 
ter, in whatever emergency he happens to be placed, 
forms a prompt, clear, and defined judgment of what- 
ever conduct or expedient the situation requires, and 
acts with promptitude upon his decision. In both 
these respect he differs equally from the listless in- 
activity of one description of men, and the rash, 
hasty, and inconsiderate conduct of another. He 
differs not less from characters of a third class, who. 



A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 343 

though they may be correct in their judgment of 
what ought to be done, arrive at their decision, or 
act upon it too slowly for the circumstances, and 
consequently are said, according to a common prov- 
erb, to be wise behind time. The listless and tor- 
pid character, indeed, may occasionally be excited 
by emergencies to a degree of mental activity 
which is not natural to him ; and this is, in many in- 
stances, the source of a readiness of conception, 
and a promptitude in action which the individual 
does not exhibit in ordinary circumstances. 

In the pursuits of science these mental qualities 
constitute observing and inventive genius, — two con- 
ditions of mind which lie at the foundation of all 
philosophical eminence. By observing genius I 
mean that habit of mind by which the philosopher 
not only acquires truths relating to any subject, but 
arranges and generalizes them in such a manner as 
to show how they yield conclusions which escape 
the mere collector of facts. He likewise analyzes 
phenomena, and thus traces important relations 
among facts which, to the common mind, appear very 
remote and dissimilar. I have formerly illustrated 
this by the manner in which Newton traced a relation 
between the fall of an apple from a tree, and those 
great principles which regulate the movements of 
the heavenly bodies. By inventive genius, again, I 
mean that active, inquiring state of mind, which not 
only deduces, in this manner, principles from facts 
when they are before it, but which grasps after prin- 
ciples by eager anticipation, and then makes its own 
conjectures the guides to observation or experiment. 
This habit of mind is pecuUarly adapted to the ex- 
perimental sciences ; and in these, indeed, it may be 
considered as the source of the most important dis- 
coveries. It leads a man not only to observe and 
connect the facts, but to go in search of them, and 
to draw them, as it were, out of that concealment 
in which they escape the ordinary observer. la 



344 CHARACTERS OF 

doing so, he takes for his guides certain conjectures 
or assumptions which have arisen out of his own in- 
tense contemplation of the subject. These may be 
as often false as true ; but if found false, they are 
instantly abandoned ; and by such a course of active 
inquiry he at length arrives at the development of 
truth. From him are to be expected discoveries 
which elude the observation, not of the vulgar alone, 
but even of the philosopher who, without cultivating 
this habit of invention, is satisfied with tracing the 
relation of facts as they happen to be brouglit Ijcfor'^ 
him by the slower course of testimony or occasional 
observation. The man who only amuses himself 
M'ith conjectures, and rests satisfied in them without 
proof, is the mere visionary or speculatist, who in- 
jures every subject to which his speculations are 
directed. 

In the conceras which relate to man as a moral 
being, this active, inquiring, and reflecting habit of 
mind is not less applicable than in matters of minor 
interest. The man who cultivates it directs his 
attention intensely and eagerly to the great truths 
which belong to his moral condition, — seeks to esti- 
mate distinctly his relation to them, and to feel their 
influence upon his moral principles. This constitutes 
the distinction between the individual who merely 
professes a particular creed, and him who examines 
it till he makes it a matter of understanding and con- 
viction, and then takes its principles as the rule of 
his emotions and the guide of his conduct. Such a 
man also contemplates in the same manner his rela- 
tions to other men ; questions himself rigidly re- 
garding the duties which belong to his situation, and 
his own observance of them. He contemplates 
others with a kind of personal interest, enters into 
their wants and feelings, and participates in their 
distresses. In all his relations, whether of justice, 
benevolence, or friendship, he acts not from mere 
incidental impulse, but upon clear and steady princi- 



A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 845^ 

pies. In this course of action many may go along- 
with him when the requirements of the individual 
case are pointed out and impressed upon them ; but 
that in which the mass of mankind are wanting is 
the state of mental activity which eagerly contem- 
plates its various duties and relations, and thus finds 
its way to the line of conduct appropriate to the 
importance of each of them. 

VIII. For a well-regulated understanding, and 
particularly for the application of it to inquiries of 
the highest import, there is indispensably necessary 
a sound condition of the moral feelings. This im- 
portant subject belongs properly to another depart- 
ment of mental science ; but we have seen its ex- 
tensive influence on the due exercise of the intel- 
lectual powers ; — and it is impossible to lose sight 
of the place which it holds in the general harmony 
of the mental functions required for constituting 
that condition, of greater value than any earthly 
good, which is strictly to be called a well-regulated 
mind. This high attainment consists not in any 
cultivation, however great, of the intellectual powers ; 
but requires also a corresponding and harmonious 
culture of the benevolent affections and moral feel- 
ings; a due regulation of the passions, emotions, 
and desires; and a full recognisance of the supreme 
authority of conscience over the whole intellectual 
and moral system. Cold and contracted, indeed, is 
that view of man which regards his understanding 
alone ; and barren is that system, however wide its 
range, which rests in the mere attainment of truth. 
The highest state of man consists in his purity as a 
moral being; and in the habitual culture and full 
operation of those priaciples by which he looks 
forth to other scenes and other times. Among these 
are desires and longings which nought in earthly 
science can satisfy ; which soar beyond the sphere 
of sensible things, and find no object worthy of their 



34 G CHARACTERS OF 

capacities until, in humble adoration, they rest in 
the contemplation of God. Truths then burst upon 
the mind which seem to rise before it in a proo^res- 
sive series, each presenting characters of new and 
mightier import. The most aspiring understanding^, 
awed by the view, feels the inadequacy of its utmost 
powers ; yet the mind of the humble inquirer gains 
strength as it advances. There is now felt, in a 
peculiar manner, the influence of that healthy con- 
dition of the moral feelings which leads a man not 
to be afraid of the truth. For, on this subject, we 
are never to lose sight of the remarkable principle 
of our nature formerly referred to, by which a mnn 
comes to reason himself into the belief of what he 
wishes to be true ; and shuts his mind against, or 
even arrives at an actual disbelief of, truths which 
he fears to encounter. It is striking, also, to re- 
mark ho\v closely the philosophy of human nature 
harmonizes with the declarations of the sacred 
writings ; where this condition of mind is traced to 
its true source, in the corruption of the moral feel- 
ings, and is likewise shown to involve a high degree 
of guilt, in that rejection of truth which is its natural 
consequence : " This is the condemnation, that 
light is come into the world, and men loved dark- 
ness rather than light, because their deeds were 
evil. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, 
neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be 
reproved. But he that doeth trut*i, cometh to the 
hght, that his deeds maybe made manifest, that they 
are wrought in God." 

This condition of mind presents a subject of in- 
tense interest to every one who would study his own 
mental condition, either as an intellertiial or a moral 
being. In each individual instance, it may be traced 
to a particular course of thought and of conduct, by 
which the mind went gradually more and more astray 
from truth and from virtue. In this progress, each 
single step was felt to be a voluntary act ; but the 



A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 347 

influence of the whole, after a certain period, is to 
distort the judgment, and deaden the moral feelings 
on the great questions of truth and rectitude. Of 
this remarkable phenomenon in the economy of 
man, the explanation is beyond the reach of our 
faculties ; but the facts are unquestionable, and the 
practical lesson to be derived from them is of deep 
and serious import. The first volition by which the 
mind consciously wanders from truth, or the moral 
feelings go astray from virtue, may impart a morbid 
influence which shall perpetuate itself and gain 
strength in future volitions, until the result shall be 
to poison the whole intellectual and moral system. 
Thus, in the wondrous scheme of sequences which 
has been established in the economy of the human 
heart, one volition may impart a character to the 
future man, — the first downward step may be fatal. 
Every candid observ^er of human nature must feel 
this statement to be consistent with truth ; and, by 
a simple and legitimate step of reasoning, a princi- 
ple of the greatest interest seems to arise out of it. 
When this loss of harmony among the mental facul- 
ties has attained a certain degree, we do not per- 
ceive any power in the mind itself capable of cor- 
recting the disorder which has been introduced into 
the moral system. Either, therefore, the evil is 
irremediable and hopeless, or we must look for an 
influence from without the mind, which may afford 
an adequate remedy. We are thus led to discover 
the adaptation and the probability of the provisions 
of the Christian revelation, where an influence is 
indeed disclosed to us, capable of restoring the har- 
mony which has been destroyed, and of raising man 
anew to the sound and healthy condition of a moral 
being. We cannot perceive any improbability, that 
the Being who originally framed the wondrous fab- 
ric may thus hold intercourse with it and provide a 
remedy for its moral disorders ; and thus a state- 
ment, such as human reason never could have anti- 



348 CHARACTERS OF 

cipated, comes to us invested with every element 
of credibility and of truth. 

Tiie sound exercise of the understanding, there- 
fore, is closely connected with the important habit 
of looking within ; or of rigidly investigating our 
intellectual and moral condition. This leads us to 
inquire what opinions we have formed, ajid upon 
what grounds we have formed them -, — what have 
been our leading pursuits, — whether these have been 
guided by a sound consideration of their real vahie, 
— or whether important objects of attention have 
been lightly passed over, or entirely neglected. It 
leads us further to contemplate our moral condition, 
— our desires, attachments, and antipathies; the 
government of the imagination, and the regimen of 
the heart; what is the habitual current of our 
thoughts ; and whether we exercise over them that 
control which indicates alike intellectual vigour and 
moral purity- It leads us to review our conduct, 
with its principles and motives, and to compare the 
whole with the great standards of truth and recti- 
tude. This investigation is the part of every wise 
man. Without it, an individual may make the great- 
est attainments in science, may learn to measure the 
earth, and to trace the course of the stars, while he 
is entirely wanting in that higher department, — the 
knowledge of himself. 

On these important subjects, I would more par- 
ticularly address myself to that interesting class for 
whom this work is chiefly intended, the younger 
members of the medical profession. The considera- 
tions which have been submitted to them, while they 
appear to carry the authority of truth, are applicable 
at once to their scientific investigations, and to those 
great inquiries, equally interesting to men of every 
degree, which relate to the principles of moral and 
religious belief. On these subjects, a sound condi- 
tioii of mind will lead them to think and judge for 
themselves with a care and seriousness adapted to 



A WELL-REGULATED MIND. 349 

the solemn import of the inquiry, and without being 
influenced by the dogmas of those who, with httle 
examination, presume to decide witli confidence on 
matters of eternal moment. Of the modifications 
of that distortion of character which has commonly 
received the name of cant, the cant of hj'pocnsy 
has been said to be the worst ; but there is another 
Avhich may fairly be placed by its side, and that is 
the cant of infidelity, — the afi'ectation of scoffing at 
sacred things by men who have never examined the 
subject, or never with an attention in any degree 
adequate to its momentous importance. A well- 
regulated mind must at once perceive that this is 
alike unworthy of sound sense and sound philosophy. 
If we require the authority of names, we need only 
to be reminded, that truths which received the cor- 
dial assent of Boyle and Newton, of Haller and 
Boerhaavo, are at least deserving of grave and de- 
liberate examination. But we may dismiss such an 
appeal as this ; for nothing more is wanted to chal- 
lenge the utmost seriousness of every candid in- 
quirer than the solemn nature of the inquiry itself. 
The medical observer, in an especial manner, has 
facts at all times before him which are in the highest 
degree calculated to fix his deep and serious atten- 
tion. In the structure and economy of the human 
body he has proofs, such as no other branch of 
natural science can furnish, of the power and wis- 
dom of the Eternal One. Let him resign his mind 
to the influence of these proofs, and learn to rise in 
humble adoration to the Almighty Being of whom 
they witness; and, familiar as he is with human 
suffering and death,, let him learn to estimate the 
value of those truths which have power to heal the 
broken heart, and to cheer the bed of death with the 
prospect of immprtality. 

THE END. 



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Moore'sLife of Fitzgerald 2 v. ISrao 
French Revolution, 1830. . . 12mo 
France, by Lady Morgan. 2 v. 12mo 
Modem American Cookery, 16nic 

Housekeeper's Manual 12iiio 

Domestic Duties 12mo 

Mathematical Table* 12mo 

Lives of Signers of Dec. Ind. 12mo 

Brooks's Poems 12mo 

Miller's Greece 12nM» 

V'hoberl's Chrietianity 12mo 

Art of Invigorating Life — ISnio 

Smart's Horace 2 vols. ISma 

The Northern Traveller ISino. 

Xenophon 2 v. ISma 

Demosthenes 2 v. ISmo 

Sotllust 18mo. 

Massinger's Plays 3 v. ISmo. 

Ford's Plays 2 v. ISmo. 

For FAMILY LIBRARY, see Cat- 
alogue of " Valuable Works." 



12mo 
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The New Forest 2 v. 

Heiress of Bruges 2 v. 

The Rivals 2 v. 

Romances of Real Life, 2 v. 
Rom. of History, Spam.2v. 
Rom. of History, France tv. 

Hungarian Tales 2 v. 

Contrast •• 2 v. 

Separation 2t. 

Private Life 2 v. 

Damley 2t. 

I^wrie Todd 2 v. 

Beatrice 2 v. 

Yesterday in Ireland — 2 t. 

Tales of the West 2 v. 

St. Valentine's Day, 4»c 2 v. 

Waldegrave 2 v. 

Adventures of a Page . 2 v. 

Hybrent De Crace 2 v. 

The School of Fashion, 2 v. 

Stratton Hill 2 v. 

Almack's Revisited 2 v. 

Campaigns of a Comet, 2 v. 
Tales of Military Life . .2t. 

Foscanni 2 v. 

Stories of Waterloo 2 v. 

TheCoimtryCu rate 2 v. 

Maxwell 2 v. 

The Oxonians 2 v. 

The Denounced 2 v. 

Sketches oi Irish Character. . 

Leggd I'a Tales, &c 

Posthumous Papers 

Diary of a Phybiclan. . .2 v. 



STANDARD HISTORIES. 



THE HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE; from 
the Rise of the Modern Kingdoms to the present 
period. By William Russell, LL.D. and William 
Jones, Esq. With Annotations by an American. 
In 3 vols. 8vo. With plates. Fine edition. 

THE HISTORICAL WORKS of the Rev. Wiliiam 
Robertson, D.D.; comprising his HISTORY Of"' 
AMERICA; CHARLES V.; SCOTLAND; and 
INDIA. InSvols. 8vo. With plates. Fine edition. 

GIBBON'S HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND 
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. In 4 vols. 

8vo. With plates. Fine edition. 

?t^ Harper's editions of the above works are stereotyped, and printed 
uniformly. Great pains have been taken to render theni perfect in everv 
respect. They are decidedly the best editions ever published in this 
country. 



l^EDXCAL WORB.b. 



HOOPER'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY. From the 
last London Edition. With Additions, by Samuel 
Akerly, M.D. 8vo. 

COOPER'S SURGICAL DICTIONARY. New edi- 
tion, greatly enlarged. Svo. 

GOOD'S (Dr. J. Mason) STUDY OF MEDICINE. 
In 5 vols. Svo. A new edition. With Additions, 
by Samuel Cooper, M.D. 

" Dr. Good's extensive reading and retentive memory enable him to 
enliven the most common elementary details by interweaving curiou«. 
uiicomn:»on, or illustrative examples in almost every page. We hHve no 
hesitation in pronouncing the work, beyond all comparison, the best of the 
kind in the English language." — Medico-Chirurgical Review. 



STANDA^B l^ORHS, 



GIBSON'S SURVEYING Ir.iproved and enlarged. 
By James Ryan. 8vo. With the necessary plates. 

DAVIES'S SURVEYING. 8vo. A new work. 

SURVEYORS' TABLES. I2mo. Carefully revised. 

BROWN'S DICTIONARY of the HOLY BIBLE. 
From the last genuine Edinburgh edition. 8vo. 

BROWN'S (J.) CONCORDANCE. 32mo. 

SERMONS ON IMPORTANT SUBJECTS. By 
Rev. Samuel Davies, A. M. In 3 vols. Svo. 

THE WORKS OF REV. JOHN WESLEY, M.A. 
With his Life. Svo. With a portrait. 

LETTERS FROM THE ^GEAN. By James Emer- 
son, Esq. Svo. With Engravings. 

THE LITERARY REMAINS of the late HENRY 
NEELE, Author of the " Romance of History." Svo. 

RELIGIOUS DISCOURSES. By Walter Scott. 

PRESENT STATE OF CHRISTIANITY IN ALL 
PARTS OF THE WORLD. By Frederic Scho- 
BERL. 12mo. 

THE CONDITION OF GREECE in 1827 and 1828. 
By J. P. Miller. 12mo. 

LIFE AND REMAINS OF DR. EDWARD DAN- 
IEL CLARKE. Svo. 

VAN HALEN'S NARRATIVE of his Imprisonment 
in the Dungeons of the Inquisition, his Escape, his 
Journey to Madrid, &c. &c. Svo. 

HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 

1IN 1830. 12mo. 
SMART'S HORACE. 2 vols. ISmo 



HARPER'S FAMILY LIBRARY. 



" Books that you may carry to the Jire, and hold readily in your hand, 
are the most useful after all. A mail will often look at thtm, and be 
tempted to go on, when he would have been frightened at books of a larger 
size, and of a more erudite appearance." — Dr. Johnson. 



Thk proprietors of the Family Library feel themselves stimulated to 
increased exertions by the distinguished favour with which it has already 
been received. 

The volumes now before the public may be confidently appealed to 
as proofs of zeal on the part of the publishers to present to their readers 
a series of productions, which, as they are connected, not with ephemeral, 
but with permanent subjects, may, years hence as well as now, be con- 
eulted for lively amusement as well as solid instruction. 

To render this Library still more worthy of patronage, tne proprie- 
tors propose incorporating in it such works of interest and value as 
may appear in the various Libraries and Miscellanies now prepanng in 
Europe, particularly the " National" and the " Edinburgh Cabinet" Libra- 
ries. All these productions, as they emanate from the press, will be 
submitted to a committee of literary gentlemen for inspection ; and none 
will be reprinted but such as shall be found calculated to sustain the 
exalted character which this Library has already acquired. 

Several well-known authors have been engaged to prepare for it original 
works of an American character, on History, Biography, Travels, &c. &c. 
Every distinct subject will in general be comprehended in one volume, 
or at most in three volumes, which may form either a portion of the 
series or a complete work by itself; and each volume will be embellished 
■with appropriate engravings. 

The entire series will be the production of authors of eminence, who 
have acquired celebrity by their literary labours, and whose names, as 
they appear in succession, will afford the surest guarantee to the public 
for the satisfactory manner in whiph the subjects will be treated. 

Such is the plan by which it is intended to form an American Family 
Library, comprising all that is valuable in those branches of knowledge 
which most happily unite entertainment with instruction. The utmost 
care will be taken, not only to exclude whatever can have an injurious 
influence on the mind, but to enr.brace every thing calculated to strengthen 
the best and most salutary impressions. 

I With these arrangements and facilities, the publishers flatter them 
selves that they shall be able to present to their fellow-citizens a work 
of unparalleled merit and cheapness, embracing subjects adapted to all 
classes of readers, and forming a body of literature deserving the praiso 
of having instructed many, and amused all ; and above every other spe- 
cies of eulogy, of being fit to be introduced, without reserve or exception, 
by the father of a family to the domestic circle. Meanwhile, the very low 
price at which it is charged renders more extensive patronage necessary 
for its support and prosecution. The immediate encouragement, there 
fore, of those who approve its plan and execution is respectftiJly solicited 
^The work may be obtained in complete sets, or in separate numbers, 
torn the principal booksellers throughout the United States. 



Recommendations of the Family Library. 

The following opinions, selected from highly respectable Journals, will 
enable those who are unacquainted with the Family Library to form an 
estimate of its merits. Numerous other notices, equally favourable, and 
from sources equally respectable, might be presented if deemed necessary. 

'* The Family Library.— A very excellent, and always entertaining Mis- 
cellany." — Edinhurgh Review, No. 103. 

" Tke Family Library. — We think this series of books entitled to the 
extensive patronage they have received from the public. The subjects 
selected are, generally, both useful and interesting in themselves, and are 
treated in a popular and agreeable manner : the style is clear, easy, and 
flowing, adapted to the taste of general readers, for whom the books are 
designed. The WTiters are mostly men of high rank in the literary world, 
and appesr to possess the happy talent of blending instruction with 

amusement. We hesitate not to commend it to the public as a valuable 

series of works, and worthy a place in every gentleman's library." — Maga- 
zine of Useful and Entertaining Knowledge. 

" We take the opportunity again to recommend this valuable series of 
volumes to the public patronage. We know of no mode in which so much 
entertaining matter may be procured, at so cheap a rate, as in the Family 
Library."~iV. Y. Daily Advertiser. 

"The Family Library should be in the hands of every person. Thus 
far it has treated of subjects interesting to all, condensed in a perspicuous 

and agreeable style We have so repeatedly spoken of the merits of the 

design of this work, and of the able manner in which it is edited, that on 
this occasion we will only repeat our conviction, that it is worthy a place 
in every library in the country, and will prove one of the most useful as 
it is one of the most interesting publications which has ever issued from 
the American press."— iV. Y. Courier <V Enquirer. 

" It is needless at this late period to <roinmend to public attention and 
encouragement the collection of delightful works now in a course of pub- 
lication under the appropriate title of the Family Library."— JV. Y. Eve- 
ning Journal. 

"We have repeatedly expressed our unwavering confidence in the 
merits of this valuable series of popular and instructive books. The 
Family Librarj' has now reached its sixteenth number, with the increasing 
favour of the enlightened American public ; and we have heard of but 
one dissenting voice among the periodical and newspaper publishers who 
have frequently noticed and applauded the plan and the execution of the 
Family Library. A censure so entirely destitute of reason cannot injure 
a class of publications pure in sentiment and judicious and tasteful in 
composition."— T/ie Cabinet f>f Religion, <S-c. 

" The names of the writers employed are a sufficient surety that the 
meritof the Family Library will suffer no decline."— iV. Y. Evening Post. 

"The Family Library is a collection which should be sought after by 
every one desirous of procuring the most valuable ,new works in the 
cheapest and most convenient form."— iV. Y. Daily Sentinel. 

"Those who condense, and arrange such works for publication, and 
they also who promulgate them, richly deserve the thanks and patronage 
of all enUghtened communities in the country. The Family Library 
promises to be a most useful and cheap repository of the most important 
events of profane, ancient, and modern history. — A series of volumes, 
well conducted, and published with such stirring contents, cannot fail to 
surpass all dry encyclopedias, or diffuse and elaborate histories or biogra- 
phies, miserably translated, and extended to the very stretch of ver- 
bosity." — Philadelphia Gazette. 



Notices of the Family Library. 

"The publishers have hitherto fully deserved their daily increaslnf 
reputation by the good taste and judgment which have influenced the 
selections of works for the Family Library."— yl/i^a/iy Daily Advertiser. 

*' The Family Library — A title which, from the valuable and entertain- 
ing matter the collection contains, as well as from (he careful style of its 
execution, it well deserves. No family, indeed, in which there are chil- 
dren tb be brought up, ought to be without this Library, as it furnishes 
the readiest resources for that education which ought to accompany or 
succeed that of the boarding-school or the academy, and is infinitely more 
conducive than either to the cultivation of the intellect."-- J/o/i/Wy Review. 

"It is the duty of every person having a family to put this excellerrt 
Library into the hands of his children." — N. Y. Mercantile Advtrtuter. 

" It is one of the recominendations of the Family Library, that if em- 
braces a large circle of intsresting matter, of important information and 
agreeable entertainment, in a concise manner and a cheap form. It is 
eminently calculated for a popular series— published at a price so low, 
that persons of the most moderate income may purchase it— combining a 
matter and a style that the most ordinary mind may comprehend it, at the 
same time that it is calculated tu raise the moral and intellectual character 
of the people." — Coiuitellation. 

" We have repeatedly borne testimony to the utility of this work. It is 
one of the best that has ever been is.sued from the American press, and 
should be in the library of ex^ery family desirous of treasuru.4, up u.seful 
knowledge." — Boston Statesman. 

"We venture the assertion that there is no publication in the country 
more suitably adapted to the taste and requirements of the great Mia.ssoi 
community, or better calculated to raise the intellectual character of the 
middling classes of society, than the Family Library."' — Boston Masonic 
Mirrci. 

" We have so ol^en recommended this enterprising and useHil publica- 
tion (the Family Library), that we can here only ;idd, that each succes- 
sive numb^^r api)ears to confirm its merited popularity."— A'. Y. American. 

"The little volumes of this series truly comport with their title, and are 
in themselves a Family Library." — X. Y. Commercial AdveitisT. 

" We recommend the whole set of the Family Library as one of the 
cheapest means of atfording pleasing instruction, and .«.nparting a proper 
pride in books, with which we are acquainted." — U. S Gazette. 

" It will prove instructing and amusing to all classes. We are pleaned 
to learn that the works comprising this Library have become, as they 
ought to be, quite popular among the heads of families."— iV. Y. Gazette. 

"The Family Library is. wnat its name implies, a collection of various 
original works of the best kind, containing reading useful and interesting 
to the family c'rcle. It is neatly printed, and should be in every famdy 
that can afford it — the price being moderate." — Ncil-- England Palladivm. 

" We are pleased to see that the publishers have obtained sufficient en- 
couragement to continue their valuable Family Library." — Baltimore lU- 
publican. 

'♦The Family Library presents, in a compendious and convenient form, 
well-written histories of popular men, kingdoms, sciences. Ace. arranged 
and edited by able writers, and drawn ent.rcly from the most correct and 
accredited authirities. It is, as it professes to br, a Family Library, from 
which, at little exi>en.se, a household may prepare themselves for a con- 
sideration of those elementary subjects of education and society, withoin a 
aue acquaintance with which neither man nor woman has elaim to be 
well bred, or to take their proper place among those with whom thoy 
a.\)i<i&."— Charleston Gazette. 




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